Tripura High Court
Bhupaljit Rajkumar And His 1St Wife ... vs Sonatanjit Rajkumar And His Wife Namely ... on 11 July, 2025
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
RSA No.11 of 2024
Bhupaljit Rajkumar and his 1st wife namely Sabitri Singha
(Rajkumari) having died, their daughter and legal representative
namely:-
Smt. Prabhabati Rajkumari (Singha)
@Smt. Rajkumari Prabhabati Singha
W/O Late Bhupaljit Rajkumar
Of Jail Road, P.O. & P.S.-Dharmanagar
District-North Tripura, Age- 41 years
------ Appellant-Plaintiff
Versus
Sonatanjit Rajkumar and his wife namely Chaubi Debi (Singha)
having died, their sons and daughters namely:-
1. a) Smt. Purnima Singha,
W/O Lt. Tutendrajit Rajkumar
Vill & P.O.-Dewanpasha, P.S-Dharmanagar
Dist-North Tripura.
b) Smt. Popi Rajkumari
D/O Lt. Tutendrajit Rajkumar
W/O Sri Champu Kumar Singha
Vill-Dewanpasha (Near Mantala)
P.O.-Dewanpasha, P.S.-Dharmanagar
Dist-North Tripura.
c) Smt. Tapa Rajkumari
D/O Lt. Tutendrajit Rajkumar
W/O Sri Gautam Singha
Of Rajbari (Near Forest Office)
P.O.-Rajbari, P.S.-Dharmanagar
Dist-North Tripura
2. Sri Harendrajit Rajkumar,
S/O- Lt. Sonatanjit Rajkumar,
Of Vill & P.O.-Dewanpasha
P.S.-Dharmanagar,
District-North Tripura.
3. Smt. Ganga Rajkumari (Singha),
W/O- Sri Chandramani Singha,
D/O-Lt. Sonatanjit Rajkumar,
Of Jail Road, P.O. & P.S.-Dharmanagar,
Dist-North Tripura.
4. Smt. Jamuna Rajkumari (Singha),
W/O Sri Dilip Kumar Singha
D/O Lt. Sonatanjit Rajkumar
Vill- Mairang Gaon, P.O-Bhurunga
P.S. -Patharkandi,
Dist- Karimganj(Assam).
------ Respondent-Principal Defendants
Page 2 of 21
Ranjit Rajkumar having died, his legal heir, sons and daughters
namely:-
5. a) Smt. Sakhi Singha,
W/O Lt. Kirtijit Rajkumar
Of Jail Road (Mandop Para), Ward No.18
P.O. & P.S-Dharmanagar
Dist-North Tripura.
b) Smt. Nandita Rajkumari
D/O Lt. Kirtijit Rajkumar
W/O Sri Ashok Kumar Singha
Of Vill & P.O-Gossaipur Part 1,
P.S.-Udharbond, Pin-788030
State-Assam, District-Kachar,
Present address-
Of Jail Road (Mandop Para), ward No.18
P.O & P.S.-Dharmanagar,
District-North Tripura.
c) Smt. Sumit Rajkumari
D/O Lt. Kirtijit Rajkumar
Of Jail Road (Mandop Para), Ward No.18
P.O. & P.S.-Dharmanagar
District-North Tripura
***As per the order dated 13.12.2024 passed in I.A. No.4/2024,
necessary amendment has been made as follows:-
6. Bina Raj Kumari
W/O Late Baburen Singha @ Hemanta Meetei
D/O Late Ranjit Rajkumar
C/O Konsan Sana Meetei,
R/O-1 No.Pipal Pukhuri,
P.O. & P.S.-Lanka,
District-Hojai(Assam)
Pin-782446
7. (Deleted in the amended memo of First appeal)
.... Ranjit Rajkumar having died, his legal heir, son namely, Mangaljit
Rajkumar also having died, his wife and son namely:-
8. a) Smt. L. Ratna Debi,
W/O Lt. Bibekandajit Rajkumar
b) R. K. Sonal Singha
D/O Lt. Bibekandajit Rajkumar
c) R. K. Raysmi Singha
D/O Lt. Bibekandajit Rajkumar
All are of Vill & P.O.-Dewanpasha
P.S.-Dharmanagar
Dist-North Tripura
.....Dharmajit Rajkumar having died, his legal heir son namely,
Gokuljit Rajkumar also having died, his son namely Marjit Rajkumar
also having died, his legal heir, daughter namely:-
9. Smt. Jyotsna Rajkumari
Page 3 of 21
W/O Sri Babuchan Singha
D/O Lt. Marjit Rajkumar
Vill-Captanpur(Turning)
P.O.-Captanpur, P.S.-Sonai,
Dist-Cachar(Assam)
.....Dharmajit Rajkumar having died, his legal heir son namely,
Gokuljit Rajkumar also having died, his son namely Marjit Rajkumar
also having died, his daughter namely Jyoti Rajkumari also having
died, her legal heir son namely:-
10. Sri Narayan Singha
S/O Lt. Charu Singha
Vill- Banamalipur, Math Chowmuhani
P.O. & P.S.-Agartala,
Dist-West Tripura
11. (Deleted in the amended memo of First appeal)
Kulojit Rajkumar having died, his wife also having died, legal heirs
sons namely:-
12. a) Sri Kundajit Rajkumar,
S/O Lt. Kulojit Rajkumar
b) (i) Chandrajit Rajkumar
(ii) Ratanjit Rajkumar
Both are S/O Late Kendrajit Rajkumar
Both are of Village-West Damcherra,
P.O-Narendra Nagar, P.S-Damcherra,
District-North Tripura,
PIN-799256.
