Tripura High Court
Smt. Pinki Saha Roy vs The State Of Tripura on 20 August, 2025
Page 1 of 19
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
WP(C)(HC) No.01 of 2025
Smt. Pinki Saha Roy, W/O. Sri Raju Barman, Resident of Buddhamandir,
Opposite of Bazar India Shopping Mall, P.O.-Ujan Abhaynagar, P.S.-N.C.C.,
District-West Tripura, Pin-799005.
On behalf of Detenue in Custody:
Sri Raju Barman, S/O. Lt. Madan Barman, Resident of Ushabazar, Chinaihani,
P.S.-Airport, District-West Tripura, Pin-799009.
......... Petitioner(s).
VERSUS
1. The State of Tripura, Represented by the Secretary, Home Department,
Government of Tripura, Agartala.
2. Secretary, Home Department, Government of Tripura, Agartala.
3. The District Magistrate and Collector, West Tripura, Agartala.
.........Respondent(s).
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Samrat Kar Bhowmik , Sr. Advocate,
Mr. Ezekiel L. Darlong, Advocate,
Mr. Sreekanta Bal, Advocate,
Mr. Nirjati Debnath, Advocate.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Sankar Lodh, Advocate,
Mr. Subham Majumder, Advocate.
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA
CAV reserved on : 31.07.2025.
Judgment delivered on : 20.08.2025.
Whether fit for reporting : YES.
JUDGMENT & ORDER
(M.S. Ramachandra Rao, C.J.)
Heard Mr. Samrat Kar Bhowmik, Senior counsel assisted by Mr.
E.L. Darlong, counsel for the petitioner as well as Mr. Sankar Lodh, counsel
for the respondents-State.
2. In this Writ petition, the petitioner Smt. Pinki Saha Roy on behalf
of detenue Raju Barman challenges;
(i) order of detention dt. 05.09.2024 passed under Section 3(2) of
the National Security Act, 1980 (for short, 'the Act') passed by the District
Magistrate & Collector, West Tripura, Agartala,
(ii) order dt. 08.10.2024 of the Home Department of the
Government of Tripura issued by the Under Secretary to the Government of
Tripura rejecting the representation of the detenue, and
(iii) order dt. 11.11.2024 of the Home Department of the
Government of Tripura issued by the Under Secretary to the Government of
Tripura confirming the order of detention under Section 12(1) of the Act and
directing that said Raju Barman be detained for 12(twelve) months w.e.f.
06.09.2024 under the said law.
3. The Superintendent of Police, West Tripura made a request to the
District Magistrate, West Tripura to consider for issuance of a detention order
under the Act against the detenue Raju Barman. Along with the report, the
Superintendent of Police, West Tripura also placed on record several
documents.
The detention order dt.5.9.2024
4. On receipt of the report along with the documents, the District
Magistrate, West Tripura got satisfied for issuance of a detention order under
Section 3(3) of the Act after opining that the activities of the detenue were of
such a nature that an inference could reasonably be drawn that he would be
likely to repeat such illegal activities so as to warrant his detention. The said
detention order was passed on 05.09.2024 (Annexure-1 to the writ petition).
5. The detention order mentions 7(seven) cases registered against
the detenue in various Police Stations and also 8(eight) G.D. entries. They are:
(i) MURDER/CRIMINAL CONSPIRACY: Airport PS case No.37/
2024 dt.1.5.2024 u/s.302/120B IPC and Section 27 of Arms Act-The
allegation is he conspired and got killed one Durga Prasanna Deb who was
shot in full public view in an open market on 30.4.2024 by one of the
associates of the detinue and this caused panic among the public.
