Telangana High Court
V.Pratap Reddy vs Samala Prasad on 11 June, 2025
HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT
HYDERABAD
*****
APPEAL SUIT No.449 of 2008
BETWEEN
Vennam Pratap Reddy
... Appellant/Plaintiff
And
Samala Prasad and others
... Respondents/Defendants
Date of Judgment Pronounced: 11.06.2025
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE K. SUJANA
1. Whether Reporters of Local newspapers
may be allowed to see the Judgments? (Yes/No)
2. Whether the copies of judgment may be (Yes/No)
marked to Law Reports/Journals?
3. Whether their Lordship/ Ladyship wish to (Yes/No)
see the fair copy of the Judgment?
_____________________
JUSTICE K. SUJANA
2
SKS,J
A.S.No.449 of 2008
* THE HON'BLE SMT. JUSTICE K. SUJANA
+ APPEAL SUIT No.449 OF 2008
% Dated 11.06.2025
BETWEEN
# Vennam Pratap Reddy
... Appellant/Plaintiff
And
$ Samala Prasad and others
... Respondents/Defendants
! Counsel for Petitioners: Tangeda Dayananda Rao
^ Counsel for respondents: Smt. N. Kamala
<GIST:
> HEAD NOTE:
? Cases referred
1. (2011) 6 SCC 555
2. 2010 (166) DLT 629
3. Civil Revision No.2417 of 2018
4. (1977) 1 SCC 379
5. 1940 SCC OnLine PC 26
6. 2024 INSC 744
7. 2024 INSC 724
3
SKS,J
A.S.No.449 of 2008
THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE K. SUJANA
APPEAL SUIT No.449 of 2008
JUDGMENT:
Challenging the judgment and decree dated 10.07.2003
passed in O.S.No.196 of 1999 by the learned II Additional
Senior Civil Judge, Warangal, the present appeal suit is filed.
2. The brief facts of the case are that the plaintiff filed a
suit against the defendant seeking specific performance of an
agreement for sale of a house bearing No.5-11-522/1 at
Naimnagar, Hanamkonda, or alternatively, return of the sale
consideration of Rs.2,37,500/- with interest. The plaintiff
alleged that the defendant, known to him since 1996, agreed
to sell the house to clear debts, received the full sale price over
time, and signed a sale agreement dated 15.03.1998 after
delivering possession. Despite assurances, the defendant
allegedly avoided executing a registered sale deed, prompting
the plaintiff to issue a legal notice. In contrast, the defendant
contended that he never agreed to sell the house, nor received
any sale consideration. Instead, he alleged that under
pressure from the plaintiff and others (who were creditors of a
SKS,J
finance company where the defendant worked), he was forced
to sign blank stamp papers and white papers, which were
later misused to fabricate the alleged sale agreement. The
defendant asserted that the plaintiff was misusing the signed
papers to claim ownership and that no actual transaction of
sale ever took place.
3. Basing on the above pleadings, the trial Court framed
four issues and on behalf of the plaintiffs i.e., PWs.1 to 4 were
examined and Ex.A1 to A10 are marked. DWs.1 to 4 are
examined and no documents were marked on behalf of the
defendants.
4. After examining the evidence, the trial Court, vide order
dated 10.07.2003, dismissed the suit hold that several
inconsistencies and deficiencies in the plaintiff's case. It was
noted that no receipts or proof of payment were produced, and
it was considered improbable that such a large amount was
paid in cash without documentation. The evidence also
revealed that signatures on the alleged agreement were
obtained under coercion related to disputes with the finance
company, corroborated by witnesses who supported the
defendant's version. The trial Court further observed that
SKS,J
corrections made in the sale agreement document (Ex.A1)
appeared suspicious. Consequently, the trial Court held that
the sale agreement was not genuine, that no sale
consideration was paid, and that the plaintiff was not entitled
to specific performance or return of the amount. Aggrieved
thereby, the present appeal suit is filed.
5. Heard Sri Tangeda Dayananda Rao, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the appellant as well as
Smt. N. Kamala, learned counsel appearing on behalf of the
respondents.
