Telangana High Court

Mohammad Saleem Khan vs Surjeeth Kaur on 16 September, 2025

         THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA
                             AND
          THE HON'BLE JUSTICE GADI PRAVEEN KUMAR

               CIVIL MISCELLANEOUS APPEAL No.332 of 2025

Mr.A.P.Suresh, learned counsel appearing for the appellant.

Mr.J.Prabhakar Rao, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.1-3 and 6.

Mr.Avinash Desai, learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.4 - 5.


JUDGMENT:

(Per Hon'ble Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya)

The present Civil Miscellaneous Appeal ('CMA') arises out of an

order dated 29.07.2025 passed by the learned Principal District Judge

at Siddipet ('Trial Court') in I.A.No.88 of 2025 in O.S.No.3 of 2025 filed

by the appellant herein.

2. The appellant/plaintiff filed O.S.No.3 of 2025 seeking perpetual

injunction restraining the respondents/defendants from interfering

with the appellant's peaceful possession and enjoyment of the

agricultural land in Sy.Nos.89/E, 89/EE and 89/GHA/2 situated at

Mulugu Mandal, Siddipet District. The appellant/ plaintiff filed

I.A.No.88 of 2025 in the said Suit seeking temporary injunction

restraining the respondents/defendants from interfering with or

encroaching upon the petition schedule property till disposal of the

main Suit.

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3. By the impugned order, the Trial Court dismissed the

appellant's IA and vacated the earlier order of ad-interim injunction

granted to the appellant on 04.02.2025.

4. From the submissions made on behalf of the appellant and the

respondents, it appears that the respondents had filed a Suit

(O.S.No.14 of 2002) which was decreed in favour of the respondents

by judgment and decree dated 30.12.2010. The respondents

thereafter filed E.P.No.3 of 2017 seeking implementation of the

judgment and decree dated 30.12.2010 passed in O.S.No.14 of 2002.

The Station House Officer, Mulugu was directed to provide police

protection to the respondents.

5. The respondents claim to be the owners of the land which is

adjacent to the suit schedule property in the appellant's later Suit

(O.S.No.3 of 2025). The appellant filed a Writ Petition before this

Court in 2024 (W.P.No.29214 of 2024) for restraining the respondents

therein from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the

appellant's land in Sy.Nos.89/E, 89/EE, 89/GHA/2 and 89/CHA. The

appellant's Writ Petition was disposed of on 24.10.2024 by a learned

Single Judge of this Court by restraining the respondents therein from

interfering with the peaceful possession of the writ petitioner (the

appellant herein) over the land in Sy.No.89. The appellant was given

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protection for as long as the appellant's name was reflected in the

Revenue Records as the absolute owner and possessor.

6. The respondent Nos.4 and 5 (in the CMA) filed a Review of the

order dated 24.10.2024 passed in W.P.No.29241 of 2024 and the

same is pending as on date. The appellant thereafter filed O.S.No.3 of

2025 wherein the appellant was initially granted ad-interim protection

on 04.02.2025. The IA filed was finally dismissed by the impugned

order dated 29.07.2025.

7. Learned counsel for the appellant submits that the appellant

purchased the schedule property in 1996 and continues to be the

owner of the said property. Counsel submits that the right and title of

the appellant to the suit schedule property was evident from the

documents filed before the Trial Court. Counsel also relies on the

order of the learned Single Judge passed in W.P.No.29214 of 2024

restraining the respondents therein from interfering with the schedule

property.

8. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.1 - 3

and 6 places documents to show that the suit schedule property in

O.S.No.3 of 2025 (filed by the appellant) was entirely different from the

suit schedule property in O.S.No.14 of 2002 (filed by the respondents).

Senior Counsel submits that the appellant hence did not have any

case to restrain the respondents from interfering with the land in the

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later Suit (O.S.No.3 of 2025). Senior Counsel further submits that the

respondents have been in possession of the schedule property in the

earlier Suit (O.S.No.14 of 2002) since 1994.

9. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the respondent Nos.4 and

5 submits that the appellant was guilty of suppression of material

facts in failing to disclose either the Writ Petition and the order passed

therein or the Review Application filed by the respondents. Senior

Counsel submits that the appellant filed the second Suit in 2025 only

after obtaining the order in the Writ Petition.

10. We have considered the respective submissions made on behalf

of the parties and perused the documents on record.

11. The impugned order clearly states that the appellant

suppressed material facts with regard to the Writ Petition together

with the fact that the respondents were not made parties to the Writ

Petition. The Trial Court further states that the appellant also did not

disclose the fact of the respondents filing a Review Application against

the order passed in the Writ Petition. The impugned order further

records that the Field Assistant/Court Bailiff had handed over the

possession of Ac.22-00 guntas of land in Sy.No.89/O and

Sy.No.89/OO to the decree holders in the earlier Suit (the respondent

Nos.4 to 7 herein) pursuant to which the respondents filed Execution

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Petition including the remaining land to the extent of Ac.11-00 guntas

in Sy.No.89/OU.

12. More important, the Trial Court further came to a finding that

the appellant failed to establish that the appellant was in possession

of the suit schedule property at the time of filing of the Suit. The Trial

Court also found that a few of the respondents were in possession of

the suit schedule property. The Trial Court accordingly proceeded to

dismiss the IA on the ground that the appellant failed to make out a

prima facie case or show balance of convenience in his favour or

irreparable injury on his part for grant of temporary injunction.

Therefore, we do not find any error in the impugned order.

13. The fact that the appellant's insistence of ownership of suit

schedule property which is denied by the respondents and the

respondents' contention that the suit schedule property in the two

Suits is entirely different necessitates that the contested facts to be

determined in a full-fledged trial. The fact of disputed ownership or

title cannot be determined in an interlocutory application until and

unless the applicant provides clear and irrefutable evidence of

ownership and possession of the suit schedule property. Besides, the

appellant is also guilty of suppression of material facts which would

be evident from the list of exhibits marked for the appellant/plaintiff

before the Trial Court. The exhibits do not disclose either the Writ

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Petition or the Review Application. The respondents brought these

documents before the Trial Court.

14. The conduct of the party invoking jurisdiction of the Court must

be free from blame since the grant of interlocutory injunction is an

equitable relief. These considerations assume importance where a

party seeks injunction under Order XXXIX Rules 1 and 2 of The Code

of Civil Procedure, 1908: Gujarat Bottling Co. Ltd. Vs. Coca Cola Co. 1.

Moreover, the litigant who approaches the Court is bound to produce

all the documents executed by him/her which are relevant to the

litigation and withholding of a vital document would amount to

playing fraud on the Court as well as on the opposing party:

S.P.Chengal Varaya Naidu Vs. Jagannath 2. Rame Gowda (D) by Lrs.

Vs. M.Varadappa Naidu (D) by Lrs. 3 involved a clear finding that the

plaintiff/respondent was in settled possession of the suit property

which was being obstructed by the defendant/appellant who claimed

ownership over it. The Supreme Court accordingly held that the

plaintiff was entitled to protect his property unless dispossessed by

due process of law. Rame Gowda is hence not relevant to the present

case.