(ii) VOLUNTARILY CAUSING GRIEVOUS HURT BY
DANGEROUS WEAPON OR MEANS/ATTEMPT TO MURDER : West
Agartala PS case No.169/2022 u/s.326/307/34 IPC & Section 27 (ii) of the
Arms Act- The allegation is that the detinue on 25.10.2022 shot at one Subir
Sarkar who was having tiffin at Nutan Nagar in front of Sonar Bangla Dhaba
using fire arms and two persons Haripada Das and Sanjay Das suffered bullet
injuries and were admitted in a private hospital.
(iii) LURKING HOUSE TRESPASS OR HOUSE BREAKING BY
NIGHT IN ORDER TO COMMIT OFFENCE PUNISHABLE WITH
IMPRISONMENT/ASSAULT OR CRIMINAL FORCE TO WOMAN WITH
INTENT TO OUTRAGE HER MODESTY/ MISCHIEF/ DACOITY ; West
Agartala PS Case No.123/2020 dt.10.8.2020 u/s.457/354/427/395/34 IPC -
the allegation is that on 9.8.2020, the detinue and associates broke into the
house of one Amit Ghosh by breaking down the main gate of his house, and
when his mother tried to stop them from entering the property, they tried to
outrage her modesty apart from ransacking the household items and started
breaking doors and windows to kill Amit Ghosh. It is alleged that they looted
Rs.20,000/- and also damaged a motorcycle and a car in the house.
(iv) WRONGFUL RESTRAINT/VOLUNTARILY CAUSING
GRIEVOUS HURT BY DANGEROUS WEAPON OR MEANS/ ATTEMPT
TO MURDER: AIRPORT PS CASE NO.75/2019 DT.4.9.2019 U/S.
341/326/325/307/427/34 IPC - On 4.9.2019 after midnight, the detinue and
associates are alleged to waylaid near a jungle Satyabrata Sarkar and his
companions and made a murderous attack with axe, daos, iron road resulting
in severing of 3 fingers of the hand of the complainant and also striking him
on the back with a dao and fled away.
(v) WRONGFUL RESTRAINT/VOLUNTARILY CAUSING
GRIEVOUS HURT/THEFT/CRIMINAL INTIMIDATION: AIRPORT PS
CASE NO.29/2019 DT.9.5.2019 U/S.341/325/382/506/34 - The allegation is
that on 8.5.2019, the detinue and his associates wrongfully restrained one Sujit
Saha and his brother when they were returning from the market, assaulted
them and snatched his gold chain and also cash of Rs.20,000/-.
(vi) PUTTING A PERSON IN FEAR OF DEATH OR OF
GRIVOUS HURT IN ORDER TO COMMIT EXTORTION/ CRIMINAL
INTIMIDATION/-: AIRPORT PS CASE NO.05/2021 DT.8.1.2021 U/S.387,
506, 34 IPC - The allegation is that the detinue and his associates threatened a
contractor who was awarded a tender for the airport terminal building and
asked him to withdraw the tender and demanded Rs.15 lakhs and also tried to
assault him.
(vii) KIDNAPPING FOR RANSOM /CONSPIRACY : AIRPORT PS
CASE NO.01/2021 DT.1.1.2021 U/S.364-A & 34.- The allegation is that the
detinue and his associates conspired and kidnapped an employee of an Assam
based Company which had bid and was successful in a tender, took away his
phone, put him in a private car and later released him after midnight on a road
cutting a paddy field.
The 8 GD entries reflect that the detinue and his associates were
threatening local people and extorting money.
In the 7 Criminal cases, there was acquittal on compromise in
items (v) and (vi). In all other cases charge sheet had been filed. The detinue
has secured bail/anticipatory bail in all cases except in item (i), where he is in
custody since 10.7.2024.
6. The detention order records that from the said data, it is evident
that the detenue was continuously involved in the noxious activities of trying
to create reign of terror among the people, being involved in various illegal
activities such as murder, dacoity, extortion, kidnapping, possessing and
handling of prohibited arms or ammunitions, assaulting and terrorizing,
threatening, blackmailing others in order to extort money from the innocent
public, businessman, creating obstruction during construction works/projects,
creating panic and fear among the public for his personal gain and thus
vitiating the public peace, tranquility and security of the State. It was also
stated therein that since his activities are prejudicial to public order, it is
necessary and expedient to detain him under the Act.
