B. Sridhar Reddy vs Union Of India
2026 Latest Caselaw 418 Tel

Telangana High Court

B. Sridhar Reddy vs Union Of India on 7 April, 2026

Author: Nagesh Bheemapaka

Bench: Nagesh Bheemapaka

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    IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
                    AT HYDERABAD


      THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA


                  WRIT PETITION No. 28152 of 2025


                                07thApril, 2026
Between:
B. Sridhar Reddy, S/o Venkat Reddy
                                                                ... Petitioner
                                    AND
1. Union of India, and others
                                                             ... Respondents
ORDER:

The case of the petitioner, precisely, as per the writ affidavit is that the initial land acquisition notification issued under Section 3A of the National Highways Act, 1956, published in Gazette No.1102(E) dated 10.03.2021 and subsequently published in newspapers on 25.03.2021. This notification proposed the acquisition of lands across approximately ten villages in Parkal, Shayampet, and Damera mandals, including portions of the petitioner's land, for construction of a new four-lane green highway. The petitioner asserts that the notification lacked adequate landowner-wise details and merely specified survey numbers and extents, making it difficult for affected persons to clearly identify their holdings. He further states that the notification claimed maps and plans were available with the competent authority, but in reality no such documents were accessible.

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Believing the project unnecessary given the existence of nearby National and State Highways that were allegedly underutilized, the petitioner and other affected farmers submitted general objections to the authorities. During the environmental impact assessment stage, a public hearing was conducted in which several landowners, including affected persons from the region, raised objections to the project.

1.1. For nearly a year thereafter, the petitioner claims there was no communication regarding the progress of the acquisition or environmental clearance. The situation changed when a public notice dated 04.02.2023 was issued under Section 3G of the National Highways Act, and published in newspapers on 15.02.2023, directing landowners to appear before the competent authority on various dates between 23.02.2023 and 09.03.2023 to submit their compensation claims. Through this notice, the petitioner states he first learned that a declaration under Section 3D had already been issued through Gazette No.1017 dated 08.03.2022, which effectively finalized the acquisition of the land. He asserts that this declaration was neither published locally nor circulated in newspapers with local readership, thereby depriving affected landowners of proper notice. In response, the petitioner and others submitted representations to the authorities requesting that the acquisition process be halted.

1.2. Subsequently, the petitioner and several other affected landowners approached this Court by filing W.P. No.5187 of 2023, challenging both the Section 3D declaration dated 08.03.2022 and the Section 3G award enquiry notice dated 04.02.2023. Their principal contention was that the acquisition process had advanced prior to obtaining environmental clearance, which they argued was impermissible under law. This Court initially granted stay of further proceedings for more than six

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months, but during the pendency of the writ petition the environmental clearance was obtained. As a result, the Court dismissed the petition in October 2023. The petitioner and others then filed Writ Appeal No.1190 of 2023, which was admitted and remains pending adjudication. The petitioner asserts that after the dismissal of the earlier writ petition and during the pendency of the writ appeal, the authorities resumed the acquisition process and proceeded to issue further notices and awards under Section 3G.

1.3. It is stated that in April 2024, several other landowners from Oorugonda village filed W.P. No.9909 of 2024, challenging multiple acquisition notifications including Section 3A notifications S.O.No.1102 dated 10.03.2021 and S.O.No.1905 dated 21.04.2022, the Section 3D notifications dated 08.03.2021 and 29.07.2022, the public notice under Section 3G dated 04.02.2023, and an unnumbered notice dated 13.01.2024. In that case, this Court granted interim protection from dispossession, by Order dated 03.05.2024, and the order has continued to be extended. Since those lands were adjacent to his own and involved identical legal issues under the same acquisition notifications, the petitioner states that he believed the authorities would also refrain from interfering with his possession until the disputes were resolved. Additionally, he asserts that copies of the award proceedings were not initially provided to him and were only supplied after repeated representations in February 2025.

1.4. It is stated that after obtaining the award documents, the petitioner discovered that the authorities had already issued the impugned award on 16.01.2024, through proceedings No. B/85/2021-10-NH-163G, and had begun issuing possession notices under Section 3E. The petitioner contends that the award is fundamentally defective because it was made

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under Section 3G of the National Highways Act, whereas, by virtue of the Removal of Difficulties Order, 2015, the provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013--including Sections 21 to 30 relating to compensation and Sections 16 to 18, 23, and 31 relating to rehabilitation and resettlement-- should govern the determination of compensation for acquisitions under the National Highways Act. According to the petitioner, this legal position has been recognized by government authorities themselves and supported by opinions of the Attorney General of India. However, the petitioner alleges that the competent authority failed to revise the market value of the land as required under Section 26 of the 2013 Act, and no revision of rates had occurred since 2013, and further the authorities applied two different compensation rates for awards issued in January 2024 merely because the corresponding Section 3A notifications were issued a year apart, and this resulted in discriminatory treatment of landowners in the same village for the same project.

1.5. The petitioner further asserts that the award proceedings themselves acknowledge that compensation for trees and structures located on the land was never determined, and that no proper enumeration or valuation of such assets was conducted nor were notices issued for that purpose. Because the compensation determination did not include these elements or the applicable rehabilitation and resettlement entitlements, he contends that the award remains incomplete.

1.6. It is further asserted that the petitioner made repeated representations expressing his unwillingness to part with the land and pointing out these alleged legal irregularities, the authorities began physical marking activities in the fields with police presence during June and July 2025. He states that officials warned farmers not to cultivate their

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lands and imposed deadlines for accepting compensation, indicating that if the compensation was not received the amount would be deposited in Court and possession would be forcibly taken. The petitioner claims that because he had taken the initiative to challenge the acquisition in Court, the authorities began targeting him specifically with the assistance of local police.

