[Cites 5, Cited by 0]
Tripura High Court
The State Of Tripura To Be Represented By ... vs Smt. Mina Deb on 19 January, 2026
Page 1 of 10
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
WA No.80 of 2025
1. The State of Tripura to be represented by the Secretary, Department of
Finance, Government of Tripura, New Secretariat Building, New Capital
Complex, Kunjaban, P.S. New Capital Complex, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN-
799010
2. The Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Social Education, Govt. of
Tripura, New Secretariat Building, New Capital Complex, Kunjaban, P.S. New
Capital Complex, Agartala, West Tripura, PIN- 799010
3. The Director, Social Welfare and Social Education Department, Govt. of
Tripura, Malancha, Ujan Abhoynagar, Agartala, West Tripura
4. The Officer-in-Charge, Tripura Social Welfare Board, Pensioner's Awaas
Ashray, Gurkhabasti, Agartala
5. Tripura State Social Welfare Board to be represented by the Chairperson,
Tripura State Social Welfare Board, Akhaura Road, Agartala, Tripura
.........Appellant(s);
Versus
Smt. Mina Deb, D/o Late Haripada Deb, R/o Ramnagar, Road No.10, P.O.
Ramnagar, P.S. West Agartala, West Tripura, PIN- 799002
.........Respondent(s)
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Dipankar Sarma, Addl. G.A.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Purusuttam Roy Barman, Sr. Advocate,
Mr. Kawsik Nath, Advocate,
Ms. Aradhita Debbarma, Advocate.
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Order
19/01/2026
This Writ Appeal is preferred by the State of Tripura and others
including the Tripura State Social Welfare Board challenging the judgment
dt.10.03.2025 in WP(C) No.633/2024.
2. The respondent was appointed as Contingent Clerk-cum-Typist on
a consolidated pay of Rs.700/- per month in the establishment of the Tripura
State Social Welfare Board (appellant No.5) initially for a period of 89 days.
3. The appellants continued to appoint her in the said position by
giving a break after the 89th day, and again re-employing her.
4. This practice continued upto 24.01.2011 when the respondent was
offered by the appellant No.5 - Board a regular post of Lower Division Clerk in
the said Board in the pay scale of Rs.5310-24000/- (PB-2) with Grade Pay of
Rs.1800/- per month terming it to be an appointment on temporary basis liable
for termination at any time by a month's notice on either side.
5. After having been appointed as the Lower Division Clerk, which
post she joined on 01.02.2011, she retired on 31.01.2020.
6. On her retirement, the appellant No.5 - Board took a decision to
allow pension taking into consideration of the previous service only from
12.12.2009, i.e. from the date of lifting the condition of break in service, which
condition had been withdrawn by the State vide memorandum dt.31.07.2014.
7. However it was decided that the spell of broken service shall not
be taken into account for determining the qualifying service for payment of
pension. Thus, the spell of service of the petitioner/respondent herein from
31.12.1987 to 11.12.2009, which had been broken several times as per the
condition of appointment, i.e. after each 89 days, was not counted for the
purposes of pension.
8. The respondent therefore filed WP(C) No.633/2024 before this
Court, and sought a direction to the appellants to count 50% of the service
rendered by her with effect from 31.12.1987 till her regularization on
01.02.2011 along with regular service rendered by her from 01.02.2011 to
31.01.2020 for determining the qualifying service years rendered by her for
calculation of pension and other pensionary benefits, which had been rejected
on 31.08.2024 by the respondents/appellants herein.
9. In the Writ Petition, the respondent had contended inter alia that in
computing the qualifying service rendered by her for the purpose of pension
and other pensionary benefits, 50% of the service rendered by her as
Contingent Clerk with effect from 31.12.1987 till 31.01.2011 i.e. 12 years is
also to be counted along with regular service rendered by her from 01.02.2011
to 31.01.2020 for determining the qualifying service rendered by her for the
said purpose.
10. She alleged that 50% of the past service rendered by her as
Contingent Clerk, had not been taken into consideration. She also alleged that
in determining the regular monthly pension and other pensionary benefits
payable to her, the appellants did not add 50% of service rendered by her as
Contingent Clerk with effect from 31.12.1987 to 31.01.2011, and her
pensionary benefits had been calculated and determined only on the basis of her
regular service as Lower Division Clerk with effect from 01.02.2011 to
31.01.2020, and as a result thereof, she had been deprived of her actual
pensionary benefits.
