Kamal Virmani vs State Of Uttarakhand
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Uttarakhand High Court

Kamal Virmani vs State Of Uttarakhand on 10 September, 2024

Author: Rakesh Thapliyal

Bench: Rakesh Thapliyal

      HIGH COURT OF UTTARAKHAND AT
                NAINITAL
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE RAKESH THAPLIYAL

         First Bail Application No. 1201 of 2024
Kamal Virmani                                             ........Applicant
                                   Versus

State of Uttarakhand                                        ....Respondent


Counsel for the applicant          :   Mr. Aditya Singh, learned counsel
Counsel for the State/respondent   :   Mr. Pratiroop Pandey, learned AGA

                                              Reserved on : 04.09.2024
                                              Delivered on : 10.09.2024


Hon'ble Rakesh Thapliyal, J. (Oral)

1. The present applicant is an accused in a case arising out of the First Information Report dated 16.09.2023, bearing FIR No. 0413 of 2023, P.S. Kotwali Dehradun, District Dehradun, wherein he has been implicated for the offences punishable under Sections 120B, 420, 467, 468 read with Section 471 IPC.

2. Prior to registration of the FIR No. 0413 of 2023, he was taken into custody on 26.08.2023 in connection with another FIR No. 107 of 2023 and FIR No. 281 of 2023, both registered at P.S. Kotwali District Dehradun and the applicant was in judicial custody from 27.08.2023 in both the cases.

3. In both the FIRs i.e. FIR No. 107 of 2023 and FIR No. 281 of 2023, the applicant was granted bail by the coordinate Bench of this Court by order dated 15.05.2024, passed in First Bail Application No. 2276 of 2023 and in Bail Application No. 2277 of 2023.

4. It is submitted that, though the applicant was granted bail by the coordinate Bench of this Court by order dated 15.05.2024; however, before the applicant could be released from jail, the Investigating Agency took the present applicant in judicial custody in the present case on 17.05.2024. Thereafter, the applicant moved bail application before the Court of Chief Judicial Magistrate, Dehradun, which was rejected on 20.05.2024. Subsequently, the applicant approached to Sessions Judge, wherein a detailed report was filed by the Investigating Officer wherein it is reported that after the chargesheet filed against Swaran Singh and Amit Yadav, the name of the present applicant came to light during further investigation. Learned Sessions Judge reject the bail application of the applicant by order dated 29.05.2024.

5. It is submitted by the learned counsel for the applicant that, while the present applicant was in judicial custody from 16.09.2023 to 16.04.2024 in connection with two FIRs, bearing FIR No. 107 of 2023 and FIR No. 281 of 2023, he was taken on remand on 17.05.2024. Thereafter, the applicant moved an application for seeking default bail under Section 167(2) of CrPC and the same was rejected by the Chief Judicial Magistrate on 18.07.2024. Now, the present applicant is before this Court, seeking default bail under Section 167(2) of CrPC.

6. On 07.08.2024, the learned counsel for the applicant raised an issue by placing reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul Vs. State of Assam, 2017 (15) SCC 67 and by referring this judgment, he submitted that for grant of default bail the test would be the minimum sentence.

Consequently, the matter was posted and issue was framed, whether for the default bail, the test would be the minimum or the maximum sentence.

7. Learned counsel for the applicant by referring the judgment of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra) submitted that in the said judgment, the majority opinion held that 90 days limit is only available in respect of the offences where a minimum 10 years imprisonment period is stipulated.

By placing this judgment, he also submitted that in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court also examined the view expressed by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the Case of Rajeev Chaudhary Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), 2001 (5) SCC

34.

8. At this juncture, for deciding the issue whether for default bail the test would be the minimum sentence or the maximum, the history behind the enactment of Section 167 of CrPC is also required to be elaborated which has also been discussed in the case of Rakesh

Kumar Paul (supra) and it is also necessary to reproduce the history behind the enactment of Section 167 CrPC as discussed in paragraphs 10 to 17, which are being reproduced herein as under:-

History behind the enactment of Section 167 CrPC

10. The Code of Criminal Procedure enacted in 1898 contained Section 167 which laid down the procedure to be followed in the event the investigation into an offence is not completed within twenty-four hours. What is significant is that the legislative expectation was that the investigation would ordinarily be completed within twenty-four hours. Incidentally, this legislative expectation continues till today. Whatever be the anxiety of the legislature in 1898, there can be no gainsaying that investigation into an offence deserves an early closure, one way or the other. Therefore, when Section 167 was enacted in the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 it was premised on the conclusion of investigations within twenty-four hours or within 15 days on the outside, regardless of the nature of the offence or the punishment. Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 reads as follows:

"167. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty-four hours.--(1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by Section 61, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well founded, the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation if he is not below the rank of Sub- Inspector shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate.

(2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole. If he has not jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction:

Provided that no Magistrate of the third class, and no Magistrate of the second class not specially empowered in this behalf by the State Government shall authorise detention in the custody of the police.

(3) A Magistrate authorising under this section detention in the custody of the police shall record his reasons for so doing.

(4) If such order is given by a Magistrate other than the District Magistrate or Sub-Divisional Magistrate, he shall forward a copy of his order, with his reasons for making it to the Magistrate to whom he is immediately subordinate."

11. Unfortunately, all laws tend to be misused whenever opportunity knocks, and Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 was no exception. Since there was a practical difficulty in completing investigations within the 15-day time-limit, the prosecution often took recourse to the provisions of Section 344 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 and filed a preliminary or incomplete report before the Magistrate to keep the accused in custody. The Law Commission of India noted this in its 41st Report (after carefully studying several earlier Reports) and proposed to increase the time-limit for completion of investigations to 60 days, acknowledging that:

"14.19. ... such an extension may result in the maximum period becoming the rule in every case as a matter of routine; but we trust that proper supervision by the superior courts will prevent that."

