Uttarakhand High Court

Unknown vs State Of Uttarakhand And Others on 7 November, 2025

Author: Ravindra Maithani

Bench: Ravindra Maithani

                                                      Reserved On - 09.10.2025
                                                      Delivered On - 07.11.2025

  HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
                      Writ Petition No. 2358 of 2024 (S/S)

 Anita Pandey
                                                             ........Petitioner
                                     Versus

 State of Uttarakhand and others                             .....Respondents


 Present:-
        Ms. Anita Pandey, petitioner in person.
        Mr. Pooran Singh Bisht, Addl. CSC for the State.
        Mr. Vipul Sharma, Advocate for the respondent nos. 2, 3 & 4.



Hon'ble Ravindra Maithani, J.

The challenge in this petition is made to the

communication dated 31.10.2023 of the respondent no. 4/Manager,

HR (Human Resources), State Infrastructure & Industrial Development

Corporation of Uttarakhand Limited ("SIIDCUL"), by which the

petitioner was informed that her resignation is approved by the

Management as per request. The petitioner also seeks directions that

the petitioner may be permitted to withdraw her resignation notice

dated 10.10.2023 and allow the petitioner to join on the post of

Receptionist.

2. It is the case of the petitioner that she was appointed as

Receptionist in SIIDCUL on 27.09.2016; she worked on the position;

she was given additional work on multiple occasions. The events

thereafter, which are necessary for adjudication of the petition are as

follows:-

(i) On 23.03.2023, the Managing Director, SIIDCUL

("MD, SIIDCUL") attached the petitioner in the

Directorate of Industries at Dehradun. The

petitioner was further given additional charge.

(ii) On 10.10.2023, due to certain family problems and

in view to look after her child, the petitioner

tendered her notice of resignation to the MD

SIIDCUL.

(iii) On 31.10.2023, according to the petitioner, in most

illegal and arbitrary manner, the Manager (HR),

SIIDCUL, who is not the appointing authority,

accepted the notice of resignation, just within 20

days of its submission.

(iv) It is the case of the petitioner that the Uttarakhand

Government Servants Resignation Rules, 2003

("Resignation Rules, 2003") provides that the notice

of resignation should be for three months and Rule

5 of it provides that the resignation shall not be

effective unless it is accepted by the appointing

authority and a formal order is issued thereof. It is

the case of the petitioner that the resignation could

not have been accepted within three months from

the date of notice.

(v) The petitioner submitted an application on

09.12.2023 to the MD, SIIDCUL requesting for

withdrawal of her resignation notice dated

10.10.2023. However, no action was taken.

(vi) The petitioner filed multiple representations. The

State of Uttarakhand also asked the MD, SIIDCUL

to take action on the withdrawal letter of the

petitioner.

(vii) On 24.06.2024, the Additional Secretary,

Government of Uttarakhand conveyed the opinion

of the Department of Personnel and Vigilance to

the MD, SIIDCUL claiming that unless formal order

is issued, the resignation cannot be termed to be

accepted. Therefore, the application dated

09.12.2023 requires to be decided, by which the

petitioner has requested for withdrawal of her

notice of resignation. This communication is

Annexure 21 to the writ petition. It also records

that, in fact, the Rules promulgated by the

Personnel Department do not apply to the Boards,

Corporations, Commissions and other autonomous

institutions unless the Rules are adopted by such

Board, Corporation, Commission & autonomous

institutions.

3. On behalf of the SIIDCUL, counter affidavit has been

filed. According to the SIIDCUL, it is a Government of Uttarakhand

enterprises, which is incorporated under the Companies Act. It the

case of the respondent nos. 2, 3 & 4 that the resignation of the

petitioner dated 10.10.2023 was duly accepted by the competent

authority i.e. Managing Director, SIIDCUL; the communication of

acceptance was made by the Manager (HR), SIIDCUL; The HR

Department is designated for issuing communication of behalf of the

higher authorities; there is no requirement under the law that the

appointing authority must communicate such acceptance. Referring

to Resignation Rules, 2023, in para 20 of the counter affidavit, the

respondent nos. 2, 3 & 4 state that petitioner's interpretation is

selective; Rule 5 of Resignation Rules, 2023 permits appointing

authority to accept the resignation letter with shorter notice; the

petitioner's reference on three months period is misplaced; Rule 5 of

the Resignation Rules, 2003 provides rejection of resignation only

under certain limited conditions, which do not exist in the present

case.

