"...to issue a writ of mandamus or any other appropriate writ or
direction by declaring the inaction of the Respondent No. 2 for
taking necessary action against Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 despite
of the request made by the Secretary of Bar Council of the State of
Andhra Pradesh through its proceedings vide R.O.C. No. 38 of
2018 dated 4-1-2018 and consequently direct Respondent No. 2 to
initiate appropriate action against Respondent Nos. 4 and 5 for the
atrocities committed against the Petitioner herein and to pass such
other order or orders..."
NTR,J
2. I have heard Ms. Pujari Srinitha, learned counsel for the petitioner
and Mr. Mahesh Raje, learned Government Pleader for Home, appearing
on behalf of respondent Nos.1 to 3.
3.1. The learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the petitioner is
a practicing advocate in Jogulamba Gadwal District. It is alleged that the
respondent police officials, actuated by personal animosity, subjected the
petitioner to continuous harassment and falsely implicated him in multiple
criminal cases while he was discharging his professional duties as an
advocate, particularly in matters relating to civil disputes involving alleged
land grabbing. According to the petitioner, upon exposing certain illegal
acts of the local police and initiating legal proceedings against them, the
said officials began targeting him by misusing their official authority.
3.2. The petitioner further asserts that he submitted representations to
higher authorities and also approached the Bar Council. Pursuant thereto,
the Bar Council, vide ROC No. 38 of 2018 dated 04.01.2018, requested
respondent No. 2/the Director General of Police to inquire into the matter
and take appropriate action against the concerned officials. However,
despite such intervention, the alleged harassment is stated to have
continued in the form of registration of frivolous criminal cases. It is,
therefore, contended that the inaction on the part of respondent No. 2 is
NTR,J
arbitrary, illegal, and violative of the petitioner's fundamental rights under
Articles 14 and 21 of the Constitution of India.
3.3. The petitioner further contends that the inquiry purportedly
conducted pursuant to his representations is legally unsustainable, as it
does not conform to the mandatory procedure prescribed under the Civil
Services (Classification, Control and Appeal) Rules, 1991 (for short, "CCA
Rules"). It is argued that no proper disciplinary proceedings were initiated
in accordance with law. In the absence of any efficacious alternative
remedy, the petitioner has invoked the extraordinary jurisdiction of this
Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India.
3.4. In support of his submissions, reliance is placed on an order of this
court in Dr. Duraisamy Baskaran v. M/s. GAIL (India) Limited (W.P. No.
26030 of 2017) to contend that writ jurisdiction is maintainable where
statutory procedures governing disciplinary action are not followed.
Further reliance is placed on Medha Kotwal Lele v. Union of India, (2013)
1 SCC 297, wherein the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that a writ of
mandamus would lie to compel authorities discharging public duties to act
in accordance with law. The petitioner also relies upon Kulamani Biswal v.
Union of India, 2022 SCC OnLine Del 1888, and Union of India v. P.
Thyagarajan, (1999) 1 SCC 733, to contend that any inquiry conducted in
NTR,J
violation of prescribed procedure is vitiated in law and liable to be set
aside. Further reliance is placed on Jagmohan v. State of Uttar Pradesh,
(2025) 3 ILRA 191, wherein it was held that disciplinary findings cannot
be sustained in the absence of a proper evidentiary process, including
examination of witnesses.
4.1. Per contra, the learned Government Pleader for Home submits that
the allegations are baseless and motivated by mala fides. It is contended
that the alleged harassment and misuse of authority attributed to
respondent Nos. 4 and 5 are categorically denied and that all actions
undertaken by the police officials were strictly in accordance with law and
in discharge of their official duties. It is further submitted that, upon receipt
of the Bar Council's communication dated 04.01.2018, respondent No. 2
forwarded the same to respondent No. 3, who, in turn, entrusted the
matter to the Circle Inspector of Police, Gadwal. An inquiry was
conducted and a report dated 13.11.2024 was submitted. Thus, it is
contended that there has been no inaction on the part of the authorities.
4.2. The respondents further submit that the petitioner has been
involved in several criminal cases registered at different points in time and
that such cases were instituted based on complaints and material
evidence. It is asserted that all actions, including arrest and remand, were
NTR,J
carried out strictly in accordance with the procedure established by law. It
is also contended that the petitioner has a history of filing complaints
against officials and that the present allegations are motivated, possibly
due to political affiliations.
5. In reply, the petitioner reiterates that the directions issued by the
Bar Council were not complied with in their true spirit and that the so
called inquiry conducted by the Circle Inspector cannot be construed as a
valid departmental inquiry under the CCA Rules. It is emphasized that no
formal disciplinary proceedings were initiated, no charges were framed,
no inquiry officer was appointed, and the mandatory procedure prescribed
under Rule 20 of the CCA Rules, such as framing of definite charges,
recording of evidence, and examination of witnesses has not been
followed. It is further contended that no final order has been passed by
the competent authority, thereby vitiating the entire process.
