Tripura High Court
The State Of Tripura vs Juled Hossen (43 Years) S/O Taher Miah on 26 August, 2025
Page 1 of 8
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
IA No.01/2025 in/and WA No.77 of 2025
1. The State of Tripura, represented by the Secretary to the Govt. of Tripura,
Department of Higher Education, Government of Tripura, Khejur Bagan, P.O.
Agartala, P.S. NCC, District: West Tripura, Pin-799001
2. The Commissioner & Secretary, Department of Finance, Govt. of Tripura,
New Secretariat Complex, Gorkha Basti, P.O. Kunjaban, P.S. NCC, District:
West Tripura, Pin-799001
3. The Directorate of Higher Education, Government of Tripura, Estt. (N.G.)
Section, Old Secretariat Complex, P.O. Agartala, District- West Tripura
4. The Principal, Tripura Institute of Technology, Narsingarh, Airport Road,
Singerbil, P.O. Agartala, P.S. Airport Police Station, District: West Tripura,
Pin-799009
.........Applicant/Appellant(s);
Versus
1. Juled Hossen (43 years) S/o Taher Miah, R/o- Maharani, Udaipur, District-
Gomati Tripura, Pin-799120
2. Sri Sudip Kar (50 years) S/o Late Balai Chandra Kar, R/o Ushabazar,
Chinaihani, P.O. Agartala Airport, P.S. Airport, District: West Tripura, Pin-
799009
3. Sri Tapas Kanti Rakshit (50 years) S/o Late Sitangshu Sekhar Rakshit, R/o
Joynagar, Dashamighat, P.O. Agartala, P.S. West Agartala, District: West
Tripura, Pin-799001
.........Respondent(s)
For Applicant/Appellant(s) : Mr. Dipankar Sarma, Addl. G.A.
For Respondent(s) : None.
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA
Date of hearing : 20.08.2025
Date of Judgment & Order : 26.08.2025
Whether Fit for Reporting : YES
JUDGMENT & ORDER
(M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.)
This application is filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act,
1963 to condone the delay of 237 days in filing the Writ Appeal challenging
the judgment dt.20.08.2024 of the learned Single Judge in WP(C) No.777 of
2023.
2. The fourth applicant herein is the Tripura Institute of
Technology.
3. It is contended that the said applicant obtained downloaded copy
of the impugned judgment from the internet for examination, and when the
file was under examination, it received a representation from the respondents
on 09.09.2024, and it was forwarded to the Higher Education Department on
12.09.2024.
4. It is contended that the Department of Higher Education, after
examination of the file, referred the matter to the Law Department for views
on 25.11.2024, and the Law Department, after giving their views, returned the
file to the said department on 26.11.2024.
5. Thereafter the Higher Education Department again examined the
file, and referred it to Finance Department for their views on 16.12.2024, and
the said department gave their views and returned the file on 27.12.2024.
6. Subsequently, the Higher Education Department again referred
the matter to the learned Advocate General for opinion on 11.04.2025, and he
gave his opinion on the very same day.
7. Thereafter the file was handed over to the advocate for filing
appeal on 17.04.2025, and after the drafting of the memo of appeal, it was
again sent to the Advocate General for vetting on 21.04.2025.
8. The Advocate General on 22.04.2025 vetted the memo of appeal,
stay petition and the delay condonation petition, and returned the file to the
counsel for the applicants.
9. Thereafter application for certified copy was made on
24.04.2025, and then the appeal came to be filed on 15.05.2025.
10. It is contended that on account of the above reasons, the delay in
filing the appeal occurred and the same was on account of movement of file
from one authority to another, and so the said delay is liable to be condoned.
11. Such a plea on part of the state was not accepted by the Supreme
Court in Postmaster General and others v. Living Media India Limited and
another1, the Supreme Court held:
"25. We have already extracted the reasons as mentioned in the "better
affidavit" sworn by Mr Aparajeet Pattanayak, SSRM, Air Mail Sorting
Division, New Delhi. It is relevant to note that in the said affidavit, the
Department has itself mentioned and is aware of the date of the judgment
of the Division Bench of the High Court in Office of the Chief Postmaster
v. Living Media India Ltd. as 11-9-2009. Even according to the deponent,
their counsel had applied for the certified copy of the said judgment only
on 8-1-2010 and the same was received by the Department on the very
same day. There is no explanation for not applying for the certified copy
of the impugned judgment on 11-9-2009 or at least within a reasonable
time. The fact remains that the certified copy was applied for only on 8-
1-2010 i.e. after a period of nearly four months.
