Tripura High Court
Sri Salem Debbarma @ Salen vs State Of Tripura on 18 March, 2025
Author: T. Amarnath Goud
Bench: T. Amarnath Goud
Page 1 of 19
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
CRL.A(J)NO.64 OF 2023
1. Sri Salem Debbarma @ Salen,
Aged about 48 years, son of Somprai Debbarma,
Resident of East Takchaia, Ramharipara,
P.O.+ P.S.- Champahaur, District-Khowai, Tripura.
2. Sri Alakesh Debbarma,
Aged about 24 years, son of Salim Debbarma,
Resident of East Takchaia, Ramharipara,
P.O. + P.S.-Champahaur, District-Khowai, Tripura.
3. Sri Bidhu Kumar Debbarma@Bidyut Debbarma,
Aged about 41 years, son of late Suresh Debbarma,
Resident of East Takchaia, Ramharipara,
P.O. + P.S.- Champahaur, District Khowai, Tripura.
...... Appellant(s)
Versus
1. State of Tripura,
.......Respondent(s)
For the Appellant(s) : Mr. Sankar Lodh, Advocate.
Mr. Kishaloy Roy, Advocate.
Mr. Subham Majumder, Advocate.
For the Respondent(s) : Mr. Raju Datta, Public Prosecutor.
Date of hearing : 05.03.2025.
Date of delivery of
Judgment & Order : 18/03/2025.
Whether fit for reporting : NO.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE T. AMARNATH GOUD
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
JUDGMENT & ORDER
(T. AMARNATH GOUD,J)
This present criminal appeal has been filed under
Section 374(2) of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, against the
impugned Judgment of Conviction and Sentence dated 11.09.2023,
passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Khowai Judicial District,
Khowai, Tripura, in Case No. S.T. (TYPE-1) 05 of 2018. By the said
judgment, the learned Sessions Judge, Khowai, Tripura, convicted
the appellants for committing an offence punishable under Sections
302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code and sentenced
them to suffer life imprisonment. Additionally, the appellants were
fined Rs. 5,000/- (Rupees Five thousand) each, with a default
sentence of one month of simple imprisonment.
2. The prosecution case, in brief, is that one Madhabi
Debbarma lodged a written ejahar with the Officer-in-Charge,
Champahaur Police Station, alleging that on 14.02.2017, at about
10:00/10:30 hours, her husband, Samir Debbarma, was attacked
indiscriminately with a 'dao' by the appellants while he was
returning from a marriage ceremony. Upon hearing his cries, the
informant and others rushed to the spot and found him with
bleeding injuries. When the informant questioned the appellants
regarding the attack, they also assaulted her. Immediately after the
incident, the injured husband of the informant was shifted to
Khowai Hospital, where he succumbed to his injuries on
15.02.2017.
3. Upon receipt of the written complaint, the police
registered a case vide Champahaur P.S. Case No. 2017 CPH
PS/004, dated 15.02.2017, under Sections 341, 302, 325, and 34 of
the Indian Penal Code. After registering the case, the police initiated
an investigation and arrested the appellants. Upon completion of
the investigation, the police filed a charge sheet against the
appellants for offences punishable under Sections 341, 302, 325,
and 34 of the IPC.
4. After receiving the charge sheet, the learned trial
Court took cognizance of the offences and proceeded with the case.
Copies of incriminating documents were supplied to the appellants
in compliance with Section 200 of the CrPC. Subsequently, the
learned Court below framed charges against the appellants for
offences punishable under Sections 341, 302, 325, and 34 of the
IPC.
5. To prove its case, the prosecution examined as
many as 27 (twenty-seven) witnesses, whereas the appellants did
not adduce any witnesses in their defense. After hearing both sides,
the learned Sessions Judge, Khowai, Tripura, vide the impugned
Judgment of Conviction and Sentence dated 11.09.2023, in S.T. (T-
1) 05 of 2018, convicted the appellants as stated above.