(iii) Tombishana Rajkumari
D/O Late Kendrajit Rajkumar
W/O Mihir Sinha,
Resident of Village, Kolkoli,
P.S.-Kolkoli, District-Sepahijala,
PIN-799102
......Kulojit Rajkumar having died, his wife also having died, his son
namely, Keshajit Rajkumar also having died his legal heirs namely:-
(c) Smt. Ranjita Rajkumari
W/O- Lt. Kewshajit Rajkumar
(d) Smt. Anita Rajkumari
W/O Sri Sudip Singha
D/O-Lt. Keshajit Rajkumar
(e) Smt. Nita Rajkumari
W/O-Sri Bimal Singha
D/O Lt. Keshajit Rajkumar
(f) Smt. Nibedita Rajkumari
W/O Sri Priyabrata Singha
D/O Lt. Keshajit Rajkumar
All are of Vill-West Damcherra
P.O-Narendra Nagar, P.S-Damcherra
Page 4 of 21
Dist-North Tripura
(g) Smt. Sangita Rajkumari
W/O Sri Raben Singha
D/O Lt. Keshajit Rajkumar
Vill & PO-Dolugaon, P.S-Kailashahar
Dist-Unakoti
......Bhupaljit Rajkumar having died, his legal heir 2nd wife namely:-
13. Smt. Shyamali Debi
W/O Lt. Bhupaljit Rajkumar
C/O-Sri Kirtijit Rajkumar(Pro-defendant No.5)
Of Jail Road, P.O & P.S-Dharmanagar
Dist-North Tripura
------ Proforma Defendants/Proforma Respondents
For Appellant(s) : Mr. Saktimoy Chakraborty, Sr. Adv.,
Ms. Pinki Chakraborty, Adv.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Dipankar Sarma, Adv.
Date of hearing : 04.07.2025
Date of delivery of
Judgment & Order : 11.07.2025
Whether fit for
reporting : YES
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Judgment & Order
This appeal under Section 100 of CPC is preferred challenging
the judgment dated 12.01.2024 and consequential decree dated
16.01.2024 delivered by Learned District Judge, North Tripura,
Dharmanagar in connection with case No.T.A./1/2019. By the same
judgment and decree, Learned 1st Appellate Court was pleased to
dismiss the appeal preferred by the appellant upholding the judgment
dated 18.12.2018 and decree dated 19.12.2018 delivered by Learned
Trial Court in connection with TS(P) No.8 of 2013 and challenging that
judgment and decree, the appellant has again preferred this appeal
before this Court.
Page 5 of 21
2. Heard Learned Senior Counsel Mr. Saktimoy Chakraborty
assisted by Learned Counsel Ms. Pinki Chakraborty appearing on
behalf of the appellant and also heard Learned Counsel Mr. Dipankar
Sarma appearing on behalf of the contesting respondent-defendants.
3. At the time of admission of appeal, the following substantial
questions of law was formulated by this Court by order dated
26.03.2024:
i) Whether the judgment and decree passed by the first
appellate court were perverse, by giving effect to a deed of
relinquishment (Nadabipatra) despite the claim of the
plaintiff that she was minor at the time of execution of that
deed of relinquishment and that the pro-defendant No.13
was also not a party to that deed?
ii) Any other substantial question of law may also be heard
during hearing of the appeal?
4. Before proceeding with the merit of the appeal, let us discuss
about the subject matter of dispute amongst the rival parties. The
appellants and the respondents herein are the joint owners and
possessors of the suit property measuring 3.14 acres, recorded in
Khatian No. 272 under Mouja-Dewan Pasha, Dharmanagar Sub-
Division which contained the name of their predecessors. The
appellant being the successor and legal heir of one late Bhupaljit
Rajkumar is entitled to get land measuring 0.32 acres out of the
aforesaid quantum of land as her 10% share portion which is/was in
her active possession since the time of her father. The respondent-
principal defendant Nos.1, 2, 3, and 4 being the legal heirs and
successors of one Late Sonaljit Rajkumar are jointly entitled to get
land measuring 0.63 acres i.e. 20% share portion of the aforesaid
land measuring 3.14 acres. Similarly, the other proforma respondents
are also entitled to get their respective shares in the aforesaid suit
Page 6 of 21
property. The principal defendants i.e. the respondents herein started
creating disturbance upon the appellant in peaceful position of her
share measuring 0.32 acres and accordingly the appellant approached
for amicable partition of the suit property but that was not
considered/agreed to by the principal respondents.