6. I have carefully considered the submissions and the materials
placed on record.
7. Upon consideration of the material on record, it is evident that the
petitioner had submitted representations alleging misuse of power by
respondent Nos. 4 and 5 and that the matter was forwarded for inquiry,
NTR,J
culminating in a report submitted by the Circle Inspector. Therefore, the
contention of complete inaction on the part of the respondents cannot be
sustained.
8. Nonetheless, the crucial issue that arises for consideration is
whether the inquiry so conducted satisfies the requirements of a lawful
departmental inquiry under the CCA Rules.
9. Prima facie, the exercise undertaken by the respondents appears
to be confined to a preliminary fact finding inquiry, without initiation of
formal disciplinary proceedings. It is a settled principle of service
jurisprudence that the mere receipt of a complaint does not, by itself,
obligate the disciplinary authority to initiate disciplinary proceedings. The
authority is vested with discretion to examine the material and arrive at a
prima facie satisfaction as to whether further action is warranted. In Union
of India v. Upendra Singh, (1994) 3 SCC 357, the Hon'ble Supreme Court
held that prior to framing of charges, the authority is entitled to evaluate
whether sufficient material exists to proceed. Similarly, in State of Punjab
v. V.K. Khanna, (2001) 2 SCC 330, it was held that initiation of
disciplinary proceedings is an administrative decision, subject to judicial
review only on limited grounds such as mala fides or arbitrariness. This
NTR,J
principle was reiterated in Secretary, Ministry of Defence v. Prabhash
Chandra Mirdha, (2012) 11 SCC 565.
10. The law also recognizes the permissibility of a preliminary or fact-
finding inquiry to enable the authority to decide whether a formal inquiry is
warranted. Such an inquiry is merely exploratory in nature and cannot be
equated with a regular departmental inquiry.
11. The contention of the petitioner that the procedure under Rule 20 of
the CCA Rules ought to have been followed at this stage is misconceived.
Rule 20 governs the procedure for conducting a regular departmental
inquiry after a decision has been taken to initiate disciplinary proceedings.
The safeguards contemplated therein such as framing of charges,
appointment of an inquiry officer, recording of evidence, and affording
opportunity of hearing are mandatory, but only at the stage of a formal
inquiry.
12. In Union of India v. P. Thyagarajan, (1999) 1 SCC 733, and Roop
Singh Negi v. Punjab National Bank, (2009) 2 SCC 570, it has been held
that non compliance with the prescribed procedure vitiates the inquiry;
however, such requirement arises only when a departmental inquiry is
actually instituted. Similarly, in State of Uttar Pradesh v. Saroj Kumar
NTR,J
Sinha, (2010) 2 SCC 772, it was held that findings must be based on
evidence recorded in a duly conducted inquiry.
13. Thus, a clear distinction is maintained in law between a preliminary
inquiry and a formal departmental inquiry. Where the disciplinary
authority, upon consideration of the preliminary inquiry report, arrives at a
conclusion that no disciplinary proceedings are warranted, the question of
invoking or complying with Rule 20 does not arise.
14. In the present case, there is no material to indicate that any formal
disciplinary proceedings were initiated, such as issuance of a charge
memorandum, appointment of an inquiry officer, or conduct of an
evidentiary inquiry. The exercise undertaken by the respondents remains
within the domain of a preliminary inquiry.
15. Accordingly, this Court is of the considered view that there is no
legal requirement to follow the procedure prescribed under Rule 20 of the
CCA Rules in a case where the disciplinary authority, upon due
consideration of a preliminary inquiry, forms an opinion that no case is
made out for initiation of disciplinary proceedings. The contention of the
petitioner to the contrary is devoid of merit.
NTR,J
16. In view of the above, this Court holds that the disciplinary authority
is not bound to initiate disciplinary proceedings upon every complaint; that
a preliminary inquiry to ascertain prima facie material is permissible; that
the procedure under Rule 20 of the CCA Rules becomes mandatory only
upon initiation of formal disciplinary proceedings; and that where no such
decision is taken, non-compliance with Rule 20 does not vitiate the action
of the respondents.
17. Resultantly, the Writ Petition is dismissed. However, it is made
clear that if the competent authority, upon further consideration of the
material, decides to initiate disciplinary proceedings, the same shall be
conducted strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the
CCA Rules. There shall be no order as to costs. Pending miscellaneous
applications, if any, shall stand closed.
______________
N.TUKARAMJI, J
Date: 15.04.2026
svl
