Per: Hon'ble Ravindra Maithani, J. (Oral)
2. Heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the
3. Briefly stated, according to the petitioner, by a letter
performance or until regular appointment. The petitioner took up
initial period of contract, which was to expire on 25.05.2013. But, it
two years period. He received salary, etc. Subsequently, due to
petitioner was relieved on 15.07.2014. It is the case of the
petitioner that he has not been paid salary, etc. which is detailed in
Rs.1,25,700/- (Rupees One 15.07.2014. (Rupees Three
Lakh Twenty-five Thousand (2.5 months) Lakh Fourteen
Seven Hundred) per month. Thousand Two
Hundred Fifty).
2. Second Annual Increment @ 26.05.2013 to Rs.72,000/-
Rs.6,000/- (Rupees Six 25.05.2014. (Rupees Seventy-
4. On 17.06.2025, when the petition was presented, this
"How could such claim be entertained after 11 years, in
view of the law, as laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
the case of Union of India and Others Vs. Tarsem Singh,
(2008)8 SCC 678, wherein, in Para 7, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court has stated that consequential relief relating to arrears
normally should be restricted to a period of 3 years, prior to the
date of filing of the writ petition? "
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the claim
of the petitioner is not delayed. He also raised the following
submissions:-
i. In the instant case, the petitioner has continuous
cause of action; it has never been interpreted or
stopped by any administrative order or decision of
any of the respondents.
ii. The right to sue accrues only when the claim of the
petitioner is denied by the respondents; a cause of
action arises when a legal right is infringed or
threatened.
iii. In the instant case, the respondents had not denied
the claim of the petitioner.
iv. By a communication dated 22.09.2022, the
respondent no.3, the Director, Medical Education
has informed it to the petitioner that his claim is
under process at the level of the respondent no.4,
the Principal/Dean of the Medical College.
v. The petitioner had, for the first time, given a
representation in the year 2015.
vi. The cause of action is continued since the year
2014.
vii. The principle of law, as laid down in the case of
Union of India and others Vs. Tarsem Singh,
(2008)8 SCC 648, is not at all applicable in the
present case. In that case, there was a delay of 16
years.
viii. The observation in para 5 of the judgment in the
case of Tarsem Singh (supra) would apply in the
instant case and the claim is not barred by any law.
6. On the other hand, learned State Counsel submits that
the claim is much delayed, therefore, it cannot be entertained.
7. It is also argued on behalf of the State that on
22.09.2022, the respondent no.3, the Director, Medical Education
had not admitted that the claim is pending instead, it is argued
that in response to an RTI query, the petitioner was informed that
his query is under process.
8. There is no time limit prescribed for entertaining a writ
petition. While exercising its jurisdiction under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India, a Court has also to consider, as to whether
the petitioner is guilty of unexplained delay and laches. In the case
of City and Industrial Development Corporation Vs. Dosu Aardeshir
Bhiwandiwala and others, (2009)1 SCC, 168, the Hon'ble Supreme
Court considered this aspect and in para 26 of the judgment
observed as follows:-
"26. It is well settled and needs no restatement at our hands that
under Article 226 of the Constitution, the jurisdiction of a High Court
to issue appropriate writs particularly a writ of mandamus is highly
discretionary. The relief cannot be claimed as of right. One of the
grounds for refusing relief is that the person approaching the High
Court is guilty of unexplained delay and the laches. Inordinate delay
in moving the court for a writ is an adequate ground for refusing a
writ. The principle is that the courts exercising public law jurisdiction
do not encourage agitation of stale claims and exhuming matters
where the rights of third parties may have accrued in the
interregnum."
9. In the case of Tarsem Singh (supra), the law on this point
has been summed up by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. In last three
lines of para 7 of the judgment in the case of Tarsem Singh (supra)
restricts the arrears up to three years prior to the date of filing of
the writ petition.
