Anuj Singhal vs State Of Uttarakhand & Ors
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Uttarakhand High Court

Anuj Singhal vs State Of Uttarakhand & Ors on 28 November, 2025

Author: Pankaj Purohit

Bench: Pankaj Purohit

                                                      Reportable
                          Judgment reserved on: 02.09.2025
                         Judgment delivered on: 28.11.2025
HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
 Criminal Misc. Application u/s 482 No.422 of 2022
Anuj Singhal                                   .........Applicant
                              Versus
State of Uttarakhand & Ors.                  .........Respondents
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Presence:

Mr. Tushar Chauhan, learned counsel holding brief of Mr. Aditya Singh, learned counsel for applicant.

Mr. S.C. Dumka, learned A.G.A. with Ms. Sweta Badola Dobhal, learned Brief Holder for State of Uttarakhand/ respondent Nos.1 and 2.

Mr. Bhuwan Bhatt, learned counsel for respondent No.3.

Hon'ble Pankaj Purohit, J. (Per)

By means of the present C482 application, applicant has put to challenge the Charge-sheet No.456 of 2018 dated 28.12.2018 for the offence under Section 420 IPC in connection with FIR No. 94 of 2018 under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, 506 IPC, registered with P.S. Kotwali Dehradun, District Dehradun, cognizance/ summoning order dated 12.02.2019 passed by learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dehradun, in Case No.1242 of 2019 State Vs. Anuj Singhal.

2. The brief facts of the case are that the applicant, Anuj Singhal, is a building contractor operating under the name and style of M/s Amar Builders. It is stated that in furtherance of his business, he entered into a detailed construction agreement dated 25.12.2012 with the complainant for developing a multi- storey building situated at Rajpur Road, near Sehkari Bazar, Dehradun. Under the contract, the applicant was required to carry out construction work in accordance with the sanctioned map dated 12.09.2012 at the agreed

rate of ₹525 per square foot. It was further agreed that payment would be made in stages, proportionate to the progress of construction. The complainant alleges in the FIR that he released substantial payments to the applicant from time to time through various cheques, including a major payment of ₹77,50,000/-, and later an additional sum of ₹25,00,000/-, pursuant to the applicant's representation that he would expedite the remaining construction work. However, despite receipt of the payments, the applicant allegedly stopped the work at the site around January 2014 and did not resume construction despite repeated requests. The complainant claims that due to non-performance by the applicant, he had to engage another firm, Humza Construction, after a gap of more than three years, to complete the remaining construction work, incurring additional expenditure.

3. It is further alleged by the complainant that the applicant not only failed to complete the work but also performed substandard and poor-quality construction, forcing him to carry out additional strengthening of the structure and other allied works at extra cost. It is also alleged that the applicant failed to provide any accounts for the money received and avoided giving bills for the construction work undertaken. The complainant also claims that because of the delay in completion of construction, he suffered a notional financial loss of approximately ₹3.32 crores, which was quantified in a legal notice dated 10.04.2017 issued by his counsel to the applicant. Based on these allegations, FIR No. 94 of 2018 came to be registered against the applicant at Police Station Kotwali Nagar, Dehradun under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, and 506 of the IPC. After investigation, the Investigating Officer submitted

charge-sheet No. 456/2018 dated 25.12.2018 for the offence under Section 420 IPC alone. The learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dehradun, however, summoned the applicant vide order dated 12.02.2019 for offences under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471, and 506 IPC. The applicant has, therefore, preferred the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C., seeking quashing of the charge- sheet and summoning order on the ground that the dispute is purely civil in nature arising out of contractual obligations, and that criminal proceedings have been maliciously initiated to settle a civil dispute.

4. Learned counsel for the applicant argued that the entire dispute is purely civil in nature arising out of contractual obligations which could only be adjudicated by a civil court. It is submitted that there existed a written agreement dated 25.12.2012, and subsequently, another supplementary agreement dated 25.09.2013 between the parties quantifying ₹1.5 crores towards the development work. The applicant had undertaken construction work under those agreements, and payments were made to him strictly in furtherance of the contract. Therefore, it is contended, that no dishonest inducement or fraudulent intention can be inferred at the inception of the contract,a necessary ingredient to attract Section 420 IPC.

5. It is further submitted by learned counsel for the applicant that even as per the FIR, all payments made by the complainant were towards the construction work actually executed and not for any fictitious consideration. The allegation that the applicant failed to complete the construction on time or with agreed quality standards amounts, at best, to breach of contractual terms, which may give rise to civil consequences but

cannot be stretched into criminal liability. It is emphasized that no property was obtained by deception, and every amount paid by the complainant was under

the subsisting contractual relationship. Therefore, the basic ingredient of "mens-rea" and "dishonest inducement" is completely absent.