4. Further pleadings have also been filed by the parties.

Rejoinder affidavit dated 17.05.2025 has been filed by the petitioner.

Along with it, she has enclosed State Infrastructure and Industrial

Corporation of Uttarakhand Limited Service Regulations, 2015 ("the

Service Regulations, 2015"), which are promulgated under the Article

of Association of SIIDCUL. These Service Regulations, 2015 requires a

little elaboration, but before that it may be noted that in para 7 of her

rejoinder affidavit, the petitioner writes that she tendered her notice

of resignation when she was working under the authority of Joint

Director of Department of Industries. In fact, impliedly, what the

petitioner wants to submit is that she is governed by Resignation

Rules, 2003.

5. Regulation 26 of Service Regulations, 2015 requires that

the SIIDCUL employee shall get all the leaves as are admissible to

Government employees. Similarly, as per Regulation 27 of Service

Regulations, 2015, the disciplinary and conduct rules of Uttarakhand

Government shall be applicable to the members of SIIDCUL, subject

to the decision of the Government/Board. According to Regulation 28

of the Service Regulations, 2015, the age of retirement shall be same

as is fixed for State Government employees. Regulation 32 of Service

Regulations, 2015 also makes applicable the Government

Rules/orders under various circumstances with regard to

compassionate appointment, etc.

6. An additional affidavit has also been filed by the

petitioner on 18.07.2025 and along with it, an office order dated

24.02.2023 of the SIIDCUL passed by the MD, SIIDCUL has been

enclosed, which records that all the proceedings in the SIIDCUL from

01.03.2023 shall be conducted through e-office, therefore, email and

digital signature be obtained prior to that and training may be

secured.

7. The respondent nos. 2, 3 & 4 filed a supplementary

counter affidavit on 24.09.2025. It gives details as to how SIIDCUL

functions. According to the additional counter affidavit, the Service

Regulations, 2015 govern appointments, conditions of service,

resignation, retirement and disciplinary control of SIIDCUL

employees; these Regulations are corporate in character, not

statutory, and they derive legitimacy from the Articles rather than

from the constitutional power of the Governor under Article 309 of

the Constitution of India. With regard to digital signature, etc., the

respondent nos. 2, 3 & 4 have stated in paragraphs 22 to 26 of the

supplementary counter affidavit.

8. Heard the petitioner in person as well as the learned

counsel for the respondent nos. 2, 3 & 4.

9. The petitioner has appeared in person. According to her,

her resignation is governed by Resignation Rules, 2003; the

resignation notice is for three months, but prior to it, it has been

accepted within thirty days. According to her, her resignation has not

been yet accepted, therefore, her withdrawal application needs to be

allowed and she should be permitted to join her services. She raised

the following arguments in her submissions:-

(i) The petitioner was appointed by MD, SIIDCUL,

whereas the impugned communication dated

31.10.2023, which is Annexure 1 to the writ

petition, has been issued by the respondent no.

4/the Manager (HR), SIIDCUL; he is not the

competent authority to accept the resignation.

(ii) Rule 5 of Resignation Rules, 2003 requires that

after acceptance of resignation, a formal order is to

be issued, which is not issued in the instant

matter.

(iii) The Government of Uttarakhand has also directed

the MD, SIIDCUL to take decision on withdrawal

application of the petitioner, but it has yet not been

acted upon.

(iv) The MD, SIIDCUL by office order dated 24.02.2023

had directed that for e-office, digital signature may

be obtained, which means even in the office

notings, digital signatures are to be appended.

10. Referring to the e-office working process of higher

authorities, which has been enclosed with her supplementary

affidavit dated 30.07.2025, the petitioner submits that even on e-

office, after approving the draft, one has to sign it. This printout is

page no. 301, Annexure 3 to the supplementary affidavit dated

30.07.2025.

11. The petitioner in person submits that her resignation has

not been accepted by the competent authority and no formal order of

acceptance has been passed, therefore, till date the resignation notice

dated 10.10.2023 of the petitioner is not acted upon; now on

09.12.2023, the petitioner has already requested for withdrawal of

resignation notice; it needs to be allowed and the petitioner deserves

to be permitted to join her duties as Receptionist.

