Tripura High Court
Tripura State Electricity Corporation ... vs Smt. Gouri Ghosh And Others on 11 July, 2024
Page 1 of 4
HIGH COURT OF TRIPURA
AGARTALA
CRP No.47 of 2024
Tripura State Electricity Corporation Ltd. and others
......... Petitioner (s).
Versus
Smt. Gouri Ghosh and others
....... Respondent(s).
For Petitioner (s) : Mr. Nepal Majumder, Advocate.
For Respondent(s) : None.
HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE MR. APARESH KUMAR SINGH
Order
11/07//2024
Heard Mr. Nepal Majumder, learned counsel for the petitioners.
[2] The impugned judgment and award is dated 17.01.2022 passed in
Civil Misc. No.67 of 2015 by the learned Court of the District Judge, West
Tripura, Agartala whereby the application under Section 16(3) of Indian
Telegraph Act, 1885 for granting compensation to the respondents for
extending high voltage 132 k.v. overhead electric line over the jote land of the
claimant petitioner and proforma respondent causing damage and loss to the
claimant petitioner and the proforma respondent was allowed in their favour by
directing the respondents No.3 to 5 who are the Tripura State Electricity
Corporation Ltd. and its officials to pay compensation of Rs.18,00,000/-
(Rupees Eighteen Lakhs) to the claimant within 2(two) months from the date of
the order failing which it would carry an interest @9% per annum from the date
of filing of the said application till payment of compensation.
[3] The present revision petition under Article 227 of the Constitution
of India has been filed after approximately two years and four months of the
passing of the impugned judgment. It is not that the case was decided ex parte
in their favour. The respondents No.3 to 5 who are the petitioners herein had
also contested the case by filing written statement where they denied and
disputed the claim that the claimant had sustained in loss of damage due to
laying down of 132 k.v. overhead electric line over her land. But the instant
revision petition does not contain even a semblance of explanation for the delay
of approximately two years and four months in filing this revision petition
under Article 227 of the Constitution of India. Though no limitation period is
prescribed to invoke the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 227 of the
Constitution of India but it is expected that the party approaching this Court is
required to satisfactorily explain the delay, if any, in approaching this Court.
The petition does not contain any explanation for the delay. The opinion of the
Apex Court in Tridip Kumar Dingal and Others Vs. State of West Bengal and
Others, reported in (2009) 1 SCC 768, paragraphs 56 & 57 is extracted
hereunder:
"56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can
be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary
jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court
takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and
laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well
settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for
refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the
petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.
57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should
come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate
delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for
refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of
this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters
which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third
parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal
Bhai [AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261] , Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial
Court [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India [(1992) 3
SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969] ). This principle applies
even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand
Motichand v. H.B. Munshi [(1969) 1 SCC 110] , Durga Prashad v. Chief
Controller of Imports & Exports [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath
Bose v. Union of India [(1970) 1 SCC 84] )."
[4] This view has been later referred to in the case of Chanchali
Gowrinaidu vs Indian Coast Guard and Others, reported in (2024) SCC
Online SC 551 at para 11 which is also quoted hereunder:
"11. For filing of a writ petition, there is no doubt that no fixed period of
limitation is prescribed. However, when the extraordinary jurisdiction of the
writ court is invoked, it has to be seen as to whether within a reasonable time
same has been invoked and even submitting of memorials would not revive
the dead cause of action or resurrect the cause of action which has had a
natural death. In such circumstances on the ground of delay and latches
alone, the appeal ought to be dismissed or the applicant ought to be non-
suited. If it is found that the writ petitioner is guilty of delay and latches, the
High Court ought to dismiss the petition on that sole ground itself, in as much
as the writ courts are not to indulge in permitting such indolent litigant to
take advantage of his own wrong. It is true that there cannot be any waiver of
fundamental right but while exercising discretionary jurisdiction under
Article 226, the High Court will have to necessarily take into consideration
the delay and latches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court.
This Court in the case of Tridip Kumar Dingal v. State of W.B., (2009) 1
SCC 768 has held to the following effect:
"56. We are unable to uphold the contention. It is no doubt true that there can
be no waiver of fundamental right. But while exercising discretionary
jurisdiction under Articles 32, 226, 227 or 136 of the Constitution, this Court
takes into account certain factors and one of such considerations is delay and
laches on the part of the applicant in approaching a writ court. It is well
settled that power to issue a writ is discretionary. One of the grounds for
refusing reliefs under Article 32 or 226 of the Constitution is that the
petitioner is guilty of delay and laches.
57. If the petitioner wants to invoke jurisdiction of a writ court, he should
come to the Court at the earliest reasonably possible opportunity. Inordinate
delay in making the motion for a writ will indeed be a good ground for
refusing to exercise such discretionary jurisdiction. The underlying object of
this principle is not to encourage agitation of stale claims and exhume matters
which have already been disposed of or settled or where the rights of third
parties have accrued in the meantime (vide State of M.P. v. Bhailal Bhai,
[AIR 1964 SC 1006 : (1964) 6 SCR 261], Moon Mills Ltd. v. Industrial
Court, [AIR 1967 SC 1450] and Bhoop Singh v. Union of India, [(1992) 3
SCC 136 : (1992) 21 ATC 675 : (1992) 2 SCR 969]). This principle applies
even in case of an infringement of fundamental right (vide Tilokchand
Motichand v. H.B. Munshi, [(1969) 1 SCC 110], Durga Prashad v. Chief
Controller of Imports & Exports, [(1969) 1 SCC 185] and Rabindranath
Bose v. Union of India, [(1970) 1 SCC 84]).
58. There is no upper limit and there is no lower limit as to when a person
can approach a court. The question is one of discretion and has to be decided
on the basis of facts before the court depending on and varying from case to
case. It will depend upon what the breach of fundamental right and the
remedy claimed are and when and how the delay arose."
[5] Mr. Nepal Majumder, learned counsel for the petitioners has
during submission, however, sought to explain the delay on account of the
reason that it took time for collecting relevant documents related to the instant
case for preparation and filing of the instant petition.
[6] Though the matter was adjourned on the first date for two weeks
on the prayer of the learned counsel for the petitioners to file an amendment
application to explain the delay but no such application has either been filed. In
such circumstances, this Court is not inclined to enter into the merits of the case
of the petitioners in the absence of any explanation for such an inordinate delay
in approaching this Court in its supervisory jurisdiction.
[7] As such, the instant petition is dismissed. Pending application(s), if
any, also stands disposed of.
(APARESH KUMAR SINGH), CJ
Munna S MUNNA SAHA Digitally signed by MUNNA SAHA
Date: 2024.07.15 16:21:14 +05'30'
