Kalva Muktheshwarnath vs Donthi Tirupathi Reddy
2025 Latest Caselaw 5622 Tel

Telangana High Court

Kalva Muktheshwarnath vs Donthi Tirupathi Reddy on 22 September, 2025

            The Hon'ble Smt. Justice Renuka Yara

                Second Appeal No.277 of 2025

Judgment:

          Heard Sri P. Ramachander Rao, learned counsel for the

appellant and Sri Bommineni Vivekananda, learned counsel for

the respondent, on the question of admission. Perused the

record.

2. This is a Second appeal preferred aggrieved by the

concurrent judgments passed by the learned Principal District

Judge, Hanumakonda in A.S.No.246 of 2022, dated 18.03.2025

and learned II Additional Junior Civil Judge, Warangal in

O.S.No.239 of 2008, dated 22.02.2019, wherein, the relief of

perpetual injunction sought by the appellant herein was denied.

3. The case of appellant is that he is the owner and

possessor of house bearing No.1-9-997 with open place

admeasuring 350 sq.yds. situated at Basithnagar, near Julywada,

Hanamkonda, Warangal District consisting of three rooms with

amenities. The appellant purchased said property from V. Jagan

Mohan Reddy under a registered sale deed bearing document

No.1099 of 2008, dated 16.02.2008 and since then, he has been

paying the property tax and water tax, etc. Further, the name of

the appellant is mutated in the revenue records vide ROC

No.A3/5475/2008, dated 25.02.2008 and was issued

ownership certificate vide ROC No.E/7/30545/2008, dated

05.03.2008. When there was interference from the respondent,

suit for perpetual injunction is filed. The case of the respondent

is that he has purchased 175 sq.yds. under an Agreement of

sale from the vendor of appellant herein and he is in possession

of his part of the suit schedule property by constructing a wall

separating 350 sq.yds. into 175 sq.yds. each. Since he is working

at Singareni Colleries, the appellant herein took advantage and

got his name mutated for the entire extent in his name .

Further, in the absence of the respondent, the property was

dismantled and therefore, a complaint is given to the police in

Crime No.35 of 2008.

4. Upon considering the case of both the parties, the

learned Trial Court dismissed the suit on the premise that the

appellant herein has approached the Court with unclean hands

as there was no mention about the existence of a wall

separating the 350 sq.yds. into 175 sq.yds. each dividing the

property into two equal halves between the appellant and

respondent. Further, it is observed that the vendor of the

appellant has first executed an Agreement of sale in favour of

the respondent and then executed a registered sale deed in

favour of the appellant and said fact is not mentioned. On the

basis of said ground of suppression of facts, the discretionary

relief of perpetual injunction is denied. Aggrieved by the same,

the First Appeal is preferred before the First Appellate Court.

The learned First Appellate Court upon examining the

evidence adduced by the parties on record before the learned

Trial Court also concluded that there is an admission by the

appellant as PW1 that he is not in possession of the entire

extent of the suit schedule property but is in possession of only

175 sq.yds. of land. Further, there is suppression of existence

of compound wall in the suit schedule property and therefore,

confirmed the finding of the learned Trial Court with regard to

the suppression of facts and thus, dismissed the appeal

confirming the judgment and decree passed by the learned Trial

court.

5. Aggrieved by the concurrent judgments of the learned

Trial Court and the learned First Appellate Court, the present

Second Appeal is preferred raising the following substantial

questions of law:

1. Both the Courts below gave inconsistent judgments wherein the judgment of the First Appellate Court and the Trial Court are on the basis of entirely different points for consideration.

2. Both the Courts below have ignored the cardinal principle of law that in an injunction suit, the defendant who deliberately violated the interim injunction order of the trial Court and trespassed into suit schedule property.

6. During arguments at the stage of admission, the

learned counsel for the appellant referred to the boundaries

mentioned in Ex.A1 Registered sale deed bearing document

No.1099 of 2008, dated 16.02.2008 executed by one V. Jagan

Mohan Reddy in favour of the appellant for 350 sq.yds of land

with boundaries consisting of East: H.No.1-9-996 of

M. Chandramouli, West: House of Ismail in H.No.1-9-998,

North: House of Farveen Sultana in H.No.1-9-101-4/3 and

South: 30 ft. wide road, whereas, Ex.B2 Agreement of sale

dated 29.08.2003 under which the respondent is claiming

ownership over 175 sq.yds. of land has boundaries consisting

of East: Road, West: Open place, North: House of vendor and

South: Open place of Rajaiah. Since the boundaries are totally

different, it is argued that the property of the respondent is

different from that of the property of the appellant and

therefore, both the learned Trial Court and the First Appellate

Court have committed error in dismissing the suit.

7. In the Second Appeal, photograph dated 07.03.2008 is

filed to show that there are three rooms in existence in the suit

schedule property and another photograph is filed showing the

property with a wall in between, which runs from North to

South. On the basis of the boundaries shown in Ex.A1 sale

deed dated 16.02.2008 and Ex.B2 Agreement of Sale dated

29.08.2003, it is argued that the property of the respondent is

completely different and not connected with the suit schedule

property. Irrespective of the fact that there is discrepancy in the

boundaries, the evidence of PW2 who is vendor of both the

appellant as well as the respondent identified the suit schedule

property. PW2 admitted executing registered sale deed in

favour of the appellant under Ex.A1 and execution of

Agreement of sale in favour of respondent under Ex.B2. In

view of the same, the identity of suit schedule property cannot

be disputed at this stage by the appellant.

8. Further, PW1 admitted about the existence of wall in

the suit schedule property. The said finding is reflected in the

judgment of the learned Trial Court at Paragraph No.15 and

the same is extracted and produced below:

15. .... However, in regard to the possession, the defendant pleaded that after purchase of property from PW-2 under agreement of sale, he constructed a wall by dividing the entire suit schedule property into two half. In this regard, PW-2 was confronted with the photographs i.e. Ex.B-1 and the he admitted that the property as reflected in the photographs is the suit schedule property herein, but according to him, there exist no wall intervening the property and that he does not know who constructed the said wall.

Contrary to the evidence of PW-2, PW-1 deposed in his cross examination that there exist a wall intervening the suit schedule property and that the said wall was constructed by him."

9. When there is evidence by PW2 about the existence of

suit schedule property, denial of existence of a compound wall

separating the suit schedule property into two halves and

contrary evidence is given by the appellant himself admitting

existence of a compound wall, it is not open for the appellant

to deny the existence of a compound wall across the property

at the stage of Second Appeal. When there is admission about

the existence of a compound wall running across the suit

schedule property and there is no explanation for its existence

on the part of the appellant, the conclusion of the learned Trial

Court and the learned Appellate Court is that he is in

occupation of only half of the suit schedule property and

therefore have arrived at concurrent findings about the

appellant approaching the Court with unclean hands i.e.,

suppression with respect to existence of wall and possession

over only half of the total extent of suit schedule property.

10. This Court examined the findings of fact given by both

the Courts and does not find any infirmity to interfere with the

said findings. Therefore, the substantial questions of law raised

with respect to first and second points above are not tenable as

per judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India in

Hemavathi v. v. Hombegowda 1, wherein, it is stipulated that

a Second Appeal is maintainable only when there are

substantial questions of law to be considered. As such, there

are no merits in the present Second Appeal and the same is

liable to be dismissed at the stage of admission.

11. In the result, the Second Appeal is dismissed at the

stage of admission. No costs.

Miscellaneous applications, if any, pending in this

Second Appeal, shall stand closed.

_________________ RENUKA YARA, J Date: 22.09.2025 gvl

(2025) 5 SCC 442