(emphasis supplied) The view expressed by the Law Commission of India and its proposal is as follows:

"14.19. Section 167.--Section 167 provides for remands. The total period for which an arrested person may be remanded to custody-- police or judicial--is 15 days. The assumption is that the investigation must be completed within 15 days, and the final report under Section 173 sent to court by then. In actual practice, however, this has frequently been found unworkable. Quite often, a complicated investigation cannot be completed within 15 days, and if the offence is serious, the police naturally insist that the accused be kept in custody. A practice of doubtful legal validity has therefore grown up. The police file before a Magistrate a preliminary or "incomplete" report, and the Magistrate, purporting to act under Section 344, adjourns the proceedings and remands the accused to custody. In the Fourteenth Report, the Law Commission doubted if such an order could be made under Section 344, as that section is intended to operate only after a Magistrate has taken cognizance of an offence, which can be properly done only after a final report under Section 173 has been received, and not while the investigation is still proceeding. We are of the same view, and to us also it appears proper that the law should be clarified in this respect. The use of Section 344 for a remand beyond the statutory period fixed under Section 167 can lead to serious abuse, as an arrested person can in this manner be kept in custody indefinitely while the investigation can go on in a leisurely manner. It is, therefore, desirable, as was observed in the Fourteenth Report, that some time-limit should be placed on the power of the police to obtain a remand, while the investigation is still going on; and if the present time-limit of 15 days is too short, it would be better to fix a longer period rather than countenance a practice which violates the spirit of the legal safeguard. Like the earlier Law Commission, we feel that 15 days is perhaps too short, and we propose therefore to follow the recommendation in the Fourteenth Report that the maximum period under Section 167 should be fixed at 60 days. We are aware of the danger that such an extension may result in the maximum period becoming the rule in every case as a matter of routine; but we trust that proper supervision by the superior courts

will prevent that. We propose accordingly to revise sub-sections (2) and (4) of Section 167 as follows:

'167. (2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days at a time and sixty days in the whole. If he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction:

Provided that--

(a) no Magistrate shall authorise detention in any custody under this section unless the accused is produced before him;

(b) no Magistrate of the Second Class not specially empowered in this behalf by the High Court shall authorise detention in the custody of the police.

*** (4)Any Magistrate other than the Chief Judicial Magistrate making such order shall forward a copy of his order, with his reasons for making it, to the Chief Judicial Magistrate.'"

(emphasis in original)

12. The recommendations of the Law Commission of India were carefully examined and then accepted. The basic considerations for acceptance, as mentioned in the Statement of Objects and Reasons dated 7-11-1970 for introducing the (new) Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 were:

"3. The recommendations of the Commission were examined carefully by the Government, keeping in view among others, the following basic considerations--

(i) an accused person should get a fair trial in accordance with the accepted principles of natural justice;

(ii) every effort should be made to avoid delay in investigation and trial which is harmful not only to the individuals involved but also to society; and

(iii) the procedure should not be complicated and should, to the utmost extent possible, ensure fair deal to the poorer sections of the community.

The occasion has been availed of to consider and adopt where appropriate suggestions received from other quarters, based on practical experience of investigation and the working of criminal courts."

13. Accordingly, Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (CrPC) was enacted as follows, with the recommended time- limit and again regardless of the nature of the offence or the punishment:

"167. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty- four hours.--(1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by Section 57, and there

are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well founded, the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of Sub- Inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate.

(2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction:

Provided that--

(a) the Magistrate may authorise detention of the accused person, otherwise than in custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exists for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this section for a total period exceeding sixty days, and on the expiry of the said period of sixty days, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail; and every person released on bail under this section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter;

(b) no Magistrate shall authorise detention in any custody under this section unless the accused is produced before him;

(c) no Magistrate of the Second Class, not specially empowered in this behalf by the High Court, shall authorise detention in the custody of the police.

Explanation.--If any question arises whether an accused person was produced before the Magistrate as required under para (b), the production of the accused person may be proved by his signature on the order authorising detention.

(3)-(6) Not relevant for the present purposes."

14. A few years later in 1978, a need was felt to amend Section 167 CrPC by not only extending the period for completing investigation but also relating that period to the offence. Therefore, a shift was proposed to grant an aggregate period of 90 days for completing the investigation in cases relating to offences punishable with death, imprisonment for life or "imprisonment for not less than ten years or more" and up to 60 days in any other case, as stated in the Notes on Clauses accompanying the Statement of Objects and Reasons dated 9- 5-1978 for amending the statute. What is of significance (for our purposes) is the use of the words "imprisonment for not less than ten years or more". In our opinion, the use of the words "or more" gives a clear indication that the period of 90 days was relatable to an offence punishable with a minimum imprisonment for a period of not less than ten years, if not more. The Notes on Clauses reads as follows:

"Clause 13.-- Section 167 is being amended to empower the Magistrate to authorise detention, pending investigation, for an aggregate period of 90 days in cases where the investigation relates to offences punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for not less than ten years or more and up to 60 days in any other case. These amendments are intended to remove difficulties which have been actually experienced in relation to the investigation of offences of a serious nature.

A new sub-section is being inserted empowering an Executive Magistrate...."

(emphasis supplied)

15. When Section 167 CrPC was enacted, it was perhaps felt that the words "or more" were superfluous (as indeed we believe that they are in the context of the use of the words "not less than") and Section 167 came to read:

"167. Procedure when investigation cannot be completed in twenty- four hours.--(1) Whenever any person is arrested and detained in custody, and it appears that the investigation cannot be completed within the period of twenty-four hours fixed by Section 57, and there are grounds for believing that the accusation or information is well founded, the officer in charge of the police station or the police officer making the investigation, if he is not below the rank of Sub- Inspector, shall forthwith transmit to the nearest Judicial Magistrate a copy of the entries in the diary hereinafter prescribed relating to the case, and shall at the same time forward the accused to such Magistrate.

