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Mohd Mir Laiq Ali vs The Government Of Andhra Pradesh,
2025 Latest Caselaw 6294 Tel

Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 6294 Tel
Judgement Date : 6 November, 2025

Telangana High Court

Mohd Mir Laiq Ali vs The Government Of Andhra Pradesh, on 6 November, 2025

  IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA
                      WP.No.12081 of 2014

Between:

Mohd. Mir Laiq Ali,
S/o Mir Iqbal Ali
                                                     ... Petitioner
And

The State of Telangana,
Department of Municipal Administration
and Urban Development, reptd by its
Principal Secretary, Hyderabad and two others.
                                                    ...Respondents

JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON 06.11.2025

HON'BLE JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY

1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers :         Yes
   may be allowed to see the Judgment?

2. Whether the copies of judgment may be

   marked to Law Reporters/Journals?       :       Yes

3. Whether her Lordship wishes to

 see the fair copy of the Judgment?            :   Yes



                    _______________________________________
                     JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY
                                  2
                                                               LNA, J
                                                   WP.No.12081 of 2014


    HON'BLE JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY
                      WP.No.12081 of 2014

% 06.11.2025

Between:

# Mohd. Mir Laiq Ali,
S/o Mir Iqbal Ali
                                                      .... Petitioner

And:
$ The State of Telangana,
Department of Municipal Administration
and Urban Development, reptd by its
Principal Secretary, Hyderabad and two others.
                                                    ....Respondents
< Gist:
> Head Note:

! Counsel for the petitioner: Sri Surendra Desai

^ Counsel for Respondents: Sri G.Madhusudhan Reddy

? Cases Referred:


   1. 2001 (2) ALT 662 (FB)

   2. Order dated 20.01.2015 in WP.No.37983 of 2014

   3. (2003) 2 SCC 111

   4. (2022) 5 AIR Bom R 803
                                    3
                                                                  LNA, J
                                                      WP.No.12081 of 2014


HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY

                       WP.No.12081 of 2014

ORDER:

This Writ Petition is filed to issue a Writ of Mandamus

declaring the action of the respondents in proposing to acquire the

land of the petitioner to an extent of 126.25 square meters in Plot

No.135, situated at Masid Banda in Sy.No.192 of Kondapur

Village, Serilingampalli Mandal, Ranga Reddy District, vide

proceedings No.RW/TPS/Cir-XI/GHMC/2012, dated 01.06.2013,

of respondent No.3, without following the procedure prescribed

under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 (for brevity 'the L.A.Act')

read with A.P. Amendment Act, 2008, as illegal and arbitrary and

consequently, to direct the respondents-Corporation to pay

compensation to the petitioner for the land acquired by initiating

proceedings under the L.A. Act.

2. Heard Sri Suderndra Desai learned Counsel for the petitioner

and Sri G. Madhusudhan Reddy learned Standing Counsel for

GHMC.

3. The case of the petitioner, briefly stated, as narrated in the

affidavit filed in support of the Writ Petition, is that he is the owner

LNA, J

and occupier of residential Plot admeasuring 550 square yards

bearing Nos.128 and 135, situated in Sy.No.192 (Masid Banda) of

Kondapur Village, Serilingampalli Mandal, Ranga Reddy District,

having purchased the same from one Kodicherla Mallesha under

registered sale deed, dated 25.07.1991. While so, respondent No.3

issued a letter dated 01.06.2013, to the petitioner stating that in the

proposed road widening from HCU Bus stop to Botanical gardens

via Masjeed Banda, the plot of the petitioner to an extent of 112.8

square meters would be affected, for which, he would be given

concessions as prescribed in GO.Ms.No.279, Municipal

Administration, dated 01.04.2008. That the petitioner, having

found that the concessions given as per the said GO are not

beneficial to him, got issued a legal notice dated 05.07.2013 calling

upon the respondents to follow the procedure contemplated under

the L.A. Act for the purpose of acquiring his land said to be

affected in road widening. But, as there was no response from the

respondents, the petitioner again got issued another notice dated

13.01.2014, however, there was no response from the respondents.