7. The District Magistrate, West Tripura deployed on 06.09.2024,
3(three) Police Officials for supply of the detention order to the detenue along
with the enclosures thereto (Annexures-B, C & D to the counter affidavit).
8. It is not in dispute that the State Government, in exercise of
powers conferred by Section 3(3) of the Act had issued a notification
dt. 29.06.2024 conferring powers upon all the District Magistrates within their
jurisdiction to exercise powers for issuance of a detention order under Section
3 of the Act, and in terms of the said notification, the District Magistrate, West
Tripura passed the said order of detention. The said order was also
communicated to the State Government on 05.09.2024 itself.
The approval of detention order by State Government on 13.9.2024
9. On 13.09.2024 the State Government approved the detention
order as per Section 3(4) of the Act (Annexure-E to the counter affidavit).
10. On 18.09.2024 the State Government also communicated/
reported to the Central Government the same under Section 3(5) of the Act
(Annexure-F to the counter affidavit).
11. On 20.09.2024, the detenue submitted a representation to the
State Government under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India.
12. On 25.09.2024, the Home Department of the State Government
referred the matter also to the Advisory Board under Section 10 of the Act
which was received by the said Advisory Board on 26.09.2024. The Advisory
Board convened a meeting on 04.10.2024.
13. The Advisory Board on that date noted that the detenue had a
right to be heard in person by the Board and directed his production before the
Board by the Jail Authority on 09.10.2024 at 11 a.m.
14. The Home Department communicated this order to the District
Magistrate, West Tripura to take action to comply with the said direction.
15. In the meantime, on 08.10.2024 the State Government rejected
the representation of the detenue in terms of Article 22(5) of the Constitution
of India, vide Annexure-7.
16. On 09.10.2024 the detenue made a representation before the
Advisory Board (Annexure-5) and was also provided a personal hearing.
17. On 23.10.2024 the Advisory Board opined that there was enough
material that the detenue had indulged in criminal activities detrimental to
peace, tranquility and public order in the locality, and that he poses a serious
threat to the peace and tranquility in the locality if allowed to remain free, and
there may be chance of his being released on bail in pending criminal cases
also. It also held that the order of preventive detention was not based on
surmise or conjecture and that the satisfaction of the Detaining Authority was
not mechanical and there was sufficient justification for passing the same.
18. This was submitted within 7(seven) weeks from the date of
detention, i.e. 06.09.2024 as stipulated under Section 11(1) of the Act.
19. On 11.11.2024 the State Government confirmed the detention
order dt. 05.09.2024 under Section 12 (1) of the Act. (Annexure-9, page-348
to 349 of the writ petition).
The Writ Petition
20. Assailing the same, this writ petition was filed.
21. Among the 7(seven) criminal cases referred to in the detention
order, admittedly the detenue was acquitted in (a) Airport P.S. case
No.29/2019 dt.9.5.2019 under Sections 341,323,506,34 IPC and also in (b)
Airport P.S. case No.05 of 2021 dt. 08.01.2021 under Sections 387/506/34 of
IPC.
22. But the factum of acquittal in these two cases does not appear to
have been noticed by the Detaining Authority and is not referred to in the
detention order dt. 05.09.2024 passed by him.
23. Counsel for the petitioner contended that since the Sponsoring
Authority i.e., the Superintendent of Police, West Tripura, Agartala had
suppressed before the Detaining Authority i.e., the District Magistrate, West
Tripura the factum of acquittal of the detenue in both these cases, the
detention order as well as the consequential orders passed by the State
Government are all vitiated.