On 07.04.2013 at about 10 a.m., the appellant again
approached the principal defendants-respondents with a request for
amicable partition of the suit property but the respondents did not
heed to her request. By this time, the appellant collected the certified
copy of Khatian bearing No.272 when she could know that finally
published Khatian bearing No.725 of Mouja-Dewanpasha have been
prepared in the name of principal defendants-respondents containing
land measuring 1.29 acres without implicating the names of other co-
sharers as recorded under Khatian No.272 of Mouja-Dewan Pasha.
It was also the case of the appellant-plaintiff that the principal
defendants-respondents are/were trying to sell the landed property
which is under peaceful possession of the appellant by changing its
nature and character and also trying to dispossess her and her family
members from the said part of land. Finding no alternative, the
appellant approached the Learned Trial Court by filing a suit for
partition of the suit property and prayed for passing a preliminary
decree and thereafter to appoint a Commissioner for affecting
partition by metes and bounds.
Notices were issued upon all the respondents and in response
to such notice, the principal respondent-defendants Nos.1 and 2
appeared and contested the suit by filing their written statement
Page 7 of 21
wherein they denied and disputed all the claims raised by the
appellant and pleaded that as per registered document No.1-845 of
1998 Nandini Rajkumari along with Kulojit Rajkumar, Surajit
Rajkumar and Kirtijit Rajkumar jointly executed their disclaimer deed
in favour of Smt. Choubi Devi, Tutendrajit Rajkumar, Harendrajit
Rajkumar, Smt. Jamuna Rajkumari and Smt. Ganga Rajkumari in
respect of plot of lands as mentioned in Khatian No.725 of Mouja-
Dewan Pasha and for this reason, the applicant has got no land of her
own and also has got no right to file a suit for partition of the suit
property, comprising in Khatian No.272.
In the said suit before the Learned Trial Court the proforma
respondents No.12(a) to 12(g) contested the suit by filing written
statement and prayed for partition of the suit property, and other
respondents and proforma respondents in spite of receipt of
summons/notices did not appear before the Learned Trial Court to
contest the suit.
5. Upon the pleadings of the parties, Learned Trial Court, in
Original Suit No. TS(P)/8/2013, framed the following issues:
i) Is the suit maintainable in its present form and
nature?
ii) Has the plaintiff cause of action for this suit?
iii) Is the suit land joint properties of the parties to
this suit? If, so, is the suit land liable to be
partitioned as prayed for?
iv) What should be the quantum of share of each party
to this suit over the suit land?
v) Is the plaintiff entitled to get a decree as prayed
for?
vi) What other relief/relieves the plaintiff is entitled to
get?
To prove the issues, both the parties have adduced their
oral/documentary evidence on record, which are mentioned as under:
Page 8 of 21
(A) Plaintiffs' Exhibits :-
i) Ext.1:- Certified copy of khatian No.272 of
Mouja Dewanpassa in four sheets.
ii) Ext.2:- Original Voter I/D card.
iii) Ext.3:- Original admit card issued by the
Tripura Board of Secondary Education.
iv) Ext.4:- Certified copy of trace map of Mouza-
Dewanpassa No.27 sheet No.4(pt) in
original.
(B) Plaintiffs' Witnesses :-
i) PW.1 Smt. Prabhabati Rajkumari.
ii) PW.2 Sri Kirtijit Rajkukmar.
(C) Defendant's Exhibits :-
i) Ext.A:- Reply letter of State Public
Information Officer dated 27-06-2013.
ii) Ext.B:- Khatian No.272.
iii) Ext.C:- Khatian No.272/5.
iv) Ext.D:- Computerized Khatian No.725.
v) Ext.E:- Certified copy of nadabipatra vide
No.1-846 of the year 1998.
vi) Ext.F:- Finally published corrected khatian
No.725.
(D) Defendant's Witnesses :-
i) DW.1 Tutendrajit Raj Kumar.
ii) DW.2 Baranya Bijoy Singha.
iii) DW.3 Sri Sanjib Goswami.
It is also to be noted here that initially on 11.08.2016 the
then Learned Civil Judge (Senior Division) passed a preliminary
decree of partition in favour of the present appellant, which was
challenged before the Learned 1st Appellate Court, and the Learned 1st
Appellate Court was pleased to set aside the said judgment and
decree, and asked for fresh trial as per law. Accordingly, on
18.12.2018, second judgment was delivered by Learned Trial Court
afresh, dismissing the suit of the appellant plaintiff. The operative
portion of the judgment and order dated 18.12.2018, delivered by
Learned Trial Court runs as follows:
FINALORDER
14. From the discussion made above on various
issues this Court is of the opinion that plaintiff has
failed to prove the status of land as joint property
Page 9 of 21
and hence it is not liable to be partitioned. Suit is not
maintainable having no cause of action.