12. In support of her contentions, the petitioner has placed

reliance on the principle of law as laid down in the cases of Mahadeo

and Ors. V. Sovan Devi and Ors., (2023) 10 SCC 807 and State Bank

of India v. Ajay Kumar Sood, (2023) 7 SCC 282.

13. In the case of Mahadeo (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme

Court observed that the notings on the file cannot be treated as a

decision of the authority. Even if the competent authority records

opinion in the file, on the merits of the matter under consideration,

the same cannot be termed as a decision of the competent authority.

In para 15, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as follows:-

17. This Court in Municipal Committee, Barwala v. Jai Narayan & Co. [Municipal Committee, Barwala v. Jai Narayan & Co., (2023) 14 SCC 786 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC 376] held that a noting recorded in the file is merely a noting simpliciter and

nothing more. It merely represents expression of an opinion by the particular individual. It was held as under : (SCC paras 16-17) "16. This Court in a judgment in State of Uttaranchal v. Sunil Kumar Vaish [State of Uttaranchal v. Sunil Kumar Vaish, (2011) 8 SCC 670 : (2011) 4 SCC (Civ) 325 :

(2011) 3 SCC (Cri) 542 : (2011) 2 SCC (L&S) 410] held that a noting recorded in the file is merely a noting simpliciter and nothing more. It merely represents expression of opinion by the particular individual. By no stretch of imagination, such noting can be treated as a decision of the Government. It was held as under : (SCC p. 678, para 24) '24. A noting recorded in the file is merely a noting simpliciter and nothing more. It merely represents expression of opinion by the particular individual. By no stretch of imagination, such noting can be treated as a decision of the Government. Even if the competent authority records its opinion in the file on the merits of the matter under consideration, the same cannot be termed as a decision of the Government unless it is sanctified and acted upon by issuing an order in accordance with Articles 77(1) and (2) or Articles 166(1) and (2). The noting in the file or even a decision gets culminated into an order affecting right of the parties only when it is expressed in the name of the President or the Governor, as the case may be, and authenticated in the manner provided in Article 77(2) or Article 166(2). A noting or even a decision recorded in the file can always be reviewed/reversed/overruled or overturned and the court cannot take cognizance of the earlier noting or decision for exercise of the power of judicial review. (See State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh [State of Punjab v. Sodhi Sukhdev Singh, 1960 SCC OnLine SC 38 : AIR 1961 SC 493] , Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab [Bachhittar Singh v. State of Punjab, 1962 SCC OnLine SC 11 : AIR 1963 SC 395] , State of Bihar v. Kripalu Shankar [State of Bihar v. Kripalu Shankar, (1987) 3 SCC 34 : 1987 SCC (Cri) 442] , Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan [Rajasthan Housing Board v. Shri Kishan, (1993) 2 SCC 84] , Sethi Auto Service Station v. DDA [Sethi Auto Service Station v. DDA, (2009) 1 SCC 180] and Shanti Sports Club v. Union of India [Shanti Sports Club v. Union of India, (2009) 15 SCC 705 : (2009) 5 SCC (Civ) 707] .)'

17. Thus, the letter seeking approval of the State Government by the Deputy Commissioner is not the approval granted by him, which could be enforced by the plaintiff in the court of law."

14. In the case of Ajay Kumar Sood (supra), on a different

context, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has observed and, in fact,

directed the courts and tribunals to upload the judgments and order,

which are signed using digital signature. In para 22, the Hon'ble

Supreme Court has observed as under:-

"22. On the note of accessibility, the importance of making judgments accessible to persons from all sections of society, especially persons with disability needs emphasis. All judicial institutions must ensure that the judgments and orders being published by them do not carry improperly placed watermarks as they end up making the documents inaccessible for persons with visual disability who use screen readers to access them. On the same note, courts and tribunals must also ensure that the version of the judgments and orders uploaded is accessible and signed using digital signatures. They should not be scanned versions of printed copies. The practice of printing and scanning documents is a futile and time-consuming process which does not serve any purpose. The practice should be eradicated from the litigation process as it tends to make documents as well as the process inaccessible for an entire gamut of citizens."