6. Learned counsel further submits that the complainant had itself issued a notice dated 10.04.2017 quantifying alleged notional loss of ₹3.32 crores solely on account of delay in construction, without making any allegation relating to cheating, forgery, or quality defects. This notice shows that the complainant had treated the dispute as purely civil until the FIR was lodged much later on 22.02.2018, only as a retaliatory measure, after the applicant had lodged FIR No. 50 of 2018 under Sections 420, 504 and 406 IPC against the complainant. The learned counsel argues that the present FIR is a counterblast to harass the applicant using criminal proceedings, which amounts to abuse of court process.

7. It is further argued by the learned counsel for the applicant that neither the FIR nor the material collected during investigation discloses any forgery or fabrication of documents so as to attract offences under Sections 467, 468, and 471 IPC. It is contended that no forged document was created or used by the applicant to induce the complainant to make any financial transaction. Similarly, the allegations of criminal intimidation under Section 506 IPC are vague, omnibus, and do not meet the statutory test. The learned counsel for the applicant therefore submits that the prosecution is malicious, misconceived, and primarily intended to exert pressure in a civil dispute. It is argued that continuance of the criminal proceedings would be a

misuse of process of law, and this Court may exercise its inherent jurisdiction under Section 482 Cr.P.C. to quash the summoning order as well as the charge-sheet in the interest of justice.

8. Per contra, learned State Counsel submits that the present petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is wholly misconceived and is liable to be dismissed at the very threshold. It is submitted that the applicant is seeking quashing of proceedings merely on disputed questions of fact, which cannot be adjudicated in a petition under Section 482 Cr.P.C. It is argued that the allegations against the applicant are serious in nature, involving offences of cheating, forgery, fabrication of documents and misappropriation of substantial funds, which are prima facie borne out from the materials collected during investigation. It is emphasized that the trial court, after applying its judicial mind, has rightly taken cognizance and issued summons to the applicant.

9. It is further submitted by the learned counsel for the state that during investigation, the police collected concrete evidence establishing the complicity of the applicant in the commission of the alleged offences. Statements of the complainant and other material witnesses under Section 161 Cr.P.C., along with supporting documents, were examined, and based on the same, the Investigating Officer filed a detailed charge sheet against the applicant, which clearly discloses the commission of cognizable offences. It is further contended by the learned counsel that the material on record demonstrates that forged and fabricated agreements were prepared by the applicant, wherein the date was illegally altered from 25.09.2013 to 25.12.2012, and such forged document was produced before

government authorities. These acts, prima facie, constitute an offence under Section 420 IPC, and also fulfill the ingredients of Sections 467, 468, 471 IPC.

10. It is also submitted by learned State Counsel that the FSL report, which forms part of the investigation record, corroborates the allegation that the signatures of Respondent No. 3 were forged, and thus the applicant purposely used fabricated documents for unlawful gain. It is further submitted by the learned counsel that it is a settled proposition of law that where civil and criminal liability co-exists, criminal proceedings cannot be quashed merely because civil proceedings are also available. The allegations in this case clearly disclose criminal intention from the inception, involving deliberate deception, dishonest inducement, breach of trust, and use of forged documents. Therefore, the present petition is an abuse of the process of court and deserves to be dismissed.

11. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 3 by means of his counter affidavit submits that the applicant has deliberately attempted to mischaracterize a clear case of cheating, forgery, fabrication of documents, and dishonest misappropriation of funds as a mere contractual dispute. It is asserted that from the very beginning, the applicant approached Respondent No. 3 with fraudulent intent, induced him to part with large sums of money on the false promise of timely and quality construction, but instead misappropriated the funds for personal gain. It is further submitted that, in order to give a civil color to his fraudulent activities and to protect himself from criminal liability, the applicant forged two agreements dated 25.12.2012 and 25.09.2013, fabricating the signatures of Respondent No. 3, and used

the forged documents before various government authorities including the Sales Tax Department.

12. It is further submitted by learned counsel for Respondent no. 3 that the applicant had no intention to complete the construction work from the very beginning, and after receiving a substantial sum of ₹76,50,000/- and subsequently additional amounts aggregating to a much larger sum, he deliberately stopped the work in January 2014. It is also argued that the applicant not only abandoned the work but also used inferior-quality construction materials contrary to his contractual promise, resulting in structural deficiencies and compelling Respondent No. 3 to undertake expensive remedial work. These actions, according to the respondent no. 3, clearly demonstrate a pre-planned scheme to dishonestly induce, deceive, and defraud him, thereby satisfying the essential ingredients of cheating under Section 420 IPC.