(2) The Magistrate to whom an accused person is forwarded under this section may, whether he has or has not jurisdiction to try the case, from time to time, authorise the detention of the accused in such custody as such Magistrate thinks fit, for a term not exceeding fifteen days in the whole; and if he has no jurisdiction to try the case or commit it for trial, and considers further detention unnecessary, he may order the accused to be forwarded to a Magistrate having such jurisdiction:

Provided that--

(a) the Magistrate may authorise the detention of the accused person, otherwise than in the custody of the police, beyond the period of fifteen days, if he is satisfied that adequate grounds exist for doing so, but no Magistrate shall authorise the detention of the accused person in custody under this paragraph for a total period exceeding--

(i) ninety days, where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years;

(ii) sixty days, where the investigation relates to any other offence, and, on the expiry of the said period of ninety days, or sixty days, as the case may be, the accused person shall be released on bail if he is prepared to and does furnish bail, and every person released on bail under this sub-section shall be deemed to be so released under the provisions of Chapter XXXIII for the purposes of that Chapter;

(b) no Magistrate shall authorise detention of the accused in custody of the police under this section unless the accused is produced before him in person for the first time and subsequently every time till the accused remains in the custody of the police, but the Magistrate may extend further detention in judicial custody on production of the accused either in person or through the medium of electronic video linkage;

(c) no Magistrate of the Second Class, not specially empowered in this behalf by the High Court, shall authorise detention in the custody of the police.

Explanation I.--For the avoidance of doubts, it is hereby declared that, notwithstanding the expiry of the period specified in para (a), the accused shall be detained in custody so long as he does not furnish bail.

Explanation II.--If any question arises whether an accused person was produced before the Magistrate as required under para (b), the production of the accused person may be proved by his signature on the order authorising detention or by the order certified by the Magistrate as to production of the accused person through the medium of electronic video linkage, as the case may be:

Provided further that in case of a woman under eighteen years of age, the detention shall be authorised to be in the custody of a remand home or recognised social institution.

(2-A)-(6) Not relevant for the present purposes."

16. Generally speaking therefore, it could be said that the legislative intent is and always has been to complete the investigation into an offence within twenty-four hours, failing which within 15 days (CrPC of 1898). The period of 15 days was later extended to 60 days (CrPC of 1973) and eventually it was extended to 90 days if the investigation was relatable to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years. In respect of all other offences, the period of 60 days remained unchanged.

17. The significance of the period of 60 days or 90 days, as the case may be, is that if the investigation is not completed within that period then the accused (assuming he or she is in custody) is entitled to "default bail" if no charge-sheet or challan is filed on the 60th or 90th day, the accused applies for "default bail" and is prepared to and does furnish bail for release. As can be seen from the narration of facts, no charge-sheet or challan was filed against the petitioner on the 60th day but was filed before the conclusion of 90 days. Consequently, was the petitioner entitled to "default bail" after 60 days? According to the petitioner the answer is in the affirmative since he had not committed an offence punishable with imprisonment for not less than ten years, but according to the State he had committed an offence punishable with imprisonment for ten years."

9. In para 20, the reference of the earlier judgment rendered in the case of Rajiv Chaudhary (supra) has

been given and thereafter a reference of the subsequent judgment in the case of Bhupinder Singh Vs. Jarnail Singh, 2006 (6) SCC 277 has been given. In para 22, a reference has been made of Rajeev Chaudhary (supra) that the decision was distinguished in the subsequent judgment i.e. in the case of Bhupinder Singh (supra).

10. In paragraphs 22 to 27, there is a discussion on the two views i.e. in the case of Bhupinder Singh (supra) and in the case of Rajeev Chaudhary (supra) and in para 26, after discussing these two views expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, the view of Rajeev Chaudhary (supra) was accepted. The discussion of both the judgments and the views dealt with in para 22 to 27 of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra) are being reproduced herein as under:-

22. The decision in Rajeev Chaudhary [Rajeev Chaudhary v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 5 SCC 34 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 819] was distinguished by recording that the case "related to an offence punishable under Section 386 IPC and the sentence in respect of the said offence is not less than 10 years. This Court held that the expression "not less than"

means that the imprisonment should be 10 years or more to attract 90 days' period. In that context it was said that for the purpose of clause (i) of proviso (a) of Section 167(2) CrPC the imprisonment should be for a clear period of 10 years or more".

(Bhupinder Singh case [Bhupinder Singh v. Jarnail Singh, (2006) 6 SCC 277 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 101] , SCC p. 281, para

11) This is factually incorrect, inasmuch as Section 386 IPC provides for a punishment "which may extend to ten years". It is clause (i) that uses the expression "imprisonment for a term not less than ten years". This Court unfortunately overlooked the juxtaposition and distinction referred to above.

23. It was further held in para 11 of the Report: (Bhupinder Singh case [Bhupinder Singh v. Jarnail Singh, (2006) 6 SCC 277 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 101] , SCC pp. 281-82) "11. ... The position is different in respect of the offence punishable under Section 304-B IPC. In the case of Section 304-B the

range varies between 7 years and imprisonment for life. What should be the adequate punishment in a given case has to be decided by the court on the basis of the facts and circumstances involved in the particular case. The stage of imposing a sentence comes only after recording the order of conviction of the accused person. The significant word in the proviso is "punishable". The word "punishable" as used in statutes which declare that certain offences are punishable in a certain way means liable to be punished in the way designated. It is ordinarily defined as deserving of or capable or liable to punishment, capable of being punished by law or right, may be punished or liable to be punished, and not must be punished."

24. In the context of the word "punishable" occurring in clause (i) and the meaning attached to this word taken from several dictionaries, this Court held in Bhupinder Singh [Bhupinder Singh v. Jarnail Singh, (2006) 6 SCC 277 : (2006) 3 SCC (Cri) 101] that where a minimum and maximum sentence is prescribed, both are imposable depending upon the facts of the case. Therefore, if an offence is punishable with imprisonment that may extend up to or beyond or including 10 years, then the period available for completing investigations would be 90 days before the provision for "default bail" kicks in. It was said in para 15 of the Report: (SCC p. 282) "15. Where minimum and maximum sentences are prescribed, both are imposable depending on the facts of the cases. It is for the court, after recording conviction, to impose appropriate sentence. It cannot, therefore, be accepted that only the minimum sentence is imposable and not the maximum sentence. Merely because minimum sentence is provided that does not mean that the sentence imposable is only the minimum sentence."