2. A counter-affidavit is filed by the Project Director of NHAI, on behalf of Respondent Nos.2 and 7, essentially contending that NHAI is entrusted with the development and maintenance of national highways across the country; and in the present case, NHAI undertook the construction of a four-lane National Highway-163G between Mancherial and Warangal, covering the stretch from Km. 88.418 to Km. 111.762 at Parkal in the State of Telangana, which includes lands in Oorugonda Village of Damera Mandal. According to the respondents, the project is a greenfield corridor designed to reduce travel distance, lower vehicle operating costs, shorten travel time, and promote economic development in the surrounding region. For implementing the acquisition process, the 5th respondent-Revenue Divisional Officer, Parkal, was appointed as the Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (CALA) under the National Highways Act, 1956.NHAI submitted a requisition for acquisition of the required land under Section 3A(1) of the Act, and the Central Government accordingly issued the Section 3A notification through Gazette S.O. No.1102(E) dated 10.03.2021 for acquisition of lands, including the land belonging to the petitioner.

2.1. It is further stated that the substance of the Section 3A notification dated 10.03.2021 was published in Mana Telangana (Telugu)

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and The Hindu (English) on 25.03.2021, granting 21 days' time for affected landowners to file objections under Section 3C of the National Highways Act, 1956.It is stated that no objections were received within the stipulated period, following which the Central Government issued the declaration under Section 3D through Gazette S.O. No.1017(E) dated 08.03.2022, resulting in the land vesting absolutely with the Central Government free from encumbrances. It is further stated that environmental clearance for the project was granted by the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change on 05.07.2023. Prior to the award determination, a public notice dated 04.02.2023 was issued under Section 3G(3) of the National Highways Act and published in Mana Telangana and The Hindu on 15.02.2023, calling upon interested persons to appear before the Competent Authority on 06.03.2023 during office hours to submit their claims and documentary proof of title. Following this enquiry conducted under Section 3G, the Competent Authority passed the award on 16.01.2024 through Proceedings No. B/85/2021-10-NH-163G, determining compensation for the acquired lands.

2.2. According to the respondents, the petitioner was granted a compensation amount of Rs. 69,51,221/-, calculated strictly in accordance with the statutory framework. It is contended that compensation for land acquired under the National Highways Act is determined by applying Sections 26 to 30 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, including statutory benefits such as 100% solatium, an additional 12% market value from the date of Section 3A publication to the date of award, and a 1.5 multiplication factor on the land value. The respondents also state that although compensation for the land has been determined, possession of the land has not yet been taken and will only be taken after payment of

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compensation as required under Section 3H of the National Highways Act, 1956. It is further stated that NHAI has already deposited the compensation amount determined under the award, and that a supplementary award will subsequently be issued by the Competent Authority for structures such as trees and borewells after following due procedure.

2.3. The respondents deny the allegation that the award is invalid or incomplete. They assert that the acquisition process--from the Section 3A notification on 10.03.2021, the newspaper publication on 25.03.2021, the Section 3D declaration on 08.03.2022, the Section 3G notice dated 04.02.2023, the enquiry conducted on 06.03.2023, and finally the award dated 16.01.2024--was conducted strictly in accordance with the National Highways Act. The respondents also reject the petitioner's argument that Section 3G of the National Highways Act is no longer in force, stating that only the provisions of the RFCTLARR Act relating to determination of compensation under Sections 26 to 30 are applicable to highway acquisitions, and not the entire framework of the 2013 Act as alleged by the petitioner. According to the respondents, the petitioner has misinterpreted the Removal of Difficulties Order, 2015 issued through Gazette Notification No. S.O.2368(E) dated 28.08.2015, which came into force on 01.09.2015, and is attempting to mislead the Court by claiming broader applicability of the RFCTLARR provisions.

2.4. The respondents contend that rehabilitation and resettlement benefits under the Second and Third Schedules of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013apply only to "displaced families" as defined under Section 3(k) of the Act, meaning families must have been relocated and resettled from the affected area to a resettlement area due to land acquisition. They assert that

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in the present case the petitioner has neither been displaced nor relocated, as only a small extent of land required for the highway's Right of Way, typically ranging between 45 metres and 70 metres for four-lane highways, has been acquired. Consequently, it is contended that the petitioner does not qualify for rehabilitation or resettlement benefits and has failed to provide any documentary evidence demonstrating displacement or loss of livelihood. It is contended that for considering the rehabilitation and resettlement benefits, the Competent Authority must certify that the affected family has been displaced, but in the petitioner's case, no such certification exists in favour of the petitioner.

2.5. It is contended that though W.P. No.5187 of 2023 was filed earlier and that Writ Appeal No.1190 of 2023 is pending, there is no stay order in the writ appeal, and therefore the acquisition proceedings cannot be halted on the ground of mere pendency of appeal as there is no stay order. Similarly, it is contended that the interim order granted on 03.05.2024 in W.P. No.9909 of 2024 in favour of other landowners does not automatically extend to the petitioner, and that such interim relief applies only to the parties in that particular proceeding.

2.6. It is also contended that even if the petitioner has any grievance regarding the compensation determined in the award dated 16.01.2024, the appropriate remedy is not a writ petition but the statutory mechanism under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956, which allows an aggrieved landowner to seek determination by an arbitrator, usually the District Collector, followed by further recourse under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act before the District Court. It is contended that since the project is undertaken for a public

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purpose and any alleged loss to the petitioner can be compensated monetarily, the balance of convenience does not lie in favour the petitioner.

