[Cites 3, Cited by 0]
Tripura High Court
Sri Jugambudhi Nath vs Smt. Laxmi Devi Nath on 4 February, 2026
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
IA No.01/2026 in/and MAT.App. No.3 of 2026
Sri Jugambudhi Nath, S/o Late Kripesh Chandra Nath, of Village-Netaji
Nagar, P.O. & P.S. Kanchanpur, District: North Tripura.
......... Appellant/Applicant (s).
VERSUS
Smt. Laxmi Devi Nath, W/o Sri Jugambudhi Nath, D/o Late Naresh Chandra
Nath, of Lembucherra, Damdamia Health Centre, Agartala, West Tripura.
......... Respondent(s).
For Appellant/Applicant (s) : Mr. Alik Das, Advocate
Ms. Mallika Roy, Advocate
For Respondent(s) : None
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
CAV reserved on : 02.02.2026.
Judgment delivered on : 04.02.2026
Whether fit for reporting : NO
JUDGMENT & ORDER
(Biswajit Palit, J)
Heard Mr. Alik Das, learned counsel appearing for the
appellant/applicant.
2. This application has been filed by the appellant/applicant under
Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 seeking condonation of delay of 149
days in filing the connected appeal challenging the judgment dt. 26.05.2025
passed by Learned District Judge, North Tripura, Dharmanagar in connection
with case No.Title Suit (Divorce) 09 of 2022.
3. It is stated in the application filed by the appellant/applicant
seeking condonation of delay that after the judgment was pronounced, the
appellant/applicant became mentally shocked and was also busy for his
official duties. Consequently, he was not in a position to come to Agartala to
discuss the matter and take necessary steps. Thereafter, in the month of
August, 2025 the appellant/applicant decided to contest the case before this
Court and accordingly, on 21.09.2025, the appellant/applicant came to
Agartala to meet with his advocate. On 26.10.2025, he again met with his
advocate who advised him to prefer an appeal. But, after expiry of the period
of 90 days for preferring the appeal, the appellant/applicant prayed for a
certified copy of the judgment and thereafter, upon receiving the same, he
took steps to file the connected appeal.
4. It is further stated in the present application that the period of
appeal has expired on 24.08.2025 and thus, a delay of 149 days have been
occurred in preferring the connected appeal. It is also stated by the
appellant/applicant that the delay is unintentional and there was no laches on
the part of the appellant/applicant to prefer the connected appeal. So, the
appellant/applicant prayed for condoning the delay in preferring the connected
appeal before this Court.
5. At the time of hearing, learned counsel for the appellant/applicant
only laid the aforesaid facts before this Court but failed to explain as to how
the delay was caused in preferring the appeal. The limitation for preferring the
appeal is fixed at 90 days excluding the period required for obtaining the
certified copy of the judgment but, here in the case at hand, the
appellant/applicant save and except mentioning the aforesaid facts, could not
place any other materials before this Court to consider the application for
condonation of delay. The appellant/applicant only stated that he was mentally
shocked and busy for official works. Thus, it appears to this Court that there
was lack of due diligence on the part of the appellant/applicant in preferring
the connected appeal on time. Furthermore, learned counsel for the
appellant/applicant also failed to place any convincing materials before this
Court explaining day to day delay occurred in filing the connected appeal.
6. In Thirunagalingam v. Lingeswaran & Anr.1, at para Nos.31
and 32, Hon'ble the Supreme Court observed as under:
"31. It is a well-settled law that while considering the plea for
condonation of delay, the first and foremost duty of the court is to
first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party
seeking condonation rather than starting with the merits of the main
matter. Only when sufficient cause or reasons given for the delay by
the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced or
stand on equal footing, the court may consider the merits of the main
matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.
32. Further, this Court has repeatedly emphasised in several cases
that delay should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity.
The pursuit of substantial justice must not come at the cost of
causing prejudice to the opposing party. In the present case, the
respondents/defendants have failed to demonstrate reasonable
grounds of delay in pursuing the matter, and this crucial requirement
for condoning the delay remains unmet."
(emphasis supplied)
7. Similarly, in H. Guruswamy & Ors. v. A. Krishnaiah since
deceased by Lrs.2, at para Nos.16 and 17, Hon'ble the Supreme Court
observed as under:
"16. The length of the delay is definitely a relevant matter which the
court must take into consideration while considering whether the
delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of
the respondents herein, it appears that they want to fix their own
period of limitation for the purpose of instituting the proceedings for
which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a
party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits
because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be
non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he
cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be
preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering
the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the
merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the
bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking
condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant
and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court
may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of
condoning the delay.
2025 SCC OnLine SC 1093
2025 SCC OnLine SC 54
17. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a
technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the
principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. No court
should keep the „Sword of Damocles‟ hanging over the head of a
litigant for an indefinite period of time."
8. It is the settled position that the law of limitation is based on
public policy and principles of equity. The power under Section 5 of
Limitation Act, 1963 is a discretionary power and it may not be exercised if
the delay is attributed to the elements of negligence, carelessness and lack of
due diligence on the part of the appellant/applicant.
9. Having considered the facts and circumstance of the case, we are
not at all satisfied with the explanations as offered by the appellant/applicant
in the application for condonation of delay of 149 days in preferring the
connected appeal.
10. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay filed by the
appellant/applicant is rejected. Consequently, the connected appeal is also
dismissed.
All pending application(s), shall stand closed.
(BISWAJIT PALIT, J) (M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO, CJ)
Snigdha
SNIGDHA Digitally signed by
SNIGDHA DAS
DAS Date: 2026.02.04
17:28:45 +05'30'