25. While it is true that merely because a minimum sentence is provided for in the statute it does not mean that only the minimum sentence is imposable. Equally, there is also nothing to suggest that only the maximum sentence is imposable. Either punishment can be imposed and even something in between. Where does one strike a balance? It was held that it is eventually for the court to decide what sentence should be imposed given the range available. Undoubtedly, the legislature can bind the sentencing court by laying down the minimum sentence (not less than) and it can also lay down the maximum sentence. If the minimum is laid down, the sentencing Judge has no option but to give a sentence "not less than" that sentence provided for. Therefore, the words "not less than" occurring in clause (i) to proviso (a) of Section 167(2) CrPC (and in other provisions) must be given their natural and obvious meaning, which is to say, not below a minimum threshold and in the case of Section 167 CrPC these words must relate to an offence punishable with a minimum of 10 years' imprisonment.

26. Of the two views expressed by this Court, we accept the view in Rajeev Chaudhary [Rajeev Chaudhary v. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 5 SCC 34 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 819] .

27. It is true that an offence punishable with a sentence of death or imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term that may extend to 10 years is a serious offence entailing intensive and perhaps extensive investigation. It would therefore appear that given the seriousness of the

offence, the extended period of 90 days should be available to the investigating officer in such cases. In other words, the period of investigation should be relatable to the gravity of the offence -- understandably so. This could be contrasted with an offence where the maximum punishment under IPC or any other penal statute is (say) 7 years, the offence being not serious or grave enough to warrant an extended period of 90 days of investigation. This is certainly a possible view and indeed CrPC makes a distinction in the period of investigation for the purposes of "default bail" depending on the gravity of the offence. Nevertheless, to avoid any uncertainty or ambiguity in interpretation, the law was enacted with two compartments. Offences punishable with imprisonment of not less than ten years have been kept in one compartment equating them with offences punishable with death or imprisonment for life. This category of offences undoubtedly calls for deeper investigation since the minimum punishment is pretty stiff. All other offences have been placed in a separate compartment, since they provide for a lesser minimum sentence, even though the maximum punishment could be more than ten years' imprisonment. While such offences might also require deeper investigation (since the maximum is quite high) they have been kept in a different compartment because of the lower minimum imposable by the sentencing court, and thereby reducing the period of incarceration during investigations which must be concluded expeditiously. The cut-off, whether one likes it or not, is based on the wisdom of the legislature and must be respected. Discussion from personal liberty perspective

28. We may also look at the entire issue not only from the narrow interpretational perspective but from the perspective of personal liberty. Ever since 1898, the legislative intent has been to conclude investigations within twenty-four hours. This intention has not changed for more than a century, as the marginal notes to Section 167 CrPC suggest. However, the legislature has been pragmatic enough to appreciate that it is not always possible to complete investigations into an offence within twenty- four hours. Therefore initially, in 1898 CrPC, a maximum period of 15 days was provided for completing the investigations. Unfortunately, this limit was being violated through the subterfuge of taking advantage of Section 344, 1898 CrPC. The misuse was recognised in the 41st Report of the Law Commission of India and consequently the Law Commission recommended fixing a maximum period of 60 days for completing investigations and that recommendation came to be enacted as the law in 1973 CrPC. Subsequently, this period was also found to be insufficient for completing investigations into more serious offences and, as mentioned above, the period for completing investigations was bifurcated into 90 days for some offences and 60 days for the remaining offences."

11. In para 37 of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra), a reference has been made of two other judgments i.e. in the case of Union of India Vs. Nirala Yadav, 2014(9) SCC 457, in which a reference was made to

Uday Mohanlal Acharya Vs. State of Maharashtra 2001 (5) SCC 453 and the conclusion (3) in the case of Nirala Yadav (supra) was also reproduced in para 37, which is also being reproduced herein as under:-

"'13. (3) On the expiry of the said period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case may be, an indefeasible right accrues in favour of the accused for being released on bail on account of default by the investigating agency in the completion of the investigation within the period prescribed and the accused is entitled to be released on bail, if he is prepared to and furnishes the bail as directed by the Magistrate.' (Uday Mohanlal case [Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 5 SCC 453 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 760] , SCC p. 473, para 13)"

12. Mr. Aditya Singh, learned counsel for the applicant submits that the majority opinion in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra) is evident from paras 49 to 51. In para 83 to 86, the Hon'ble Justice Mr. Prafulla C. Pant, J. gave a dissenting view and while giving dissenting view, three questions were taken into consideration, the reference of which is given in paras 98, 98.1, 98.2 and 98.3, which are being reproduced herein as under:-

"98. The three main questions that arise in these appeals for our consideration are as under:

98.1. (i) Whether in a case regarding offence for which the punishment imposable may extend up to ten years, the accused is entitled to bail under Section 167(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 due to default on the part of the investigating agency in not filing the charge-sheet within sixty days? 98.2. (ii) Whether the appellant is entitled to default bail under Section 167(2) of the Code though he has not made any application (oral or written) under Section 167(2) of the Code before the Magistrate (or Special Judge), but has instead argued orally without pleadings in a pending regular bail application filed under Section 439 of the Code before the High Court?

98.3. (iii) Whether the appellant is entitled to bail on merits?

13. From para 104 to 107, there is a discussion on the interpretation of the provision arises in the use of the

words "not less than ten years" in Section 167(2)(a)(i) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. In para 105, there is a reference of classification of the offences and as per this classification, the cases punishable with death sentence were classified in one group and the cases punishable with life imprisonment were classified in another group and the cases punishable with imprisonment of up to ten years were classified in the third group.