11. She relied on a memorandum dt.16.08.1978 issued by the Finance
Department of the Government of Tripura which specifically permitted half the
period of continuous service rendered by a Contingent employee and engaged
on full time to be counted towards pension when followed by employment in
regular pensionable service. This method had also been reiterated in subsequent
memorandums dt.26.09.1979, dt.19.07.1982, and dt.25.02.2010.
12. The appellants, on the other hand, contended before the learned
Single Judge that because there was an artificial break in service, the benefit of
the above memorandums cannot be given to her for determining the qualifying
service in connection with the calculation of pension and other retiral benefits.
13. The learned Single Judge, in the impugned judgment, rejected the
contention of the appellants, and by placing reliance on the judgments of the
Supreme Court in the case of Ahalya A. Samtaney v. State of Maharashtra &
others1 and also in the case of Prem Singh v. State of Uttar Pradesh and
Others2 held that the action of the appellants in giving artificial break of one
day after every 89 days of service, is not proper as per Service Rules, and this
method had been adopted by the appellants only to deprive the respondent of
the retiral benefits due to her.
He held that the respondent cannot be deprived of the legitimate
expectation of pension after serving the appellants, and the technical methods
adopted by the appellants to deprive the respondent's right to pension and
eligibility, cannot be appreciated. Periodical one day breakage and
discontinuity cannot be said as a breakage in service.
He, therefore, allowed the Writ Petition, and directed the
appellants to treat 50% of the service rendered by the respondent as a
Contingent Worker taking into consideration the regularization of service and
fixing the entitlement of her retirement benefits in accordance with law, and set
aside the proceeding dt.31.08.2024 passed by the third appellant.
14. Challenging the same, this Appeal has been preferred by the
appellants.
(2018) 9 SCC 92
(2019) 10 SCC 516
15. Counsel for the appellants contended that learned Single Judge
erred in allowing the Writ Petition filed by the respondent, and he also erred in
holding that giving of the break in service after every 89 days' of service, is not
correct ; that it was permitted by the then existing Rules, and she had worked
on the said basis as Contingent Clerk-cum-Typist from 31.12.1987 till the said
condition of break in service was withdrawn on 31.07.2014 with effect from
12.12.2009; and the respondent had thus fulfilled only 9(nine) years in the post
of Lower Division Clerk as regular service when counted from 01.02.2011, and
unless she completes ten years of service, she is not qualified to get higher
pension. According to him, the spell of broken service cannot be taken into
account for determining the qualifying service for payment of pension.
16. He also stated that there is no statute permitting condonation of the
interrupted period, and therefore she is not entitled to pension by taking into
account her past service as a Contingent Clerk-cum-Typist.
17. Counsel for appellants is unable to explain under what principle of
law, the respondent had been appointed on 31.12.1987, and continued till
24.01.2011 by giving her artificial breaks after every 89 days.
18. The Supreme Court in several cases had deprecated the practice of
the Government or Government instrumentalities giving artificial breaks in
service of employees to deny them continuity of service.
19. In Rattan Lal & others v. State of Haryana & Others3, the
Supreme Court held:
(1985) 4 SCC 43 : 1985 SCC (L&S) 938, at page 43 :
"1. In all these petitions the common question which arises
for decision is whether it is open to the State Government to
appoint teachers on an ad hoc basis at the commencement
of an academic year and terminate their services before the
commencement of the next summer vacation, or earlier, to
appoint them again on an ad hoc basis at the
commencement of next academic year and to terminate their
services before the commencement of the succeeding
summer vacation or earlier and to continue to do so year
after year. A substantial number of such ad hoc
appointments are made in the existing vacancies which have
remained unfilled for three to four years. It is the duty of the
State Government to take steps to appoint teachers in those
vacancies in accordance with the rules as early as possible.