3. A counter-affidavit is also filed by the respondent No.5 - Revenue Divisional Officer/CALA, contending that the award proceedings No. B/85/2021-10-NH-163G dated 16.01.2024, relating to the petitioner's land measuring Ac.0.3506726 guntas in Survey No.123 of Oorugonda Village, Damera Mandal, Hanumakonda District, were passed strictly in accordance with the provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956 and the applicable provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013.

3.1. It is contended that the decision to adopt the greenfield alignment was taken during a Land Acquisition Committee meeting held on 03.09.2020 at the headquarters of the concerned authority, and once the alignment was finalized based on technical parameters and site conditions, it could not be altered. The respondent states that the Revenue Divisional Officer, Parkal, was formally designated as the Competent Authority for Land Acquisition for the project within the Parkal Revenue Division through Gazette Notification No.3099 dated 27.08.2019. Following a requisition from the implementing authority, the Central Government issued the Section 3A notification through Gazette No.1102(E) dated 10.03.2021, proposing acquisition of lands across ten villages, including the petitioner's land in Oorugonda Village. The substance of this notification was published in the newspapers Mana Telangana and The Hindu on 25.03.2021, inviting objections from interested persons within 21 days as required under Section 3C of the National Highways Act.

3.2. It is contended that several landowners, including the petitioner, filed their objections within the statutory period. Their

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objections were considered by the Competent Authority, and hearings were conducted after issuing notices to the objectors. After examining the issues raised, the objections were rejected through Proceedings No. B/85/2021 dated 20.11.2021, and the acquisition process was allowed to proceed. Thereafter, the Central Government issued the final declaration under Section 3D through Gazette Notification S.O. No.1017(E) dated 08.03.2022, which legally vested the acquired lands in the Central Government free from encumbrances. It is stated that, during the preparation of sub-division records, the authorities discovered that certain extents of land within the alignment had been inadvertently omitted from the original Section 3A notification dated 10.03.2021, and to rectify this omission, an additional Section 3A notification S.O. No.1905(E) dated 21.04.2022 was issued covering the missing extents without any overlap. After disposal of objections under Section 3C, a further Section 3D declaration S.O. No.3526(E) dated 29.07.2022 was issued, and the consequential Section 3G public notice was published on 13.01.2024 in Mana Telangana and The Hindu.

3.3. It is contended that the acquisition proceedings were temporarily affected by litigation initiated by certain landowners. It is stated that in W.P. No.5187 of 2023, which was filed challenging the environmental clearance process, this Court granted interim orders on 26.02.2023 in favour of petitioners. However, the Ministry of Environment, Forest and Climate Change, Government of India, granted environmental clearance on 05.07.2023. Following the grant of environmental clearance, this Court dismissed the writ petition on 26.09.2023, and although Writ Appeal No.1190 of 2023 was subsequently filed,no stay order has been granted in that appeal. Consequently, the

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acquisition proceedings continued in accordance with law. After conducting the required enquiry under Section 3G, the Competent Authority passed the award on 16.01.2024, determining compensation by applying Sections 26 to 30 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, including statutory benefits such as 100% solatium, an additional 12% market value calculated from the date of Section 3A publication to the date of the award, and a 1.5 multiplication factor on the land value.

3.4. It is stated that the market value determined by the Competent Authority was subsequently reviewed by the Arbitrator-cum-District Collector, Hanumakonda, who enhanced the market value for lands acquired under the project in all ten villages including Oorugonda Village through Appeal No. G/1371/2024-1 dated 17.10.2025, and that the enhanced compensation has already been disbursed to the concerned landowners. The respondent further states that compensation for structures and trees was separately assessed through technical evaluations conducted by the Executive Engineer, MB Intra Division, Hanumakonda, the District Horticulture and Sericulture Officer, the District (R&B) Officer, Hanumakonda, and the District Forest Officer, Hanumakonda. Based on these evaluations, a Supplementary Award bearing Proceedings No. B/85/2021-10-NH-163G-Structure dated 28.05.2025 was issued to compensate for structures and trees on the acquired lands.

3.5. It is argued that Section 3G of the National Highways Act, 1956 is still valid. The Removal of Difficulties Order only makes certain parts of the 2013 Act (Sections 26 to 30, which deal with compensation) applicable. The rest of the 2013 Act does not apply to land acquisitions under the National Highways Act.It is contended that the petitioner has misconstrued by claiming broader applicability of provisions such as

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Sections 16 to 18, 21, and 23, which relate to preparation of rehabilitation and resettlement schemes, and that such provisions are not applicable to highway acquisitions because these projects are linear in nature, involve limited Right of Way, and rarely cause displacement requiring relocation and resettlement.

3.6. It is further stated that the determination of market value under Section 26 of the RFCTLARR Act requires examination of sale transactions during the three years preceding the Section 3A notification, and since the original Section 3A notification dated 10.03.2021 and the additional Section 3A notification dated 21.04.2022 were issued on different dates, and therefore the reference periods differed, resulting in variation in land values, and therefore the differential compensation is a lawful consequence of the statutory method of valuation and does not constitute discrimination.

3.7. Adverting to the petitioner's allegation that possession is being taken without due process, it is contended that notices under Section 3E of the National Highways Act have been issued only after completion of statutory procedures, and that in cases where this Court has granted protection--such as W.P. No.9909 of 2024--the authorities have complied with the Court's directions and refrained from dispossessing those petitioners. Further, the petitioner's allegation that officials or contractors interfered with cultivation or damaged crops is denied.