24. Counsel for the State contended that the acquittal in these two
criminal cases was on account of compromise/settlement with the
complainants/victims and so they have no bearing on the detention order in
view of Section 5-A of the Act. The said Section 5A states as under:
"5A. Grounds of detention severable.--Where a person has
been detained in pursuance of an order of detention whether made
before or after the commencement of the National Security (Second
Amendment) Act, 1984 under section 3 which has been made on two
or more grounds, such order of detention shall be deemed to have
been made separately on each of such grounds and accordingly--
(a) such order shall not be deemed to be invalid or
inoperative merely because one or some of the grounds is or are--
(i) vague,
(ii) non-existent,
(iii) not relevant,
(iv) not connected or not proximately connected with
such person, or
(v) invalid for any other reason whatsoever,
and it is not, therefore, possible to hold that the Government or officer
making such order would have been satisfied as provided in section 3
with reference to the remaining ground or grounds and made the
order of detention;
(b) the Government or officer making the order of detention
shall be deemed to have made the order of detention under the said
section after being satisfied as provided in that section with reference
to the remaining ground or grounds."
25. In the case of Bimla Dewan Smt. v. Lieutenant Governor of
Delhi1, the Supreme Court held that if in the detention order there are
references to criminal cases, but in some of those cases, the detenue was found
to be acquitted or discharged, they cannot be legitimately taken into
consideration for detaining the detenue under Section 3(2) of the NSA. The
Supreme Court held that since the Detaining Authority would naturally have
been influenced by the reference to the said criminal cases for coming to the
conclusion that the detenue required to be detained under the provisions of the
Act, the entire order of detention is unsustainable.
26. The judgment in Bimla Dewan (1 supra) though rendered under
the National Security Act,1980, it was rendered at a time when Section 5A
was not there in the said statute book as the said provision was introduced by
Act 60 of 1984 with retrospective effect from 21.06.1984.
27. In fact, provision akin to Section 5A was already there in the
COFEPOSA Act,1974 i.e. the Conservation of Foreign Exchange and
Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 by the date of the judgment in
Bimla Dewan (1 supra).
The petitioner in Bimla Dewan (1 supra) contended that because
there was no provision like Section 5A of the COFEPOSA Act, 1974 in the
National Security Act,1980 at that point of time, the whole order would get
vitiated if one of the grounds is bad and the entire order has to be quashed and
this argument was accepted by the Supreme court. It held :
(1982) 2 SCC 469
" 6. ... ... Mr Ram Jethmalani, Senior Advocate who appeared for the
petitioner in this case submitted that in the National Security Act there
is no provision like Section 5-A in COFEPOSA (Conservation of
Foreign Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act) and,
therefore, if one of the grounds is bad the order of detention has to be
quashed in its entirety and that as the detaining authority has based
the order of detention of Grounds 1 to 24 and 28 also, the order of
detention is unsustainable. The learned counsel for the respondent did
not submit anything to controvert that submission of Mr Ram
Jethmalani. We are of the opinion that since the detaining authority
would naturally have been influenced by these grounds as well for
coming to the conclusion that the detenu requires to be detained under
the provisions of the Act, the entire order of detention is
unsustainable." (emphasis supplied)
28. Thus it appears that absence of provision like Section 5-A of the
COFEPOSA Act in the National Security Act,1980 at the time the judgment
was rendered, made the Supreme court to take the view that the entire
detention order is vitiated if any of the grounds of the detention is not valid.
29. But the instant case has arisen long after introduction of Section
5-A in the National Security Act,1980 by Act 60 of 1984 w.e.f 21.6.1984.
This is in pari materia with the Section 5-A of the COFEPOSA Act. Section
5A of the National Security Act,1980 specifically provides that an order of
detention will not be deemed to be invalid or inoperative merely because one
or some of the grounds are invalid for any other reason whatsoever [Clause
(v) of Section 5A].
30. The General Diary entries (mentioned in the detention order)
record all important transactions/events taking place in a Police Station and
there is no reason to doubt the veracity of the entries as there is no
presumption that the General Diary entries have no value.
