Tripura High Court
Pinki Saha Roy For And On Behalf Of Shani ... vs The State Of Tripura on 12 November, 2024
Page 1 of 12
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
BA No.58 of 2024
Pinki Saha Roy for and on behalf of Shani Saha Roy
---Applicant(s)
Versus
The State of Tripura
----Respondent(s)
For Applicant(s) : Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik, Sr. Adv.
Mr. E. L. Darlong, Adv.
Mr. S. Bal, Adv.
Mr. J. Das, Adv.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. B. N. Majumder, Spl. P.P.
Mr. S. Lodh, Adv.
Mr. K. Deb, Adv.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE BISWAJIT PALIT
Order
12/11/2024
This application under Section 439 of Cr.P.C. is filed for
releasing the accused petitioner in custody namely Shri Shani
Saha Roy.
Heard Learned Senior Counsel Mr. S. Kar Bhowmik assisted
by Mr. E.L. Darlong, Learned counsel, Mr. S. Bal, Learned counsel
and Mr. J. Das, Learned counsel appearing for the accused
petitioner in custody and also heard Mr. B. N. Majumder, Learned
Special P.P. along with Mr. S. Lodh, Learned counsel and Mr. K.
Deb, Learned counsel for the State-respondent.
In course of hearing Learned Senior counsel Mr. S. Kar
Bhowmik appearing on behalf of the accused person in custody
first of all drawn the attention of the court that the accused is
lodging in jail since last 186 days and by this time the I.O. has
submitted half chargesheet and out of eight accused persons two
accused persons namely Smt. Susmita Sarkar and Smt. Uma
Sarkar have already been enlarged on bail by the Learned
Sessions Judge, West Tripura, Agartala in connection with Bail
Application No.172 of 2024 dated 07.09.2024 and Bail Application
No.173 of 2024 dated 07.09.2024. Referring the bail application
Learned Senior Counsel further drawn the attention of the court
that prosecution in this case has relied upon the confessional
statement of the said two women accused persons who have
already been granted bail by the Learned Sessions Judge, West
Tripura District, Agartala and from their statement there is no
incriminating evidence reveals against the accused person in
custody showing his further detention in custody and furthermore
if considering the materials on record the women accused persons
could be granted bail then on the face of materials on record there
is no scope to detain the accused petitioner in custody since by
this time the I.O. has laid chargesheet against the accused person
in custody and other persons.
Learned Senior counsel further drawn the attention of the
court the forwarding report of I.O. [Annexure-4] and also the
prayer of I.O. for adding Section 201/34 of IPC [Annexure-5] and
the confessional statement of the two women accused persons
[Annexure-7 and Annexure-8] and submitted that excepting the
statements of two women accused persons the I.O. could not
collect any materials against the accused person in custody and
also regarding adding of Section 201 of IPC referring the materials
on record Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that Section
201 of IPC is bailable one and since the I.O. could not place any
direct materials against the accused person in custody showing his
involvement with the offence punishable under Section 302 of IPC.
So Learned Senior Counsel finally urged for releasing the accused
person in custody on bail in any condition. He also relied upon one
citation of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in Surinder Kumar
Khanna vs. Intelligence Officer, Directorate of Revenue
Intelligence reported in 2018 SCC OnLine SC 757 wherein in
para Nos. 10 and 11 Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:
"10. In Kashmira Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh(1952)1
SCC 275, this Court relied upon the decision of the Privy
Council in Bhuboni Sahu v. R: 1949 SCC OnLine PC 12 and
laid down as under:
8.Gurubachan's confession has played an important
part in implicating the appellant, and the question
at once arises, how far and in what way the
confession of an accused person can be used
against a co-accused? It is evident that it is not
evidence in the ordinary sense of the term because,
as the Privy Council say in Bhuboni Sahu v. R.
..... It does not indeed come within the
definition of" 'evidence' contained in section
3 of the Evidence Act., It is not required to be
given on oath, nor in the presence of the
accused, and it cannot be tested by cross-
examination." Their Lordships also point out
that it is
"obviously evidence of a very weak type.........
It is a much weaker type of evidence than the
evidence of an approver, which is not subject
to any of those infirmities.
They stated in addition that such a confession
cannot be made the foundation of a
conviction and can only be used in "support
of other evidence." In view of these remarks,
it would be pointless to cover the same
ground, but we feel it is necessary to
expound this further as misapprehension still
exists. The question is, in what way can it be
used in support of other evidence? Can it be
used to fill in missing gaps? Can it be used to
corroborate an accomplice or, as in the
present case, a witness who, though not an
accomplice, is placed in the same category
regarding credibility because the judge
refuses to believe him except in so far as he
is corroborated ?
