Telangana High Court
M/S. Telangana State Industrial ... vs Sri Mark Raj Kumar on 25 July, 2025
1
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA
AND
THE HON'BLE JUSTICE B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO
I.A.No.1 OF 2025
IN/AND
COMCA No.1 of 2025
Sri Shyam S.Agrawal, learned counsel for the appellant.
Mr. Ashish Kale, learned counsel representing Ms. Sneha Bhogle, learned
counsel for the respondent No.1.
COMMON ORDER:
(Per Hon'ble. Justice Moushumi Bhattacharya)
1. The petitioner/appellant, M/s. Telangana State Industrial
Development Corporation Limited, has challenged the impugned
order and decree passed by the learned Commercial Court dated
16.02.2023, whereby the appellant's Commercial Original Petition
(C.O.P.No.38 of 2016) filed under section 31(1)(a) and (aa) of The
State Financial Corporations Act, 1951, for a decree against the
respondents for an amount of Rs.1,30,31,000/- with interest
@ 17.5% per annum, was dismissed.
2. The present Appeal was filed on 26.12.2024 along with an
application (I.A.No.1 of 2025) for condonation of a delay of 514
days in filing the Appeal. The parties have filed their respective
affidavits in the I.A. The respondents have strongly objected to the
condonation of delay.
3. We have heard learned counsel appearing for the
petitioner/appellant and learned counsel appearing for the
respondent No.1 in support of their submissions and considered
the case law cited on behalf of the parties.
4. The petitioner/appellant has filed two affidavits in support of
the application for condonation of delay. The second affidavit is
described as an 'Additional Affidavit' for supplementing the reasons
stated in the first affidavit. The reasons for the condonation of
delay are set out from paragraph 25 of the first affidavit. The
relevant dates mentioned are as follows.
5. The petitioner states that after passing of the impugned
order on 16.02.2023, the petitioner applied for a Certified Copy of
the said order and decree on 22.02.2023 and the Certified Copy
was furnished to the petitioner on 07.06.2023. Upon receiving the
copy of the order, the petitioner's Law Officer prepared a note and
submitted it to the 'Higher Officials' for taking a decision and
necessary action. However, the immediate higher official, the
Deputy General Manager of the petitioner 'took long time to go
through and understand the impugned order and after sometime, he
had placed it before the Managing Director of the petitioner'.
Elections were declared in the State of Telangana, during which 'all
the officials were busy and no instructions were coming for the
decisions to be taken in regard to legal matters and the issue of the
present case was lying pending'. By the time normal work
resumed after the State Elections, the Union Elections had
commenced and 'again there was no progress in the work including
the issue of the present case'. Paragraph 26 of the affidavit further
states that even after the Union Elections, 'it took some time for
normal work to get resumed...... However, the file of the present case
got mixed up in the numerous files that were pending for
circulation...... and hence no decision was taken as the file itself
was got mixed up and went missing'.
6. Paragraph 27 of the affidavit states that it was only in
November, 2024 that the petitioner realized that 'the decision in
regard to the impugned order had not yet been taken' and that the
matter was pending. This came to light when the respondent No.1
approached the petitioner for return of the original Title Deeds of
the schedule property. The petitioner gave instructions to put up
the file 'but the same was not being traced and it was realized that
the file was missing'. The petitioner thereafter gave instructions to
trace the file and place it before the higher officials. It is further
stated that 'after a long search and with great difficulty, the file
could be traced out in the second week of December, 2024'. The
petitioner immediately held discussions with counsel and a
decision was taken to file an Appeal before the High Court. The
Appeal was thereafter prepared and filed.
7. The 'Additional Affidavit' reiterates the dates of the Elections
which were mentioned in the first affidavit. The petitioner states
that the schedule for the Elections to the Telangana State
Legislative Assembly was announced on 09.10.2023 and the
Elections were held on 30.11.2023. The employees of the
petitioner-Corporation, being a State Government company, were
assigned official duties for conducting elections and therefore,
could not 'concentrate on the issue relating to filing of the present
Appeal and obtaining necessary instructions' since they were
engaged in election related work. Paragraph 6 of the Additional
Affidavit states that the Election Commission of India had
announced the schedule for the General Elections on 16.03.2024,
and the polling in the State of Telangana was held on 13.05.2024.
The petitioner's employees were entrusted with election duties and
'they were completely involved therein'. The petitioner further
states that 'in view of such disturbances in work due to successive
elections, immediate action for filing of the appeal could not be taken
up'. Paragraph 7 states that following the change of the
Government, three Vice Chairmen and Managing Directors took
charge in quick succession at the petitioner-Corporation, which
further contributed to the delay in filing the Appeal.
8. The statements made in the two affidavits filed in support of
the application for condonation of delay in filing of the Appeal have
been reproduced verbatim in the preceding paragraphs. The
extracts in italics are reproduced from the two affidavits.
9. The dates mentioned in the two affidavits contain several
unexplained time-gaps. The impugned order was passed on
16.02.2023 and the application for a Certified Copy thereof was
made on 22.02.2023. Although the Certified Copy was made ready
on 07.06.2023, the next date mentioned in the Additional Affidavit
is 09.10.2023 (the announcement of the schedule for the
Telangana Legislative Assembly Elections), followed by the conduct
of the Elections on 30.11.2023.
