[Cites 3, Cited by 0]
Uttarakhand High Court
Sri Rajesh Kumar Sharma vs Uttaranchal Iron And Ispat Ltd. And ... on 10 December, 2025
Author: Pankaj Purohit
Bench: Pankaj Purohit
HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT NAINITAL
Appeal from Order No.360 of 2014
Sri Rajesh Kumar Sharma .........Appellant
Versus
Uttaranchal Iron and Ispat Ltd. and another .........Respondents
Mr. Pankaj Miglani, Advocate for the appellant appeared through video
conferencing.
Mr. P.C. Maulekhi, Advocate for the respondent.
Hon'ble Pankaj Purohit, J. (Oral)
This appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's
Compensation Act, 1923 (hereinafter referred to as "the Act")
has been preferred by the claimant/appellant challenging the
judgment and order dated 13.10.2013 passed by the learned
Workmen's Compensation Commissioner, Dehradun, in Case
No. 50 of 2012, Sri Rajesh Kumar Sharma vs. Uttaranchal
Iron & Ispat Limited and another. By the said order, the
learned Commissioner held that an amount of Rs. 1,87,617/-
has already been paid to the claimant during the pendency of
the proceedings, and that in the absence of any certificate of
disability indicating the percentage of permanent disability,
no further compensation could be assessed or granted. The
appellant contends that the learned Commissioner erred in
law in denying him compensation for permanent disability
resulting from the amputation of his left arm, an injury that
admittedly arose out of and during the course of his
employment.
2. The brief facts of the present case are that the
appellant was employed with respondent no.1, Uttaranachal
Iron & Ispat Ltd., and while performing his duties on
06.02.2003, he suffered a serious accident, following which
he was treated at Safdarjung Hospital, New Delhi. The injury
resulted in the amputation of his left arm, and the appellant
asserts that such injury constitutes 100% disability within the
meaning of Part-I of the First Schedule of the Workmen's
Compensation Act. The appellant filed a claim petition
seeking due compensation. The respondents did not dispute
the accident or its connection with the employment. The
employer's insurer also paid Rs.1,87,617/- during the
pendency of the proceedings towards compensation. The
learned Commissioner, however, took the view that mere
amputation did not automatically establish the percentage of
disability unless supported by a medical certificate specifying
the degree of functional disability, and in the absence of such
proof, no additional compensation could be awarded. Hence,
this appeal.
3. The learned counsel for the appellant submits that
the learned Commissioner committed a grave error in
ignoring the First Schedule of the Act, which enumerates the
nature of injuries and the percentage of disability
corresponding to each. It is argued that amputation of an arm
above the elbow is statutorily recognized as permanent total
disability, and therefore, the appellant was not required to
produce a separate medical certificate to establish what the
statute itself already declares. It is further submitted by the
learned counsel that the discharge summary issued by
Safdarjung Hospital was placed on record, clearly showing
the amputation, and since the respondents did not deny the
injury or dispute the medical records, the Commissioner
ought to have accepted the disability as proved and
determined compensation in accordance with the statutory
formula.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant further
argues that the Workmen's Compensation Act is a beneficial
legislation intended to compensate workmen for loss of
earning capacity resulting from injuries arising in the course
of employment. It is contended that once the occurrence of
the accident and the amputation were undisputed, the
Commissioner was duty-bound to determine compensation in
a manner consistent with the principles of social welfare
underlying the Act. The learned counsel submits that by
refusing to compute the compensation only because no
certificate quantifying the disability was filed. The
Commissioner elevated a procedural requirement over
substantive justice. It further argued by the learned counsel
that the nature and extent of disability were matters admitted
by all parties, and what is admitted need not be proved. It is,
therefore, pleaded that denial of compensation amounts to
negating the very object of the legislation.
5. The learned counsel for the appellant vehemently
argued that the learned Commissioner adopted an unduly
technical approach and ignored settled principles of law
requiring authorities under the Workmen's Compensation Act
to construe evidence liberally in favour of the workman. The
appeal highlights the Commissioner's finding that the
disability could not be quantified was based on conjecture,
because the statute itself specifies the measure of disability. It
is argued that the appellant has suffered permanent loss of
earning capacity as a direct consequence of the accident, and
the Commissioner's refusal to award appropriate
compensation amounts to a miscarriage of justice. The
learned counsel emphasises that appellant's permanent
disability and the humanitarian considerations of the case
warrant substantial relief.
6. Having considered the submissions and upon
careful scrutiny of the impugned order, this Court finds no
reason to interfere in the impugned judgment. While it is true
that the Workmen's Compensation Act is a beneficial
legislation intended to protect injured workmen, such benefit
cannot be stretched beyond what the statutory framework
permits. The learned Commissioner has recorded that
although the injury and amputation were not disputed, the
appellant failed to furnish any medical assessment of
functional disability. The distinction between medical injury
and loss of earning capacity has been repeatedly emphasized
by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Determination of
compensation must necessarily be based on the loss of
earning capacity certified by a qualified medical practitioner,
particularly, in cases, where the injury does not automatically
equate to total disablement for the specific employment.
Even where the First Schedule prescribes a percentage of
disability, courts have consistently held that medical evidence
is essential to establish functional disability and its impact on
employability. The discharge summary produced by the
appellant only confirms treatment and amputation and it does
not certify whether the disability renders the appellant unfit
for the nature of work, he was performing or for employment
generally.
7. The Commissioner was therefore justified in
holding that without such medical evidence, the computation
of compensation would be speculative and contrary to the
statutory scheme. The argument that amputation per se
constitutes 100% disability is misconceived. The First
Schedule specifies the percentage of loss of earning capacity
attributable to certain injuries, but does not eliminate the
requirement of medical evidence establishing that such injury
corresponds to the facts of the particular case. The
Commissioner has also recorded that compensation
amounting to Rs.1,87,617/- has already been disbursed to the
appellant. The statute does not entitle a claimant to
unconditional enhancement of compensation in the absence
of proof supporting such enhancement. Insofar as the
appellant's plea of beneficial construction is concerned, it
must be noted that while welfare legislation deserves liberal
interpretation, such interpretation cannot override the
essential requirement of evidence. A beneficial statute cannot
empower the Court to assume facts not proved on record. The
responsibility to furnish a disability certificate was squarely
on the claimant, and no explanation has been offered for the
omission. The Commissioner's conclusion that the evidence
was insufficient to quantify disability cannot be termed
perverse, arbitrary, or contrary to law. This Court is
exercising jurisdiction under Section 30 of the Act, which is
limited to substantial questions of law. The appellant has not
demonstrated that the impugned order suffers from any such
legal infirmity. The findings are based on evidence, the
reasoning is neither irrational nor perverse, and no statutory
mandate has been disregarded and no such interference is
warranted.
8. With the aforesaid observations, the appeal is
devoid of merit and is, accordingly, dismissed.
(Pankaj Purohit, J.)
10.12.2025
Ravi