26. In spite of affording another opportunity to file better affidavit by
placing adequate material, neither the Department nor the person-
incharge has filed any explanation for not applying the certified copy
within the prescribed period. The other dates mentioned in the affidavit
which we have already extracted, clearly show that there was delay at
every stage and except mentioning the dates of receipt of the file and the
decision taken, there is no explanation as to why such delay had
occasioned. Though it was stated by the Department that the delay was
due to unavoidable circumstances and genuine difficulties, the fact
remains that from day one the Department or the person/persons
concerned have not evinced diligence in prosecuting the matter to this
Court by taking appropriate steps.
27. It is not in dispute that the person(s) concerned were well aware or
conversant with the issues involved including the prescribed period of
limitation for taking up the matter by way of filing a special leave
petition in this Court. They cannot claim that they have a separate period
of limitation when the Department was possessed with competent persons
familiar with court proceedings. In the absence of plausible and
acceptable explanation, we are posing a question why the delay is to be
condoned mechanically merely because the Government or a wing of the
Government is a party before us.
28. Though we are conscious of the fact that in a matter of condonation
of delay when there was no gross negligence or deliberate inaction or
lack of bona fides, a liberal concession has to be adopted to advance
(2012) 3 SCC 563
substantial justice, we are of the view that in the facts and circumstances,
the Department cannot take advantage of various earlier decisions. The
claim on account of impersonal machinery and inherited bureaucratic
methodology of making several notes cannot be accepted in view of the
modern technologies being used and available. The law of limitation
undoubtedly binds everybody, including the Government."
(Emphasis supplied)
12. The said judgment has been followed by the Supreme Court in
several cases such as Commissioner of Customs, Chennai v. Volex
Interconnect (India) Private Limited2, Principal Commissioner Central
Excise Delhi-I v. Design Dialogues India Pvt. Ltd.3, Union of India v.
Central Tibetan Schools Administration & Others4, Union of India &
Others v. Vishnu Aroma Pouching Private Limited and another5, and State
of Uttar Pradesh & Others v. Sabha Narain & Others6.
13. In Union of India & Another v. Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy
(D) through his legal heir 7, the Supreme Court held that it is not permissible
to look into the merits of the matter as long as it is not convinced that
sufficient cause has been made out for condonation of long and inordinate
delay; that it hardly matters whether a litigant is a private party or a State or
Union of India when it comes to condoning gross delay of more than 12 years;
length of delay is a relevant matter which the court must take into
consideration while considering whether the delay should be condoned or not;
from the tenor of the approach of the appellants, it appears that they want to
fix their own period of limitation for instituting the proceedings for which law
has prescribed a period of limitation; once it is held that a party has lost his
right to have the matter considered on merits because of his long inaction, it
(2022) 3 SCC 159
(2022) 2 SCC 327
(2021) 11 SCC 557
(2022) 9 SCC 263
(2022) 9 SCC 266
2024 INSC 262 : 2024 SCC OnLine SC 489
cannot be presumed to be non-deliberate delay and in such circumstances, he
cannot be heard to plead that the substantial justice deserves to be preferred as
against the technical considerations. It was reiterated while considering plea
for condonation of delay, Court must not start with the merits of the main case
and the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation
offered by the party seeking condonation. It declared that delay should not be
excused as a matter of generosity.
14. This was also reiterated in State of Madhya Pradesh v.
Ramkumar Choudhary8.
15. In the judgment of the Supreme Court in Inder Singh v. The
State of Madhya Pradesh9 referred to by the counsel for the applicants, no
doubt, there are observations indicating that though delay cannot be condoned
without sufficient cause, it has to be kept in mind that, if in a particular case
merits need to be examined, it should not be scuttled merely on the basis of
limitation.
16. Inder Singh ( 9 supra ) was a case where the learned Single
Judge of the High Court had allowed an application for condonation of delay
in filing a Second Appeal, though, the appeal had been filed with a delay of
1537 days, and the Supreme Court did not deem it fit to interfere with the
same.