31. In our opinion, each of the 7 Crimes mentioned in the detention
order and the 8 GD entries will constitute independent grounds since the
nature of the offences alleged are several i.e., murder/ extortion/ kidnapping/
attempt to cause grievous hurt/criminal intimidation/wrongful restraint/
outraging modesty of woman. Each of them constitute individual grounds for
detention. Almost all of them took place in public spaces causing terror to the
general public.
32. Assuming for the sake of argument without conceding that the
detention order was invalid for non consideration of acquittal in the two
Criminal cases, they are severable, and the entire order of detention cannot get
vitiated because the other 5 FIRs and the 8 GD entries are adequate to base
the subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority. So the judgment in
Bimla Dewan (1 supra) cannot be relied upon by the petitioner.
33. Similar view was taken in State of U.P. v. Sanjai Pratap Gupta2,
the Supreme Court held:
"16. A bare perusal of the quoted portion from the grounds of
detention makes it clear that two aspects i.e. one relating to criminal
background of antecedents and other relating to a particular incident
were treated separately. This becomes apparently clear because the
detaining authority in the backdrop of the criminal antecedents
referred to the particular act. Therefore, one was the general
background, and the other was the particular incident. They are
clearly separable.
(2004) 8 SCC 591 : 2005 SCC (Cri) 366, at page 598 :
17. Section 5-A of the Act was introduced to take care of the
situations when one or more of the grounds can be separated from the
other grounds for justifying detention.
18. In Attorney General for India v. Amratlal Prajivandas3 it was
observed that where the detention order is based on more than one
ground, by a legal fiction it would be deemed that there are as many
orders of detention as there are grounds which means that each of
such orders is an independent one. In that case the Constitution Bench
was considering scope of Section 5-A of the Conservation of Foreign
Exchange and Prevention of Smuggling Activities Act, 1974 (in short
"the COFEPOSA Act") which is in pari materia with Section 5-A of
the Act. In view of the factual position analysed, the inevitable
conclusion is that Section 5-A is applicable to the case and the High
Court was not justified in holding to the contrary. The High Court's
judgment is therefore clearly indefensible."(emphasis supplied)
34. Moreover, the Supreme court had held that even after the detinue
is acquitted in a criminal Case, a detention order can still be passed. (see
Haradhan saha v. The State Of West Bengal4)
35. In the case of Pesala Nookaraju v. Government of Andhra
Pradesh and others5 the Supreme Court held that the power of preventive
detention is qualitatively different from punitive detention. It is a
precautionary power exercised in reasonable anticipation. It may or may not
relate to an offence. It is not a parallel proceeding. It does not overlap with
prosecution even if it relies on certain facts for which prosecution may be
launched or may have been launched. An order of preventive detention may
be made before or during prosecution. It may also be made with or without
prosecution and in anticipation or after discharge or even acquittal.
(1994) 5 SCC 54
(1975) 3 SCC 198
(2023) 14 SCC 641 at para 17
36. Therefore, merely because the detenue has secured acquittal in
two criminal cases, it cannot be said that the order of preventive detention is
vitiated.
37. Though counsel for petitioner had relied on the decisions in
Ramesh v. State of Gujarat and others6 and Dharamdas Shamlal Agarwal v.
Police commissioner and another7 which have taken a contrary view, the
said cases arose under the Gujarat Prevention of Anti-Social Activities Act,
1985 but the acquittal of the detinue in those cases is not on compromise, as
in the instant case. So the said judgments cannot come to the assistance of the
petitioner.
38. In fact the said judgments do not appear to have been followed
after 1989 by the Supreme Court.
39. We further agree with the contention of counsel for respondents
that the non-consideration of orders of acquittal in two of the 7 cases has no
bearing on the detention order as the orders of acquittal were passed on
compromise. It is possible that such compromise happened due to fear of
harm felt by the complainant from the detinue's associates.