14. The discussion and the answer, as given by the Hon'ble Justice Prafulla C. Pant, J. in para 104 to 107 of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra) are very relevant to examine the issue in hand and therefore, it is necessary to reproduce the same herein as under:-

104. The main ambiguity in the interpretation of the provision arises in the use of the words "not less than ten years" in Section 167(2)(a)(i) of the Code. The legislative drafts on the amendment of this provision do not throw much light on the expression "not less than ten years" used in the provision. But while answering the criticism to the amendment at the Rajya Sabha, the then Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs -- Shri S.D. Patil, who had moved the Bill in both the Houses, made the following statement which may help us to know the kinds of cases that were intended to be included in the ninety days' category. The statement is as under:

"Then, Sir, a lot of criticism has been levelled against Section 167 as to why the investigation is not completed within 60 days. There is a provision for releasing a person on bail. Why do we want to extend it by thirty days? We have made two categories. Ninety days are applicable where the investigation relates to an offence punishable with death,--there are eight offences punishable with death ... Imprisonment for life--we have 48 offences punishable with imprisonment for life ... or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years and we have 36 offences punishable with this sentence. Only in such cases which are complicated in nature, investigation takes a longer time. To complete this kind of investigation, one has to go through other States as well. This has been our experience..." [ Rajya Sabha Debates, Vol CVII, Nos. 13-25, 6 to 25 December 1978 (6th December), p. 203.]

105. If we look at the figures of 8, 48 and 36, referred to in the aforementioned statement, we may be able to cull out the intention of the legislature in classifying the offences. From the First Schedule of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (as it existed in 1978) read with whole of IPC, it can be gathered that, the "eight" cases punishable with death were -- Sections 121, 132, 194 (Part II), 302, 303 (struck down), 305, 307 (Part III), 396 IPC; the forty-eight offences punishable with life imprisonment were -- Sections 121-A, 122, 124-A, 125, 128, 130, 131, 194 (Part I), 222, 225 (Part V), 232, 238, 255, 304 (Part I), 307 (Part II), 311, 313, 314 (Part II), 326, 329, 363-A (Part II), 364, 371, 376, 377, 388 (Part II), 389 (Part II), 394, 395, 400, 409, 412, 413, 436, 437, 438, 449, 459, 460, 467, 472, 474 (Part II), 475, 477, 489-A, 489-B, 489-D and 511 (Part I) IPC; and the thirty-six offences refer to Sections 119 (Part II), 123, 235 (Part II), 240, 251, 304 (Part II), 306, 307 (Part I), 314, 315, 316, 327, 328, 331, 333, 363-A (Part I), 366, 366-A, 366-B, 367, 372, 373, 382, 386, 388 (Part I), 389 (Part I), 392 (Part I), 399, 437, 439, 450, 454 (Part II), 455, 493 and 495 IPC.

106. A perusal of the figure of eight, forty-eight, and thirty-six mentioned in his speech by the then Hon'ble Minister of State in the Ministry of Home Affairs, Shri S.D. Patil, in the light of what I have mentioned in preceding paragraph shows that the Hon'ble Minister classified cases which are "punishable" with a particular sentence as a separate class. His statistics shows that he had classified the cases punishable with death sentence in one group, cases punishable with life imprisonment were classified in another group and cases punishable with imprisonment of up to ten years were classified in the third group. The reference he was making to the 36 cases that fall in the category of "imprisonment of not less than ten years" in Section 167(2)(a)(i) of the Code, were in fact the offences for which the punishment was of imprisonment for a period which may extend to ten years. It can further be inferred that, when he stated "... or imprisonment for a term of not less than ten years and we have 36 offences punishable with this sentence...", he referred to offences wherein ten years' imprisonment was also an imposable punishment.

107. From the above analogy, I am of the opinion that the intention of the legislature was that if an offence was punishable with imprisonment up to ten years, then it falls within the provision of Section 167(2)(a)(i) of the Code, and the permissible period for investigation is ninety days. The intention of the legislature in extending the permissible time-period from sixty days to ninety days for investigation is to include the offences in which sentence awardable is at least ten years or more. Therefore, as discussed above, though the expression "not less than ten years" used in Section 167(2)(a)(i) of the Code has created some ambiguity, the real intention of the legislature seems to include all such offences wherein an imprisonment which may extend to ten years is an awardable sentence. In other words, for the offences wherein the punishment may extend to ten years' imprisonment, the permissible period for

filing charge-sheet shall be ninety days, and only after the period of ninety days, the accused shall be entitled to bail on default for non- filing of the charge-sheet. (In the present case, admittedly the charge- sheet is filed within ninety days.) I may further add that, since the expression "not less than ten years" has caused ambiguity in interpretation, the best course for the legislature would be to clear its intention by using the appropriate words."

15. Learned counsel for the applicant further placed reliance on the subsequent judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M. Ravindran Vs. Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue Intelligence, (2021) 2 SCC 485 and by placing reliance upon the said judgment, learned counsel for the applicant submits that the majority opinion in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra) is also affirmed in this case. He particularly placed reliance in para 17 to 17.7 of the said judgment wherein there is a complete discussion on the right to "default bail" of Section 167(2) CrPC which are also being reproduced herein as under:-

II. Section 167(2) and the Fundamental Right to Life and Personal Liberty

17. Before we proceed to expand upon the parameters of the right to default bail under Section 167(2) as interpreted by various decisions of this Court, we find it pertinent to note the observations made by this Court in Uday Mohanlal Acharya [Uday Mohanlal Acharya v. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 5 SCC 453 : 2001 SCC (Cri) 760] on the fundamental right to personal liberty of the person and the effect of deprivation of the same as follows : (SCC p. 472, para 13) "13. ... Personal liberty is one of the cherished objects of the Indian Constitution and deprivation of the same can only be in accordance with law and in conformity with the provisions thereof, as stipulated under Article 21 of the Constitution. When the law provides that the Magistrate could authorise the detention of the accused in custody up to a maximum period as indicated in the proviso to sub-section (2) of Section 167, any further detention beyond the period without filing of a challan by the investigating agency would be a subterfuge and would not be in accordance with law and in conformity with the provisions of the Criminal Procedure

Code, and as such, could be violative of Article 21 of the Constitution."