17. It appears that the attention of the Bench of the Supreme Court in
Inder Singh ( 9 supra ) was not drawn to the judgments referred to by us in
Jahangir Byramji Jeejeebhoy ( 7 supra ) and in the case of Ramkumar
Choudhary ( 8 supra), where the Court had stated that while considering pleas
Special Leave Petition (C) Diary No. 48636 of 2024 dt.29.11.2024
Special Leave Petition (Civil) No.6145 of 2024 dt. 21.03.2025
of condonation of delay, Court must not start with the merits of the main case
and the Court owes a duty to first ascertain the bona fides of the explanation
offered by the party seeking condonation of delay. It also stated that if there is
a long inaction, party would lose the right to have the matter considered on
merits and in such circumstances, he cannot be heard to plead that the
substantial justice deserves to be preferred as against the technical
consideration.
18. Counsel for respondents also relied on Ramchandra Shankar,
Deodhar & Others v. State of Maharashtra & Others10 and also the judgment
in Sheo Raj Singh (deceased) through Legal Representatives & Others v.
Union of India & Another 11, to contend that liberal approach should be taken
in condoning delays where the limitation ground undermines the merits of the
case and obstructs substantial justice.
19. In Sheo Raj Singh ( 11 supra ), referred to in the judgment of the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Inder Singh ( 9 supra ), the High Court had
condoned the delay of 479 days in filing the Land Acquisition Appeal in the
High Court and the explanation offered found favour of the Supreme Court.
In that case, the Supreme Court observed that it was not hearing an
application for condonation of delay, but sitting in appeal over a discretionary
exercise of the High Court granting the prayer for condonation of delay; in the
case of the former, whether to condone or not, would be the only question,
whereas in the latter, whether there has been proper exercise of discretion in
favour of grant of prayer for condonation, would be the question; that the law
is well-settled that a court of appeal should not ordinarily interfere with the
(1974) 1 SCC 317
(2023) 10 SCC 531
discretionary exercise by the courts below; and that the appellate power
should be exercised only when the order challenged in appeal is clearly wrong
and not when it is merely not right.
20. Both these decisions cannot help the applicants, since, in the instant
application, this Court has to consider the question whether sufficient cause has
been shown by the applicants to condone the period of delay. It is not considering
an order passed by a subordinate forum condoning the delay or refusing to
condone it.
21. In the judgment of State of Rajasthan and Another v. Bal
Kishan Mathur (dead) through legal representatives and others 12 cited by
the counsel for the applicants, the delay on the part of the State in filing the
Special Appeal Writ was only 98 days. Also in the facts of that case, the High
Court had declined to condone delay which was not explained merely for a
period of six days out of 98 days. It was undoubtedly a harsh approach on the
part of the High Court, and therefore the Supreme Court rightly intervened, set
aside the judgment of the High Court and condoned the delay. But where the
delay as in the instant case is 237 days, such a view cannot be adopted.
22. In Executive Officer, Antiyur Town Panchayat v. G. Arumugam
(dead) by legal representatives13 cited by the counsel for the applicants, a
delay of 1373 days in filing Second Appeal by the Executive Officer of a
Panchayat in relation to Panchayat property was condoned on the ground that
there were deliberate lapses on the part of the previous Executive Officer of
the Panchayat at the relevant time, and there was an attempt on the part of the
Government officials or public servants to defeat justice by causing delay. In
(2014) 1 SCC 592
(2015) 3 SCC 569
the instant case there is no such contention raised, and therefore the said
judgment also has no application.
23. We may also point out that the applicants were undoubtedly
aware that the limitation for filing the appeal is only 30 days, and they cannot
take their own sweet time to decide on filing the appeal, and file it whenever
they feel like it ignoring the period of limitation for filing the same.
24. The facts narrated above indicate that the fourth applicant and the
other applicants acted in a very leisurely manner knowing fully well the period
of limitation for filing the Writ Appeal. When the Finance Department
returned the file to the Higher Education Department on 27.12.2024, no reason
is offered why till 11.04.2025, for 4 months, the file was not referred to the
Advocate General.
25. Also there is an inordinate delay in applying for certified copy of
the judgment of the learned Single Judge, and such application was filed only
on 24.04.2025 though the judgment was delivered on 20.08.2024. No
explanation is offered for this delay by the applicants.
26. We are satisfied that in the facts and circumstances of the case,
the applicants were clearly negligent in taking steps in filing the Writ Appeal,
and no sufficient cause has been shown by them for condoning the inordinate
delay of 237 days in filing the Writ Appeal.
27. Accordingly, the application for condonation of delay is
dismissed. Consequently the Writ Appeal is also dismissed.
28. Pending applications shall stand closed.
(S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA, J) (M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO, CJ)
Pijush/
MUNNA SAHA Digitally signed by MUNNA SAHA
Date: 2025.08.26 13:02:55 +05'30'