9.In our opinion, the matter was put
succinctly by Sir 'Lawrence Jenkins
in Emperor v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty:
ILR(1911)38 Cal 559 where he said that such
a confession can only be used to "lend
assurance to other evidence against a co-
accused "or, to put it in another way, as
Reilly J. did in In re Periyaswami Moopan in
Re 1930 SCC OnLine Mad 86
"the provision goes no further than
this--where there is evidence against
the co-accused sufficient, if believed,
to support his conviction, then the kind
of confession de- scribed in section
30 may be thrown into the scale as an
additional reason for believing that
evidence."
10.Translating these observations into concrete
terms they come to this. The proper way to
approach a case of this kind is, first, to marshal the
evidence against the accused excluding the
confession altogether from consideration and see
whether, if it is believed, a conviction could safely
be based on it. If it is capable of belief
independently of the confession, then of course it is
not necessary to call the confession in aid. But
cases may arise where the judge is not prepared to
act on the other evidence as it stands even though,
if believed, it would be sufficient to sustain a
conviction. In such an event the judge may call in
aid the confession and use it to lend assurance to
the other evidence and thus fortify himself in
believing what without the aid of the confession he
would not be prepared to accept."
11. The law laid down in Kashmira Singh (supra) was
approved by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Hari
Charan Kurmi v. State of Bihar(1964) 6 SCR 623 wherein
it was observed:
"12. As we have already indicated, this question has
been considered on several occasions by judicial
decisions and it has been consistently held that a
confession cannot be treated as evidence which is
substantive evidence against a co-accused person.
In dealing with a criminal case where the
prosecution relies upon the confession of one
accused person against another accused person, the
proper approach to adopt is to consider the other
evidence against such an accused person, and if the
said evidence appears to be satisfactory and the
court is inclined to hold that the said evidence may
sustain the charge framed against the said accused
person, the court turns to the confession with a
view to assure itself that the conclusion which it is
inclined to draw from the other evidence is right. As
was observed by Sir Lawrence Jenkins in Emperor
v. Lalit Mohan Chuckerbutty: ILR (1911) 38 Cal 559
a confession can only be used to "lend assurance to
other evidence against a co-accused." In re
Periyaswami Moopan Reilly. J., observed that the
provision of Section 30 goes not further than this:
"where there is evidence against the co-
accused sufficient, if believed, to support his
conviction, then the kind of confession
described in Section 30 may be thrown into
the scale as an additional reason for believing
that evidence"
In Bhuboni Sahu v. R: (1949) SCC OnLine PC 12 the
Privy Council has expressed the same view. Sir John
Beaumont who spoke for the Board, observed that:
"a confession of a co-accused is obviously
evidence of a very weak type. It does not
indeed come within the definition of
"evidence" contained in Section 3 of the
Evidence Act. It is not required to be given on
oath, nor in the presence of the accused, and
it cannot be tested by cross-examination. It
is a much weaker type of evidence than the
evidence of an approver, which is not subject
to any of those infirmities. Section 30,
however, provides that the court may take
the confession into consideration and
thereby, no doubt, makes it evidence on
which the court may act; but the section does
not say that the confession is to amount to
proof. Clearly there must be other evidence.
The confession is only one element in the
consideration of all the facts proved the case;
it can be put into the scale and weighed with
the other evidence".
It would be noticed that as a result of the
provisions contained in Section 30, the confession
has no doubt to be regarded as amounting to
evidence in a general way, because whatever is
considered by the court is evidence; circumstances
which are considered by the court as well as
probabilities do amount to evidence in that generic
sense. Thus, though confession may be regarded as
evidence in that generic sense because of the
provisions of Section 30, the fact remains that it is
not evidence as defined by Section 3 of the Act. The
result, therefore, is that in dealing with a case
against an accused person, the court cannot start
with the confession of a co-accused person; it must
begin with other evidence adduced by the
prosecution and after it has formed its opinion with
regard to the quality and effect of the said evidence,
then it is permissible to turn to the confession in
order to receive assurance to the conclusion of guilt
which the judicial mind is about to reach on the said
other evidence. That, briefly stated, is the effect of
the provisions contained in Section 30. The same
view has been expressed by this Court in Kashmira
Singh v. State of Madhya Pradesh: (1952) 1 SCC
275 where the decision of the Privy Council
in Bhuboni Sahu case: (1949) SCC OnLine PC
12 case has been cited with approval."