17.1. Article 21 of the Constitution of India provides that "no person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty except according to procedure established by law". It has been settled by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India [Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, (1978) 1 SCC 248] , that such a procedure cannot be arbitrary, unfair or unreasonable. The history of the enactment of Section 167(2) CrPC and the safeguard of "default bail" contained in the proviso thereto is intrinsically linked to Article 21 and is nothing but a legislative exposition of the constitutional safeguard that no person shall be detained except in accordance with rule of law.

17.2. Under Section 167 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 ("the 1898 Code") which was in force prior to the enactment of the CrPC, the maximum period for which an accused could be remanded to custody, either police or judicial, was 15 days. However, since it was often unworkable to conclude complicated investigations within 15 days, a practice arose wherein investigating officers would file "preliminary charge-sheets" after the expiry of the remand period. The State would then request the Magistrate to postpone commencement of the trial and authorise further remand of the accused under Section 344 of the 1898 Code till the time the investigation was completed and the final charge-

sheet was filed. The Law Commission of India in Report No. 14 on Reforms of the Judicial Administration (Vol. II, 1948, pp. 758-760) pointed out that in many cases the accused were languishing for several months in custody without any final report being filed before the courts. It was also pointed out that there was conflict in judicial opinion as to whether the Magistrate was bound to release the accused if the police report was not filed within 15 days.

17.3. Hence the Law Commission in Report No. 14 recommended the need for an appropriate provision specifically providing for continued remand after the expiry of 15 days, in a manner that "while meeting the needs of a full and proper investigation in cases of serious crime, will still safeguard the liberty of the person of the individual". Further, that the legislature should prescribe a maximum time period beyond which no accused could be detained without filing of the police report before the Magistrate. It was pointed out that in England, even a person accused of grave offences such as treason could not be indefinitely detained in prison till commencement of the trial.

17.4. The suggestion made in Report No. 14 was reiterated by the Law Commission in Report No. 41 on The Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (Vol. I, 1969, pp. 76-77). The Law Commission re-emphasised the need to guard against the misuse of Section 344 of the 1898 Code by filing "preliminary reports" for remanding the accused beyond the statutory period prescribed under Section 167. It was pointed out that this could lead to serious abuse wherein "the arrested person can in this manner be kept in custody indefinitely while the investigation can go on in a leisurely manner". Hence the Commission recommended fixing of a maximum time-limit of 60 days for remand. The Commission considered the reservation expressed earlier in Report No. 37 that such an extension may result in the 60-day period becoming a matter of routine. However,

faith was expressed that proper supervision by the superior courts would help circumvent the same.

17.5. The suggestions made in Report No. 41 were taken note of and incorporated by the Central Government while drafting the Code of Criminal Procedure Bill in 1970. Ultimately, the 1898 Code was replaced by the present CrPC. The Statement of Objects and Reasons of the CrPC provides that the Government took the following important considerations into account while evaluating the recommendations of the Law Commission:

"3. The recommendations of the Commission were examined carefully by the Government, keeping in view, among others, the following basic considerations:

(i) an accused person should get a fair trial in accordance with the accepted principles of natural justice;

(ii) every effort should be made to avoid delay in investigation and trial which is harmful not only to the individuals involved but also to society; and

(iii) the procedure should not be complicated and should, to the utmost extent possible, ensure fair deal to the poorer sections of the community."

17.6. It was in this backdrop that Section 167(2) was enacted within the present day CrPC, providing for time-limits on the period of remand of the accused, proportionate to the seriousness of the offence committed, failing which the accused acquires the indefeasible right to bail. As is evident from the recommendations of the Law Commission mentioned supra, the intent of the legislature was to balance the need for sufficient time-limits to complete the investigation with the need to protect the civil liberties of the accused. Section 167(2) provides for a clear mandate that the investigative agency must collect the required evidence within the prescribed time period, failing which the accused can no longer be detained. This ensures that the investigating officers are compelled to act swiftly and efficiently without misusing the prospect of further remand. This also ensures that the court takes cognizance of the case without any undue delay from the date of giving information of the offence, so that society at large does not lose faith and develop cynicism towards the criminal justice system.

17.7. Therefore, as mentioned supra, Section 167(2) is integrally linked to the constitutional commitment under Article 21 promising protection of life and personal liberty against unlawful and arbitrary detention, and must be interpreted in a manner which serves this purpose. In this regard we find it useful to refer to the decision of the three-Judge Bench of this Court in Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam [Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam, (2017) 15 SCC 67 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 401] , which laid down certain seminal principles as to the interpretation of Section 167(2) CrPC though the questions of law involved were somewhat different from the present case. The questions before the three- Judge Bench in Rakesh Kumar Paul [Rakesh Kumar Paul v. State of Assam, (2017) 15 SCC 67 : (2018) 1 SCC (Cri) 401] were whether, firstly, the 90-day remand extension under Section 167(2)(a)(i) would be applicable in respect of offences where the maximum period of

imprisonment was 10 years, though the minimum period was less than 10 years. Secondly, whether the application for bail filed by the accused could be construed as an application for default bail, even though the expiry of the statutory period under Section 167(2) had not been specifically pleaded as a ground for bail. The majority opinion held that the 90-day limit is only available in respect of offences where a minimum ten year' imprisonment period is stipulated, and that the oral arguments for default bail made by the counsel for the accused before the High Court would suffice in lieu of a written application. This was based on the reasoning that the court should not be too technical in matters of personal liberty. Madan B. Lokur, J. in his majority opinion, pertinently observed as follows : (SCC pp. 95-96 & 99, paras 29, 32 & 41) "29. Notwithstanding this, the basic legislative intent of completing investigations within twenty-four hours and also within an otherwise time-bound period remains unchanged, even though that period has been extended over the years. This is an indication that in addition to giving adequate time to complete investigations, the legislature has also and always put a premium on personal liberty and has always felt that it would be unfair to an accused to remain in custody for a prolonged or indefinite period. It is for this reason and also to hold the investigating agency accountable that time-limits have been laid down by the legislature. ...