15. Learned counsel appearing for the respondent nos. 2, 3 &

4 had initially argued that Rule 5 of the Resignation Rules, 2003 is in

two parts; one is acceptance by the appointing authority and the

second is a formal order of acceptance. He submits that the

acceptance by the appointing authority is essential and mandatory

before the resignation is termed to have been accepted, but he would

submit that issuance of formal order is not mandatory. On the

subsequent stage, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 2, 3 & 4

submits that the petitioner is not a Government servant; SIIDCUL is

an entity under the Companies Act, which is governed through

Articles of Association and the Resignation Rules, 2003 are not

applicable to the SIIDCUL employees. He submits that the SIIDCUL

has framed Service Regulations, 2015. Therefore, it is argued that

Resignation Rules, 2003 are not applicable in the instant case.

Learned counsel submits that the MD, SIIDCUL has accepted the

resignation and this decision was communicated by the respondent

no. 4/Manager (HR), SIIDCUL, which makes the acceptance

complete.

16. In fact, admittedly, the resignation notice dated

10.10.2023 of the petitioner was processed through e-office software.

The printouts of those e-office software has been filed by the

respondent nos. 2, 3 & 4 as Annexure 2 to their counter affidavit. It is

admitted that the MD, SIIDCUL Rohit Meena has not digitally singed

or e-signed the office note. As per the printouts of the e-office

software, before the name of Rohit Meena, MD, SIIDCUL, "OK as

proposed" is written. It is the case of the petitioner that the MD,

SIIDCUL was required to append his digital signature on any noting,

which he has made so as to authenticate, because, it is argued by the

petitioner in person that unless the note is digitally signed or e-

signed, it is not authenticated.

17. On this aspect, learned counsel for the respondent nos.

2, 3 & 4 initially argued that the noting with regard to resignation

notice of the petitioner has been initiated, which was initially digitally

signed; the MD, SIIDCUL has accepted the proposal. He admits that

the MD, SIIDCUL has not digitally signed the noting. He also admits

that the MD, SIIDCUL has not placed his e-signature on the noting.

What is argued that Parichay e-office software, which is working in

the SIIDCUL is a secured software; it is password secured with OTP,

therefore, it is authenticated. This is, in fact, what is pleaded in paras

22 to 24 of the supplementary counter affidavit dated 24.09.2025

filed on behalf of the respondent nos. 2 to 4. These paras are as

follows:-

"22. That Section 3A(1) of the Information Technology Act, 2000 declares that an electronic signature or electronic authentication technique shall be considered legally valid if it is reliable and fulfils the following essential conditions: (a) it is unique to the subscriber; (b) it is capable of identifying the subscriber; (c) it is created under the exclusive control of the subscriber; and (d) it is linked to the electronic record in such a manner that alteration of the record invalidates the authentication.

23. That the Parichay system, as described in the User Login Manual, provides for authentication through multiple modes, namely password-based login with OTP verification, password-less login using registered mobile/email OTP, and multi-factor authentication through Tap Authentication and Token Authentication. Each of these methods generates a unique and time-sensitive credential tied to the subscriber's registered account and device.

24. That the operation of the Parichay login process satisfies the fourfold test prescribed in Section 3A(1). The OTP or token generated is unique to the subscriber for that session; the subscriber is identified through pre-verified credentials such as registered mobile number or email address; the credential is under the exclusive control of the subscriber because it is accessible only through their device or authenticator app; and the system automatically invalidates the process if the record is altered or the credential is misused."

18. In support of his contention, learned counsel for the

respondent nos. 2, 3 & 4 has placed reliance in the principle of law as

laid down in the cases of Pyare Lal Sharma v. Managing Director and

others, (1989) 3 SCC 448, Raj Kumar v. Union of India, 1968 SCC

OnLine SC 51 and North Zone Cultural Centre and another v.

Vedpathi Dinesh Kumar, (2003) 5 SCC 455.

19. In the case of Pyare Lal Sharma (supra), the Hon'ble

Supreme Court, inter alia, observed that "There is no provision in

the Articles of Association or the regulations of the company

giving same protection to the employees of the company as is

given to the civil servants under Article 311(1) of the

Constitution of India. An employee of the company cannot,

therefore, claim that he cannot be dismissed or removed by an

authority subordinate to that by which he was appointed".