6. Learned counsel for the appellant submitted that the
judgment and decree of the trial Court is contrary to law,
weight of evidence, and probabilities of the case. He further
submitted that the trial Court failed to properly appreciate the
pleadings, oral and documentary evidence, and committed a
grave error in placing the initial burden of proof on the
appellant instead of the respondent, who alleged coercion and
fabrication of the document Ex.A1. He argued that once
execution and signature on Ex.A1 were admitted by the
respondent, the burden shifted onto the respondent to
establish that the document was obtained under coercion, as
SKS,J
per Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. Despite alleging
illegal detention and manipulation of signatures, the
respondent admittedly did not lodge any police complaint or
issue any notice denying Ex.A1 immediately, which, according
to the appellant, severely undermines the respondent's
defense.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the
trial Court drew unwarranted presumptions against the
appellant regarding non-production of receipts for the
payment of sale consideration, overlooking the fact that the
respondent never seriously disputed the possession and
payment arrangements post-Ex.A1. He further contended
that even after the alleged coercion, the respondent allowed
the appellant to pay municipal taxes and collect rents, which
was inconsistent with the claim of a fabricated transaction.
The counsel for the appellant criticized the trial Court for
placing undue reliance on the evidence of D.Ws. 2 to 4, whose
testimony was branded as concocted and self-serving. It was
urged that the erroneous approach regarding onus of proof
and the misappreciation of evidence led to a perverse
SKS,J
judgment. Therefore, he prayed the Court to set aside the
judgment of the trial Court by allowing this appeal suit.
8. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the
appellant relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Janak Dulari Devi and another v. Kapildeo Rai
and another 1, wherein in paragraph No.9, it is held as under:
"9. The first appellate court after analysing the
evidence held that the evidence was contrary to the
pleadings and therefore liable to be rejected. When
what is pleaded is not proved, or what is stated in
the evidence is contrary to the pleadings, the dictum
that no amount of evidence, contrary to the
pleadings, howsoever cogent, can be relied on,
would apply. The first appellate court also found
that there was no endorsement in the sale deed by
the Sub-Registrar about payment of Rs. 17,000 in
his presence, nor any separate receipt existed to
show the payment of Rs. 17,000 prior to the
preparation and the execution of the sale deed."
9. He further relied upon the judgment of High Court of
Delhi in Prakash Rattan lal v. Mankey Ram 2 , wherein in
paragraph Nos. and 5, it is held as under:
"4. The sole purpose of pleadings is to bind
the parties to a stand. When the plaintiff makes
certain allegations, the defendant is supposed to
(2011) 6 SCC 555
2010 (166) DLT 629
SKS,J
disclose his defence to each and every allegation
specifically and state true facts to the court and
once the facts are stated by both the parties, the
court has to frame issues and ask the parties to
lead evidence. It is settled law that the parties can
lead evidence limited to their pleadings and parties
while leading evidence cannot travel beyond
pleadings. If the parties are allowed to lead evidence
beyond pleadings then the sacrosancy of pleadings
comes to an end and the entire purpose of filing
pleadings also stand defeated. The other purpose
behind this is that no party can be taken by
surprise and new facts cannot be brought through
evidence which have not been stated by the
defendant in the written statement. The law
provides a procedure for amendment of the
pleadings and if there are any new facts which the
party wanted to bring on record, the party can
amend pleadings, but without amendment of
pleadings, a party cannot be allowed to lead
evidence beyond pleadings.
5. I am supported in this view by judgments of
Supreme Court in AIR (1975) 1 SCC 212; Harihar
Prasad Singh & Ors. Vs. Balmiki Prasad Singh
wherein the Supreme Court has held that evidence
adduced cannot travel beyond the pleadings. In AIR
(1987) 2 SCC 555; Ram Sarup Gupta by LRs Vs.
Bishun Narain Inter College & Ors., the Supreme
Court again reiterated that the evidence cannot
travel beyond the pleadings."
SKS,J
10. Further, he also relied upon the judgment of High Court
of Punjab and Haryana in Vivek Sharma v. Vani Sharma 3,
wherein in paragraph Nos.8 to 12, it is held as under:
"8. Order 6, Rule 2 CPC applies to the pleadings
only and the same cannot be extended to the stage
of evidence in the form of evidence for leading
examination-in-chief. Similarly Order 18, Rule 4
CPC does not apply to the facts of this case. The
pleadings made by the petitioner in para nos.2 and
7 to 10 in the petition under section 13 of the Hindu
Marriage Act would be tested by the Court with
reference to the affidavit in the form of examination-
in-chief. On being cross-examined by the
respondent, the trial Court would be at liberty to
take final call on merits.