40. The crimes registered against the petitioner range from May,
2019 to May, 2024. In the cases pertaining to the years 2019, 2020, 2022 and
2024 admittedly, charge-sheets have been filed and the matter is pending trial,
though he had secured anticipatory bail in one of the cases (Airport P.S. case
No.29 of 2019) and he was granted regular bail in the other cases. It is not in
dispute that in the criminal case lodged against him in the year 2024 (item no.
(1989) 4 SCC 124
(1989) 2 SCC 370
(i)) , his application for bail was rejected by the Sessions Court and he is in
judicial custody.
41. There is no reference in the detention order passed in the instant
case to the orders in the bail/anticipatory bail secured by the detinue. But the
factum of grant of bail to him is mentioned in regard to all cases [except item
(i) ( where bail was refused) and item (iv) (where it was granted)] in the
supporting documents relied on by the detaining authority. So it cannot be
said that the detaining authority was not aware of the factum of bail being
granted to the detinue.
42. It was contended by the counsel for the petitioner that mere
reference to the grant of bail in the documents supplied by the Sponsoring
Authority to the Detaining Authority without placing on record the bail orders
vitiates the said orders as the subjective satisfaction cannot be said to be there
of the Detaining Authority.
43. Strong reliance was placed on the judgment of the Supreme
Court in the case of M. Ahamed Kutty v. Union of India and another8.
In that case, it was held that bail application and bail order were
vital materials for consideration and if those were not considered, the
satisfaction of the detaining Authority itself would have been impaired, and if
those had been considered, they would be documents relied on by the
detaining Authority though not specifically mentioned in the annexure to the
order of detention and those ought to have formed part of the documents
supplied to the detenue with the grounds of detention, and without them, the
(1990) 2 SCC 1
grounds themselves could not be said to have been complete. In that case,
Supreme Court set aside the detention order on the said ground.
44. But in several later cases, the Supreme court held that application
for bail or order in the bail application need not invariably and mandatorily be
placed before the detaining authority and copies thereof supplied to the
detinue. ( see Sunlia Jain v. Union of India9, K. Varadharaj vrs. State of
Tamilnadu and another10 and Vinod K.Chawla v. Union of India11 ).
In K. Varadharaj (10 supra), the Supreme Court held that it
cannot read into the observations in M. Ahmed Kutty (8 supra) that in every
case where there is an application for bail and an order made thereon, the
detaining authority must as a rule be made aware of the said application and
order made thereon. It held that the judgment in M. Ahamed Kutty (8 supra)
does not lay down a mandatory principle of law that in every case the
application for bail and the order made thereon should be placed before the
Court. It held that such a requirement would depend upon the facts of each
case and on the contents of those documents and if the documents do contain
some material which on facts of that case would have some bearing on the
subjective satisfaction of the detaining authority, then like any other vital
material, even this document may have to be placed before the detaining
authority.
45. Even in the judgment of the Supreme Court in the case of
Jaseela Shaji v. Union of India and others12 relied upon by the counsel for
the petitioner, the judgment of Ahamed Kutty ( 8 supra) was referred to. But
(2006) 3 SCC 321
(2002) 6 SCC 735
(2006) 7 SCC 337
(2024) 9 SCC 53
at paragraph-31 thereof, it was held that a copy of every document mentioned
in the order is not required to be supplied to the detenue and copies of only
such of those documents as have been relied on by the detaining authority for
reaching the satisfaction that preventive detention of the detenue is necessary
are required to be supplied to him. It thus reiterated that only copies which
form the ground for detention are to be supplied and non-supply thereof
would prejudice the detenue and the documents which are merely referred to
for the purpose of narration of facts in that sense cannot be termed to be
documents without the supply of which the detenue is prejudiced.
46. In any event, the detinue was in custody in one of the criminal
cases (item (i)) at the time the detention order was passed. So he cannot
complain that the detaining authority's subjective satisfaction was vitiated on
the ground of lack of knowledge of contents of the bail/Anticipatory bail
orders.