6. Being aggrieved and dissatisfied with the impugned
Judgment of Conviction and Sentence dated 11.09.2023, passed by
the learned Sessions Judge, Khowai, Tripura, in S.T.(T-1) 05 of
2018, the appellants have preferred this instant criminal appeal,
seeking to set aside the said judgment.
7. Heard Mr. Sankar Lodh, learned counsel appearing
for the appellants, as well as Mr. Raju Datta, learned Public
Prosecutor appearing for the State-respondent.
8. Mr. Lodh, learned counsel for the appellants,
submits that according to the prosecution, P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 are
the eye witnesses. However, there are contradictions regarding the
place of occurrence and inconsistencies regarding the weapon used
to inflict injuries upon the victim. In the depositions of P.W.-1 and
P.W.-2, there is a discrepancy concerning the weapon allegedly
used by the accused to attack the victim. Furthermore, the
supposed eyewitnesses i.e., P.W.-1 and P.W.-2, do not mention
each other's presence or having seen each other at the scene of the
incident. According to P.W.-2, after the hue and cry, several
individuals i.e., P.W.-14, P.W.-15, P.W.-16, and P.W.-17, arrived at
the spot. In fact, P.W.-15 stated that when she asked P.W.-1 about
the incident, P.W.-1 replied that she was asleep at that time. These
four witnesses arrived immediately after the commission but did not
confirm the presence of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2. The learned counsel for
the appellants contends that the depositions of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2
were not corroborated by P.W.-15, P.W.-16, and P.W.-17. However,
the prosecution did not declare these witnesses hostile. There is
also a contradiction regarding the place from where the blood-
stained mud was collected. Different witnesses have provided
varying accounts of the place of occurrence, some stating it was at
the accused house, others mentioning the road, and some claiming
it was at the deceased's house. Additionally, there is inconsistency
in the number of weapons used and recovered by the prosecution,
which casts doubt on the case. The prosecution asserts that the
victim was killed on the spot, but the existence of multiple places of
occurrence creates doubt regarding the reliability of the eyewitness
depositions of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2. Furthermore, to prove their case,
the prosecution relied on P.W.-5, the videographer who prepared
the C.D. However, no certificate under Section 65B of the Indian
Evidence Act was produced. There is also an anomaly in the
deposition of P.W.-25, the Executive Magistrate, regarding the
seizure of the weapon and the location where it was seized. The
learned counsel also submits that the Investigating Officer
committed several lapses during the investigation process.
8.1 On the point of witness, learned counsel appearing
for the appellant referred to Para-9 of the Judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court reported in (2005) 5 SCC 272 titled as Raja Ram
Vs. State of Rajasthan. The same is produced here-in-under:-
"9. But the testimony of PW 8 Dr. Sukhdev Singh, who is
another neighbour, cannot easily be surmounted by the prosecution. He
has testified in very clear terms that he saw PW 5 making the deceased
believe that unless she puts the blame on the appellant and his parents
she would have to face the consequences like prosecution proceedings.
It did not occur to the Public Prosecutor in the trial court to seek
permission of the court to heard (sic declare) PW 8 as a hostile witness
for reasons only known to him. Now, as it \ is, the evidence of PW 8 is
binding on the prosecution. Absolutely no reason, much less any good
reason, has been stated by the Division Bench of the High Court as to
how PW 8's testimony can be sidelined."
Stating the citation, learned counsel submits that
as P.Ws.-13, 14 and 15 demolishes the witness of P.Ws.1 and 2 as
eye witnesses, the prosecution ought to have declared them as
hostile.
8.2. On the point of different place of occurrences,
learned counsel relied upon the following Judgments of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court.
Para-13 of the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court reported in (2005) 11 SCC 245, titled as Balwan Singh Vs.
State of Haryana. The same is produced here-in-under:-
"13. Having regard to the facts of the case and the
findings of the High Court, we are satisfied that the case of the
prosecution is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. The prosecution has
not disclosed the true genesis of the occurrence. On the other hand, the
evidence discloses that the occurrence took place in a different manner
and at a different place in which three members of the defence party
also suffered serious injuries. In these circumstances, the appellant and
the other co-accused were at least entitled to the benefit of doubt. We,
therefore, allow the appeal, set aside the judgment and order of the
High Court impugned and acquit the appellant of all the charges levelled
against him. The special leave petition preferred by the State is
dismissed."