3.8. It is further contended that out of 1035 affected awardees, 859 landowners have already accepted the compensation, which is roughly 83%, whereas only the petitioner and a few others have refused to receive the payment. In any event, if the petitioner is dissatisfied with the compensation determined in the award dated 16.01.2024, the proper

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remedy lies under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, which allows an aggrieved party to approach the statutory arbitrator, namely the District Collector, and thereafter seek further remedy before the District Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. Since the acquisition process has been conducted strictly in accordance with law and the petitioner has an adequate statutory remedy, the respondent submits that the writ petition is not maintainable and prays for dismissal of the writ petition apart from vacating the interim order.

4. Learned Standing Counsel for NHAI appearing for respondents No.2 and 7 contends that the entire land acquisition process for the NH- 163G project between Km. 88.418 and Km. 111.762 (Mancherial- Warangal section) has been conducted strictly in accordance with the provisions of the National Highways Act, 1956 and the applicable provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013. It is submitted that the acquisition proceedings commenced with the Section 3A notification dated 10.03.2021, which was published in the newspapers Mana Telangana and The Hindu on 25.03.2021, followed by the Section 3D declaration dated 08.03.2022, and thereafter the Section 3G notice dated 04.02.2023, pursuant to which an enquiry was conducted on 06.03.2023. Learned counsel submits that after conducting due enquiry, the Competent Authority passed the award on 16.01.2024 in Proceedings No. B/85/2021- 10-NH-163G, granting the petitioner compensation of Rs. 69,51,221/-, calculated in accordance with Sections 26 to 30 of the 2013 Act, along with 100% solatium, 12% additional market value, and a 1.5 multiplication factor. It is argued that the petitioner's contention that Section 3G of the National Highways Act has become inoperative is legally untenable and amounts to a misinterpretation of the Removal of Difficulties Order dated

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28.08.2015. The learned counsel further submits that the petitioner is not entitled to rehabilitation and resettlement benefits under the Second and Third Schedules of the 2013 Act, as he has neither been displaced nor relocated from the affected area and therefore does not fall within the definition of a "displaced family" under Section 3(k) of the Act. It is also contended that the petitioner cannot rely upon interim orders granted to other landowners in W.P. No.9909 of 2024, nor can he claim any benefit from the pendency of Writ Appeal No.1190 of 2023, as no stay order has been granted for halting the acquisition proceedings. The learned counsel further submits that possession of the land will be taken only after payment of compensation in accordance with Section 3H of the National Highways Act, and therefore the petitioner's apprehensions are unfounded. It is argued that if the petitioner is dissatisfied with the compensation determined in the award dated 16.01.2024, the appropriate remedy lies under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act by approaching the statutory arbitrator and not by invoking writ jurisdiction, and therefore contends that the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

5. Learned counsel appearing on behalf of respondents No. 3 to 6 also made submissions in similar lines of respondent No.2 and 7. Learned counsel contends that the petitioner is not entitled to rehabilitation and resettlement benefits, since the acquisition is for a linear highway project involving limited Right of Way, and the petitioner has neither been displaced nor relocated. The learned counsel further points out that the Arbitrator-cum-District Collector, Hanumakonda, has already enhanced the market value through Appeal No. G/1371/2024-1 dated 17.10.2025, and a supplementary award dated 28.05.2025 was issued for structures and trees after technical evaluation by concerned departments. It is also submitted

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that out of 1035 affected awardees, 859 landowners have already received compensation, while the petitioner alone has refused to accept the amount and if the petitioner is dissatisfied with the compensation determined, the proper remedy lies under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act before the statutory arbitrator and not through a writ petition.

6. Learned counsel for the petitioners contends that the acquisition proceedings were earlier challenged in WP No.5187 of 2023 on the ground that environmental clearance was not obtained prior to issuance of the declaration under Section 3D of the NH Act, 1956, and though interim orders were initially granted, the writ petition was later dismissed and Writ Appeal No.1190 of 2023 is pending without interim relief; that some adjoining landowners have separately challenged the Section 3A and 3D notifications in WP No.10431 of 2024 and obtained interim protection, leading the petitioners to reasonably believe that the authorities would not interfere with their possession until final adjudication; that the petitioners received copies of the Award proceedings only in February 2025; that multiple notifications under Sections 3A and 3D were issued without specifying survey numbers, landowner-wise extents, plans, or maps, and the order under Section 3C dated 20.11.2021 was not communicated to the petitioners; that the petitioners came to know about the multiple notifications only through the NHAI website and were unaware of the environmental clearance for nearly a year until public notices appeared in newspapers; that Section 3G of the NH Act, 1956, relating to determination of compensation, is no longer operative in view of the RFCTLARR (Removal of Difficulties) Order, 2015 issued under Section 105(3) of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, and therefore the provisions of the 2013 Act apply to acquisitions under the National Highways Act; that consequently,

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compensation and rehabilitation benefits ought to have been determined in accordance with Sections 16 to 18, 21 to 30, 23 and 31 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 and not under Section 3G of the National Highways Act; that the competent authority failed to revise or update the market value of the acquired land as required under Section 26 of the RFCTLARR Act prior to issuance of the Section 3A notification; that two different rates were adopted while passing the award in January 2024; that the expressions "amount" and "compensation" used in Sections 3G and 3H of the National Highways Act include compensation for land, structures, and rehabilitation entitlements to affected families; that though the petitioners may not be displaced, they remain an affected family entitled to rehabilitation benefits; that possession of the land cannot be taken unless complete compensation including valuation of trees and structures and determination of rehabilitation entitlements is finalized; that the award proceedings are unsustainable as compensation for structures and trees has not been determined and therefore the notice under Section 3E of the National Highways Act is also liable to be set aside; that the competent authority ought to have issued notice under Section 21 of the RFCTLARR Act and conducted award enquiry under Section 23 after following the procedure under Sections 16 to 18 for identification of eligible persons and preparation of a Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme instead of proceeding under Section 3G of the National Highways Act; that despite representations expressing unwillingness to part with the land and pointing out the illegality in the acquisition and compensation determination, the authorities in June-July 2025 attempted to mark the petitioner's land with police assistance and threatened the petitioner not to cultivate the land despite the existence of standing crops, thereby compelling the petitioner to approach this Court.