9. The trial Court would be at liberty to appreciate
the relevancy, admissibility and genuineness of the
evidence on legal parameters, if the same is found to
be in consonance with the pleadings, the same can
be relied. If the evidence led by the petitioner is
found to be beyond pleadings, the same can be
eschewed by the Court.
10. The Hon'ble Apex Court in case of Bipin
Shantilal Panchal vs. State of Gujarat 2001 (1)
criminal RCR 859, has castigated the practice of
holding up trial on objections taken at the time of
tendering of documents in evidence and held such a
practice to be archaic practice. Though, the
aforesaid view was expressed in a criminal case but
the same was followed in civil cases also.
Civil Revision No.2147 of 2018
SKS,J
11. Leading of evidence at this stage would not
crystallize any substantial right in favour of the
petitioner. The execution of document with the
endorsement of objection by the respondent would
be tested at the threshold of admissibility, validity
and genuineness of the documents in terms of its
execution and its nature can be considered at a
later stage. Even though, there is no provision in
law for de-exhibiting documents already exhibited in
evidence but if the execution of an document is
objected to then the same has to be answered in
terms of its admissibility at a later stage and in the
event of failure to prove its execution, the evidence
can be eschewed by the Court.
12. For the reasons recorded hereinabove, the
impugned order dated 29.04.2017 passed by the
Addl. District Judge, Amritsar is set aside. However,
the trial Court would be at liberty to decide the
relevancy, authenticity and genuineness of the plea
taken in the examination-in-chief at the appropriate
stage. If the evidence is found to be in consonance
with the pleadings, the same can be relied, however
if the evidence is found to be not in consonance with
the pleadings, the same can be eschewed in
accordance with law."
11. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondent
contended that the appeal is devoid of merit and that the trial
Court rightly dismissed the suit after thoroughly considering
the evidence. He further contended that the respondent never
intended to sell the suit schedule property and that the
alleged agreement of sale (Ex.A1) was fabricated by the
SKS,J
appellant by misusing blank signed papers obtained under
duress when the respondent was unlawfully detained by the
appellant and others. He submitted that the appellant failed to
produce any convincing evidence showing actual payment of
consideration, and that it was highly improbable for such a
huge sum of Rs.2,37,500/- to be paid without a single receipt
or acknowledgment.
12. Learned counsel for the respondents further submitted
that the conduct of the appellant, including discrepancies
regarding possession and the delay in asserting rights,
coupled with the respondent's continuous possession and
later sale of the property to a third party, clearly disproves the
claim of the appellant and that the trial Court rightly gave
credence to the testimonies of D.Ws.2 to 4, who corroborated
the version of coercion and fabrication. Further, learned
counsel pointed out that the appellant had misled the Court
by misrepresenting his residential address, thus casting
serious doubt on his version. Therefore, he prayed the Court
to dismiss the appeal suit.
13. In support of his submissions, learned counsel for the
respondents relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
SKS,J
Court in Seth Loonkaran Sethiya and others v. Mr. Ivan E.
John and Others 4, wherein in paragraph No.23, it is held as
under:
"23. Question 5 : Before proceeding to determine
this question, it would be well to advert to the legal
position bearing on the matter. As aptly stated in
para 1378 of Volume 12 of Halsbury's Laws of
England (Fourth Edition)
"if an alteration (by erasure, interlineation, or
otherwise) is made in a material part of a deed, after
its execution, by or with the consent of any party to
or person entitled under it, but without the consent
of the party or parties liable under it, the deed is
rendered void from the time of the alteration so as
to prevent the person who has made or authorised
the alteration, and those claiming under him, from
putting the deed in suit to enforce against any party
bound by it, who did not consent to the alteration,
any obligation, covenant, or promise thereby
undertaken or made.
24. A material alteration, according to this
authoritative work, is one which varies the rights,
liabilities, or legal position of the parties as
ascertained by the deed in its original state, or
otherwise varies the legal effect of the instrument as
originally expressed, or reduces to certainty some
provision which was originally unascertained and as
such void, or which may otherwise prejudice the
party bound by the deed as originally executed.