Relevant part of Para-11 of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court Judgment reported in reported in (2006) 10 SCC 601 titled
as Syed Ibrahim Vs. State of A.P. The same is produced here-
in-under:-
"...................when the place of occurrence
itself has not been established it would not be proper to accept the
prosecution version."
8.3. On the point of applicability of Section 27 of the
Evidence Act, learned counsel referred to Para-27 of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court Judgment reported in 2024 SCC Online SC 3589
titled as Wadla Bheemraidu Vs. State of Telangana. The same
is produced here-in-under:-
"27. This Court in the recent judgment of Babu
Sahebgouda Rudragoudar v. State of Karnataka28, while referring to the
earlier judgments on this point, examined the aspect regarding the
standard of proof of information provided by the accused to the
Investigating Officer under Section 27 IEA in the following terms:-
"60. We would now discuss about the requirement under law so as to
prove a disclosure statement recorded under Section 27 of the Evidence
Act, 1872 (hereinafter being referred to as "the Evidence Act") and the
discoveries made in furtherance thereof.
61. The statement of an accused recorded by a police officer under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act is basically a memorandum of confession
of the accused recorded by the investigating officer during interrogation
which has been taken down in writing. The confessional part of such
statement is inadmissible and only the part which distinctly leads to
discovery of fact is admissible in evidence as laid down by this Court in
State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya [State of U.P. v. Deoman Upadhyaya,
1960 SCC OnLine SC 8 : AIR 1960 SC 1125].
62. Thus, when the investigating officer steps into the witness box for
proving such disclosure statement, he would be required to narrate what
the accused stated to him. The investigating officer essentially testifies
about the conversation held between himself and the accused which has
been taken down into writing leading to the discovery of incriminating
fact(s).
63. As per Section 60 of the Evidence Act, oral evidence in all cases must
be direct. The section leaves no ambiguity and mandates that no
secondary/hearsay evidence can be given in case of oral evidence,
except for the circumstances enumerated in the section. In the case of a
person who asserts to have heard a fact, only his evidence must be given
in respect of the same.
64. The manner of proving the disclosure statement under Section 27 of
the Evidence Act has been the subject matter of consideration by this
Court in various judgments, some of which are being referred to below.
65. In Mohd. Abdul Hafeez v. State of A.P. [Mohd. Abdul Hafeez v. State
of A.P., (1983) 1 SCC 143 : 1983 SCC (Cri) 139] , it was held by this
Court as follows : (SCC p. 146, para 5)
"5. If evidence otherwise confessional in character is admissible under
Section 27 of the Evidence Act, it is obligatory upon the investigating
officer to state and record who gave the information; when he is dealing
with more than one accused, what words were used by him so that a
recovery pursuant to the information received may be connected to the
person giving the information so as to provide incriminating evidence
against that person."
66. Further, in Subramanya v. State of Karnataka [Subramanya v. State
of Karnataka, (2023) 11 SCC 255] , it was held as under : (SCC pp. 299-
300, paras 76 to 78)
"76. Keeping in mind the aforesaid evidence, we proceed to consider
whether the prosecution has been able to prove and establish the
discoveries in accordance with law. Section 27 of the Evidence Act reads
thus:
'27. How much of information received from accused may be proved.-
Provided that, when any fact is deposed to as discovered in consequence
of information received from a person accused of any offence, in the
custody of a police officer, so much of such information, whether it
amounts to a confession or not, as relates distinctly to the fact thereby
discovered, may be proved.'
77. The first and the basic infirmity in the evidence of all the aforesaid
prosecution witnesses is that none of them have deposed the exact
statement said to have been made by the appellant herein which
ultimately led to the discovery of a fact relevant under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act.