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7. Learned counsel for the petitionersrelies on:

1) Akkala Chandrakala v. The State of Telangana 1;

2) Kolkata Municipal Corporation v. Bimal Kumar Shah 2;

3) B.K. Ravichandra v. Union of India3;

4) Hindustan Petroleum Corpn. Ltd. v. Darius Shapur Chenai 4;

5) K. Ramachandram v. State of Telangana5;

6) Madi Satyavati v. State of Telangana6;

7) Manorama Devi v. National Highways Authority of India7;

8) Nagpur Improvement Trust v. Vithal Rao 8;

9) National Highways Authority of India v. P. Nagaraju alias Cheluvaiah 9;

10)Ranivr Singh v. National Highways Authority of India 10;

11) Union of India v. Shiv Raj 11;

12) State of Uttar Pradesh v. Singhara Singh 12

7.1. In Akkala Chandrakala (supra), this Courtconsidered a dispute over land acquisition for the development of National Highway 765DG. The petitioners, whose homes were being acquired, sought Rehabilitation and Resettlement (R&R) benefits under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and

W.P. No. 11486 of 2024 (Telangana High Court)

(2024) 10 SCC 533

(2021) 14 SCC 703

(2005) 7 SCC 627

W.P. No. 23939 of 2013 (Telangana High Court)

W.A. No. 676 of 2023 (Telangana High Court)

Neutral Citation No. 2023:AHC:240588 - DB (Allahabad High Court)

(1973) 1 SCC 500

(2022) 15 SCC 1

2023 SCC OnLine All 5276

(2014) 6 SCC 564

1963 SCC OnLine SC 23

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Resettlement Act, 2013, while government authorities argued that such benefits were not applicable to the road-widening project under the National Highways Act, 1956. This Court, by interim order dated 12.11.2024, rejected the authorities' prayer to vacate an earlier stay order and indicated that highway acquisitions remain subject to modern R&R protections, and granted status quo until final hearing, while allowing authorities to begin the formal process of determining and awarding R&R compensation.

7.2. In Bimal Kumar Shah (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court broadened the understanding of the constitutional right to property under Article 300-A of the Constitution of India by stating that lawful land acquisition requires more than just public purpose and compensation. The Hon'ble Supreme Court identified seven essential procedural sub-rights-- including the right to notice, the right to be heard, and the right to a reasoned decision--along with requirements for an efficient process and fair rehabilitation. Ruling against the Kolkata Municipal Corporation, the Supreme Court held that any State action that ignores these safeguards is invalid.

7.3. In B.K. Ravichandra (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court clarified the limits of Government power over private property. The Supreme Court held that although the right to property is no longer a fundamental right, it remains a constitutional safeguard under Article 300- A of the Constitution of India, protecting both physical land and intangible assets, and the government cannot occupy private land indefinitely without proper legal authority, as prolonged possession amounts to unlawful deprivation of property. Emphasizing the rule of law, the Court rejected any notion that the State can act with "royal prerogative" and insisted that

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all State actions must be backed by clear statutory authority. As a result, the Court ordered the return of land that had been held by the government for over thirty years and directed that fair compensation be paid to the rightful owners.

7.4. In Darius Shapur Chenai (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined the procedural safeguards required under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 during the acquisition of private property. The Supreme Court focused on whether the State had genuinely considered the landowner's objections as required under Section 5-A of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. It held that the right to object and be heard under Section 5-A is a significant safeguard--comparable in importance to a fundamental right--and must involve a real and careful consideration by the government rather than a mere formality. The Court further ruled that when such decisions are challenged, the government must produce its records to demonstrate that a fair decision-making process was followed. Since the State failed to provide adequate evidence or a proper counter- affidavit, the Court upheld the quashing of the acquisition, reinforcing that laws allowing the taking of private property must be strictly interpreted to prevent arbitrary state action.

7.5. In K. Ramachandram(supra), this Courtexamined whether the government had followed the required statutory procedures while attempting to acquire the petitioner's land; and held that although the preliminary notification remained valid because it had been properly extended, the later declaration was unlawful due to the authorities' failure to prepare and publish mandatory rehabilitation and resettlement schemes under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. Finding that these

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procedural safeguards are essential to protect the landowner's rights, the declaration was quashed with a direction to the government to strictly comply with the Act if it wishes to proceed with the acquisition, while also encouraging both parties to pursue an amicable settlement through land exchange or fair monetary compensation.

7.6. In Madi Satyavati v. State of Telangana 13, the Division Bench of this Court dealt with a matter pertaining to land acquisition for a railway project; and held that not only the mother, but also her three daughters, qualify as an affected family under Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013; and modified a prior order to ensure that rehabilitation benefits are determined for the daughters in addition to the mother's solatium and allowed the appellants to seek a formal reference if they are dissatisfied with the final monetary compensation, reinforcing that the rights of all affected family members must be recognized in land acquisition cases.

7.7. In Manorama Devi (supra), the Allahabad High Court adjudicated a petition filed by Manorma Devi against the National Highway Authority of India. The Allahabad High Court addressed her claim for rehabilitation and resettlement benefits, which she had not received despite being compensated for her land. The Court observed that her grievance aligned with previous cases under the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, where affected landowners were entitled to additional support. It directed the authorities to prepare a formal proposal within six months to provide the petitioner with entitlements for housing,

W.A. No. 676 of 2023 (Telangana High Court)

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employment, and relocation as outlined in the Second Schedule of the Act, and granted legal relief consistent with earlier, similar judgments.

