Shri Rajani Kanta Debnath vs Shri Haripada Acharjee
2025 Latest Caselaw 1106 Tri

Tripura High Court

Shri Rajani Kanta Debnath vs Shri Haripada Acharjee on 9 September, 2025

                   HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
                         AGARTALA
                         IA 01 of 2025
                     In RSA No.12 of 2025

Shri Rajani Kanta Debnath, S/o-Lt. Rajeswar Debnath, R/o-
Town Indranagar, P.O.-Dhaleswar, P.S.-East Agartala, Dist.-West
Tripura
                                   ....Applicant/Appellant(s)

                                 Versus

Shri Haripada Acharjee, S/o- Lt. Upendra Ch. Acharjee, R/o-
Town Indranagar, P.O.-Dhaleswar, P.S.-East Agartala, Dist.-West
Tripura.
                                            ....Respondent(s)

For Applicant/Appellant(s) : Mr. Ashish Nandi,Advocate.

For Respondent(s) : Mr. P. Chakraborty,Advocate.

Ms. S. Debnath,Advocate.

     Date of Hearing &             :      9th September,2025.
     Delivery of Order
     Whether fit for reporting     :       Yes No
                                           

                          B_E_F_O_R_E
           HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA

                           -O-R-D-E-R-


                Heard Ld. Counsel of both sides.

     [2]        The second appeal has been preferred against the

judgment dated 24.04.2024 passed by Ld. District Judge,

West Tripura, Agartala in Title Appeal No. 55 of 2017 and

related decree thereof whereby the appeal was allowed by

setting aside the judgment passed by Ld. Trial Court. The

right, title and interest over the suit land was declared by the

first appellate court with the relief of recovery of possession

of the same. The appeal is filed with a delay of 275 days by

the appellant defendant.

[3] Ld. Counsel, Mr. Ashish Nandi representing the

appellant, submits in respect of the petition filed u/s 5 of the

Limitation Act that after the passing of the appellate

judgment and decree on 24.04.2024 and 26.04.2024

respectively, the neighbours and well wishers of both the

parties intervened in the matter and a meeting was held on

26.06.2024 amongst them wherein it was resolved that

respondent would not file any execution petition for recovery

of possession from the defendant appellant. Though, the

written resolution was agreed to be reduced into writing, but

same was not done because the plaintiff respondent had to

leave the venue of the meeting for his urgent work.

Thereafter, from time to time the petitioner attempted to get

the said resolution signed, but the respondent was found

reluctant in signing the same. Thereafter the petitioner left

for Bangladesh to attend a marriage ceremony on 25th

December, 2024 and returned after 3 months therefrom and

this way the time rolled on.

[4] It is further stated that the petitioner appellant

visited Bangladesh without any passport. Thereafter, on

28.03.2024 the petitioner-appellant contacted with the

respondent for finalization of the settlement of their land

dispute and at that time the respondent intimated that he

had already filed one execution petition for execution of the

appellate decree and thereafter, again on 05.04.2024 all the

well wishers and neighbours of the respondent for honoring

the earlier terms of settlement to which the respondent

strongly opposed. Thereafter, the appellant filed the present

appeal with a delay of 275 days.

[5] Ld. Counsel, Mr. Ashish Nandi earnestly prays for

condoning the delay submitting that there were no latches or

negligence on the part of the appellant in preferring the

appeal and taking some lenient view, the delay may be

condoned.

[6] Ld. Counsel, Mr. Nandi also submits that the claim

of the plaintiff was based on a registered „Will‟ and in the trial

court, the attesting witnesses of the „Will‟ were not

examined. Though in the first appellant court both the

attesting witnesses were allowed to be examined by said Ld.

Court, still the content of the said „Will‟ were not proved and

therefore, there is merit in the appeal.

[7] Ld. Counsel, Mr. Nandi relies on a decision of the

Hon‟ble Supreme Court in case of Collector, Land

Acquisition, Anantanag and another v. Mst. Katiji and

others [AIR 1987 SUPREME COURT 1353] wherein it was

observed that the legislature had conferred the power to

condone delay by enacting Section 5 of the Indian Limitation

Act of 1963 in order to enable the Courts to do substantial

justice to parties by disposing the matter on „merits‟. The

expression "sufficient cause" employed by the legislature is

adequately elastic to enable the Courts to apply the law in a

meaningful manner which subserves the end of justice that

being life purpose for the existence of the institution of

Courts.