Referring the same Learned Senior Counsel Mr. S. Kar
Bhowmik further submitted that since the confession of the co-
accused is a very weak type of peace of evidence and it does not
come within the purview of definition of 'evidence' as mentioned in
Section-3 of the Evidence Act and urged for taking consideration
of the aforesaid principle of law laid down by the Hon'ble Apex
Court in the aforenoted case.
On the other hand, Learned Special P.P. along with Mr. S.
Lodh, Learned counsel appearing on behalf of the State-
respondent strongly objected the bail application filed by the
accused petitioner and submitted that in this case the I.O. has laid
chargesheet against this accused person in custody within the
statutory period.
Mr. S. Lodh, Learned counsel further drawn the attention of
the court that the provision of Section 173(2) and (5 ) of Cr.P.C.
and submitted that considering the nature and gravity of the
offence at this stage there is no scope to release the accused on
bail in this case and furthermore the I.O. in this case considering
the nature and gravity of this offence urged for custodial trial of
the accused persons in custody for the sake of justice.
Learned Counsel Mr. S. Lodh in support of his contention
referred few citations of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India. In
Mahadev Meena vs. Praveen Rathore and Another reported
in (2021) 17 SCC 788. In para No.19 Hon'ble the Apex Court
observed as under:
"19. In Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai Hirabhai
Makwana: (2021) 6 SCC 230, a two judge Bench of this
Court of which one of us (Justice DY Chandrachud) was a
part, has held that the High Court while granting bail must
focus on the role of the accused in deciding the aspect of
parity. This Court observed: (SCC p. 246, para 26)
"26. ... The High Court: Vishanbhai Hirabhai
Makwana v. State of Gujarat: (2020) SCC
OnLine Guj 2987, Dinesh Karshan Akhiyani v.
State of Gujarat, (2021) SCC OnLine Guj 784,
Vanraj Karsha Akhiyani v. State of Gujarat:
(2021) SCC OnLine Guj 783, Pravinbhai
Hirabhai Koli v. State of Gujarat: (2020) SCC
OnLine Guj 2986, Khetabhai Parbatbhai
Makwana v. State of Gujarat: (2020) SCC
OnLine Guj 2988, Siddhrajsinh Bhagubha
Vaghela v. State of Gujarat: (2020) SCC
OnLine Guj 2985 has evidently
misunderstood the central aspect of what is
meant by parity. Parity while granting bail
must focus upon the role of the accused.
Merely observing that another accused who
was granted bail was armed with a similar
weapon is not sufficient to determine
whether a case for the grant of bail on the
basis of parity has been established. In
deciding the aspect of parity, the role
attached to the accused, their position in
relation to the incident and to the victims is
of utmost importance. The High Court has
proceeded on the basis of parity on a
simplistic assessment as noted above, which
again cannot pass muster under the law."
He also relied upon another citation of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court of India in Ritu Chhabaria vs. Union of India and Ors.
reported in AIR 2023 SC (Supp) 1851 wherein in para Nos.23
and 24 Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:
"23. It is also to be noted that as per the scheme of
Cr.P.C., an investigation of a cognizable case commences
with the recording of an FIR under Section 154 Cr.P.C. If a
person is arrested and the investigation of the case cannot
be completed within 24 hours, he has to be produced
before the magistrate to seek his remand under Section
167(2) of the Cr.P.C. during continued investigation.
There is a statutory time frame then prescribed for
remand of the accused for the purposes of investigation,
however, the same cannot extend beyond 90 days, as
provided under Section 167(2)(a)(i) in cases where the
investigation relates to an offence punishable with death,
imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term of not
less than 10 years and 60 days, as provided under Section
167(2)(a)(ii), where the investigation relates to any other
offence. The relevant section further provides that on
expiry of the period of 90 days or 60 days, as the case
may be, the accused has a right to be released on default
bail in case he is prepared to and furnishes bail.
24. This right of statutory bail, however, is extinguished,
if the charge sheet is filed within the stipulated period.
The question of resorting to a supplementary charge-
sheet under Section 173(8) of the Cr.P.C. only arises after
the main chargesheet has been filed, and as such, a
supplementary chargesheet, wherein it is explicitly stated
that the investigation is still pending, cannot under any
circumstance, be used to scuttle the right of default bail,
for then, the entire purpose of default bail is defeated, and
the filing of a chargesheet or a supplementary
chargesheet becomes a mere formality, and a tool, to
insue that the right of default bail is scuttled."