20. In the case of Raj Kumar (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme

Court, in para 5, observed as follows:-

"5. Our attention was invited to a judgment of this Court in State of Punjab v. Amar Singh Harika [AIR 1966 SC 1313] in which it was held that an order of dismissal passed by an authority and kept on its file without communicating it to the officer concerned or otherwise publishing it did not take effect as from the date on which the order was actually written out by the said authority; such an order could only be effective after it was communicated to the officer concerned or was otherwise published. The principle of that case has no application here. Termination of employment by order passed by the Government does not become effective until the order is intimated to the employee. But where a public servant has invited by his letter of resignation determination of his employment, his services normally stand terminated from the date on which the letter of resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority and in the absence of any law or rule governing the conditions of his service to the contrary, it will not be open to the public servant to withdraw his resignation after it is accepted by the appropriate authority. Till the resignation is accepted by the appropriate authority in consonance with the rules governing the acceptance, the public servant concerned has locus poenitentiae but not

thereafter. Undue delay in intimating to the public servant concerned the action taken on the letter of resignation may justify an inference that resignation has not been accepted. In the present case the resignation was accepted within a short time after it was received by the Government of India. Apparently the State of Rajasthan did not immediately implement the order, and relieve the appellant of his duties, but the appellant cannot profit by the delay in intimating acceptance or in relieving him of his duties."

21. In the case of North Zone Cultural Centre (supra), the

Hon'ble Supreme Court following the principle of law as laid down in

the case of Raj Kumar (supra) held that "it is clear that non-

communication of the acceptance does not make the resignation

inoperative provided there is in fact an acceptance before the

withdrawal".

22. Basically, the issue involved is quite short, though it has

been taken on different directions. The question is as to whether the

resignation that is given by the petitioner on 10.10.2023 has been

accepted by the competent authority and further has this order been

formally communicated or a formal order has been issued?

23. In so far as Resignation Rules, 2003 are concerned,

although initially the respondent nos. 2, 3 & 4 also argued on these

Rules, but subsequently, it is argued that the Resignation Rules,

2003 are not applicable because the SIIDCUL employee is not a

Government servant; it is incorporated under the Companies Act

under an Article of Association, under which Service Regulations

Rules, 2015 are promulgated. This is not disputed.

24. In fact, at subsequent stage, the Service Regulations,

2015 have been placed on record by the petitioner by her rejoinder

affidavit dated 17.05.2025. In view of the SIIDCUL being incorporated

under the Companies Act, it has an Article of Association, which is

enclosed by respondent nos. 2, 3 & 4 along with their supplementary

counter affidavit, as Annexure SCA-1. Service Regulations, 2015 have

been filed by both the parties. In such a situation, unless Service

Regulations, 2015 make a provision that Resignation Rules, 2003

shall be applicable to the employees of the SIIDCUL, it shall not be

automatically applicable to the SIIDCUL employees.

25. Service Rules, 2015 do not make applicability of

Resignation Rules, 2003 on the employees of the SIIDCUL, but it

makes applicable multiple other Government Rules on the SIIDCUL,

like Disciplinary and Punishment Rules, Rules relating to

compassionate appointment, Retirement Rules, etc. Therefore, as

such it cannot be said that the Resignation Rules, 2003 are

applicable on the petitioner. The case of the petitioner has to be

decided in the light of Service Regulation, 2015.

26. It is not disputed that the resignation has to be accepted

by the competent authority. It is also not in dispute that, first and

foremost, a resignation notice has to be accepted before it becomes

effective. Whether formal order needs to be issued thereafter or it may

be communicated in any other manner, in the instant case, it is

disputed between the parties.

27. In its supplementary counter affidavit, the respondent

nos. 2, 3 & 4, in para 6, write that the resignation is governed by

Service Regulations, 2015. But, the learned counsel for the

respondent nos. 2, 3 & 4 cold not show any provision under Service

Regulations, 2015 relating to resignation and its acceptance. The

arguments, thereafter, was raised around the authenticity of the

notings on e-office software.

28. The action on the resignation notice dated 10.10.2023

was done electronically. The provisions of the Information Technology

Act, 2000 ("the Act") need to be seen in this context. Section 3, 3A, 4

& 5 of the Act are as follows:-

"3. Authentication of electronic records.-(1) Subject to the provisions of this section any subscriber may authenticate an electronic record by affixing his digital signature.