[8] Ld. Counsel, Mr. Nandi also relies on another

decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in Pathupati Subba

Reddy(Died)by L.Rs & Ors v. The Special Deputy

Collector (LA)[2024 4 SCR 241] wherein it is observed

that the courts are conferred with discretionary powers to

admit an appeal even after the expiry of the prescribed

period or limitation, provided that the appellant is able to

establish „sufficient cause‟ for not filing it within time. Said

power to condone the delay or to admit the appeal preferred

after expiry of time is discretionary in nature and may not be

exercised even if sufficient cause is shown based upon host

of other factors such as negligence, failure to exercise due

diligence etc. In paragraph 16 of the said judgment, it was

also observed that generally courts adopt a very liberal

approach in construing the phrase „sufficient cause‟ used in

Section 5 of the Limitation Act in order to condone the delay

to enable the courts to do substantial justice.

[9] Ld. Counsel, Mr. Pradip Chakraborty on the other

hand strongly opposes the prayer stating that there was no

talk of any compromise between the parties and no village

level meeting was also organized on any occasion. Therefore,

the pleas as taken by the petitioner appellant are totally

false.

[10] Ld. Counsel, Mr. Chakraborty also relies on a

decision of the Division Bench of this Court in case of Dipak

Chandra Kar Vs. Union of India [decided on 04.08.2025

in IA No.01 of 2025], wherein prayer for condoning delay

of 362 days was rejected with the observation that the delay

should not be condoned merely as an act of generosity.

[11] Mr. Chakraborty, Ld. Counsel also relies on

another decision of Hon‟ble Supreme Court in case of Mool

Chandra Vs. Union of India and Anr. [(2025)1 TLR (SC)

295] wherein the Hon‟ble Apex Court observed that if the

cause for delay would fall within the four corners of

"sufficient cause", irrespective of the length of delay, same

deserved to be condoned, and if the cause as shown was

insufficient, irrespective of the period of delay, same would

not be condoned.

[12] Court has considered submissions of both sides

and also perused the materials placed in the record.

[13] At one place the petitioner asserted that though

the resolution of the participants of the meeting dated

26.06.2024 was agreed to be reduced into writing, but that

was not done as the respondent had to leave the venue of

the said meeting for his urgent work. But in another place he

has asserted that from time to time, he attempted to get the

resolution signed by the respondent but he was found

reluctant. Both the assertions are self contradictory. If no

resolution was recorded in writing atall, question of

presenting the same for signing doesnot arise and if it was

presented for signing by the respondent, certainly the

resolution of the meeting was written down, but no copy of

any such resolution is placed in the record. Such

contradictory versions lead to the inference that both are

doubtful. It is also the case of the appellant that he went to

Bangladesh to attend a marriage ceremony on 25th

December, 2024 (though illegally without any Passport) and

returned to India only on 25th March 2025 i.e. after 3 months

therefrom. Such long stay at Bangladesh without taking any

steps for presenting the appeal, clearly demonstrates his

lackadaisical and negligent attitude in pursuing his own

cause.

[14] In a recent decision by the Hon‟ble Supreme Court

in case of Union of India & another v. Jahangir Byramji

Jeejeebhoy (D) through his L.R.s, 2024 SCC Online SC

489, it has been held that when it is decided that a party has

lost his right to have the matter considered on merits

because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed

to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances, he

cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice

deserves to be preferred as against the technical

considerations. While considering the petition for condonation

of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main

case. The relevant paragraph nos.26 and 27 of said decision

are extracted below:

"26. The length of the delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not. From the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law has prescribed a period of limitation. Once it is held that a party has lost his right to have the matter considered on merits because of his own inaction for a long, it cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances of the case, he cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical considerations. While considering the plea for condonation of delay, the court must not start with the merits of the main matter. The court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation offered by the party seeking condonation. It is only if the sufficient cause assigned by the litigant and the opposition of the other side is equally balanced that the court may bring into aid the merits of the matter for the purpose of condoning the delay.

27. We are of the view that the question of limitation is not merely a technical consideration. The rules of limitation are based on the principles of sound public policy and principles of equity. We should not keep the „Sword of Damocles‟ hanging over the head of the respondent for indefinite period of time to be determined at the whims and fancies of the appellants."

[15] Again in State of Madhya Pradesh v.

Ramkumar Choudhury,[Special Leave Petition(C) Diary

No.48636 of 2024 decided on 29.11.2024], above said

principle has been reiterated by the Apex Court. It is also

further observed that the discretion to condone the delay has

to be exercised judiciously based on facts and circumstance

of each case and that, the expression „sufficient cause‟

cannot be liberally interpreted, if negligence, inaction or lack

of bonafides is attributed to the party.

[16] The reasons for delay as projected by the

appellant in the instant case, as discussed earlier in

paragraph no. 13, appears to be not at all satisfactory, rather

the negligence and lack of diligence of the appellant are

evident in his conduct. Therefore, the Court is not inclined to

condone the delay as prayed for.

[17] Accordingly, the petition for condonation of delay

is rejected.

JUDGE

Saikat Sarma RUDRADEE Digitally signed by RUDRADEEP BANERJEE

P BANERJEE Date: 2025.09.11 16:04:19 +05'30'