Learned Counsel Mr. S. Lodh further relied upon another
citation in Atulbhai Bithalbhai Bhanderi vs. State of Gujarat
reported in AIR 2023 SC 2352 wherein in para No.12 Hon'ble the
Apex Court observed as under:
"12. Insofar as parity is concerned, we need only reproduce
the apt observations from Ramesh Bhavan Rathod v. Vishanbhai
Hirabhai Makwana (Koli), (2021) 6 SCC 230: AIR (2021) SC
2011, of which we take note:
"26....Parity while granting bail must focus upon the role
of the accused. Merely observing that another accused
who was granted bail was armed with a similar weapon is
not sufficient to determine whether a case for the grant of
bail on the basis of parity has been established. In
deciding the aspect of parity, the role attached to the
accused, their position in relation to the incident and to
the victims is of utmost importance. The High Court has
proceeded on the basis of parity on a simplistic
assessment as noted above, which again cannot pass
muster under the law."
[Emphasis supplied]
Mr. Lodh, Learned counsel referred another citation in
Ramesh Bhavan Rathod vs. Bishanbhai Hirabhai Marwana
(Koli) and Another reported in (2021) 6 SCC 230 wherein in
para Nos.23 and 26 Hon'ble the Apex Court observed as under:
"23. The first aspect of the case which stares in the face is the
singular absence in the judgment of the High Court to the nature
and gravity of the crime. The incident which took place on 9 May
2020 resulted in five homicidal deaths. The nature of the offence
is a circumstance which has an important bearing on the grant
of bail. The orders of the High Court are conspicuous in the
absence of any awareness or elaboration of the serious nature of
the offence. The perversity lies in the failure of the High Court to
consider an important circumstance which has a bearing on
whether bail should be granted. In the two-judge Bench decision
of this Court in Ram Govind Upadhyay v. Sudharshan Singh:
(2002) 3 SCC 598 the nature of the crime was recorded as "one
of the basic considerations" which has a bearing on the grant or
denial of bail. The considerations which govern the grant of bail
were elucidated in the judgment of this Court without attaching
an exhaustive nature or character to them. This emerges from
the following extract:
"4. Apart from the above, certain other which may be
attributed to be relevant considerations may also be
noticed at this juncture, though however, the same are
only illustrative and not exhaustive, neither there can be
any. The considerations being:
(a) While granting bail the court has to keep in mind not
only the nature of the accusations, but the severity of the
punishment, if the accusation entails a conviction and the
nature of evidence in support of the accusations.
(b) Reasonable apprehensions of the witnesses being
tampered with or the apprehension of there being a threat
for the complainant should also weigh with the court in
the matter of grant of bail.
(c) While it is not expected to have the entire evidence
establishing the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable
doubt but there ought always to be a prima facie
satisfaction of the court in support of the charge.
(d) Frivolity in prosecution should always be considered
and it is only the element of genuineness that shall have
to be considered in the matter of grant of bail, and in the
event of there being some doubt as to the genuineness of
the prosecution, in the normal course of events, the
accused is entitled to an order of bail."
This Court further laid down the standard for
overturning an order granting bail in the following
terms: (Ram Govind Upadhyay case: Ram Govind
Upadhyay v. Sudarshan Singh, (2002) 3 SCC 598
"3. Grant of bail though being a discretionary order
-- but, however, calls for exercise of such a
discretion in a judicious manner and not as a matter
of course. Order for bail bereft of any cogent reason
cannot be sustained."
26. Another aspect of the case which needs emphasis is the
manner in which the High Court has applied the principle of
parity. By its two orders both dated 21.12.2020: Prayinbhai
Hirabhai Koli v. State of Gujarat:(2020) SCC OnLine Guj 2986,
Khetabhai Parbhatbhai Makwana v. State of Gujarat: 2020 SCC
OnLine Guj 2988, the High Court granted bail to Pravin Koli (A-
10) and Kheta Parbat Koli (A-15). Parity was sought with
Sidhdhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela (A-13) to whom bail was
granted on 22-10-2020:Siddhrajsinh Bhagubha Vaghela v. State
of Gujarat(2020) SCC OnLine Guj 2985 on the ground (as the
High Court recorded) that he was "assigned similar role of
armed with stick (sic)". Again, bail was granted to Vanraj Koli
(A-16) on the ground that he was armed with a wooden stick
and on the ground that Pravin (A-10), Kheta (A-15) and
Sidhdhrajsinh (A-13) who were armed with sticks had been
granted bail. The High Court has evidently misunderstood the
central aspect of what is meant by parity. Parity while granting
bail must focus upon the role of the accused. Merely observing
that another accused who was granted bail was armed with a
similar weapon is not sufficient to determine whether a case for
the grant of bail on the basis of parity has been established. In
deciding the aspect of parity, the role attached to the accused,
their position in relation to the incident and to the victims is of
utmost importance. The High Court has proceeded on the basis
of parity on a simplistic assessment as noted above, which again
cannot pass muster under the law."