The deed of relinquishment/ nadabipatra ie
registered deed no.1-848, dated 25-03-1998 is the
vital document for our consideration. Deed of
release/relinquishment is covered as a valid transfer
as per Section 5 of T.P.Act. Exbt.1 vide khatian
No.272 is now converted to the new corrected
khatian vide No. 725 after deletion of some names
on the basis of nadabipatra and hence the plantiff-
Pravabati Rajkumari cannot get any partition of the
suit land. If we compare the old dags/sabek dags of
khatian No.272 to the new dag numbers of finally
published khatain No. of 725(vide Exbt.F), we can
get the similar plots in respect of C/S Plot No. 1214,
1215, 1220, 1221, 1582 which are shown in the suit
land but now these plots are converted into the hal
plot Nos.3651, 3681, 3662, 3665, 3631, 3701 and
3702. So, nothing is left for partition and therefore
suit of the plaintiff is failed.
Accordingly, the suit is dismissed on contest with
cost.
Prepare decree of dismissal accordingly.
Enter the result entry in the Trial Register.
Challenging that judgment and decree, the present appellant
further preferred appeal under Section 96 of CPC before the Learned
1st Appellate Court i.e. Learned District Judge, North Tripura,
Dharmanagar which was also dismissed by the Learned 1st Appellate
Court. The operative portion of the judgment and order dated
12.01.2024 passed by Learned 1st Appellate Court runs as follows:
ORDER
33. In the result this appeal filed by the appellant is
found to be devoid of merit and it is dismissed.
The Judgment and Decree passed by Ld. Trial Court
in T.S.(Partition) 08 of 2013 is upheld and affirmed.
Prepare the decree accordingly.
Send down the L. C. Record along with a copy of this
Judgment to the Ld. Trial Court.
This appeal stands disposed of on contest.
Make necessary entry in the TR and CIS.
Accordingly, challenging that judgment, the appellant has
again approached this Court by filing second appeal under Section
100 of CPC.
6. At the time of hearing of argument Learned Senior Counsel
Mr. S. M. Chakraborty assisted by Learned Counsel Ms. P.
Chakraborty first of all drawn the attention of the Court and submitted
that on the day of execution of deed of relinquishment i.e. Nadabi
Patra(Exhibit-E), the appellant was minor. Furthermore, according to
Learned Senior Counsel, on that day, her second mother was alive,
but her signature was also not obtained on the said deed of
relinquishment(Exhibit-E). Moreso, to substantiate her contention, the
appellant before the Learned Trial Court relied upon and produced and
proved documented evidences like Voter ID card(Exhibit-2) and Admit
Card(Exhibit-3) from which it was crystal clear that on the day of
execution of deed of relinquishment, the appellant was a minor. Even
the contesting respondents failed to satisfy the Court by adducing any
rebuttable evidence on record to disbelieve Exhibit-2 and Exhibit-3,
but the Learned Trial Court did not appreciate those documents and
finally dismissed the suit. He thereafter drawn the attention of the
Court referring the written statement filed by the contesting
respondent-defendants Nos.1 and 2, wherein in para No.9, they have
mentioned as follows:
"9. That the suit is barred by limitation, being a disclaimer, vide
Regd. Deed No.1846 of 1998 dated 25.03.1998 signed as a joint
disclaimer No.4 as a lone daughter of Late Bhupaljit Rajkumar."
Learned Senior Counsel further referred para No.14 of the
written statement filed by the contesting respondents, wherein it was
mentioned as under:
"14. That, in respect of para-4 of the plaint the plaintiff has failed
to establish her claim as a legal heir and successor of Late
Bhupaljit Rajkumar and Late Bhupaljit Rajkumar's share was 25%
as per C.S. Khatian No.272 of Mouja-Dewanpasha and not 10% of
the presumptive suit land of 3.14 acres. So, the claim of the
plaintiff appears to be a kid's story of the monkey, sharing bread
with the cats."
Referring the aforesaid paragraphs, Learned Senior Counsel
has drawn the attention of the Court that the stand of the contesting
respondents was contrary to each other. In one para, they stated that
the appellant was the legal heir of late Bhupaljit Rajkumar, but in
another para, they have taken the plea that the appellant had got no
share of her own rather 10% was presumptive. Thereafter, Learned
Senior Counsel has further drawn the attention of the Court referring
Exhibit-1, i.e. Khatian No.272 which was attested on 03.12.1965,
wherein the share of the predecessor who is the father of the
appellant has been shown as 1(one) Kani out of total land measuring
3.14 acres. Learned Senior Counsel has also drawn the attention of
the Court referring para No.3 of the plaint, wherein it has been
specifically mentioned the aforesaid land measuring 3.14 acres, and
the said fact, according to Learned Senior Counsel, has not been
disputed by the contesting respondent-defendants.