It is further averred that on 22.02.2014, the petitioner found some

digging mark and cementing work in his land and therefore, he

LNA, J

filed the present Writ Petition challenging the action of the

respondents in encroaching his land without following due process

of law.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the

petitioner is the owner of the subject property and a part of his land

is said to be affected in road widening. He further submitted that

petitioner cannot be forced or compelled to accept for acquisition

of his property under the guise of a Government Order, without

paying compensation to him as per the prevailing market value by

duly following the procedure contemplated under the L.A. Act.

5. In support of his contentions, learned counsel for petitioner

relied upon the judgment of the erstwhile High Court of Andhra

Pradesh in M/s Ushodaya Publications, Eeenadu Complex,

Hyderabad Vs. Commissioner, MCH and another 1.

6. In the said judgment, the question that fell for consideration

is whether the consent given by the landlady for acquisition of the

property without giving notice or opportunity to the lessee is

binding on the lessee and the said point was answered in negative.

2001 (2) ALT 662 (FB)

LNA, J

7. The facts of the said case and the facts of the present case are

entirely distinct and hence, the ratio laid down in the said judgment

is not applicable to the instant case.

8. Learned counsel for petitioner also relied upon the judgment

dated 20.01.2015 passed by the erstwhile High Court of Andhra

Pradesh in W.P.No.37983 of 2014 {Usha Rani Vs. State of

Andhra Pradesh, rep, by its Principal Secretary and three others}

wherein, a learned single Judge allowed Writ Petition directing the

respondent therein-Visakhapatnam Urban Development Authority

to initiate proceedings as per the provisions of the Right to Fair

Compensation and Transparency in Land Acquisition,

Rehabilitation and Resettlement Act, 2013, for acquisition of the

entire land owned by the petitioner therein for road widening and

pay compensation to her, while observing as hereunder:-

"Section 146 of the GHMC Act contemplates acquisition of immovable property by agreement between the Commissioner and the owner of the land in the event the said land is required by the Corporation; and when he is unable to do so, Section 147 of the GHMC Act provides for acquisition of the land under the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 as amended from time to time. The provision in Rule 16(a) of the Rules, which states that unless the area affected in road widening as per the

LNA, J

statutory plan/master plan road or Circulation network is surrendered free of cost, no development permission shall be given, in my opinion, is ultra vires provisions of the GHMC Act. Rule 16(a) of the Rules is not in accordance with the GHMC Act, and is contrary to Section 146/Section 147 thereof. It is settled law that in case of conflict between delegated legislation and its parent substantive Act, the latter would prevail (See Novva Ads vs. Deptt. of Municipal Admn. And Water Supply [4] ). Therefore, the provision requiring land owner to surrender land free of cost merely because a portion of the land owned by him is shown as road affected in a statutory plan/master plan or circulation network or as required to be widened as per road development plan is ultra vires provision of the GHMC Act. Such compulsory deprivation of property without paying any compensation violates Articles 14 and 300-A of the Constitution of India. The respondents' conduct amounts to coercing the petitioner to part with her property without acquisition. In my opinion, it would be unjust to make the petitioner to suffer in this manner."

9. On the other hand, learned Standing Counsel for the

respondents-Corporation contended that the Government would

pay concessions to the petitioner as per GO.Ms.No.279, Municipal

Administration Department, dated 01.04.2008, to the extent of his

land affected in road widening and therefore, the petitioner would

not be put to any loss financially. He further submitted that the

LNA, J

respondents have in fact addressed a letter dated 01.06.2013 to the

petitioner to the said effect and therefore, the action of the

respondents proposing to acquire the petitioner's land for road

widening cannot be said to be illegal and arbitrary and hence, the

Writ Petition is liable to be dismissed.