13. Learned counsel for Respondent No. 3 further submits that the alleged agreements filed by the applicant are forged and fabricated, and bear no genuine signatures or consent of Respondent No. 3. It is argued that the applicant manipulated and fabricated the documents subsequently, using stamp papers purchased on dates later than the alleged execution dates, which clearly establishes fabrication, and attracts Sections 467, 468, and 471 of the IPC. It is also submitted that this conduct of forging documents, misrepresenting facts, and wrongfully using forged documents for unlawful gains cannot be treated as a civil wrong, but constitutes a clear criminal offence.

14. It is further argued by him that substantial evidence collected during the investigation, including

documentary material and statements of witnesses, prima facie establish that the applicant dishonestly induced Respondent No. 3 to part with money, forged agreements, fabricated documents, embezzled and misappropriated funds, and thereafter tried to suppress these facts under the guise of a civil dispute. The learned counsel submits that it is the specific case of Respondent No. 3 that there exists criminal intent from the inception, and the offences of cheating, criminal breach of trust, forgery, and using forged documents are clearly made out. It is therefore submitted by the learned counsel that the inherent jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. cannot be invoked to stifle a genuine criminal prosecution at this threshold stage where the allegations in the FIR and charge-sheet disclose cognizable offences. Hence, the present application deserves outright dismissal.

15. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and having perused the material placed on record, this Court finds that the applicant seeks quashing of the summoning order and charge-sheet primarily on the ground that the dispute between the parties is purely civil in nature arising out of contractual obligations and that no ingredients of criminal offences are made out. It is also contended that the criminal proceedings have been maliciously invoked to give a civil dispute the colour of criminality. At this stage, it must be noted that the power of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is to be exercised sparingly, with great caution, and only where the complaint or charge-sheet does not disclose any offence or is manifestly attended with mala fide or where continuation of criminal proceedings would amount to abuse of the process of the Court. The Hon'ble Supreme

Court in State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal, 1992 Supp (1) SCC 335, has laid down illustrative categories where such jurisdiction may be exercised, while also cautioning that such power should not be used to stifle legitimate prosecution. It is also well-settled, as held in Amit Kapoor v. Ramesh Chander, (2012) 9 SCC 460, that at the stage of quashing, the Court is not to examine the sufficiency or reliability of the material, nor is it permissible to conduct a mini-trial. The Court is only to examine whether, assuming the allegations in the FIR and material collected to be true, a prima facie case is made out disclosing ingredients of the alleged offences. Similarly, in Rajeev Thapar v. Madan Lal Kapoor, (2013) 3 SCC 330, the Hon'ble Supreme Court reiterated that only in cases where the prosecution is completely untenable, absurd, or inherently improbable, should quashing be exercised, and not where accusations necessitate appreciation of evidence. The hon'ble Supreme Court stated that:

28. The High Court, in exercise of its jurisdiction under Section 482 CrPC, must make a just and rightful choice. This is not a stage of evaluating the truthfulness or otherwise of the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant against the accused. Likewise, it is not a stage for determining how weighty the defences raised on behalf of the accused are. Even if the accused is successful in showing some suspicion or doubt, in the allegations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, it would be impermissible to discharge the accused before trial. This is so because it would result in giving finality to the accusations levelled by the prosecution/complainant, without allowing the prosecution or the complainant to adduce evidence to substantiate the same. The converse is, however, not true, because even if trial is proceeded with, the accused is not subjected to any irreparable consequences. The accused would still be in a position to succeed by establishing his defences by producing evidence in accordance with law. There is an endless list of judgments rendered by this Court declaring the legal position that in a case where the prosecution/complainant has levelled allegations bringing out all ingredients of the charge(s) levelled, and have placed material before the Court, prima facie evidencing the truthfulness of the allegations levelled, trial must be held.

16. In the present case, the allegations against the applicant do not merely pertain to breach of contractual terms, delay, or deficiency in civil performance. The complainant has specifically alleged that from the inception, the applicant dishonestly induced him to part

with large sums of money on false promises of timely and quality construction, that the applicant used forged agreements to substantiate his claims, that fabrication of documents was done by altering the date of stamp papers, and that such forged documents were used before government authorities. The investigation has resulted in submission of a charge-sheet under Section 420 IPC, and the learned Magistrate, upon consideration of material on record, has also summoned the applicant under Sections 467, 468, 471 IPC. The allegations of forgery and use of fabricated documents do not remain within the domain of mere civil breach and prima facie disclose criminal intention.