Learned Senior Counsel thereafter referred last part of para
No.13 of the judgment delivered by the Learned Trial Court. In the
said para, it has been mentioned by the Learned Trial Court that on
the basis of alleged Nadabi Patra(deed of relinquishment) which has
been marked as Exhibit-E, new Khatian No.725 was created wherein
there was no share belonging to the present appellant as observed by
the Learned Trial Court. But according to Learned Senior Counsel,
where the deed itself is inoperative and inadmissible in evidence, how
the Learned Trial Court relied upon the same because the minor
cannot enter into an agreement and in support of his contention,
Learned Senior Counsel relied upon one citation of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court of India reported in (2006) 5 SCC 353 in Prem
Singh and others v. Birbal and others wherein in Para No. 16,
Hon'ble the Apex court observed as under:
"16. When a document is valid, no question arises of
its cancellation. When a document is void ab initio, a
decree for setting aside the same would not be
necessary as the same is non est in the eye of the
law, as it would be a nullity."
Referring the same, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that
since the document itself is void ab initio as such, the same is non est
in the eye of law and as such on the basis of that no legal action can
be acted upon/taken, although the same was not challenged by the
alleged minor by attaining her maturity.
Learned Senior Counsel again drawn the attention of the
Court that in para No.30 of the judgment, Learned 1st Appellate Court
came to the observation that Nadabi Patra stands good and based on
that, finally published Khatian No.725 was published but where the
Nadabi Potra was non est in the eye of law in view of the said
principle of law laid by the Hon'ble Supreme Court, any action taken
on that cannot be legally acceptable and based upon that no legal
right can be established. But both the Courts below relied upon
Exhibit-E and Khatian No.725(Exhibit-C) and dismissed the suit
without any basis for which interference of the Court is required by
setting aside both the judgment and decree of the Learned Courts
below by allowing this appeal.
7. On the other hand, Learned Counsel for the principal
defendants-respondents has drawn the attention of the Court that
there was no infirmity in the judgment delivered by Learned Courts
below. According to Learned Counsel in the plaint from Page No.-1 to
8, nowhere the appellant took the plea that she was Nandini
Rajkumari, rather in all places she took the plea that her name was
Prabhabati Rajkumari(Singha). Furthermore, only during her cross-
examination by the contesting respondent-defendants, she took the
plea that her another name is Nandini Rajkumari. Learned Counsel
Mr. Sarma further submitted that said "Nadabi Patra" i.e. deed of
relinquishment(Exhibit-E) was never challenged by the appellant-
plaintiff. Even she has not also denied her signatures on Nadabi Patra.
Furthermore, the appellant could also file suit within a period of
limitation as provided under Article 59 of the Limitation Act. So, at
this belated stage, there is no scope on the part of the appellant to
take the plea and both the Learned Courts below considering
everything rightly dismissed the suit of the appellant-plaintiff. Learned
Counsel Mr. Sarma further drawn the attention of the Court referring
Section 5 and 6 of the T.P. Act, and submitted that by virtue of
Exhibit-D i.e. deed of relinquishment, one can transfer the legal right
and property and there is presumption of correctness of entries in the
ROR as per Section 43(3) of TLR and LR Act, 1960. Learned Counsel
in support of his contention, also relied upon one citation of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India reported in (2022) 12 SCC 815 in K.
Jayaram and others v. Bangalore Development Authority and
others, wherein in Para Nos.10, 14 and 15, Hon'ble the Apex Court
observed as under:
"10. It is well-settled that the jurisdiction exercised
by the High Court under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India is extraordinary, equitable and
discretionary and it is imperative that the petitioner
approaching the writ court must come with clean
hands and put forward all facts before the court
without concealing or suppressing anything. A
litigant is bound to state all facts which are relevant
to the litigation. If he withholds some vital or
relevant material in order to gain advantage over the
other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud
with the court as well as with the opposite parties
which cannot be countenanced.
14. It is necessary for us to state here that in order
to check multiplicity of proceedings pertaining to the
same subject-matter and more importantly to stop
the menace of soliciting inconsistent orders through
different judicial forums by suppressing material
facts either by remaining silent or by making
misleading statements in the pleadings in order to
escape the liability of making a false statement, we
are of the view that the parties have to disclose the
details of all legal proceedings and litigations either
past or present concerning any part of the subject-
matter of dispute which is within their knowledge. In
case, according to the parties to the dispute, no legal
proceedings or court litigations were or are pending,
they have to mandatorily state so in their pleadings
in order to resolve the dispute between the parties in
accordance with law.