(1977) 1 SCC 379
SKS,J
25. The effect of making such an alteration without
the consent of the party bound is exactly the same
as that of cancelling the deed.
26. To the same effect are the observations made by
the Privy Council in Nathu Lal v. Musammat Gomti
[AIR 1940 PC 160 : 67 IA 318] ."
14. He further relied upon the Judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Nathu Lal and Ors v. Musammat Gomti
Kuar and Ors 5, wherein the relevant paragraphs are extracted
hereunder:
"The rule relating to the effect of material
alterations in a deed made after its execution, by or
with the consent of any party thereto, as it prevails
in English Courts, can be briefly summarised as
follows:-
"If an alteration (by erasure, interlineation or
otherwise) is made in a material part of a deed after
its execution, by or with the consent of any party
thereto or person entitled thereunder, but without
the consent of the party or parties liable thereunder,
the deed is thereby made void. The avoidance
however is not ab initio or so as to nullify any
conveyancing effect which the deed has alreadyhad;
but only operates as from the time of such
alteration and so as to prevent the person who has
made or authorised the alteration and those
claiming under him, from putting the deed in suit to
enforce, against any party bound thereby who did
1940 SCC OnLine PC 26
SKS,J
not consent to the alteration, any obligation,
covenant or promise thereby undertaken or made.
A material alteration is one which varies the
rights, liabilities, or legal position of the parties
ascertained by the deed in its original state or
otherwise varies the legal effect of the instrument as
originally expressed, or reduces to certainty some
provision which was originally unascertained and as
such void, or may otherwise prejudice the party
bound by the deed as originally executed.
The effect of making such an alteration without
the consent of the party bound is exactly the same
as that of cancelling the deed. The avoidance of the
deed is not retrospective and does not revest or
reoonvey any estate or interest in property which
passed under it. And the deed may be put in
evidence to prove that such estate or interest so
passed or for any other purpose than to maintain an
action to enforce some agreement therein
contained."*
Is there anything in the principle or origin of this
rule which makes it inapplicable to conditions
prevailing in India? Their Lordships have no
difficulty in answering the question in the negative.
The rule is based on "great good sense." It is
dictated by public policy and is independent of
considerations of clime or race. It is consistent with
the principles of equity and good conscience which
have generally prevailed in India, unless they
conflicted with Hindu or Mahommedan law. In their
Lordships' opinion, there is no such conflict and
there is no reason why the rule should not be made
applicable to India.
SKS,J
Their Lordships are not therefore surprised to find
that the rule has in fact been adopted in Indian
decisions which are numerous. It is enough to refer
to a few, one from each of the important provinces."
15. He further relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Lakha Singh v. Balwinder Singh and anr6,
wherein in paragraph No.27, it is held as under:
"27. At this stage, a very crucial fact which is
noticeable from the disputed agreement needs to be
highlighted. It is not in dispute that the stamp
papers were not purchased by the appellant-
defendant and rather Amarjeet Singh was the
person who purchased the same. The document was
typed out in Gurmukhi language and the photostat
copy thereof is available on record. A visual overview
of the disputed agreement would show that it runs
into three pages. The signature of the respondent-
plaintiff, and the thumb impression of the
appellant-defendant are marked only on the last
page thereof. The first and second pages of the
agreement, do not bear the signature of the
respondent-plaintiff or the thumb impression of the
appellant-defendant. There exist significant blank
spaces at the foot of the first two pages below the
transcription typed out on these two pages. These
observations give rise to a strong inference fortifying
the contention of the appellant-defendant's counsel
that the thumb impression of the appellant-
defendant may have been taken on a blank stamp
2024 INSC 744
SKS,J
paper and the disputed agreement was typed
thereon subsequently.
28. It cannot be denied that the respondent-plaintiff
being a Police Constable was mandatorily required
to seek permission from his department before
entering into an agreement to purchase property of
such a high value. However, admittedly, he did not
seek any such permission from the department. As
per the disputed agreement, the appellant-
defendant agreed to sell the suit land to the
respondent-plaintiff @ Rs. 5,00,000/- per Killa,
which was just about half of the market rate of the
land at the relevant point of time, as admitted by
the respondent-plaintiff. Going by the rate as fixed
in the disputed agreement, the total sale
consideration would have amounted to
approximately, Rs. 18,87,000/-. The disputed
agreement recites that the appellant-defendant had
received earnest money to the tune of Rs.