78. If, it is say of the investigating officer that the appellant-accused
while in custody on his own free will and volition made a statement that
he would lead to the place where he had hidden the weapon of offence,
the site of burial of the dead body, clothes, etc. then the first thing that
the investigating officer should have done was to call for two
independent witnesses at the police station itself. Once the two
independent witnesses would arrive at the police station thereafter in
their presence the accused should be asked to make an appropriate
statement as he may desire in regard to pointing out the place where he
is said to have hidden the weapon of offence, etc.
When the accused while in custody makes such statement before the two
independent witnesses (panch witnesses) the exact statement or rather
the exact words uttered by the accused should be incorporated in the
first part of the panchnama that the investigating officer may draw in
accordance with law. This first part of the panchnama for the purpose of
Section 27 of the Evidence Act is always drawn at the police station in
the presence of the independent witnesses so as to lend credence that a
particular statement was made by the accused expressing his willingness
on his own free will and volition to point out the place where the weapon
of offence or any other article used in the commission of the offence had
been hidden.
Once the first part of the panchnama is completed thereafter the police
party along with the accused and the two independent witnesses (panch
witnesses) would proceed to the particular place as may be led by the
accused. If from that particular place anything like the weapon of
offence or bloodstained clothes or any other article is discovered then
that part of the entire process would form the second part of the
panchnama. This is how the law expects the investigating officer to draw
the discovery panchnama as contemplated under Section 27 of the
Evidence Act. If we read the entire oral evidence of the investigating
officer then it is clear that the same is deficient in all the aforesaid
relevant aspects of the matter."
67. Similar view was taken by this Court in Ramanand v. State of U.P.
[Ramanand v. State of U.P., (2023) 16 SCC 510 : 2022 SCC OnLine SC
1396] , wherein this Court held that mere exhibiting of memorandum
prepared by the investigating officer during investigation cannot
tantamount to proof of its contents. While testifying on oath, the
investigating officer would be required to narrate the sequence of events
which transpired leading to the recording of the disclosure statement."
(emphasis supplied)
8.4. On the point of requirement of certification of
electronic evidence, the learned counsel relied upon paras-21 and
22 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court Judgment reported in (2022) 7
SCC 581 titled as Ravinder Singh alias Kaku Vs. State of
Punjab. The same is produced here-in-under:-
"20. Lastly, this appeal also raised an important
substantive question of law that whether the call records produced by
the prosecution would be admissible under section 65A and 65B of the
Indian Evidence Act, given the fact that the requirement of certification
of electronic evidence has not been complied with as contemplated under
the Act. The uncertainty of whether Anvar P.V. vs P.K. Basheer & Ors [
(2014) 10 SCC 473] occupies the filed in this area of law or whether
Shafhi Mohammad v. State of Himachal Pradesh (2018) 2 SCC 801 lays
down the correct law in this regard has now been conclusively settled by
this court by a judgement dated 14/07/2020 in Arjun Panditrao Khotkar
vs Kailash Kushanrao Gorantyal [ (2020) 7 SCC 1] wherein the court has
held that:
"We may reiterate, therefore, that the certificate required under Section
65B(4) is a condition precedent to the admissibility of evidence by way
of electronic record, as correctly held in Anvar P.V. (supra), and
incorrectly "clarified" in Shafhi Mohammed (supra). Oral evidence in the
place of such certificate cannot possibly suffice as Section 65B(4) is a
mandatory requirement of the law. Indeed, the hallowed principle in
Taylor v. Taylor (1876) 1 Ch.D 426, which has been followed in a number
of the judgments of this Court, can also be applied. Section 65B(4) of the
Evidence Act clearly states that secondary evidence is admissible only if
lead in the manner stated and not otherwise. To hold otherwise would
render Section 65B(4) otiose.
Anvar P.V. (supra), as clarified by us hereinabove, is the law declared by
this Court on Section 65B of the Evidence Act. The judgment in Tomaso
Bruno (supra), being per incuriam, does not lay down the law correctly.
Also, the judgment in SLP (Crl.) No. 9431 of 2011 reported as Shafhi
Mohammad (supra) and the judgment dated 03.04.2018 reported as
(2018) 5 SCC 311, do not lay down the law correctly and are therefore
overruled. .