(2) The authentication of the electronic record shall be effected by the use of asymmetric crypto system and hash function which envelop and transform the initial electronic record into another electronic record.

Explanation.-For the purposes of this sub-section, "hash function"

means an algorithm mapping or translation of one sequence of bits into another, generally smaller, set known as "hash result" such that an electronic record yields the same hash result every time the algorithm is executed with the same electronic record as its input making it computationally infeasible-

(a) to derive or reconstruct the original electronic record from the hash result produced by the algorithm; (b) that two electronic records can produce the same hash result using the algorithm. (3) Any person by the use of a public key of the subscriber can verify the electronic record. (4) The private key and the public key are unique to the subscriber and constitute a functioning key pair.

3A. Electronic signature.--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 3, but subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), a subscriber may authenticate any electronic record by such electronic signature or electronic authentication technique which--

(a) is considered reliable; and

(b) may be specified in the Second Schedule.

(2) For the purposes of this section any electronic signature or electronic authentication technique shall be considered reliable if--

(a) the signature creation data or the authentication data are, within the context in which they are used, linked to the signatory or, as the case may be, the authenticator and to no other person;

(b) the signature creation data or the authentication data were, at the time of signing, under the control of the signatory or, as the case may be, the authenticator and of no other person;

(d) any alteration to the information made after its authentication by electronic signature is detectable; and

(e) it fulfils such other conditions which may be prescribed. (3) The Central Government may prescribe the procedure for the purpose of ascertaining whether electronic signature is that of the person by whom it is purported to have been affixed or authenticated. (4) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, add to or omit any electronic signature or electronic authentication technique and the procedure for affixing such signature from the Second Schedule:

Provided that no electronic signature or authentication technique shall be specified in the Second Schedule unless such signature or technique is reliable.

(5) Every notification issued under sub-section (4) shall be laid before each House of Parliament.

4. Legal recognition of electronic records.--Where any law provides that information or any other matter shall be in writing or in the typewritten or printed form, then, notwithstanding anything contained in such law, such requirement shall be deemed to have been satisfied if such information or matter is-

(a) rendered or made available in an electronic form; and

(b) accessible so as to be usable for a subsequent reference.

5. Legal recognition of electronic signatures.--Where any law provides that information or any other matter shall be authenticated by affixing the signature or any document shall be signed or bear the signature of any person, then, notwithstanding anything contained in such law, such requirement shall be deemed to have been satisfied, if such information or matter is authenticated by means of electronic signature affixed in such manner as may be prescribed by the Central Government.

Explanation.-For the purposes of this section, "signed", with its grammatical variations and cognate expressions, shall, with reference to a person, mean affixing of his hand written signature or any mark on any document and the expression "signature" shall be construed accordingly."

29. The information in electronic form is equal to such

information, which is required to be maintained in writing. Electronic

record is recognized under Section 4 of the Act.

30. Section 5 of the Act deals with electronic signature and if

signatures are required on any document, such requirement,

according to this Section 5, shall be deemed to have been satisfied, if

such information or matter is authenticated by means of electronic

signature.

31. Authentication of electronic records is maintained under

Section 3 of the Act by affixing digital signature. Section 3A of the Act

speaks of authentication by virtue of electronic signature or electronic

authentication technique, which is reliable and which may be

specified in the Second Schedule. In the Second Schedule, the rules

have been promulgated, namely, Electronic Signature or Electronic

Authentication Technique and Procedure Rules, 2015

("Authentication Technique and Procedure Rules, 2015").

32. Learned counsel for the respondent nos. 2, 3 & 4 admits

that the resignation notice dated 10.10.2023 of the petitioner has

been processed on e-office and the text that has been written in the e-

office note above the name of the MD, SIIDCUL, has not been either

digitally signed under Section 3 of the Act nor it has been signed

under Section 3-A of the Act, and it is also not covered under the

Authentication Technique and Procedure Rules, 2015. The argument

is on other aspect of it. It is with regard to the authenticity of the

software. At the cost of repetition, it may be reiterated that in para 22

to 24 of the supplementary counter affidavit, the working of this e-

office software has been stated. But, in view of the Act, the software

authenticity may not authenticate the electronic record. The

electronic record can be authenticated only in accordance with

Section 3, 3-A, 4 & 5 of the Act. It is also admitted on behalf of the

learned counsel for the respondent nos. 2, 3 & 4 that it is not so

done.