15. In the instant case, since the appellants have not
disclosed the filing of the suit and its dismissal and
also the dismissal of the appeal against the judgment
of the civil court, the appellants have to be non-
suited on the ground of suppression of material
facts. They have not come to the court with clean
hands and they have also abused the process of law.
Therefore, they are not entitled for the
extraordinary, equitable and discretionary relief."
Referring the same, Learned Counsel Mr. Sarma submitted
that the appellant all along suppressed the material facts and she has
not come before the Court with clean hands. As such there is no merit
in the appeal and urged for upholding the judgments delivered by the
Learned Courts below.
Learned Counsel also referred another citation of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court reported in (2008) 12 SCC 481 in K.D. Sharma v.
Steel Authority of India Limited and others wherein in para
Nos.26 to 28 Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:
"26. It is well settled that "fraud avoids all judicial
acts, ecclesiastical or temporal" proclaimed Chief
Justice Edward Coke of England about three
centuries before. Reference was made by the counsel
to a leading decision of this Court in S.P.
Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath:(1994) 1 SCC 1
wherein quoting the above observations, this Court
held that a judgment/decree obtained by fraud has
to be treated as a nullity by every court.
27. Reference was also made to a recent decision of
this Court in A.V Papayya Sastry v. Govt. of
A.P.:(2007) 4 SCC 221 Considering English and
Indian cases, one of us (C.K. Thakker, J.) stated:
(SCC p. 231, para 22)
"22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a
judgment, decree or order obtained by playing
fraud on the court, tribunal or authority is a
nullity and non est in the eye of the law. Such a
judgment, decree or order-by the first court or
by the final court has to be treated as nullity by
every court, superior or inferior. It can be
challenged in any court, at any time, in appeal,
revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings."
The Court defined "fraud" as an act of deliberate
deception with the design of securing something by
taking unfair advantage of another. In fraud one
gains at the loss and cost of another. Even the most
solemn proceedings stand vitiated if they are
actuated by fraud. Fraud is thus an extrinsic
collateral act which vitiates all judicial acts, whether
in rem or in personam.
28. So far as the proposition of law is concerned,
there can be no two opinions. The learned counsel
for the respondents also did not dispute the
principles laid down in the above decisions as also in
several other judgments. They, however, stated that
on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the
ratio laid down in the above cases has no
application."
Referring the same, Learned Counsel again submitted that as
the appellant has not come before the Court with the clean hands as
such she is not entitled to get the relief as prayed for.
Finally, Learned Counsel relied upon another citation of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court of India reported in AIR 1967 SC 1395 in
Kuppuswami Chettiar v. A.S.P. Arumugam Chettiar and another
wherein in para No.2 and 6, Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as
under:
"2. The High Court held, and in our opinion rightly,
that Ex. B-1 was not vitiated by misrepresentation
and the appellant was well aware of the nature of
the deed when he executed it. The appellant is
somewhat deaf of hearing. But he is a wealthy and
shrewd money lender and capable of managing his
affairs. He took the draft of the deed to his own
lawyer and after obtaining legal advice, executed it.
He himself presented the deed for registration. He
received no consideration for release, but the motive
for the release was the pending litigation and the
fact that the properties originally belonged to the
family of the respondents. Having regard to the
release, the respondents immediately applied in the
pending suit for removal of the properties from the
scope of the suit and for the consequential
amendment of the plaint. After the execution of the
deed, the appellant never asked for accounts, nor
cared to ascertain how the respondents were
managing the properties. In the written statement
filed in O.S. No.174 of 1953, he took the plea that the
deed of release did not effectively pass title to the
outstandings, but he did not then say that it was
vitiated by misrepresentation. His present plea that
the deed was induced by misrepresentation is an
afterthought. In agreement with the High Court we
accept the testimony of the respondents witnesses
and we reject the onus is upon the appellant to
establish the plea of misrepresentation. He has failed
to establish this plea.
6. Counsel next submitted that a release can only
enlarge an existing title of the releasee, and there
can be no release in favour of a releasee who has no
interest in the property. He relied on the following
observation in Hutchi Gowder v. Bheema Gowder,
1959-2 Mad LJ 324 at p. 337: (AIR 1960 Mad 33 at p.
41). "A release deed can only feed title but cannot
transfer title" and another observation in S. P.
Chinnathambiar v. V. R. P. Chinnathambiar, 1953-2
Mad LJ 387 at p. 391: (AIR 1954 Mad 5 at p. 8)
"Renunciation must be in favour of a person, who
had already title to the estate, the effect of which is
only to enlarge the right. Re-nunciation does not vest
in a person a title where it did not exist. . . . . . ."