The clarification referred to above is that the required certificate under
Section 65B(4) is unnecessary if the original document itself is produced.
This can be done by the owner of a laptop computer, computer tablet or
even a mobile phone, by stepping into the witness box and proving that
the concerned device, on which the original information is first stored, is
owned and/or operated by him. In cases where the "computer" happens
to be a part of a "computer system" or "computer network" and it
becomes impossible to physically bring such system or network to the
Court, then the only means of providing information contained in such
electronic record can be in accordance with Section 65B(1), together
with the requisite certificate under Section 65B(4)."
21. In light of the above, the electronic evidence produced before the
High Court should have been in accordance with the statute and should
have complied with the certification requirement, for it to be admissible
in the court of law. As rightly stated above, Oral evidence in the place of
such certificate, as is the case in the present matter, cannot possibly
suffice as Section 65B(4) is a mandatory requirement of the law. "
Submitting thus, learned counsel stated that the
Court below did not property appreciated the case of the accused as
such the impugned Judgment is liable to the quashed and set aside.
9. On the other hand, the learned P.P. submits that the
testimony of the two eyewitnesses, i.e., P.W.1 and P.W.2, is
sufficient to establish the case against the appellants. Their
statements remained unshaken and were further supported by
medical evidence. Additionally, a hand-drawn sketch map of the
place of occurrence (P.O.) clearly specifies the location of the
incident, which the convict-accused did not dispute during the trial.
Furthermore, P.W.-25, an independent witness (DCM), testified that
one of the accused, Selim Debbarma, pointed out the weapon of
offense, a 'dao' and an iron hammer near his house, following which
the police recovered them. The submission made by the appellant's
counsel does not form part of the cross-examination. Hon'ble
Supreme Court in its judgment reported in 2022 SCC OnLine SC
1424 titled as State through the Inspector of Police Vs. Laly
alias Manikandan and another specifically observed that even
when the weapon are not recovered but when eye witness is there,
on that basis, the acquittal cannot be made. The relevant para of
the said Judgment is given as under:-
20............... Merely because the original complainant is
not examined cannot be a ground to discard the deposition of PW1. As
observed hereinabove, PW1 is the eye witness to the occurrence at
both the places. Similarly, assuming that the recovery of the weapon
used is not established or proved also cannot be a ground to acquit the
accused when there is a direct evidence of the eye witness. Recovery
of the weapon used in the commission of the offence is not a sine qua
non to convict the accused. If there is a direct evidence in the form of
eye witness, even in the absence of recovery of weapon, the accused
can be convicted. Similarly, even in the case of some contradictions
with respect to timing of lodging the FIR/complaint cannot be a ground
to acquit the accused when the prosecution case is based upon the
deposition of eye witness."
On the point that motive is not required, learned
P.P., relied upon para-38 of the Judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court reported in (2019) 12 SCC 560 titled as Jafel Biswas and
ors Vs. State of West Bengal. The same is produced here-in-
under:-
"38. The learned counsel for the appellant has also
contended that prosecution failed to prove any motive of committing the
murder. The trial court has elaborately dealt with this submission.
Relying on the judgment of this Court reported in State of Haryana vs.
Sher Singh and Others, 1981 (2) SCC 300, it was held that absence of
motive does not disperse a prosecution case if the prosecution succeed
in proving the same. The motive is always in the mind of person
authoring the incident. Motive not being apparent or not being proved
only requires deeper scruitiny of the evidence by the courts while coming
to a conclusion. When there are definite evidence proving an incident
and eye-witness account prove the role of accused, absence in proving of
the motive by prosecution does not affect the prosecution case. In
paragraph 10 of State of Haryana case (supra) following was laid down:
"10. The prosecution is not bound to prove motive of any offence in a
criminal case, inasmuch as motive is known only to the perpetrator of
the crime and may not be known to others. If the motive is proved by
prosecution, the court has to consider it and see whether it is adequate.
In the instant case the motive proved was apparently inadequate,
although it might be possible."