10. Apropos the submissions made by learned counsel for both

the parties, the point that arises for consideration is whether the

modes of acquisition provided under the provisions of the Greater

Hyderabad Municipal Corporation Act, 1955, are at the choice of

either of the parties or only of the acquiring authority?

11. Section 146 of GHMC Act provides for acquisition of

immovable property required for public purpose by agreement. The

word 'agreement' denotes the express agreement between the

Corporation, represented by the Commissioner, and the land

owner/s thereof, with regard to acceptance of offer of TDR/FSI by

the land owner/s concerned.

12. Section 147 of the GHMC Act envisages the procedure to be

followed when immovable property cannot be acquired by

agreement. The said Section postulates that whenever the

Commissioner, representing the Corporation, is unable to acquire

LNA, J

the immovable property by agreement with the land owner/s

concerned, the same shall be acquired by following the provisions

of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894.

13. For interpretation of Sections 146 and 147 of the GHMC

Act, the language employed in the said provisions needs to be

considered for knowing the legislative intent. The language

employed in the aforesaid provisions is plain and unambiguous, in

which case, the scope of legislation or the intention of the

legislature cannot be enlarged or changed (See the judgment of the

Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhavnagar University Vs. Palitana

Sugar Mill (Petitioner) Ltd 2).

14. In the case on hand, the respondent-Corporation proposed to

acquired the land belonging to the petitioner by giving him the

concessions as provided for in GO.Ms.No.279, MA, dated

01.04.2008, however, the petitioner declined to accept the offer of

respondents-Corporation with regard to such concessions and

called upon the respondents-Corporation to follow the procedure

contemplated under Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for acquiring the

land belonging to him. Thus, there is no consensus between the

respondent-Corporation and the petitioner-land owner for invoking

(2003) 2 SCC 111

LNA, J

Section 146 of GHMC Act. In other words, there is no express

agreement between the petitioner and the respondent-Corporation,

whereunder the petitioner accepted the offer made by the

respondent-Corporation to extend the concessions as provided in

GO.Ms.No.279, dated 01.04.2008. Thus, the two essential

requirements, i.e., offer and acceptance, to constitute an agreement

are not satisfied in the instant case, which empowers the

respondent-Corporation to invoke Section 146 of the GHMC Act.

15. When a similar issue fell for consideration before a larger

Bench of High Court of Bombay in Shree Vinayak Builders and

Developers, Nagpur Vs. State of Maharashtra and others3, it was

held that the acquisition under Section 126(1)(a) of the

Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966, has to be by

consensus between both the parties and not only at the option of the

Acquiring authority.

16. Section 146 of the GHMC Act is akin to Section 126(1) (a)

of the Maharashtra Regional and Town Planning Act, 1966 and

therefore, the ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgment squarely

applies to the case on hand.

(2022) 5 AIR Bom R 803

LNA, J

17. In the light of the foregoing reasons, discussion and the law

laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Bhavnagar

University's case (cited supra) and the judgment of larger Bench of

High Court of Bombay in Shree Vinayak Builders and

Developers, Nagpur's case (cited supra), this Court is of the

considered opinion that for invoking Section 146 of the GHMC

Act, a consensus between the respondents-Corporation and

petitioner-land owner is mandatory and it is not at the option of the

acquiring authority alone. Therefore, the petitioner cannot be

foisted upon to accept the concessions provided for in

GOMs.No.279, dated 01.04.2008 and the respondent-Corporation

has to necessarily follow the due procedure contemplated under the

Land Acquisition Act, 1894, for acquiring the subject land

belonging to the petitioner.

18. Subject to the above, this Writ Petition is allowed.

19. Miscellaneous petitions pending, if any, shall stand closed.

No costs.

___________________________________ LAXMI NARAYANA ALISHETTY, J

Date: 06.11.2025 dr

 
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