7.8. In Nagpur Improvement Trust (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court examined whether the Nagpur Improvement Trust Act violated Article 14 of the Constitution of India by allowing the State to acquire property at lower compensation rates than standard national laws. The Supreme Court held that the Government cannot justify paying different amounts for similar lands based solely on which authority conducts the acquisition or the stated public purpose. Emphasizing the principle of equal protection, the judgment affirmed that landowners are entitled to consistent, market-value compensation regardless of the acquiring body, and dismissed the appeal, ruling that discriminatory treatment in compensation or statutory bonuses is unconstitutional.

7.9. In P. Nagaraju alias Cheluvaiah (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court addressed the determination of fair compensation and clarified the role of Courts in reviewing arbitral awards under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996. The Supreme Court held that an arbitrator's failure to provide adequate and intelligible reasoning for compensation constitutes a ground of "patent illegality," justifying judicial intervention. Emphasizing equitable treatment for landowners, including solatium and interest, the ruling aligned compensation practices with constitutional protections and remanded the matter for recalculation of the property's market value using proper evidence and updated guideline rates.

7.10. In Ranivr Singh (supra), the Allahabad High Court addressed petitions by displaced families who claimed that the National Highway Authority of India had failed to provide mandatory rehabilitation and resettlement benefits under the Right to Fair Compensation and

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Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013. The Court held that the status of affected families must be properly assessed, rejecting the authorities' contention that linear road projects cause minimal disruption. It directed the competent authority to conduct a thorough inquiry and submit a resettlement proposal to the District Collector, ensuring that eligible landowners receive entitlements such as housing units, employment opportunities, or relocation allowances as part of their compensation.

7.11. In Shiv Raj (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Courtconsidered the validity of land acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. The Supreme Court highlighted procedural lapses, including violations of natural justice where objections were heard by one official but the final report was issued by another without a fresh hearing. It also examined the impact of the Right to Fair Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition, Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013 on older cases where the government delayed possession or failed to provide compensation for over five years.

7.12. InSinghara Singh (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court addressed the admissibility of oral testimony regarding a defendant's confession, arising from a Second-Class Magistrate's failure to follow procedures under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973.

8. Learned Standing Counsel for NHAI contends that the competent authority awarded adequate and lawful compensation to the petitioners in accordance with the National Highways Act, 1956 and the RFCTLARR Act, 2013; that the Respondent No.4-CALA passed awards dated 05.01.2024 and 31.01.2024 in Proceedings No. B/85/2021-08-NH-163G

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after considering objections and providing opportunity of hearing to all concerned, and the compensation amounts were received by the petitioners except petitioner Nos. 4 and 6; that if the petitioners are aggrieved by the determination of compensation, they have an efficacious alternative remedy under Section 3G(5) of the NH Act by approaching the Arbitration- cum-District Collector and any challenge to the arbitral award lies before the District Court under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; that the petitioners do not fall within the definition of a displaced family under Section 3(k) of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 as they have neither been relocated nor resettled from the affected area; that the petitioners have failed to produce any documentary evidence establishing displacement or loss of livelihood so as to qualify as an "affected family"

under Section 3(c) of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 or to claim benefits under the Second and Third Schedules of the said Act; that only a portion of the petitioners' land has been acquired and the remaining land continues to be available for their livelihood, thereby negating any claim of deprivation of livelihood; that where substantial monetary compensation has been awarded, the landowners can utilize such compensation for acquiring alternative land or assets and therefore cannot insist on rehabilitation or resettlement benefits; that even otherwise, the petitioners failed to raise specific objections before the competent authority demonstrating that the compensation awarded was insufficient to enable rehabilitation or resettlement; that any claim for rehabilitation or resettlement requires cogent evidence demonstrating that the compensation determined is grossly inadequate to secure such rehabilitation; that entitlement to benefits under the Second Schedule of the RFCTLARR Act arises only when the competent authority certifies that the family has been displaced or dislocated, which is not the case here; that preparation of a Social Impact

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Assessment (SIA) report is not mandatory for acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956; that the provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, particularly those relating to Social Impact Assessment and rehabilitation and resettlement under Chapter II, do not automatically apply to acquisitions under the National Highways Act unless specifically extended by notification under Section 105 of the Act of 2013, and no such notification applies in the present case; that since only part of the petitioners' land has been acquired and they have not been dislocated, there is no requirement to frame a rehabilitation and resettlement scheme; that injunction against an infrastructure project is barred under Section 20-A of the Specific Relief Act, 1963; that the present project is a public infrastructure project of national importance and cannot be stalled, and therefore the acquisition proceedings cannot be challenged merely on the ground of dissatisfaction with the compensation, particularly when an effective statutory remedy for enhancement of compensation is available under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act.