17. The contention that no offence under Section 420 IPC is made out, as the dispute is essentially contractual, cannot be accepted at this stage. Whether there existed dishonest intention from the inception is a matter of trial. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in S.W. Palanitkar v. State of Bihar, (2002) 1 SCC 241, has held that if allegations show that the accused had fraudulent and dishonest intention at the time of making the promise, then the offence of cheating is made out notwithstanding the existence of a civil dispute. The court reiterated the above principle in the following paragraph:

11. One of us (D.P. Mohapatra, J.), speaking for the Bench, in Hridaya Ranjan Prasad Verma v. State of Bihar [(2000) 4 SCC 168 : 2000 SCC (Cri) 786] on facts of that case, has expressed thus: (SCC p. 177, para 15) "15. In determining the question it has to be kept in mind that the distinction between mere breach of contract and the offence of cheating is a fine one. It depends upon the intention of the accused at the time of inducement which may be judged by his subsequent conduct but for this subsequent conduct is not the sole test. Mere breach of contract cannot give rise to criminal prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of the transaction, that is the time when the offence is said to have been committed.

Therefore it is the intention which is the gist of the offence. To hold a person guilty of cheating it is necessary to show that he had fraudulent or dishonest intention at the time of making the promise. From his mere failure to keep up promise subsequently such a culpable intention right at the beginning, that is, when he made the promise cannot be presumed."

18. Insofar as the offences under Sections 467, 468, 471 IPC are concerned, the charge-sheet and investigation record, including the FSL report, are stated to indicate prima facie use of forged documents in the course of the transaction. Whether such documents are indeed forged and whether Respondent No. 3's signatures were fabricated, are matters which require evidence and cannot be adjudicated under Section 482 Cr.P.C. at a preliminary stage.

19. Furthermore, the applicant's argument that civil and criminal proceedings cannot co-exist is also untenable. The Supreme Court, in Rajesh Bajaj v. State NCT of Delhi, (1999) 3 SCC 259, has held that merely because a transaction has civil elements does not preclude criminal prosecution if allegations disclose an offence. The court observed that:

"9. It is not necessary that a complainant should verbatim reproduce in the body of his complaint all the ingredients of the offence he is alleging. Nor is it necessary that the complainant should state in so many words that the intention of the accused was dishonest or fraudulent. Splitting up of the definition into different components of the offence to make a meticulous scrutiny, whether all the ingredients have been precisely spelled out in the complaint, is not the need at this stage. If factual foundation for the offence has been laid in the complaint the court should not hasten to quash criminal proceedings during investigation stage merely on the premise that one or two ingredients have not been stated with details. For quashing an FIR (a step which is permitted only in extremely rare cases) the information in the complaint must be so bereft of even the basic facts which are absolutely necessary for making out the offence. In State of Haryana v. Bhajan Lal [1992 Supp (1) SCC 335 : 1992 SCC (Cri) 426] this Court laid down the premise on which the FIR can be quashed in rare cases. The following observations made in the aforesaid decisions are a sound reminder: (SCC p. 379, para 103) "103. We also give a note of caution to the effect that the power of quashing a criminal proceeding should be exercised very sparingly and with circumspection and that too in the rarest of rare cases;

that the court will not be justified in embarking upon an enquiry as to the reliability or genuineness or otherwise of the allegations made in the FIR or the complaint and that the extraordinary or inherent powers do not confer an arbitrary jurisdiction on the court to act according to its whim or caprice."

20. Upon a cumulative assessment of the FIR, charge-sheet, investigation material, nature of allegations, and the judicial precedents governing Section 482 Cr.P.C., this Court is of the opinion that prima facie offences are made out and continuation of criminal proceedings cannot be termed as abuse of process of

Court. This is not a case where criminal proceedings deserve to be prohibited at the threshold. On the contrary, it is a matter eminently fit for trial, where evidence can be led, and the authenticity of documents, existence of dishonest intention, and other factual disputes can be adjudicated.

21. In view of the aforesaid discussion, and keeping in mind the limited scope of interference under Section 482 Cr.P.C., this Court does not find any ground to quash the charge-sheet dated 28.12.2018 or the summoning order dated 12.02.2019 passed by the learned Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dehradun.

22. Accordingly, present Criminal Miscellaneous Application under Section 482 Cr.P.C. is dismissed.

23. Pending application(s), if any, stands disposed of.

(Pankaj Purohit, J.) 28.11.2025 PN