10. In para 5 of the judgment in the case of Tarsem Singh
(supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court has referred to the judgment in
the case of M.R. Gupta vs. Union of India, (1995)5 SCC, 628. In the
case of M.R. Gupta (supra), the appellant in that case had joined
the service of State of Punjab in the year 1967 and, thereafter, he
joined the Railways in 1978; he claimed that his initial fixation of
salary was wrong, as he was entitled to fixation of his pay after
adding one increment to the pay which he would have drawn on
01-08-1978. The appellant in that case filed an application on 4-9-
1989 before the Tribunal praying inter alia for proper fixation of his
initial pay with effect from 1-8-1978 and certain consequential
benefits. The application was contested by the respondents on the
ground that it was time barred. The Tribunal upheld the objections
holding that the raising of the matter after lapse of 11 years was
hopelessly barred by time. In the case of M.R. Gupta (supra), the
Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that the Tribunal missed the real
point and overlooked the crux of the matter. It was held that wrong
fixation of salary give rise to a recurring cause of action each time
when a person is paid a salary which was not computed in
accordance with the Rules. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in para 5,
observed that, "So long as the appellant is in service, a fresh
cause of action arises every month when he is paid his
monthly salary on the basis of a wrong computation made
contrary to rules. It is no doubt true that if the appellant's
claim is found correct on merits, he would be entitled to be
paid according to the properly fixed pay scale in the future and
the question of limitation would arise for recovery of the
arrears for the past period. In other words, the appellant's
claim, if any, for recovery of arrears calculated on the basis of
difference in the pay which has become time barred would not
be recoverable, but he would be entitled to proper fixation of
his pay in accordance with rules and to cessation of a
continuing wrong if on merits his claim is justified. Similarly,
any other consequential relief claimed by him, such as,
promotion etc. would also be subject to the defence of laches
etc. to disentitle him to those reliefs. The pay fixation can be
made only on the basis of the situation existing on 1-8-1978
without taking into account any other consequential relief
which may be barred by his laches and the bar of limitation."
This observation made in the case of M.R. Gupta (supra) has been
quoted in para 5 of the case of Tarsem Singh (supra). While making
these observations, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.R.
Gupta (supra) remanded the matter to the Tribunal with the
following observations:-
"8. For the aforesaid reasons, this appeal has to be allowed. We
make it clear that the merits of the appellant's claim have to be
examined and the only point concluded by this decision is the one
decided above. The question of limitation with regard to the
consequential and other reliefs including the arrears, if any, has to be
considered and decided in accordance with law in due course by the
Tribunal. The matter is remitted to the Tribunal for consideration of
the application and its decision afresh on merits in accordance with
law. No costs."
11. A bare reading of the observation that has been made by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M.R. Gupta (supra)
makes it abundantly clear that in so far as the recurring cause of
action is concerned that was with regard to the salary of a person
while still in service. Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that every
month when correct salary is not paid, a fresh cause of action
arises. But, the question of limitation with regard to arrears, etc.
has not been decided, as such in that case. In the case of Tarsem
Singh (supra) while referring to the law, as laid down in the case of
M.R. Gupta (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court fixed the three
years' timeline for recovery of arrears.
12. In the case of Tarsem Singh (supra), the question was
with regard to disability pension. In that case, the respondent
therein was invalidated from army service on 13.11.1983. He
approached the High Court in the year 1999 seeking disability
pension. The High Court had allowed disability pension, but arrears
were restricted to 38 months prior to filing of the writ petition with
certain other directions. In the letters patent appeal, the Division
Bench of High Court directed that the respondents therein was
entitled to disability pension from the date it was due and it should
not be restricted to a period of three years and two months prior to
filing of the writ petition. But, finally, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
observed that the High Court was not justified in directing the
payment of arrears relating to 16 years and that too with interest. It
ought to have restricted the relief relating to arrears to only three
years before the date of writ petition or from the date of demand to
the date of writ petition, whichever is lesser.
13. Pension and salary both works in different time period of
an employee's life. Entitlement of salary is till superannuation. Post
superannuation if the position is pensionable, pension is granted.
As held in the case of M.R. Gupta (supra) computation of wrong
salary gives recurring cause of action at each time when the salary
is paid, which means that a fresh cause of action arises with every
instance of payment of incorrect salary until superannuation. In
other words, the issue relating to salary comes to an end on
retirement. Thereafter, it may not be a recurring cause of action,
whereas pension is a recurring cause of action to a retired person,
each month a new cause survives when pension is not paid. In the
case of Prahlad Raut Vs. All India Institute of Medical Sciences,
(2021)14 SCC 472, this aspect was considered by Hon'ble Supreme
Court and in para 28, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as
follows:-
"28. The proposition of law laid down by this Court
in Tarsem Singh [Union of India v. Tarsem Singh, (2008) 8 SCC
648 : (2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 765] is unexceptionable. It is well
settled that where there is a continuing wrong in relation to a
service related claim, relief may be granted notwithstanding
delay, provided the granting of the relief does not unsettle
matters settled and affect third parties. The judgment was,
however, rendered in the context of discretionary relief in
proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, for
which there is no limitation prescribed. Where the cause of
action is not a continuing one the High Courts refuse monetary
claim on the ground of delay, specially arrears..........................