***

32. ... Such views and opinions over a prolonged period have prompted the legislature for more than a century to ensure expeditious conclusion of investigations so that an accused person is not unnecessarily deprived of his or her personal liberty by remaining in prolonged custody for an offence that he or she might not even have committed. In our opinion, the entire debate before us must also be looked at from the point of view of expeditious conclusion of investigations and from the angle of personal liberty and not from a purely dictionary or textual perspective as canvassed by the learned counsel for the State.

***

41. We take this view keeping in mind that in matters of personal liberty and Article 21 of the Constitution, it is not always advisable to be formalistic or technical. The history of the personal liberty jurisprudence of this Court and other constitutional courts includes petitions for a writ of habeas corpus and for other writs being entertained even on the basis of a letter addressed to the Chief Justice or the Court."

(emphasis supplied) Therefore, the courts cannot adopt a rigid or formalistic approach whilst considering any issue that touches upon the rights contained in Article

21."

16. Learned counsel for the applicant argued that since the majority opinion in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul

(supra) was affirmed in the case of M. Ravindran (supra) the period of 90 days limit is only available in respect of the offences where a minimum ten years imprisonment period is stipulated.

17. Learned counsel for the applicant, apart from this, also placed reliance upon a judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Satender Kumar Antil Vs. Central Bureau of Investigation and another, 2022 (10) SCC 51. He submits that the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of M. Ravindran (supra) was also followed and hence still holds a good law.

18. He submits that since the majority opinion in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra) was affirmed in the case of M. Ravindran (supra), which was further followed in the case of Satender Kumar Antil (supra) and hence as per the majority opinion, the 90 days limit would only available in respect of the offences where a ten years' imprisonment period is stipulated.

19. By giving reference of aforesaid judgments, learned counsel for the applicant submitted that since for the offences punishable under Section 467 IPC, the minimum sentence is not prescribed, therefore, in view of the majority opinion in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra), the 60 days limit is available for submission of the chargesheet failing which the applicant is entitled for default bail.

20. In addition to the aforesaid judgments, some more judgments have also been placed by the learned counsel for the applicant, rendered by the coordinate Bench of this Court and it is necessary to give reference of all those judgments. The first one is in the First Bail Application No. 869 of 2019, decided by the coordinate Bench of this Court on 09.05.2019; another one is in the First Bail Application No. 367 of 2019, decided on 12.04.2019 and the third one is in the Second Bail Application No. 170 of 2021 decided on 03.03.2022.

21. I also perused all these judgments passed by the coordinate Bench of this Court, wherein the accused was enlarged on bail.

22. In all these judgments, the reference of the judgment rendered in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra) as well as the views expressed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rajeev Chaudhary (supra) were also given; however, on perusal of these orders, it appears that there is no any discussion and, what it reveals from these orders, which has been rightly pointed out by the learned AGA for the State that in these cases, the State Counsel concedes that the applicant is entitled for default bail since the accused is in custody for more than 60 days but the chargesheet has not been filed.

23. These judgments, as relied by the learned counsel for the applicant may be of a persuasive value, but is

having no binding effect since there is no any discussion. It is necessary to give reference of the orders passed by the coordinate Bench of this Court, particularly in First Bail Application No. 367 of 2019 and the relevant paras are necessary to be extracted herein, in order to demonstrate that there is no any discussion whether the minimum sentence would be the criteria for entitlement of default bail.

"5. In support of his contention learned counsel for the applicant has placed reliance on the principles of law as laid down in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul Vs. State of Assam, (2017) 15 SCC

67. In the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul (Supra) in a similarly situated case, during pendency of regular bail, oral arguments with regard to default bail were made in the High Court but bail was rejected. Hon'ble Supreme Court while interpreting the provisions, inter-alia accepted the earlier view as expressed in the case of Rajeev Chaudhary Vs. State (NCT of Delhi), (2001) 5 SCC 34, in which, it was held that the words "not less than" in clause (i) would mean that imprisonment should be ten years or more and would cover only those offences for which punishment of imprisonment could be for a clear period of ten years or more.

6. Learned State counsel concedes that the applicant is entitled to 'default bail' because the accused has been in custody for more than 60 days. On 12.03.2019, the charge-sheet was not filed in the case. The applicant is in custody under Sections 379, 420, 467, 468, 471, 411 and 120-B of I.P.C and Section 66 of the Information Technology Act, 2000.

7. The applicant is in custody for offences for which punishment of imprisonment is not for a clear period of ten years or more. The applicant was arrested on 21.12.2018. Till 12.03.2019 the charge-sheet was not filed in the case. Therefore, in view of the Rakesh Kumar Paul (Supra) the applicant is entitled for 'default bail'.

8. Since, charge-sheet has not been filed within 60 days from the date of arrest of the applicant; therefore, applicant is enlarged on bail under Sections 167 (2) (a) sub-clause (ii)."

24. This Court have full regards with the judgment rendered by the coordinate Bench of this Court, but the crucial issue, which is required to be discussed here is,

that for the grant of "default bail" whether "minimum" sentence will be taken into consideration or the "maximum". Since there is no any discussion on this, therefore, without expressing any opinion on the judgments passed by the coordinate Bench of this Court, this Court is of the view that, these judgments have no persuasive value.