47. In fact the fact that the detinue is in custody is not also a bar for
passing of a detention order ( See Suraj Pal Sahu v. State of Maharashtra13).
The detaining authority obviously felt that that at some point of time the
detinue was likely to be released on bail in item (i) murder case also and
keeping in mind his alleged activities was justified in passing the order of
detention notwithstanding that he was in custody at that time.
48. The other plea of the counsel for the petitioner is that the detaining
authority is a Non-Bengali and since the material placed before him by the
Sponsoring Authority contains some documents in Bengali, it is difficult to
believe that the detaining authority had understood the purport thereof.
AIR 1986 SC 2177 PARA 28, PG.2186
This contention also cannot be accepted because in the counter
affidavit filed by the detaining authority, it is specifically contended that after
he (the District Magistrate) joined service as an IAS Officer, he cleared the
departmental examination in which Bengali language paper was also there
and he can read and talk in Bengali. It is common knowledge that this is the
practice in the Indian Civil Service. Even otherwise, Indians are learning not
only the local languages but also languages prevalent in other States where
they are employed and even Foreign languages sometimes. We, therefore,
find no merit in this submission because it cannot be said that a person who is
not a native of the State/Country cannot speak the language spoken by people
of the said State/Country. In fact though English is not the native language of
Indians many people speak, read and write in English.
49. Next it is contended by the counsel for the petitioner that the
educational qualification of the detenue was only up to Madhyamik and no
officer in jail had explained to him the contents of the detention order or the
annexures.
The contents of the representation dt. 20.09.2024 given to the
Government under Article 22(5) of the Constitution of India as well as the
representation dt. 09.10.2024 given to the NSA Advisory Board indicate that
the detinue is well versed in English language and some aspects of law as
well, as can be seen from paragraph-6 of the latter representation. Admittedly,
the detenue is based in Agartala and cannot claim ignorance of the local
language Bengali. It is therefore difficult to believe that he did not understand
the contents of the documents given to him by the detaining authority.
50. It is also contended by counsel for petitioner that some of the
cases in which the detinue was an accused were old cases of 2019 and there is
no live connection with the present order of detention.
As pointed out by the Counsel for the respondents, the detinue
got Anticipatory bail in item (v) on 15.5.2019, and within 4 months was
involved allegedly in item (iv) Crime on 4.9.2019.
Within one year from that date, on 10.8.2020, he allegedly got
involved in item (iii) Crime. He was arrested in connection with item (iii) on
20.10.2020 and was released on bail on 20.10.2020.
Within 3 months, on 1.1.2021, he got allegedly involved in item
(viii) crime and on 8.1.2021 in item (vi) Crime.
On 25.10.2022, hardly a year later, he was involved in item (ii)
Crime in which he got Anticipatory Bail on 17.2.2024.
Again on 1.5.2024, he got allegedly involved in item (i), a
serious crime of murder.
The offences in respect of which the detinue is accused and those
mentioned in the G.D. Entries are interlinked with his alleged unsocial and
criminal behavior in mostly public places, they are continuous and are of a
nature (punishable under Chapter XVI dealing with offences affecting human
body or Chapter XVII dealing with offences against property in the Indian
Penal Code, 1860) jeopardizing the peace and tranquility in the State and
causing terror to the general public, and the interval between the events is not
too long. So we find no merit in this plea of counsel for petitioner.
51. For all the aforesaid reasons, we hold that the subjective
satisfaction of the detaining authority is not vitiated on any grounds and that
there are no merits in the Writ Petition. It is accordingly dismissed. No costs.
Pending application(s), if any, also stands disposed of.
(S. DATTA PURKAYASTHA, J) (M.S. RAMACHANDRA RAO, CJ)
Pulak
PULAK BANIK Date: 2025.08.20 13:56:52
+05'30'