Now, it cannot be disputed that a release can be
usefully employed as a form of conveyance by a
person having some right or interest to another
having a limited estate, e.g., by a remainderman to a
tenant for life, and the release then operates as an
enlargement of the limited estate. But in this case,
we are not concerned with a release in favour of the
holder of a limited estate. Here, the deed was in
favour of a person having no interest in the property,
and it could not take effect as an enlargement of an
existing estate. It was intended to be and was a
transfer of ownership. A deed called a deed of
release can, by using words of sufficient amplitude,
transfer title to one having no title before the
transfer. The cases relied upon by counsel are not
authorities for the proposition that the operative
words of a release deed must be ignored. In S. P.
Chinnathambiar's case. 1953-2 Mad LJ 387: (AIR
1954 Mad 5) the document could not operate as a
transfer, because a transfer was hit by S. 34 of the
Court of Wards Act, and viewed as a renunciation of
a claim, it could not vest title in the release. In
Hutchi Gowder v. Bheema Gowder, 1959-2 Mad LJ
324: (AIR 1960 Mad 33) the question was whether a
covenant of further assurance should be enforced by
directing the defendant to execute a release deed or
a deed of conveyance, and the Court held that the
defendant should execute a deed of conveyance.
These decisions do not lay down that a deed styled a
deed of release cannot, in law, transfer title to one
who before the transfer had no interest in the
property."
Relying upon the same, Learned Counsel submitted that the
principle of law laid down in the aforesaid citation is also very much
relevant for decision of this appeal.
8. Here in the case at hand both the Courts below relied upon
Exhibit-E i.e. deed of relinquishment and as such came to the
observation that based upon Exhibit-E, Khatian No.725 was created
and dismissed the suit filed by the appellant. It is the settled position
of law that Khatian does not confer any title. Here in the case at hand
as submitted by Learned Counsel for the respondents although the
appellant as plaintiff in the plaint did not mention her name as
Nandini Rajkumari but in her cross examination she stated that her
another name is Nandini Rajkumari and the principal respondent-
defendants in their written statement admitted the said fact.
Moreover, there was no contrary evidence on record that Nandini
Rajkumari and the present appellant is not the same person rather
they are of different identity.
Further, on perusal of Exhibit-2 and Exhibit-3, it appears that
at the time of execution of "deed of relinquishment", she was minor
but the Learned Courts below did not consider those documents and
came to the observation that the same was legally enforceable and
relied upon the same. But in view of the principle of law laid down by
the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the aforenoted case, Prem Singh and
others(supra) where the document itself is void ab initio as such the
same is non est in the eye of law as there was/is no contrary evidence
on record challenging Exhibit-2 and Exhibit-3 as relied upon by the
appellant-plaintiff. Thus, it appears to this Court that both the Courts
have committed gross irregularity in proper appreciation of the
evidence on record. Since the appellant was minor on the day of
execution of deed of relinquishment (Exhibit-E), so, on the basis of
that no right can be created in favour of the present respondent-
defendants in respect of the share of property belonging to the
deceased father of the appellant namely Bhupaljit Rajkumar for land
measuring 0.32 acres as alleged in the plaint by the appellant. To
substantiate that a contract entered into by a minor is void ab initio,
reference may be made to the case of Krishnaveni v. M.A. Shagul
Hameed and Another reported in 2024 SCC OnLine SC 1903
wherein in para Nos.7, 8, 9 and 10 Hon'ble the Apex Court observed
as under:
"7. There is no dispute on the contention raised by
the defendants in the suit that the appellant was a
minor at the time of the said agreement dated
03.09.2007. Therefore, such contract with a minor,
was rightly found to be a void contract by the High
Court. For such conclusion, the High Court relied on
the ratio in Mathai Mathai v. Joseph Mary:(2015) 5
SCC 622. In this judgment, the Court opined that a
15 year old could not have entered into a valid
contract in her own name and she ought to be
represented either by her natural guardian or a
guardian appointed by the Court in order to lend
legal validity to the contract in question. The
conclusion drawn by the High Court is also supported
by the Privy Council's decision in Mohori Bibee v.
Dharmodas Ghose:1903 SCC OnLine PC 4.
8. Mr. B Balaji, learned counsel for the appellant,
submits at this juncture, that a contract in favour of
a minor is enforceable and is not void. He further
submits that the II Additional Subordinate Judge
(28.04.2017) has rightly placed reliance on A.T.
Raghava Chariar v. O.A. Srinivasa Raghava
Chariar:1916 SCC OnLine Mad 83 and Thakur Das v.
Pulti:AIR 1924 Lah 611, to hold that every contract
with a minor is not necessarily void, and a contract
for a minor's benefit is enforceable and the validity
of such a contract can be considered during trial. The
appellant's argument deserves to be negated in light
of the decision in Mathai Mathai:(2015) 5 SCC 622,
wherein this Court has held:
"18.... Many courts have held that a minor can
be a mortgagee as it is transfer of property in
the interest of the minor. We feel that this is
an erroneous application of the law keeping in
mind the decision of the Privy Council in
Mohori Bibee case(supra).