In Peng Yongxin vs. State of West Bengal reported in
2024 SCC OnLine Cal 6426 in para No.16, 17, 18 and 22
Hon'ble the Calcutta High Court observed as under:
"16. In passing the impugned order on 20th September 2023 the
judgment of Hon'ble Apex Court of Ritu Chhabaria was placed; on
the observation of the fact that the Central Government has
preferred a review petition against the judgment of Ritu
Chhabaria, the Learned Magistrate do not consider the prayer of
bail of the present petitioner.
17. On perusing the charge sheet/final report along with the CD,
it appears that during the course of investigation the police have
collected several documents and materials; on the basis of which
the charge sheet has been submitted against the present
petitioner stating the present petitioner to be a Chinese citizen
who tried to enter into the territory of India with a fake Nepali
passport. The Chinese identity card of the petitioners was verified
by the investigating agency.
18. Supplementary charge sheet contained the report the
Director, Finger Print Bureau, Delhi Police. After completion of
investigation the police have submitted charge sheet u/s 168/471
read with Section 14A/14B of Foreigners Act. It is the submission
of the present petitioner that the Nepali passport seized by the
investigating agency is yet to be verified. Thus, the charge sheet
cannot be termed as a complete charge sheet.
22. The instant Criminal Revision has been filed by the
petitioner against the impugned order dated 16.09.2023 passed
by the Learned Chief Judicial Magistrate Siliguri, wherein the
Learned Magistrate had taken cognizance of the offence on the
basis of the charge sheet submitted by the police and refused to
grant default bail. I find no illegality or irregularity in the
impugned order passed by the Learned Magistrate. The Learned
Magistrate has correctly taken cognizance of the offence on the
strength of the charge sheet, and as the charge sheet has been
submitted has correctly refused the prayer for default bail.
The proposition of law as referred by the Learned Advocate for
the petitioner in Ritu Chhabaria and Thamisharasi are not
applicable in this case due to factual difference rather Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Judgebir Singh has decided the issue which is
squarely applicable in this case."
In Narendra Kumar Amin vs. C.B.I. and Others reported
in AIR 2015 Supreme Court 1002 Hon'ble the Apex Court in
para Nos.3, 10 and 14 observed as under:
"3. The appellant/accused was arrested on 4.4.2013 for an offence
which had taken place on 15.6.2004, which is popularly known as the
fake encounter death of Ishrat Jahan. The offence alleged against the
appellant was punishable with life imprisonment or death and what is
popularly called Default Bail becomes the indefeasible right on the
expiry of 90 days in the event of non-filing of police report by then. On
3.7.2013 the first respondent viz. CBI filed what they called the
charge-sheet which is alleged by the appellant as a misnomer because
it does not comply with the statutory requirement of police report
under Section 173(2) and 173(5) of Cr.P.C.
10. Section 173(2) of Cr.P.C. enumerates the information that must
be detailed in the police report forwarded to the Magistrate by the
Investigating Officer. This includes:
(a) the names of the parties;
(b) the nature of the information;
(c) the names of the persons who appear to be acquainted with
the circumstances of the case;
(d) whether any offence appears to have been committed and, if
so, by whom;
(e) whether the accused has been arrested;
(f) whether he has been released on his bond and if so, whether
with or without sureties;
(g) Whether he has been forwarded in custody under section
170.
14. With reference to the aforesaid rival legal contentions we have
examined the impugned order to find out the correctness of the
findings and reasons recorded keeping in view the statutory provisions
under Section 173 (2) and (5) read with Section 2(r) of Cr.P.C. and
with reference to the judgments on which both the learned senior
counsel placed reliance upon. In our considered view, it is an
undisputed fact that the charge-sheet was filed on 3.7.2013 that is 90th
day. Section 2 (r) of Cr.P.C. defines the expression "police report" as a
report forwarded by a police officer to a magistrate under Section 173
(2) of Cr.P.C. the particulars to be furnished in the police report which
are extracted as above are complied with in the instant case.