10. The petitioner has not explained the lapse of four months
between 07.06.2023 and 09.10.2023. The second unexplained gap
is from 30.11.2023 (the date of the Legislative Assembly elections)
to 13.05.2024 (polling date for the General Elections in the State of
Telangana). There is no explanation for the intervening period of
six months from November, 2023 to May, 2024.
11. Apart from the gaps in the timeline, the reasons stated for
the delay are as follows:
(i) The Deputy General Manager of the petitioner took a
long time to go through and understand the impugned
order;
(ii) All the officials of the petitioner-Corporation were busy
with the election duties;
(iii) No instructions were issued to the officials regarding
the legal matters;
(iv) The file of the present case was mixed up with the
other files; and
(v) The file was ultimately lost.
12. It is evident from paragraph 27 of the first Affidavit that the
respondent No.1 demanding return of the original Title Deeds of
the schedule property triggered the petitioner's realization that no
decision had been taken with regard to the impugned order and
that the file was untraceable. Therefore, from 13.05.2024 to
November, 2024 i.e., for six months the petitioner took no steps to
challenge the impugned order dated 16.02.2023. The petitioner
admits that the file was located after a considerable delay. The
Appeal was filed in the second week of December, 2024. No other
specific dates are mentioned in the two affidavits.
13. Section 13 of The Commercial Courts Act, 2015 relates to
filing of appeals from decrees of Commercial Courts and
Commercial Divisions. Section 13(1A) provides that any person
aggrieved by the judgment or order of a Commercial Court or from
a Commercial Division of a High Court may file an appeal to the
Commercial Appellate Division of the High Court within a period of
sixty days from the date of the judgment or order.
14. The appellant has filed the present Appeal under the
provisions of The Commercial Courts Act, 2015 from the order of
the Commercial Court along with an application for condonation of
delay of 514 days. The reasons stated in the two affidavits filed
along with the application for condonation of delay have been
narrated in the foregoing paragraphs.
15. The first question is whether the Court should invoke its
discretionary powers to condone the delay.
16. The appellant entirely relies on section 5 of The Limitation
Act, 1963 which allows filing of an appeal or any application
beyond the prescribed period of time subject to the Court being
satisfied of the sufficiency of cause shown by the appellant or
applicant for the delay. The burden of proving the sufficiency of
cause lies with the appellant or applicant.
17. In Government of Maharashtra (Water Resources Department)
Vs. Borse Brothers Engineers and Contractors Private Limited 1, the
Supreme Court considered the applicable timeframe under section
37 of The Arbitration and Conciliation Act, 1996 which provides for
appeals from specified orders. Section 37 of the 1996 Act does not
specify a timeframe for filing of appeals. The Supreme Court
concluded that any delay beyond 90 days, 30 days or 60 days
(under Articles 116, 117 of The Limitation Act, 1963 and section
13(1A) of The Commercial Courts Act, 2015 respectively) for filing
of an appeal under section 37 of the 1996 Act should be condoned
by way of exception and not by way of rule. Besides, in Borse
Brothers, there was a delay of 131 days beyond the 60 days period
provided for filing of an appeal under section 13(1A) of The
Commercial Courts Act, 2015. The Supreme Court found that the
delay had not been explained with sufficient bona fides and
accordingly proceeded to dismiss the appeal.
18. It is now settled that section 5 of The Limitation Act, 1963
would apply to appeals filed under section 13(1A) of The
Commercial Courts Act, 2015: Borse Brothers; also refer to a recent
(2021) 6 SCC 460
decision of the Supreme Court in Jharkhand Urja Utpadan Nigam
Ltd., Vs. M/s. Bharat Heavy Electricals Limited 2.
19. However, in Borse Brothers, the Supreme Court made it clear
that the limitation beyond 60 days cannot be stretched to
unreasonable limits so as to defeat the object of The Commercial
Courts Act, 2015, wherein the Legislature made a conscious choice
of capping the timeline. The delay of 514 days is not being
castigated here for its length, but for the appellant's failure to
account for the delay in the manner mandated under section 5 of
The Limitation Act, 1963. Although, extension of the period of
limitation beyond the prescribed timeframe is a matter of public
policy, 'sufficient cause' cannot serve as a convenient excuse to
wipe out unexplained delays in pursuing stale claims.
20. Since section 5 of The Limitation Act, 1963 applies to the
present Commercial Court Appeal, the next question is whether
the appellant has satisfied the requirement of showing sufficient
cause. In this regard, the appellant cannot take refuge in the fact
of it being a Government Company. A discussion on this aspect
follows in the next paragraph.
2025 SCC OnLine SC 910
21. The facts before us are in stark contrast, both in degree and
depth, to those in Borse Brothers. As opposed to the delay of 131
days in Borse Brothers, the present appeal is set behind by 514
days. The only similarity with Borse Brothers is that the appellant
before the Supreme Court was the Government of Maharashtra
(Water Resources Department). In the present case, the appellant
is M/s. Telangana State Industrial Development Corporation
Limited (formerly Andhra Pradesh State Industrial Development
Corporation Ltd.).
