State Of Telangana Rep By Pp, Hyd vs Nellikondi Shiva Mallesh, Addakal ...
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Telangana High Court

State Of Telangana Rep By Pp, Hyd vs Nellikondi Shiva Mallesh, Addakal ... on 27 November, 2025

       THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE J. SREENIVAS RAO

                CRIMINAL APPEAL No.429 OF 2017

JUDGMENT:

This Criminal Appeal has been filed by the State, aggrieved by the

judgment passed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Mahabubnagar,

in S.C.No.313 of 2013, dated 07.08.2015, whereunder respondent

No.1/accused No.1 was acquitted for the offences punishable under

Sections 417, 420 and 376 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short

'IPC') and respondent Nos.2 to 6/accused Nos.2 to 6 were acquitted for

the offences punishable under Sections 417, 420 and 376 r/w 109 of the

IPC.

2. The case of prosecution in brief is that the complainant and the

accused belong to Shakapur village and reside in the same locality. The

first accused frequently visited the complainant's house and developed

intimacy with her. For about one year prior to the filing of the report, he

had sexual intercourse with her by inducing her with false assurances of

marriage, resulting in her pregnancy. When she insisted on marriage, he

refused. Meanwhile, accused Nos. 2 to 6, the family members of the first

accused, began searching for other marriage alliances for him. When the

complainant approached the village elders, the accused refused to marry

her and asked her to terminate the pregnancy in exchange for money.

Thus, the accused committed the alleged offences.

3. Heard Mr.M.Vivekananda Reddy, learned Assistant Public

Prosecutor for the appellant/State and Mr.C.Sharan Reddy, learned

counsel for respondents/accused Nos.1 to 6.

4. Learned Assistant Public Prosecutor submitted that the trial Court,

without properly appreciating the oral and documentary evidence adduced

by the prosecution, erroneously acquitted respondents/accused Nos.1 to 6

of the above said offences. The prosecution had proved beyond reasonable

doubt that respondent No.1/accused No.1 committed the offences. He

further submitted that accused No.1 induced PW.1 into a physical

relationship under a false promise of marriage. As a result of this

relationship, PW-1 conceived, and the DNA test reveals that respondent

No.1/accused No.1 is the biological father of the child. The relationship

between respondent No.1/accused No.1 and PW-1 was within the

knowledge of respondents/accused Nos.2 to 6, and they supported

respondent No.1/accused No.1 and they have not taken any steps to

perform the marriage between respondent No.1/accused No.1 and PW-1.

Therefore, the ingredients of the above said offences are attracted against

respondents/accused Nos.1 to 6. Despite this, the trial Court acquitted

respondents/accused Nos.1 to 6. Hence, the impugned judgment passed by

the learned Sessions Judge is contrary to the settled principles of law and

is liable to be set aside, and the respondents/accused Nos.1 to 6 are liable

to be convicted for the above said offences.

5. Per contra, learned counsel for respondents/accused Nos.1 to 6

vehemently contended that the relationship between respondent

No.1/accused No.1 and PW.1 was consensual relationship. PW.1 herself

admitted in her evidence that prior to the alleged incident, she was already

married to one Nagaraju and had not obtained a divorce from him.

Therefore, when the marital relationship between PW-1 and Nagaraju was

still subsisting, the question of respondent No.1/accused No.1 giving

promise of marriage does not arise. In the absence of obtaining decree of

divorce from the competent Court, the alleged allegation of PW.1 that

accused No.1 induced her by making a false promise of marriage is not

permissible under law.

6. He further submitted that the learned Sessions Judge, after properly

evaluating the oral and documentary evidence adduced by the prosecution,

rightly came to conclusion that the relationship between PW.1 and

respondent No.1/accused No.1 was consensual relationship and the

ingredients of Section 376 of the IPC are not attracted. Consequently, the

trial Court rightly acquitted respondents/accused Nos.1 to 6 for the above

said offences. Hence, there are no grounds to interfere with the well

considered judgment of the learned Sessions Judge, and therefore, the

appeal filed by the State is liable to be dismissed.

7. Having considered the rival submissions made by the respective

parties and after perusal of the impugned judgment passed by the trial

Court, it reveals that PW.1, in her evidence, specifically stated that her

marriage had been performed with one Nagaraju and she had not obtained

divorce from him. She also admitted that she did not inform the

subsistence of her marriage to the Investigating Officer during the course

of investigation. Even according to the evidence of PW-1 as on the date of

the alleged offence, both PW.1 and respondent No.1/accused No.1 were

majors. The learned Sessions Judge, after a thorough examination of the

evidence adduced by the prosecution, rightly came to the conclusion that

the marriage of PW.1 with Nagaraju was still subsisting and that her

relationship with respondent No.1/accused No.1 was consensual

relationship. Hence, the ingredients of the above said offences are not

attracted.

8. It is very much relevant to mention that the Hon'ble Supreme Court

in Kunal Chatterjee v. The State of West Bengal and others 1, held that

when a marriage is subsisting, a subsequent physical relationship between

the two with consent would not amount to rape. This principle was

established in Prithivirajan v. State 2, Pramod Suryabhan Pawar v. State

of Maharashtra3 and Maheshwar Tigga v. State of Jharkhand 4 by the

Hon'ble Apex Court.

9. In cases of acquittal, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Ravi Sharma v.

State (Government of NCT of Delhi) and another 5, held that while

dealing with an appeal against acquittal, the appellant Court has to

consider whether the trial Court's view can be termed as a possible one,

particularly when evidence on record has been analyzed. The reason is

that an order of acquittal adds up to the presumption of innocence in

favour of the accused. Thus, the appellate court has to be relatively slow in

reversing the order of the trial court rendering acquittal.

10. In Ghurey Lal v. State of Uttar Pradesh 6 the Hon'ble Supreme Court

after referring to several Judgments regarding the settled principles of law

SPL (crl) No.7004 of 2025, dt.29.07.2025

2025 SCC OnLine SC 696

(2019) 9 SCC 608

(2020) 10 SCC 108

(2022) 8 Supreme Court Cases 536

(2008) 10 Supreme Court Cases 45

and the powers of appellate Court in reversing the order of acquittal, held

at para 70, as follows:

"70. In the light of the above, the High Court and other appellate Courts should follow the well-settled principles crystallized by number of Judgments if it is going to overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal."

1. The appellate court may only overrule or otherwise disturb the trial court's acquittal if it has "very substantial and compelling reasons" for doing so.

A number of instances arise in which the appellate court would have "very substantial and compelling reasons" to discard the trial court's decision. "Very substantial and compelling reasons" exist when:

i) The trial court's conclusion with regard to the facts is palpably wrong:

ii) The trial court's decision was based on an erroneous view of law;

iii) The trial court's judgment is likely to result in "grave miscarriage of justice";

iv) The entire approach of the trial court in dealing with the evidence was patently illegal;

v) The trial court's judgment was manifestly unjust and unreasonable;

vi) The trial court has ignored the evidence or misread the material evidence or has ignored material documents like dying declarations/report of the ballistic expert, etc.

vii) This list is intended to be illustrative, not exhaustive.

2. The appellate court must always give proper weight and consideration o the findings of the trial court.