33. At one stage, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 2, 3

& 4 submits that the electronic authentication technique, if it is

considered reliable, authenticates the electronic record and it should

not be necessarily in accordance with the Scheduled Rules. He would

submit that Section 3A(1) of the Act is in two parts and if Section

3A(1)(a) of the Act, which deals with reliability, is settled, it need not

be in accordance with any specification as given under Section 3A(1)

(b) of the Act.

34. At the cost of repetition, this Court reproduces Section

3A(1) and (4) as under:-

3A. Electronic signature.--(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in section 3, but subject to the provisions of sub-section (2), a subscriber may authenticate any electronic record by such electronic signature or electronic authentication technique which--

(a) is considered reliable; and

(b) may be specified in the Second Schedule.

......................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................... (4) The Central Government may, by notification in the Official Gazette, add to or omit any electronic signature or electronic authentication technique and the procedure for affixing such signature from the Second Schedule:

......................................................................................................................... ......................................................................................................................"

35. A bare perusal of the aforesaid provisions reveals that as

per Section 3A(4), the electronic authentication technique may be

specified by the Central Government. Section 3A(1) (a) makes it

abundantly clear that electronic authentication technique may

authenticate any electronic record if such technique "is considered

reliable" and clause (b) of sub-section (1) of Section 3A of the Act

makes specific that such technique "may be specified in the second

Schedule".

36. Learned counsel for the respondent nos. 2, 3 & 4

submits that if the electronic authentication technique is reliable, it

would be enough for authenticating the electronic record in view of

Section 3A (1) (a) of the Act. He submits that in that situation, the

Authentication Technique and Procedure Rules, 2015 shall have no

application. This argument has less merit for acceptance. It is true

that Section 3A(1)(a) of the Act has two sub-clauses, namely, (a) and

(b). One could have read Section 3A(1) (a) in isolation to Section

3A(1)(b) had there been no rules specified under the Act. But, since

under Section 3A of the Act, the Authentication Technique and

Procedure Rules, 2015 has already been enacted, for the purposes of

the decision in the instant case, Section 3A(1)(a) and Section 3A(1)(b)

shall be read together. Therefore, the electronic record shall be

deemed to be authenticated only when it is authenticated by the

authentication technique, which is reliable and specified in the

second Schedule.

37. The Authentication Technique and Procedure Rules,

2015 are framed under Section 3A. It is admitted by the learned

counsel for the respondent nos. 2, 3 & 4 that the authentication is

not in accordance with the Authentication Technique and Procedure

Rules, 2015. Merely, based on the argument that the software is

secured, it cannot substitute the authentication, which is required to

be done in accordance with the provisions of the Act.

38. On the e-office software, as per the direction of the MD,

SIIDCUL dated 24.02.2023, digital signatures were to be appended,

but, as stated, in the e-office software, on which the resignation

notice of the petitioner dated 10.10.2023 was process, above the

name of Rohit Meena, MD, SIIDCUL, digital signature is not

appended. Admittedly, it was not authenticated as per the provisions

of the Act.

39. This is interesting to note that Rohit Meena, MD,

SIIDCUL has not come up to say before this Court that he has made

his noting on e-office software, though he has neither digitally signed

it nor e-signed it. In absence of authentication of the text on e-office

software above the name of Rohit Meena, it cannot be said that the

text is electronically authenticated. There is no physical record, on

which the MD, SIIDCUL has accepted the resignation notice dated

10.10.2023. Therefore, this Court is of the view that, in fact, the

resignation notice dated 10.10.2023 was never accepted by the MD,

SIIDCUL, the appointing authority.

40. The Resignation Rules, 2003 provides for the procedure

for acceptance and communication of the resignation. According to

Rule 5 of the Resignation Rules, 2003, the resignation of a

Government servant shall not be effective unless it is accepted by the

appointing authority and a formal order is issued thereof. But, as

stated, Resignation Rules, 2003 are not as such applicable to the

petitioner. Service Rules, 2015 has no such provision of issuance of a

formal order.