9.1. Learned P.P., further submits that post mortem
report suggest that 'injury 1 was sufficient enough to cause death in
ordinary course of nature'. Therefore for mere contradiction, the
same cannot be the ground for acquittal. On the side point learned
P.P., referred to para-20 and 21 of the Hon'ble Supreme Court
Judgment reported in 2023 SCC OnLine SC 1396 titled as Birbal
Nath Vs. State of Rajasthan and ors. The same is produced
here-in-under:-
"20. No doubt statement given before police
during investigation under Section 161 are "previous
statements" under Section 145 of the Evidence Act and
therefore can be used to cross examine a witness. But this is
only for a limited purpose, to "contradict" such a witness. Even
if the defence is successful in contradicting a witness, it would
not always mean that the contradiction in her two statements
would result in totally discrediting this witness. It is here that
we feel that the learned judges of the High Court have gone
wrong.
21. The contractions in the two statements may
or may not be sufficient to discredit a witness. Section 145 read
with Section 155 of the Evidence Act, have to be carefully
applied in a given case. One cannot lose sight of the fact that
PW-2 Rami is an injured eye witness, and being the wife of the
deceased her presence in their agricultural field on the fateful
day is natural. Her statement in her examination in chief gives
detail of the incident and the precise role assigned to each of
the assailants. This witness was put to a lengthy cross
examination by the defence. Some discrepancies invariably
occur in such cases when we take into account the fact that this
witness is a woman who resides in a village and is the wife of a
farmer who tills his land and raises crops by his own hands. In
other words, they are not big farmers. The rural setting, the
degree of articulation of such a witness in a Court of Law are
relevant considerations while evaluating the credibility of such
a witness. Moreover, the lengthy cross examination of a
witness may invariably result in contradictions. But these
contradictions are not always sufficient to discredit a witness.
In Rammi v. State of M.P. (1999) 8 SCC 649, this Court had held
as under:
"24. When an eyewitness is examined at length it is quite
possible for him to make some discrepancies. No true witness
can possibly escape from making some discrepant details.
Perhaps an untrue witness who is well tutored can successfully
make his testimony totally non- discrepant. But courts should
bear in mind that it is only when discrepancies in the evidence
of a witness are so incompatible with the credibility of his
version that the court is justified in jettisoning his evidence.
But too serious a view to be adopted on mere variations falling
in the narration of an incident (either as between the evidence
of two witnesses or as between two statements of the same
witness) is an unrealistic approach for judicial scrutiny.
To strengthen his point, learned P.P., also referred to
Paras-42 and 59 the Hon'ble Supreme Court Judgment titled as
(2019) 4 SCC 771 titled as Pattu Rajan Vs. State of Tamil
Nadu. The same is referred here-in-under:-
"42. It was argued by Shri Sushil Kumar that the
confession made by Accused No.2 before PW7 was not
admissible in evidence. There cannot be any dispute that a
confession made by the accused in police custody is an
inadmissible confession. The confession herein cannot even be
called an extrajudicial confession because of the 32 presence of
the police. Be that as it may, if a confession is made by the
accused before the police and a portion of the confession leads
to the recovery of any incriminating material, such portion
alone is admissible under Section 27 of the Indian Evidence Act.
Since only such portion of the confession relating to the
recovery of certain material objects was admitted in evidence
and relied upon, such reliance was in accordance with law.
59.. From the evidence of the witnesses
discussed supra, it is amply clear that the dead body recovered
from TigerChola was identified by PW1 and her family members
as Santhakumar's, and the same body was exhumed from the
burial grounds. It is evident from the depositions that the
recovery of the dead body was made from the TigerChola forest
area, which is the same place to which Accused No. 2 led the
investigation team based on his confession about disposal of
the dead body. It is relevant to note at this juncture that merely
because the actual recovery of the body happened before the
accused lead the police to the scene, it does not, in the facts
and circumstances of this case, negate the validity of the
recovery based on a confession, in terms of Section 27 of the
Evidence Act.