Therefore, filing of the police report as required under Section 173(2)
is within 90 days in the instant case."
Learned Counsel Mr. S. Lodh relied upon another citation of
the Supreme Court of India in Directorate of Enforcement
vs. Manpreet Sing Talwar in Case No. SLP (Crl.) 5724/2023
wherein para No.1 Hon'ble the Supreme Court observed as under:
"1. In continuation of the interim order of this Court dated 1 May
2023, we clarify that the order shall not preclude any trial court
or, as the case may be, High Court from considering an
application for the grant of default bail under Section 167 of the
Code of Criminal Procedure 1973 independent of and without
relying on the judgment dated 26 April 2023 in Writ Petition
(Criminal) No 60 of 2023."
Referring the aforesaid citations Learned Special P.P. along
with Mr. S. Lodh, Learned counsel finally drawn the attention of
the court that in view of the principles of the Hon'ble Apex Court
of India in respect of parity the court must focus upon the role of
the accused. But here in the given case from the act and conduct
of the accused in custody at this stage it cannot be said that the
accused in custody has not committed any offence and the other
two accused being 'women' have been granted bail, cannot be a
ground for released of the accused in the custody on bail at this
stage. Since the I.O. after completion of the investigation has laid
chargesheet against him and the chargesheet was filed within
time. So Learned Spl. P.P. along with Mr. Lodh, Learned counsel
finally urged for dismissal of this bail application.
I have heard detailed arguments of both the sides at length.
In the case at hand the case was registered on the basis of a Suo-
Moto complaint laid by S.K. Srikanta Guha of Airport P.S. on
01.05.2024 alleging inter alia that on 30.04.2024 at around 20:25
hours he received one telephonic information that a person was
shot at Salbagan Bazaar at Hatipara under Airport P.S. and
consequent upon the information he along with staffs rushed to
the spot and found one body lying by the side of road with bullet
wounds. Immediately with the help of local people the body was
shifted to ILS Hospital wherein the attending Doctors declared him
as dead. From local inquiry it came to his knowledge that at about
2010 hours miscreant shot upon Durga Prasanna Deb @ Viki while
he was sitting in a vehicle bearing No.TR06-A0745 and the same
was parked at Salbagan Bazaar Hati Para in front of one medicine
shop of Shri Bikash Das of Shalbagan BSF Para and on receipt of
bullet injury he fell down on the road from the vehicle and the
miscreants fled away. Later on some kin relatives of the deceased
arrived at Hospital where he could know from them that one Raju
Barman, Rakesh Barman, Debabrata Barman, Biman Das, Pradyut
Dhar Chowdhury and some others made conspiracy and were
involved in the commission of murder of said Durga Prasanna Deb
@ Viki and on the basis of the FIR/Suo-Moto complaint Airport PS
Case No.37 of 2024 under Section 302/120B of IPC and Section
27 of Arms Act was registered and in course of investigation the
accused person was arrested and produced before the court under
arrest on 09.05.2024 and since then he is lodging in custody and
after completion of investigation on 27.07.2024 the I.O. has laid
chargesheet against the accused person in custody along with
others subject to submission of supplementary chargesheet after
receipt of SFSL report and other reports and also the I.O. prayed
before the court to conduct the trial of this case keeping the
present accused person and other accused persons in jail custody
for the interest of the prosecution.
I have gone through the FIR and all other relevant
prosecution papers including the case diary. Also perused the
citations referred by Learned counsels of the parties. During
investigation the I.O. has collected some materials showing
implication of the present accused along with other accused
persons. In this case two women accused persons were enlarged
on bail by the Learned Sessions Judge as already stated.
Admittedly in this case the I.O. has laid chargesheet within the
time against the present accused in custody so the question of
default bail does not arise. However, considering the materials on
record and since the I.O. has laid chargesheet against the present
accused person in custody along with others and there is prayer of
the prosecution for holding custody trial and also there is evidence
against the accused in custody that a major role has been
attributed by the present accused person along with others in the
murder of the deceased. So at this stage, this court does not find
any scope to release the accused person on bail in view of the
provision provided under Section 439 of Cr.P.C.
Hence the bail application filed stands rejected.
Send back the CD through Learned Special P.P. along with a
copy of this order and also send down the LCR along with a copy
of this order.
JUDGE
MOUMITA Digitally signed by
MOUMITA DATTA
DATTA Date: 2024.11.13
12:30:44 +05'30'
Moumita