The State Government of Haryana has failed to discharge
that duty in these cases. It has been appointing teachers for
quite some time on an ad hoc basis for short periods as
stated above without any justifiable reason. In some cases
the appointments are made for a period of six months only
and they are renewed after a break of a few days. The
number of teachers in the State of Haryana who are thus
appointed on such ad hoc basis is very large indeed. If the
teachers had been appointed regularly, they would have
been entitled to the benefits of summer vacation along with
the salary and allowances payable in respect of that period
and to all other privileges such as casual leave, medical
leave, maternity leave etc. available to all the Government
servants. These benefits are denied to these ad hoc teachers
unreasonably on account of this pernicious system of
appointment adopted by the State Government. These ad
hoc teachers are unnecessarily subjected to an arbitrary
"hiring and firing" policy. These teachers who constitute
the bulk of the educated unemployed are compelled to
accept these jobs on an ad hoc basis with miserable
conditions of service. The Government appears to be
exploiting this situation. This is not a sound personnel
policy. It is bound to have serious repercussions on the
educational institutions and the children studying there. The
policy of "ad hocism" followed by the State Government for
a long period has led to the breach of Article 14 and Article
16 of the Constitution. Such a situation cannot be permitted
to last any longer. It is needless to say that the State
Government is expected to function as a model employer.
2. We, therefore, direct the State Government to take
immediate steps to fill up in accordance with the relevant
rules the vacancies in which teachers appointed on an ad
hoc basis are now working and to allow all those teachers
who are now holding these posts on ad hoc basis to remain
in those posts till the vacancies are duly filled up. The
teachers who are now working on such ad hoc basis if they
have the prescribed qualification may also apply for being
appointed regularly in those posts. The State Government
may also consider sympathetically the question of relaxing
the qualification of maximum age prescribed for
appointment to those posts in the case of those who have
been victims of this system of "ad hoc" appointments. If any
of the petitioners in these petitions has under any existing
rule acquired the right to be treated as a regularly
appointed teacher, his case shall be considered by the State
Government and an appropriate order may be. passed in his
case.
3. We strongly deprecate the policy of the State Government
under which "ad hoc" teachers are denied the salary and
allowances for the period of the summer vacation by
resorting to the fictional breaks of the type referred to
above. These "ad hoc" teachers shall be paid salary and
allowances for the period of summer vacation as long as
they hold the office under this order. Those who are entitled
to maternity or medical leave, shall also be granted such
leave in accordance with the rules." (emphasis supplied)
20. This issue also fell for consideration before the Supreme Court in
the case of Ahalya A. Samtaney (1 supra), and the Supreme Court deprecated
the action of the respondents therein in giving artificial break of one day in
order to deprive the appellant therein of the benefit of pay protection.
The Supreme Court referred to the judgment of the Bombay High
Court in the case of Pervez H. Lentin v. St. Xavier's College4 where the
Bombay High Court had deprecated such artificial breaks to deny to an
employee benefits such as pension, and the Bombay High Court had
highlighted the insecurity which is created in the mind of employees when such
artificial breaks in service are given.
21. Similar view has also been taken by the Supreme Court in Prem
Singh (2 supra).
In that case also, service as a Work-Charged employee was not
counted by the State of Uttar Pradesh for computation of qualifying service for
the purpose of retirement benefits such as pension.
The Supreme Court observed that the very concept of Work-
Charged employment had been misused by offering employment on
exploitative terms for the work which is regular and perennial in nature like in
the instant case.
The Supreme Court held in the said case that if after an employee
had put in substantial period of service on Work-Charged basis and thereafter
his services were regularized, the period spent by such employee in the Work-
Charged establishment, has to be counted towards qualifying service, and the
service rendered by them in the Work-Charged establishment cannot be treated
as if there was no service rendered at all by the employee.
22. When an employee like the respondent has been made to work as a
Contingent Clerk-cum-Typist from 31.12.1987 till she was made a Lower
Division Clerk on 24.01.2011 by giving artificial breaks in every 89 days, it has
2005 SCC OnLine Bom 1741
to be inferred that the so called artificial break was given deliberately by
misusing the appellants' powers, and exploiting the respondent. Such artificial
breaks in service have therefore to be ignored.
23. We therefore agree with the reasoning given by the learned Single
Judge in granting relief to the respondent herein in the Writ Petition.
24. In this view of the matter, we do not find any merit in the
contentions of the appellants in this Writ Appeal. It is accordingly dismissed
with cost of Rs.15,000/- to be paid by the appellants to the respondent within
8(eight) weeks.
25. Pending application(s), if any, shall stand disposed of.
(BISWAJIT PALIT, J) (M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO, CJ)
Pijush/
PIJUSH KANTI NAG Digitally signed by PIJUSH KANTI NAG
Date: 2026.01.22 16:37:13 +05'30'