19. As per the Contract Act, 1872 it is clearly
stated that for an agreement to become a
contract, the parties must be competent to
contract, wherein age of majority is a
condition for competency. A deed of mortgage
is a contract and we cannot hold that a
mortgage in the name of a minor is valid,
simply because it is in the interest of the
minor unless she is represented by her natural
guardian or guardian appointed by the court.
The law cannot be read differently for a minor
who is a mortgagor and a minor who is a
mortgagee as there are rights and liabilities in
respect of the immovable property would flow
out of such a contract on both of them.
Therefore, this Court has to hold that the
mortgage deed, Ext. A-1 is void ab initio in law
and the appellant cannot claim any rights
under it. Accordingly, the first part of first
point is answered against the appellant."
9. In view of the decision in Mathai Mathai(supra)
the judgments in Raghava Chariar(supra) and
Thakur Das(supra) are no longer good law, and the
II Additional Subordinate Judge's (28.04.2017)
reliance on the aforesaid decisions to hold that the
contract in favour of the minor is enforceable is
misconceived.
10. Having considered the basis of the impugned
judgment:2019 SCC OnLine Mad 136, we see no
infirmity with the view taken by the High Court. The
appeal is accordingly dismissed. The interim order
merges with this final order."
It is the settled law that Khatian does not confer any title. In
this regard, I would like to refer the following citation reported in
2023 SCC OnLine SC 1483 in P. Kishore Kumar v. Vittal K.
Patkar, wherein in para No.12, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17, Hon'ble the
Apex Court observed as under:
"12. It is trite law that revenue records are not
documents of title.
13. This Court in Sawarni v. Inder Kaur:(1996) 6 SCC
223 held that mutation in revenue records neither
creates nor extinguishes title, nor does it have any
presumptive value on title. All it does is entitle the
person in whose favour mutation is done to pay the
land revenue in question.
14. This was further affirmed in Balwant Singh v.
Daulat Singh (Dead) by LRs:(1997) 7 SCC 137
wherein this Court held that mere mutation of
records would not divest the owners of a land of
their right, title and interest in the land.
15. In Jitendra Singh v. State of Madhya
Pradesh:2021 SCC OnLine SC 802, this Court after
considering a catena of judgments, reiterated the
principle of law as follows:
"6. ***mutation entry does not confer any right,
title or interest in favour of the person and the
mutation entry in the revenue record is only for
the fiscal purpose."
16. We may also profitably refer to the decision of
this Court in Sita Ram Bhau Patil v. Ramchandra
Nago Patil (Dead) by LRs:(1977) 2 SCC 49 wherein it
was held that there exists no universal principle that
whatever will appear in the record of rights will be
presumed to be correct, when there exists evidence
to the contrary.
17. In the present case, the Commissioner's order
distinctly denying the rights of occupancy to the
plaintiff's vendor is evidence that renders these
revenue entries unworthy of acceptance."
9. In views of the above, after going through the judgments of
both the Courts below, it appears to this Court that there is/are
substantial questions of law to be decided in favour of the appellant
and on the basis of Exhibit-E, the right of appellant being minor on
the day of execution of deed cannot be extinguished and as such in
the considered opinion of this Court, both the judgments and decrees
of the Learned Courts below cannot be sustained in the eye of law.
Accordingly, both the judgments and decrees of the Learned Courts
below are liable to be set aside. The appellant as plaintiff along with
her mother if she is alive are jointly entitled to the share of their
deceased predecessor to the extent of land measuring 0.32 acres in
the joint family property which was initially recorded in Khatian
No.272 which was later on converted into Khatian No.725 ignoring her
share.
10. In the result, the appeal filed by the appellant is hereby
allowed. The judgment dated 12.01.2024 and consequential decree
dated 16.01.2024 delivered by Learned District Judge, North Tripura,
Dharmanagar in connection with case No.T.A./1/2019 upholding the
judgment dated 18.12.2018 and consequential decree dated
19.12.2018 in connection with case No.TS(P)/8/2013 is hereby set
aside. The matter is remanded back to the Learned Trial Court below
to determine the issues afresh excepting issue No.(iii) which has been
settled by this Court that the appellant plaintiff is entitled to partition
of her share for land measuring 0.32 acres over the joint family
property, if necessary, after taking oral/documentary evidence afresh
of both the parties in accordance with law and thereafter to deliver a
fresh judgment within a period of 6(six) months from the date of
receipt of the copy of judgment passed by this Court.
With this observation, this present appeal stands disposed of.
Prepare decree accordingly.
Both the parties be asked to appear before the Learned Trial
Court below either personally or through their engaged Learned
Counsel on 31.07.2025 positively.
Send down the records of the Learned Courts below along
with a copy of this judgment and Order.
Pending applications(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
JUDGE
MOUMIT Digitally signed by
MOUMITA DATTA
A DATTA 17:47:20 -07'00'
Date: 2025.07.17
Deepshikha