16,00,000/- for the purpose of doing agriculture
and to buy cheaper and better land nearby. Thus, a
lion's share of the sale consideration was already
paid to the appellant-defendant at the time of the
execution of the disputed agreement and the
remaining amount was hardly 15% of the total value
of the suit land as agreed upon between the parties.
Therefore, it does not stand to reason that the
respondent-plaintiff being a Police Constable would
part with a huge sum of Rs. 16,00,000/- towards a
transaction to purchase land and thereafter, agree
to defer the execution of the sale deed to a date
almost 16 months later with the balance amount
being a fraction of the total sale consideration.
SKS,J
29. Apparently thus, there was no rhyme or reason
as to why, the respondent-plaintiff would agree to
defer the execution of the sale deed to a date more
than a year and four months after the execution of
the disputed agreement. Thus, the disputed
agreement i.e., the agreement to sell read in entirety
is highly suspicious and does not inspire confidence
at all."
16. He further relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in Ranjit Singh and Anr. v. State of
uttarakhand and Ors 7, wherein in paragraph No.5, it is held
as under:
"5. On 1st July, 2002, the defendants applied for
setting aside the order dated 3rd May, 2002 by
which their defence was struck out. The application
proceeds on the allegation that on 3rd May, 2002,
the Court proceeded to strike out the defendants'
defence without giving them an opportunity of being
heard and the hearing was conducted ex parte. Very
interestingly, a reply was filed to the said
application by the plaintiffs in which a stand has
been taken that as the suit was directed to proceed
ex parte, there was no occasion to give an
intimation to the defendants or their counsel that
the application will be taken up on 3rd May, 2002.
Therefore, it is an accepted position that the
application for striking out the defence of the
defendants was taken up on the cause list on 3rd
May 2002 without issuing notice to the defendants,
though on 22nd April, 2002, the next date was
2024 INSC 724
SKS,J
already fixed as 30th May 2002. The application for
setting aside the order dated 3rd May, 2002 was
rejected. At this stage, we must clarify the legal
position. Even if a defendant does not file a written
statement and the suit is ordered to proceed ex
parte against him, the limited defence available to
the defendant is not foreclosed. A defendant can
always cross-examine the witnesses examined by
the plaintiff to prove the falsity of the plaintiff's case.
A defendant can always urge, based on the plaint
and the evidence of the plaintiff, that the suit was
barred by a statute such as the law of limitation.
Therefore, notwithstanding an order passed earlier
to proceed ex parte, while deciding an application
for striking out the defence, it was the duty of the
Court to give an opportunity of being heard to the
defendants. However, that was not done. As the suit
was fixed on 30th May, 2002, the defendants were
entitled to a notice that the suit would be taken up
on an earlier date for hearing the application for
striking out the defence. When the defendants had
appeared in the suit, the act of preponing the date
without notice to them or their advocate was
completely illegal and contrary to elementary
principles of natural justice. Therefore, it follows
that the order striking out the defendants' defence
is completely illegal, and the said order deserves to
be set aside."
17. The points that arise for consideration in this appeal
are:
i. Whether the agreement of sale is true, valid and binding
on the respondents?
SKS,J
ii. Whether the judgment of the trial Court warrants any
interference?
Point No.i:
18. In the light of the submissions made by both the
learned counsel and a perusal of the material available on
record, it is the case of the plaintiff that the defendant agreed
to sell the suit schedule property for a consideration of
Rs.2,37,500/- and that the entire consideration was paid,
following which the defendant executed the agreement of sale
(Ex.A1) and delivered possession. The plaintiff further
contended that despite repeated requests, the defendant failed
to execute a registered sale deed, compelling the plaintiff to
issue a legal notice.
19. Conversely, the defendant has categorically denied the
execution of a genuine sale agreement, alleging that the
plaintiff, along with others, exerted coercion upon him at a
police station and obtained his signatures on blank stamp
papers and white papers, which were subsequently misused
to fabricate Ex.A1. The defendant further contended that he
neither received any sale consideration nor intended to
alienate the property.