9. Learned Standing Counsel for the Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (CALA) contends that environmental clearance for the project was obtained on 05.07.2023 vide File No.10/29/2021-IA-III and the additional notification under Section 3A of the NH Act, 1956 was issued only for the purpose of covering certain missing structures; that the competent authority passed awards dated 05.01.2024 and 31.01.2024 determining compensation for the acquired lands and subsequently passed a supplementary award dated 11.11.2025 determining compensation for structures; that several landowners who were aggrieved by the compensation approached the Arbitrator-cum-District Collector under Section 3G(5) of the NHActand the arbitrator revised the market value and

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enhanced compensation through awards dated 09.05.2025, 23.07.2025, 04.08.2025 and 23.10.2025; that the provisions of Sections 16 to 18, 21 and 23 of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 are not applicable to acquisitions under the National Highways Act as the project is a linear infrastructure project where the affected area is confined to the right of way and therefore identification of eligibility for rehabilitation benefits and preparation of a Rehabilitation and Resettlement Scheme is not mandatory; that benefits under the Second Schedule of the RFCTLARR Act can be claimed only when the competent authority certifies that the petitioner's family has been displaced or dislocated from the area; that objections filed under Section 3C of the National Highways Act were duly received and disposed of and additional notifications were issued only to acquire certain missing extents of land, following which notification under Section 3D was issued and the land vested with the Central Government free from all encumbrances; that out of 1035 landowners whose lands were acquired or are in the process of acquisition, 859 landowners have already received compensation and only the petitioner and a few others have not accepted the amount; that the petitioner has raised untenable objections and approached this Court with the intention of stalling the land acquisition process; that Section 3G of the NHAct continues to govern determination of compensation for lands acquired under the Act, while only the provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 relating to determination of compensation under the First Schedule and Rehabilitation and Resettlement benefits under the Second Schedule are applicable to such acquisitions, and therefore the writ petition is liable to be dismissed.

10. Learned Additional Solicitor General relies on several judgments in support of his contention that a writ remedy is not maintainable in the

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instant case; particularly on Ramniklal N. Bhutta v. State of Maharashtra14 and contends that the Courts have to weigh the public interest vis-à-vis the private interest while exercising the power and there are many ways of affording appropriate relief and redressing a wrong, and that quashing of acquisition proceedings is not the only mode of redress.

10.1. He also relies on Nerajala Nageswara Rao v. Union of India 15, to contend that alternative remedy harsh one should not be resorted in public purpose projects and larger public purpose prevails over individual interest. He also relies on N.G. Projects Ltd. v. Vinod Kumar Jain16, to contend that construction of road is an infrastructure project and keeping in view the intent of the legislature that infrastructure projects should not be stayed, the High Court would have been well advised to hold its hand to stay the construction of the infrastructure project.

10.2. He also relies on Bluepark Seafoods (P) Ltd v. District Collector17 and contends that in case of acquisition for benefit of general public, the landowner can stake claim for reasonable compensation and nothing beyond that. Relying on NHAI v. Sayedabad Tea Company Ltd 18, it is contended that National Highways Act is a special enactment and a comprehensive code which provides an inbuilt mechanism for initiating acquisition until culmination of the proceedings in determining the compensation and its adjudication by arbitrator under Section 3-G(5) of the NH Act.

1997 (1) SCC 134

2017 SCC Online Hyd 250

2022 (6) SCC 127

2011 SCC OnLine AP 267

(2020) 15 SCC 161

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10.3. He also relies on the judgment of the High Court of Karnataka, at Bengaluru, in W.P.No.10103 of 2020 (LA-RES) and batch, dated 19.07.2022, and contends that in the said case, the High Court of Karnataka has set aside the awards passed by the CALA and directed the authority to redetermine the compensation afresh, and if the parties are aggrieved by the fresh awards passed by the CALA, the parties can approach the arbitrator.

10.4. He also relies on the judgment of Hon'ble Supreme Court in M/s Tirupati Developers v. The Union Territory of Dadra and Nagar Haveli19, and contends that the Hon'ble Supreme Court directed the Collector to give one opportunity to the appellant therein to submit its objections, followed by personal hearing and thereafter pass appropriate award after holding inquiry under Section 23 of the RTCTLARR Act, and therefore similar dispensation may be shown in the present writ petition as well in view of similarity of facts.

11. Having considered the respective contentions and perused the record, it may be noted that the grievance of the petitioners essentially is that multiple notifications under Sections 3A and 3D of the National Highways Act were issued with incomplete information, inadequate publication, and without providing proper landowner-wise details, maps, or an effective opportunity to file objections with regard to the acquisition of their agricultural lands for the proposed four-lane National Highway-163G, and that their objections were not properly considered. It is also contended that the authorities proceeded with the declaration and award process even before obtaining environmental clearance, issued additional notifications

Civil Appeal No.4952 of 2023, dated August 7, 2023

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without informing the affected landowners, and passed incomplete compensation awards without determining compensation for structures and trees, and without granting rehabilitation and resettlement benefits as required under the RFCTLARR Act, 2013 and the Removal of Difficulties Order, 2015. They also allege discriminatory and outdated valuation of land, denial of statutory entitlements, and attempts by the authorities to forcibly take possession of their lands without paying lawful compensation, thereby threatening their livelihood as small and marginal farmers. It is also their grievance that the compensation cannot be confined only to the land on the mere ground that the land is an agricultural extent, and that compensation should also be granted for the structures existing on the land, and rehabilitation and resettlement benefits should be extended to the petitioners.

11.1. On the contrary, the essential contention of the respondents (NHAI and CALA authorities) is that the acquisition of the petitioners' land for the construction of the four-lane National Highway-163G (Mancherial-Warangal Greenfield Corridor) has been carried out strictly in accordance with the procedure prescribed under the National Highways Act, 1956 and the applicable provisions of the RFCTLARR Act, 2013, and that all statutory steps--issuance of notifications under Sections 3A and 3D, consideration of objections under Section 3C, conduct of enquiry, and passing of compensation awards under Section 3G--were duly followed. According to them, adequate opportunity was given to the landowners, and compensation has been determined and deposited as per law. It is also their contention that the entire village or villages have not been acquired, requiring the villagers, along with their houses, cattle, and livelihood, to be shifted/relocated to an alternative location, or re-establish the village at

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some other place entirely; but only such extent of land(s) that is under alignment would go into the highway project, and only such limited extents of land(s) were acquired, and therefore there cannot be any contentions of displacement of persons requiring rehabilitation and resettlement under the RFCTLARR Act because they are not "displaced families". It is contended that any grievance regarding compensation must be pursued through the statutory remedy of arbitration under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act rather than through a writ petition, and the petitioners' allegations are unfounded. They further contend that the interim order restraining the project may be vacated since it delays a project of national importance and public interest.