22. A State Corporation/Government Department cannot be put
on a pedestal with privileged timelines which would be evident
from the underlying objective of special statutes which contemplate
fixed timelines. These Acts are entity-neutral in terms of limitation
periods. There is little doubt that the objective of a special statute
like The Commercial Courts Act, 2015 is to ensure speedy
resolution of high-value commercial disputes, without any
exceptions. The focus is on quick resolution which includes
Government entities when they are parties to commercial disputes.
23. Moreover, the logic of Government employees being oblivious
of timelines is totally misplaced. Government departments are
expected to be staffed with competent persons who are familiar
with Court proceedings especially in times when modern
technology aiding quick filings and communication is readily
available. The Law of Limitation binds everybody, including the
Government: Postmaster General Vs. Living Media India Limited 3.
The Government or a wing of the Government enjoys the same
perks and suffers the same pitfalls as a private entity in
commercial transactions; which begs the question whether the
Government can create and take shelter under a parallel timeline
in a fixed-period statute like The Commercial Courts Act, 2015 ?
24. None of the judgments cited on behalf of the appellant deal
with the specific limitation period prescribed under The
Commercial Courts Act, 2015. Collector Land Acquisition Officer,
Anantnag Vs. Katiji 4. N. Balakrishnan Vs. M.Krishnamurthy 5 and a
more recent judgment of the Supreme Court in Mool Chandra Vs.
(2012) 3 SCC 563
4 (1987) 2 SCC 107
5 (1998) 7 SCC 123
Union of India 6 deal with the requirement of showing sufficiency of
cause under section 5 of The Limitation Act, 1963. In
N.Balakrishna (supra), the Supreme Court dealt with the need to
advance substantial justice where the delay on the part of the
litigant was not deliberate or caused by mala fides. Similarly, in
Mool Chandra (supra) the Supreme Court found from the specific
facts of that case that there was no negligence attributable on the
part of the appellant. Sheo Raj Singh Vs. Union of India 7 agreed
with the view taken by the High Court in condoning the delay on
the part of the Union of India on the ground of proper exercise of
discretion. The Supreme Court relied on State of Manipur Vs.
Koting Lamkang 8 to hold that the impersonal nature of State-
functioning should be given due regard. Sheo Raj Singh however
involved the issue of compensation payable to the landowner and
was not under a special statute with rigorous timelines, namely,
The Commercial Courts Act, 2015.
25. Exercise of discretion under section 5 of The Limitation Act,
1963 empowers the Court to entertain an appeal or application
6 AIR 2024 SC 4046
7 (2023) 10 SCC 531
8 (2019) 10 SCC 408
beyond the prescribed period of limitation subject to the Court
being satisfied of the sufficiency of cause shown by the
applicant/appellant. The cause shown must be such that the
overarching requirement to advance the cause of substantial
justice outweighs the appellant's shortfall in filing the appeal
within the prescribed period of limitation. 'Sufficient' cause must
reflect a sense of purpose and a willingness to restore diligence.
The reasons shown cannot be slipshod or nonchalant so as to
demand condonation as a matter of entitlement. It must be borne
in mind that delay may have created equity in favour of another in
the interregnum.
26. As stated in the foregoing paragraphs, the appellant only
gives sporadic dates which randomly pop-up in a timeline from
February, 2023 to December, 2024. There is no attempt to explain
or account for the long blanks in-between these dates.
27. It is of crucial relevance that in paragraph 7 of the additional
affidavit, one of the reasons mentioned by the appellant for the
delay is that there were three Vice-Chairmen and the Managing
Directors who took charge of the appellant corporation in quick
successions. There are no dates mentioned with regard to the date
on which the Vice Chairmen and the Managing Directors assumed
charge. Counsel appearing for the respondent has however
produced G.O.Rt.No.54, dated 11.01.2024 which shows that
Dr.E.Vishnu Vardhan Reddy was placed in the post of Vice
Chairman, Managing Director, and Executive Director of the
appellant Corporation on and from 11.01.2024. There was no
change in the position of Vice Chairman/Managing Director of the
appellant from 11.01.2024 till the date of filing of the appeal i.e.,
on 26.12.2024.
28. It is of additional significance that one of the grounds for
passing the impugned order was whether the appellant's claim was
barred by limitation. The Commercial Court after considering the
facts, answered the issue against the appellant and in favour of the
respondent No.1. Thus, it is all the more difficult to accept that
the appellant would slip into a slumber for 514 days after having
suffered an order, inter alia, on the ground of delay.
29. We hence do not find any reason, satisfactory or otherwise,
in condoning the delay of 514 days in filing the Commercial Court
Appeal.
30. I.A.No.1 of 2025 is accordingly dismissed for the reasons
stated above. Consequently, COMCA.No.1 of 2025 stands rejected.
There shall be no order as to costs.
_________________________________
MOUSHUMI BHATTACHARYA, J
_____________________________
B.R.MADHUSUDHAN RAO, J
Date: 25.07.2025
va/bms