SKS,J
20. Admittedly, the defendant acknowledges his signatures
on Ex.A1. However, he asserts that the same were obtained
under coercion. In such circumstances, the burden lies upon
the defendant to establish coercion, as laid down under
Section 114 of the Indian Evidence Act. Nevertheless, it is
significant that no police complaint or immediate legal action
was initiated by the defendant alleging coercion or fabrication,
which casts some doubt on the plea of coercion.
21. That said, mere non-filing of a police complaint, while a
relevant factor, is not the sole criterion for judging the
credibility of the defense. The surrounding circumstances and
evidence must be closely scrutinized.
22. Upon a perusal of Ex.A1, it is apparent that there are
corrections, alterations, and overwriting in the document,
without any initials or attestation explaining such corrections.
No explanation has been furnished by the plaintiff regarding
these material corrections. The principle laid down by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Seth Loonkaran Sethiya and
Nathu Lal (supra) squarely applies. It is well-settled that
material alterations made in a document without the consent
SKS,J
of the party bound thereby render the document void and
unenforceable.
23. Furthermore, the evidence of P.W.1 (plaintiff) in cross-
examination reveals admissions detrimental to his case. He
admitted that he had invested Rs.1,00,000/- in the finance
company of the defendant and that the said amount was not
returned, yet no independent legal action was taken to recover
the deposit amount. This fact corroborates the defense
version that there were prior monetary disputes between the
parties, providing a context for the possibility of coercion and
misuse of signed papers.
24. Additionally, P.W.1 admitted that he did not obtain
permission from his employer (being a government employee)
before entering into the transaction. The principle laid down
in Lakha Singh (supra) is applicable here, wherein the
Hon'ble Supreme Court observed that suspicious
circumstances surrounding the execution of an agreement,
such as dealing with a substantial transaction without
requisite departmental permissions, cast serious doubts on
the genuineness of the transaction.
SKS,J
25. The absence of any documentary evidence like receipts,
acknowledgments, or bank transactions showing payment of
the alleged consideration of Rs.2,37,500/- further weakens
the case of the plaintiff. In transactions involving significant
sums, the absence of proof of payment is a strong indicator
against the credibility of the transaction, as recognized in
Janak Dulari Devi (supra).
26. It is also to be noted that possession is a critical
indicator in cases of specific performance. The plaintiff failed
to adduce cogent evidence showing that possession was
transferred to him. Contrarily, the defendant continued in
possession and subsequently sold the property to a third
party, which negates the claim of the plaintiff.
27. The learned counsel for the appellant relied upon the
judgment in Prakash Rattan Lal (supra) to contend that
evidence must not travel beyond the pleadings. However, in
the present case, the defense of coercion was sufficiently
pleaded and supported by evidence. The plaintiff, having failed
to establish the genuineness of Ex.A1 by clear and convincing
evidence, cannot seek the benefit of the doctrine prohibiting
evidence beyond pleadings.
SKS,J
28. The reliance placed by the respondents on Ranjit Singh
(supra) on the principle of natural justice and fairness in
procedure also supports the contention that suspicious and
unfair conduct around the transaction cannot be ignored.
29. Specific performance is a discretionary and equitable
relief. It is trite law that a plaintiff must approach the Court
with clean hands and prove readiness and willingness to
perform his part of the contract. In the present case,
considering the suspicious nature of Ex.A1, the corrections
without explanation, absence of evidence of consideration, and
the circumstances surrounding the execution, the plaintiff has
failed to establish a case warranting specific performance.
30. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court concurs
with the findings of the trial Court that the agreement of sale
(Ex.A1) is not genuine, and that the plaintiff failed to prove
payment of sale consideration or entitlement to the relief of
specific performance.
Point No.ii:
31. In view of the above discussion in point No.i, there is no
illegality in the judgment of the trial Court. The trial Court
SKS,J
discussed all the issues and it is a well reasoned judgment
and there are no grounds to interfere in the judgment.
32. In view thereof, this Appeal Suit is dismissed confirming
the judgment and decree dated 10.07.2003 passed in
O.S.No.196 of 1999 by the learned II Additional Senior Civil
Judge, Warangal. There shall be no order as to costs.
Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall stand
closed.
_______________
K. SUJANA, J
Date: 11.06.2025
Note: L.R. Copy to be marked
B/o
SAI
SKS,J
THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE K. SUJANA
P.D. JUDGMENT
IN
Date: 11.06.2025
Note: L.R. Copy to be marked
B/o
SAI