12. At this juncture, it is to be noted that the project concerns the laying of a four-lane National Highway (Mancherial-Warangal Greenfield Corridor), and that land acquisition has been undertaken for the said highway. In land acquisition for a National Highway of this nature, connecting highways across States, the acquisition process or the laying of the highway per se cannot be stalled indefinitely by taking recourse to the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court. Ultimately, the sole grievance that can be agitated by the aggrieved persons is confined to the compensatory benefits in lieu of the lands acquired, which is pecuniary in nature.

12.1 Further, the petitioners' grievance with regard to entitlement to compensation for structures, trees, standing crops, or even alternative rehabilitation/resettlement benefits is also justiciable, provided such structures are legally permitted, and the CALA has certified that the structures/crops, etc., have been affected in the land acquisition process, in a way that resettlement and rehabilitation is necessary.

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12.2 Be that as it may, in land acquisition for a public purpose, unless there are proven malafides, neither is the acquisition liable to be set aside, nor can the opinion of experts--either with regard to the alignment of the highway or with regard to the determination of factual aspects such as the extent of land acquired and the monetary compensation payable--be substituted by exercising extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226.

13. At this juncture, it would be relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Union of India v. Kushala Shetty 20, wherein it was held as follows:

"24. Here, it will be apposite to mention that NHAI is a professionally managed statutory body having expertise in the field of development and maintenance of National Highways. The projects involving construction of new highways and widening and development of the existing highways, which are vital for development of infrastructure in the country, are entrusted to experts in the field of highways. It comprises of persons having vast knowledge and expertise in the field of highway development and maintenance. NHAI prepares and implements projects relating to development and maintenance of National Highways after thorough study by experts in different fields. Detailed project reports are prepared keeping in view the relevant factors including intensity of heavy vehicular traffic and larger public interest. The Courts are not at all equipped to decide upon the viability and feasibility of the particular project and whether the particular alignment would subserve the larger public interest. In such matters, the scope of judicial review is very limited. The Court can nullify the acquisition of land and, in rarest of rare cases, the particular project, if it is found to be ex facie contrary to the mandate of law or tainted due to mala fides."

(2011) 12 SCC 69

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14. Further, it would be relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Division Bench of this Court in Writ Appeal No.774 of 2024, dated 07.08.2024, which is an appeal filed challenging a Notification for laying a national highway. The Hon'ble Division Bench, by referring to various precedent judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court, more particularly Kushala Shetty (supra), held as follows:

"12. In view of aforesaid enunciation of law, it is evident that the projects involving construction of new highways and widening and development of existing highways are vital for development of infrastructure of the country. The projects have been entrusted to the experts in the field of highways and it comprises of persons having vast knowledge and expertise in the field of highway development and maintenance. The NHAI is implementing the project relating to development and maintenance after thorough study by experts.

13. It is pertinent to note that in pursuance of the notification issued under the Act, award has already been passed on 10.05.2022 and petitioners No.8 and 11 in W.P.No.24150 of 2021 have even received the compensation. The project is virtually complete except for a small stretch."

15. In this connection, it is to be noted that under Section 3G of the National Highways Act, determination of compensation is entrusted to the Competent Authority for Land Acquisition (CALA). Significantly, Section 3G(5) expressly provides that where the amount determined by the Competent Authority is not acceptable to either of the parties, the matter shall, on application, be referred to the Arbitrator appointed by the Central Government--ordinarily the District Collector. Thus, the statute itself

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creates a complete adjudicatory mechanism for redressal of disputes relating to compensation.

16. Further, once the Arbitrator renders an award under Section 3G(5) of the National Highways Act, 1956, such award is governed by the provisions of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; and the persons aggrieved by the arbitral award has a further statutory remedy under Section 34 of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act before the competent Civil Court.

17. Though the existence of an alternative remedy is not a bar to invoking the writ jurisdiction of this Court under Article 226, its invocation comes with the rider that there should be exceptional circumstances, warranting invocation under Article 226 bypassing the statutory remedy. In this context, it is relevant to refer to the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Whirlpool Corporation v. Registrar of Trademarks 21, wherein the Supreme Court held as follows:

"15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of any of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justice or

1998 (8) SCC 1

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where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged."

18. In the instant writ petition, this Court does not find any violation of fundamental rights per se, or any violation of the principles of natural justice, or any jurisdictional error on the part of the respondent authorities; nor does the writ petition challenge the vires of the Act passed by the competent authority. Further, it is the specific unrebutted contention of the respondents, borne out by the record, that out of 1035 landowners whose lands were acquired or in process of acquisition, 859 landowners have already received compensation; thereby roughly 83% of persons have received the compensation.

19. The grievance of the petitioners is about (i) determination of compensation under the awards dated 05.01.2024 and 31.01.2024, (ii) alleged improper calculation of market value, multiplication factor, solatium, and other statutory components, and (iii) alleged inadequate grant of certain benefits under the RFCTLARR framework as applied to acquisitions under the National Highways Act, 1956.

20. Though the petitioners contend that they are entitled to certain rehabilitation and resettlement benefits, it cannot be disputed that the competent authority should have certified that the affected landowner has been displaced. Furthermore, the petitioners have a two-step statutory remedy, one under the National Highways Act, 1956 and, if still aggrieved, the second under the Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996; and therefore the petitioners are not remediless.