41. During the course of hearing, the petitioner in person

has also placed for perusal of the Court a dismissal order dated

12.10.2023 of one Mr. Vikas Kumar, which is quite in detail. It is

taken on record. The last paragraph of it records as follows:-

"NOW THEEFORE, I, Rohit Meena, Managing Director, SIIDCUL, being the appointing authority, in exercise of the powers conferred by the relevant rules, do hereby award punishment of dismissal from service to Mr. Vikas Kumar, Driver, SIIDCUL, with immediate effect", and it is hereby ordered that Mr. Vikas Kumar, S/o Surendra Lal, be and is hereby dismissed from service from SIIDCUL with immediate effect. Dues if any against his will be adjusted against his pending payments."

42. This dismissal order is of 12.10.2023. A formal order of

dismissal was passed by the MD, SIIDCUL. Does it mean that

SIIDCUL is also required to issue a formal order of any decision taken

by the appointing authority?

43. As stated, learned counsel for the respondent nos. 2, 3 &

4 could not show any provision in the Service Regulations, 2015

regarding acceptance of resignation. A formal order of dismissal was

passed by the MD, SIIDCUL on 12.10.2023 in the case of Vikas

Kumar. It means, a formal order needs to be drawn by the authority

accepting the resignation for communicating to the concerned

employee as well as other wings of the Department. In the instant

case, it is also not done.

44. In view of the foregoing discussions, this Court is of the

view that in the instant case, even the resignation notice dated

10.10.2023 of the petitioner has not been accepted by the MD,

SIIDCUL, the appointing authority and no formal order has been

issued. Therefore, the Court concludes that the resignation notice

dated 10.10.2023 of the petitioner has not been accepted in the eyes

of law. Even today, it has not been accepted. On 09.12.2023, the

petitioner had filed his application for withdrawal of the notice of

resignation.

45. This Court has already held that the resignation notice

dated 10.10.2023 of the petitioner has not been accepted by the

competent authority in the eyes of law. It is settled principle of law

that a resignation may be withdrawn by the employee before it is

accepted. In the case of S.D. Manohara v. Konkan Railway

Corporation Limited and others, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 2546, the

Hon'ble Supreme Court has summed up this principle and in para 3

observed as follows:-

"3. The short facts necessary for resolution of this dispute revolve around the invariable question that arises in disputes involving withdrawal of the resignation letter 1, i.e. whether the employee has withdrawn his resignation before its acceptance by the employer or not. Having examined the matter in detail, we have arrived at the conclusion that resignation was in fact withdrawn before its acceptance. We have thus allowed the appeal and directed reinstatement of the appellant. Further, to balance equities, we ordered the salary payable for the period that the appellant has not worked to be restricted to 50% of the salary payable for the said period."

46. In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court had held that

since before resignation could be accepted, the employee had

expressed his right to withdraw, the resignation has not become

effective and the employer was directed to reinstate the employee in

service and provided that on reinstatement, from the date the

employee was relieved from service to his reinstatement, he would get

50% of the salary.

47. In the instant case, the resignation has yet not been

accepted. The petitioner has already withdrawn her resignation notice

Resignation can be withdrawn before its acceptance, is an established principle of law; Suman V. Jain v. Marwadi Sammelan, 2024 SCC OnLine SC 161; Air India Express Limited v. Captain Gurdarshan Kaur Sandhu, (2019) 17 SCC 129; Srikantha S.M. v. Bharath Earth Movers Limited, (2005) 8 SCC 314; Balram Gupta v. Union of India, 1987 Supp SCC 228; Union of India v. Gopal Chandra Misra, (1978) 2 SCC 301

on 09.12.2023. Therefore, by exercising her right to withdraw the

resignation, Annexure No. 13, the resignation stood withdrawn.

Accordingly, the petitioner is entitled to be reinstated in service.

48. The writ petition is allowed.

49. The impugned communication dated 31.10.2023 is set

aside. The resignation notice dated 10.10.2023 of the petitioner has

yet not been accepted. The petitioner has already withdrawn it by

letter dated 09.12.2023, therefore, the resignation notice stood

withdrawn.

50. The respondent nos. 2, 3 & 4 are directed to reinstate the

petitioner into service within thirty days from the date of this

judgment. The petitioner shall, however, be entitled to receive 50% of