................................................................................................
..............................................................................................."
14. It is argued on behalf of the petitioner that right to sue
accrues when the claim is denied by the respondents and it has
further been argued the claim of the petitioner has never been
denied by the respondent. Does it mean that the petitioner has yet
not accrued any right to sue? The answer is in negative.
15. The petitioner was appointed for two years on contractual
basis, which expired on 25.05.2013. This period was never
extended, though the petitioner was paid salary for some time. The
petitioner claims arrears upto 15.07.2014 including arrears of
salary, annual increments and House Rent Allowance. The cause of
action had accrued to the petitioner, the moment his resignation
was received and he was relieved on 15.07.2014. The right to sue
had then accrued to the petitioner.
16. It is argued on behalf of the petitioner that he had given a
representation on 21.04.2015. It is true that on 21.04.2015, the
petitioner had given a communication to the respondent no.4, the
Principal of Medical college, who had forwarded it on 14.05.2015.
The petitioner has not filed any communication revealing that from
the year 2015 to the year 2022, he even made any communication
to the respondent authority. It appears that the petitioner sought
certain information under the Right to Information Act, 2005 on
03.09.2022, which was replied to him. In query 2 to it, the
petitioner sought information, as to what action has been taken on
his representation and the reply given was that it is under process
at the level of the respondent no.4/the Principal/Dean of the
Medical College. This RTI reply is Annexure No.12 to the writ
petition.
17. In the instant case, the right to sue or cause of action has
accrued to the petitioner on 15.07.2014, when his dues were not
paid or soon thereafter. He made first representation on 21.04.2015
and thereafter, in the year 2022, he sought information under Right
to Information Act, 2005. It was complete silence for these 07 years.
No record has been filed by the petitioner to reveal that, in fact, he
did make any representation in between. The delay is not
explained.
18. Every representation does not revive the cause of action
or right to sue. They are for administrative convenience, not an
alternate to legal remedy. In the case of State of Uttaranchal and
another Vs. Shiv Charan Singh Bhandari and others, (2013)12 SCC
179, this aspect was considered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
detail and in para 16 to 23, the Hon'ble Supreme Court observed as
follows:-
"16. We have no trace of doubt that the respondents could have
challenged the ad hoc promotion conferred on the junior employee at
the relevant time. They chose not to do so for six years and the junior
employee held the promotional post for six years till regular promotion
took place. The submission of the learned counsel for the respondents
is that they had given representations at the relevant time but the
same fell in deaf ears. It is interesting to note that when the regular
selection took place, they accepted the position solely because the
seniority was maintained and, thereafter, they knocked at the doors of
the Tribunal only in 2003. It is clear as noonday that the cause of
action had arisen for assailing the order when the junior employee
was promoted on ad hoc basis on 15-11-1983.
17. In C. Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining [C.
Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining, (2008) 10 SCC 115 : (2008) 2
SCC (L&S) 961, a two-Judge Bench was dealing with the concept of
representations and the directions issued by the court or tribunal to
consider the representations and the challenge to the said rejection
thereafter. In that context, the Court has expressed thus: (SCC p.
123, para 10)
"10. Every representation to the Government for relief, may
not be replied on merits. Representations relating to matters
which have become stale or barred by limitation, can be
rejected on that ground alone, without examining the merits of
the claim. In regard to representations unrelated to the
Department, the reply may be only to inform that the matter
did not concern the Department or to inform the appropriate
Department. Representations with incomplete particulars may
be replied by seeking relevant particulars. The replies to such
representations, cannot furnish a fresh cause of action or
revive a stale or dead claim."
18. In Union of India v. M.K. Sarkar, (2010) 2 SCC 59 :
(2010) 1 SCC (L&S) 1126, this Court after referring to C. Jacob [C.