10. Heard and perused the evidence on record.
11. The charges framed against the accused-persons
herein are produced here-in-under:-
"Firstly :- That all of you, on 14.02.2017 in the night at
about 10-30 p.m. at Ramhari Para under Champahour Police Station,
District- Khowai Tripura, in furtherance of your common intention,
wrongfully restrained Sri Samir Debbarma, the husband of the complainant
Smt. Madhabi Debbarma, wł en he was returning home after taking dinner
from a marriage ceremony and reached near the house of you namely-
Salem Debbarma and that all of you thereby committed an offence
punishable under Section 341 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code
and within the cognizance of this Court.
Secondly- That all of you, on the afore mentioned date, time
and place, in furtherance of your common intention, voluntarily caused
grievous hurt to the said Samir Debbarma by means of hammer and dao,
used as the weapon of offence and which are the instruments of causing
serious injury and cutting etc. which is likely to cause death of the said
Samir Debbarma thereby all of you committed an offence punishable under
Section 326 read with Section the Indian Penal Code and within the
cognizance of this Court.
Lastly- That all of you, on the afore mentioned date, time
and place, in Furtherance of your common intention, caused grievous hurt to
Samir Debbarma with the knowledge that it may likely to cause death of
said Samir Debbarma for which he was admitted in the hospital and on
15.02.2017 in the morning he succumbed to his injuries at GBP Hospital,
Agartala and thus all of you did commit murder by intentionally causing the
death of Samir Debbarma and thereby all of you committed an offence
punishable under Section 302 read with Section 34 of the Indian Penal Code
and within the cognizance of this Court."
12. Let us examine some important witnesses.
13. P.W.-1, Smti. Madhabi Debbarma deposed before
the Court that on 14.02.2017, at about 10:30 p.m., while her
husband Samir Debbarma was returning home after attending a
marriage ceremony at the house of Surendra Debbarma, he was
attacked near their house by Alakesh Debbarma, Salem
Debbarma, and Bidyut Debbarma. The attackers were armed
with a "dao" (billhook), hammer, and lathi. P.W.-1 further
deposed that upon hearing her husband's cries, she and others
rushed outside and saw Alakesh Debbarma assaulting her
husband with a hammer and Salem Debbarma striking him
repeatedly with a 'dao' over his head and other parts of his body.
She also witnessed Bidyut Debbarma delivering multiple blows
with a lathi on her husband's head and body. As a result, Samir
Debbarma sustained severe bleeding injuries and collapsed on
the ground. When P.W.-1 and others attempted to intervene,
Salem Debbarma attacked her. P.W.-1 further stated that her
husband was taken to Khowai Hospital in a critical condition, and
later transferred to GBP Hospital, Agartala for treatment.
However her husband succumbed to his injuries the next morning
at about 7:30 a.m. Following the incident, P.W.-1 lodged a
written Ejahar with the O/C, Champahawar P.S. She stated that
the Ejahar was prepared by Malin Debbarma based on her
narration, which she originally gave in Kokborok. Malin Debbarma
translated it into Bengali and later read it back to her in Kokborok
before she signed it in English. She was later brought before a
Magistrate, where she voluntarily narrated the incident, and her
statement was recorded by Malin Debbarma, on which her
signatures were obtained.
During cross-examination, P.W.-1 reaffirmed
that upon hearing her husband's cries, she and others came out
and witnessed Alakesh Debbarma attacking her husband with a
hammer and Salem Debbarma striking him repeatedly with a
'dao'. She also confirmed that Bidyut Debbarma was delivering
blows with a lathi. The rest of her cross-examination consisted of
denials of any contradictions.
14. P.W.-2, Shri Samiran Debbarma stated that
on 14.02.2017, at about 10:30 p.m., he was returning home
along with Samir Debbarma after attending a marriage ceremony
at Surendra Debbarma's house. As they neared Samir
Debbarma's house, they were attacked by Alakesh Debbarma
with a 'dao' and Salem Debbarma with a hammer. P.W.-2 further
stated that while the accused were assaulting Samir Debbarma,
the victim's wife, along with Birendra Debbarma, Pranjit
Debbarma, Amrit Debbarma, and Pabendra Debbarma, rushed to
the scene upon hearing the commotion. When they tried to
rescue Samir Debbarma, the accused attacked them as well,
including his wife, Madhabi Debbarma. He confirmed that Salem
Debbarma struck Madhabi Debbarma with a hammer.