25. Mr. Pratiroop Pandey, learned AGA for the State vehemently opposed the contention raised by the learned counsel for the applicant and interestingly he also placed reliance on the judgment rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra) and he has pointed out para 84.2 and 84.3 of the said judgment, which are being reproduced herein as under:-

"84.2. Section 167(2)(a)(i) of the Code is applicable only in cases where the accused is charged with (a) offences punishable with death and any lower sentence; (b) offences punishable with life imprisonment and any lower sentence; and (c) offences punishable with minimum sentence of 10 years.

84.3. In all cases where the minimum sentence is less than 10 years but the maximum sentence is not death or life imprisonment then Section 167(2)(a)(ii) will apply and the accused will be entitled to grant of "default bail" after 60 days in case charge-sheet is not filed."

26. In addition to this, he also placed reliance in one of the judgment rendered by the Bombay High Court in the case of Abdul Salim Shaikh (Siddique) and another Vs. State of Maharashtra, decided on 07.10.2013 passed in Criminal Bail Application No. 1118 of 2013, which is particularly in reference to Section 467 IPC. Para 9, 13 and 21 of the said judgment appear to

be relevant and therefore, the same are being reproduced herein as under:-

"9. Mr. Memon relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court of India in the case of "Rajeev Chaudhary V/s State of Delhi (AIR 2001 SC 3369), wherein the question as to what would be the maximum period of detention pending investigation with respect to an offence punishable under section 386 of IPC fell for consideration of Their Lordships. Section 386 of the IPC provides that the offender 'shall be punished for imprisonment for a term which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine.' Their Lordship considered as to how the term 'not less than 10 years' appearing in sub-section (i) of clause

(a) of the first proviso to Section 167(2) is to be construed and held, inter alia, that clause (i) of sub-clause (a) of the proviso to section 167(2) would be applicable to an offence punishable (i) with death; (2) imprisonment for life; and (3) imprisonment for a term not less than 10 years; and that, it would not cover the case of an offence for which punishment could be of imprisonment for less than 10 years. In other words, it was held that the expression 'not less than' occurring in the aforesaid sub- clause (i) would mean that imprisonment for that particular offence should be 10 years or more. The offence punishable under section 386 of IPC was held to be governed by sub-clause (ii) of clause (a) of the first proviso to section 167(2).

13. Indeed, section 467 of IPC provides for a punishment of imprisonment for life with respect to an offence mentioned thereunder. It cannot, therefore, be disputed that in case of an investigation into an offence of forgery of valuable security, made punishable under section 467 of IPC, the maximum period for which detention pending investigation can be authorized under section 167 (2) of the Code, would be of 90 days.

21. As a result of the aforesaid discussion, I hold that, as in this case, the investigation related to offences at least one of which was punishable with imprisonment for life, sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of the first proviso to section 167 of the Code applied. It, therefore, follows that detention of the applicants could be authorized for a period upto 90 days under the said section. The applicants, therefore, were not entitled to be released on bail, after the expiry of a period of 60 days of detention on the ground that the investigation had not been completed.

27. Mr. Pratiroop Pandey, learned AGA for the State submits that Section 167(2)(a)(i) of CrPC is very clear and there is no doubt on this. He submits that 90 day is the limit in the case in hand for submission of the

chargesheet and the argument as advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant is misconceived.

28. He submits that the arguments, as advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant are also not acceptable that the majority opinion in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra) held that the test for entitlement of default bail would be a minimum sentence. He submits that learned counsel for the applicant misunderstood the said view.

29. Apart from this, he submits that even in the case of M. Ravindran (supra), the majority opinion in the case of Rakesh Kumar Paul (supra), only the reference has been given, but ultimately what would be the test for entitlement of default bail, there is no any such observation.

30. Mr. Pratiroop Pandey, learned AGA for the State submits that on plain reading of Section 167(2)(a)(i) of CrPC with Section 467 of IPC, it is very much clear that for the offence punishable under Section 467 of IPC, the period 90 days would be the limit for filing the chargesheet.

31. In reference to the order passed by the coordinate Bench of this Court, Mr. Pandey, learned AGA submits that on the issue, as raised in this Application, there is no any discussion at all and since the State Counsel concedes, therefore, the coordinate Bench of this Court enlarged the accused on bail.

32. He submits that there is no any question for raising any doubt on the mandate of Section 167(2)(a)(i) of CrPC and here, since for the offences punishable under Section 467 IPC, there is a maximum sentence of life, therefore, the limit would be 90 days for filing chargesheet.

33. Learned AGA for the State also placed reliance on two other judgments of the coordinate Bench of this Court, one is in Criminal Miscellaneous Application No. 1848 of 2023, Randeep Singh Randhawa Vs. State of Uttarakhand and Another, decided on 19.10.2023, preferred under Section 482 CrPC and, another one is in the First Bail Application No. 1102 of 2019, Qazi Mohammed Nooruddin Vs. State of Uttarakhand, decided on 31.05.2019 and surprisingly, in both the cases, Mr. Aditya Singh, Advocate, was the counsel for the applicants.

34. The case of Randeep Singh Randhawa (supra), was pertaining to offence punishable under Section 395 IPC, which is punishable with life imprisonment and the case of Qazi Mohammed Nooruddin (supra) pertaining to the offence punishable under Section 409 IPC which is also punishable with imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term which may be extended to 10 years.

35. Here, in the present case, the applicant, who is seeking bail for the offence punishable under Sections 420, 467, 468, 471 read with Section 120B of IPC and

on perusal of Section 467 IPC, the maximum sentence is with imprisonment for life or with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to 10 years and shall also be liable to fine and therefore, in view of Section 167(2)(i)(a) CrPC, the maximum limit for the said offence would be 90 days. Thus, the argument as advanced by the learned counsel for the applicant is not acceptable and is outrightly rejected.

36. Consequently, the instant Bail Application, wherein the present applicant is seeking default bail is also hereby rejected.

37. Before parting, it also needs to be discussed that since this Court have not touched the merit of the case, the accused/applicant will be at liberty to file a regular bail application on the merit of the case.

___________________________ Rakesh Thapliyal, J.

Dt: 10.09.2024 Mahinder/