Jacob v. Director of Geology and Mining, (2008) 10 SCC 115 :
(2008) 2 SCC (L&S) 961, has ruled that: (SCC p. 66, para 15)
"15. When a belated representation in regard to a
'stale' or 'dead' issue/dispute is considered and decided, in
compliance with a direction by the court/tribunal to do so,
the date of such decision cannot be considered as
furnishing a fresh cause of action for reviving the 'dead'
issue or time-barred dispute. The issue of limitation or
delay and laches should be considered with reference to
the original cause of action and not with reference to the
date on which an order is passed in compliance with a
court's direction. Neither a court's direction to consider a
representation issued without examining the merits, nor a
decision given in compliance with such direction, will
extend the limitation, or erase the delay and laches."
19. From the aforesaid authorities it is clear as crystal that
even if the court or tribunal directs for consideration of
representations relating to a stale claim or dead grievance it does
not give rise to a fresh cause of action. The dead cause of action
cannot rise like a phoenix. Similarly, a mere submission of
representation to the competent authority does not arrest time.
20. In Karnataka Power Corpn. Ltd. v. K. Thangappan,
(2006) 4 SCC 322 : 2006 SCC (L&S) 791 the Court took note of the
factual position and laid down that when nearly for two decades
the respondent workmen therein had remained silent mere
making of representations could not justify a belated approach.
21. In State of Orissa v. Pyarimohan Samantaray, (1977) 3
SCC 396 : 1977 SCC (L&S) 424, it has been opined that making of
repeated representations is not a satisfactory explanation of delay.
The said principle was reiterated in State of Orissa v. Arun Kumar
Patnaik, (1976) 3 SCC 579 : 1976 SCC (L&S) 468 .
22. In BSNL v. Ghanshyam Dass (2), (2011) 4 SCC 374 :
(2011) 2 SCC (Civ) 268 : (2011) 1 SCC (L&S) 685, a three-Judge
Bench of this Court reiterated the principle stated in Jagdish
Lal v. State of Haryana, (1997) 6 SCC 538 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1550
and proceeded to observe that as the respondents therein
preferred to sleep over their rights and approached the Tribunal in
1997, they would not get the benefit of the order dated 7-7-1992,
Santosh Kapoor v. Union of India, OA No. 1455 of 1991, order
dated 7-7-1992 (CAT).
23. In State of T.N. v. Seshachalam, (2007) 10 SCC 137 :
(2008) 1 SCC (L&S) 475, this Court, testing the equality clause on
the bedrock of delay and laches pertaining to grant of service
benefit, has ruled thus: (SCC p. 145, para 16)
"16. ... filing of representations alone would not
save the period of limitation. Delay or laches is a relevant
factor for a court of law to determine the question as to
whether the claim made by an applicant deserves
consideration. Delay and/or laches on the part of a
government servant may deprive him of the benefit which
had been given to others. Article 14 of the Constitution of
India would not, in a situation of that nature, be attracted
as it is well known that law leans in favour of those who
are alert and vigilant.""
19. As stated, the right to sue or cause of action has accrued
to the petitioner in the year 2014. He made first representation on
21.04.2015 and, thereafter, sometime in the year 2022, he appears
to have made certain representation. It does not revive the cause of
action. The cause of action is not recurring. It is one time action of
the respondents when the outstanding dues of the petitioner was
not given to him on his resignation in the year 2014. The writ
petition has been filed in the year 2025, 11 years after the cause of
action had accrued. The delay in filing the writ petition is not
explained. The arrears in view of the judgment in the case of
Tarsem Singh (supra) cannot be paid beyond three years prior to
filing of the writ petition. Therefore, on the grounds of delay and
laches, the writ petition may not be entertained. It deserves to be
dismissed at the stage of admission itself.
20. The petition is dismissed in limine.
(Ravindra Maithani, J.)
14.07.2025
Sanjay
SANJAY
DN: c=IN, o=HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND,
2.5.4.20=e50e50b49596520698eff87e0a08bbd50468
6df4d1afc60f54a287831dec46fe,
KANOJIA
postalCode=263001, st=UTTARAKHAND,
serialNumber=26EEB7122ED0DD23233A255DD8EC4
50A84B515A087CAEFD1B3179A7DEAE40699,
cn=SANJAY KANOJIA
Date: 2025.07.14 16:34:17 +05'30'