Subsequently, Samir Debbarma was shifted to Khowai Hospital,
and later transferred to GBP Hospital, where he succumbed to his
injuries the following morning. The inquest over the deceased's
body was conducted at GBP Hospital in the presence of P.W.-2.
He also stated that he was taken before a Magistrate, where he
voluntarily narrated the entire incident, and his statement was
recorded along with his signatures.
During cross-examination, P.W.-2 admitted that he
never made any statement to the police. Apart from this, the rest
of his cross-examination consisted of denials.
15. P.W.-21, Dr. Juthika Debbarma deposed that
on 15.02.2017, while posted at AGMC and GBP Hospital as an
Assistant Professor, she conducted a post-mortem examination
on the body of Samir Debbarma between 11:50 a.m. and 1:00
p.m. The post-mortem revealed multiple antemortem injuries,
including: A U-shaped incised wound (27 cm x 2 cm x cranial
cavity deep) on the frontal region of the head, with an underlying
clean-cut frontal bone fracture (25 cm). Subdural hemorrhage
over the left cerebral hemisphere and subarachnoid hemorrhage
over both hemispheres. Additional abrasions, contusions, and
incised wounds on various parts of the body. P.W.-21 deposed
that according to their opinion, injury No. 1 was sufficient enough
to cause death in ordinary course of nature.
During cross-examination, the witness's
statements remained unchallenged.
16. P.W.-22 Dr. Prasenjit Das reiterated the
version of PW 22 in his examination-in-chief.
During cross-examination he deposed that he had
not mentioned in the report that he had prepared the report on
the computer. Apart from this rest part of his cross-examination
is that of denial.
17. P.W.-27, Dr. Nirja Debbarma, a Medical
Officer at Tulasikhar PHC, testified that on 15.02.2017, Madhabi
Debbarma came for treatment with complaints of physical
assault. Examination revealed a small lacerated injury below the
right lower eyelid. Swelling over the left wrist. P.W.-27 classified
her injuries as simple in nature.
During cross-examination, he conceded that
such injuries could result from falling or slipping, but his report
did not reflect this possibility. The rest of his cross-examination
consisted of denials.
18. The testimony of P.W.-1 and P.W.-2 i.e., both
eyewitnesses is consistent, credible, and supported by their
statements under Section 161 Cr.P.C. Their accounts have not
been contradicted. Their evidence is further corroborated by
medical reports and the testimony of the Doctors (P.W.-21, P.W.-
22, and P.W.-27). The post-mortem report confirms that Samir
Debbarma i.e., the deceased victim suffered multiple incised
wounds, with a fatal head injury caused by a sharp weapon,
which is consistent with the assault described by P.W.-1 and
P.W.-2. The medical evidence establishes a direct link between
the action of the accused and the victim's death. Although there
are minor omissions, discrepancies and contradictions, they do
not discredit the core prosecution case.
19. The appellants counsel arguments regarding
contradictions in the prosecution's case are unconvincing, as the
fundamental facts remain unchanged. As such, given the
overwhelming eyewitness and medical evidence, this Court finds
no merit in the arguments presented by the appellants' counsel,
Mr. Sankar Lodh.
20. Therefore, the Judgment of the Trial Court is to be
upheld as it requires no interference and appeal is liable to be
dismissed.
21. Accordingly, the appeal stands dismissed and order
passed by the Trial Court is confirmed.
22. As a result, any stay order is vacated. Pending
application(s), if any, are also disposed of.
B. PALIT, J T. AMARNATH GOUD, J
suhanjit
RAJKUMAR Digitally signed by RAJKUMAR
SUHANJIT SINGHA
SUHANJIT Date: 2025.03.20 15:44:41
+05'30'
SINGHA
