Telangana High Court

Dr. T.A.V. Murthy, Hyd vs The Union Of India, New Delhi And 3 Others on 24 January, 2025

Author: Nagesh Bheemapaka

Bench: Nagesh Bheemapaka

        HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE NAGESH BHEEMAPAKA

             WRIT PETITION No. 15037 OF 2009

O R D E R:

The present Writ Petition was filed challenging the

charge memorandum dated 09.03.2009 issued by the 4th

Respondent University and the disciplinary proceedings

initiated thereunder. Petitioner seeks to quash the impugned

memorandum and all consequential proceedings on the ground

of lack of jurisdiction, procedural irregularities, and non-

compliance with statutory requirements.

2. The factual background is petitioner, a former

employee of the 4th respondent University, was appointed as

Director of the 3rd respondent Organization, INFLIBNET Centre,

for five years commencing on 01.06.2001. Upon completion of

his tenure on 31.05.2006, petitioner resumed his duties at the

4th respondent University and retired on 31.03.2008 after

attaining the age of superannuation.

Subsequently, on 09.03.2009, nearly a year after

his retirement, the 4th respondent issued a charge

memorandum alleging five articles of misconduct during

petitioner's tenure as Director of the 3rd respondent, for which,

he responded seeking necessary documents and raising

objections to the charges on legal grounds. An Enquiry

Committee was constituted to investigate the charges under the

Central Civil Services (Classification, Control, and Appeal)

Rules, 1965 (CCS CCA Rules). Challenging the said charge

memo, the present writ petition is filed.

3. While issuing notice, on 27.07.2009, this Court

suspended the impugned proceedings for a period of two weeks

initially and thereafter, the said order was extended until

further orders.

4. The counter-affidavit filed on behalf of the 3rd

respondent outlines its responses to petitioner's allegations and

provides a detailed account of the procedural and factual

grounds for the actions taken. The INFLIBNET Centre,

established under the University Grants Commission (UGC) as a

cooperative venture to enhance academic and library services,

operates as an independent body under the Ministry of Human

Resource Development (MHRD) and UGC, and is fully funded by

the Government of India. It is governed by the rules and

regulations applicable to central government employees. It is

stated, petitioner, who served as the Director of INFLIBNET

Centre from 01.06.2001 to 31.05.2006 was appointed on a

tenure basis by the UGC. During this tenure, petitioner was

alleged to have committed several procedural violations and acts

of misconduct. Respondent No. 3, acting under instructions

from the Chief Vigilance Officer of MHRD and UGC, provided

necessary information to the 4th respondent to initiate

disciplinary action against petitioner. It is stated that petitioner

is governed by the CCS Conduct Rules, 1965, and thus,

inquiries can be conducted under those rules. However,

petitioner's reference to Rule 9 of the CCS (Pension) Rules,

1972, is contradictory, as his claims in writ affidavit contain

false and incorrect information.

Specific allegations include awarding contracts

without following due process, purchasing equipment without

inviting tenders, claiming duplicate reimbursements, and

undertaking tours for personal reasons. Charges are supported

by documentary evidence and disciplinary proceedings are being

conducted as per the prescribed rules. This respondent refutes

petitioner's allegation of harassment, stating that action taken

was based on instructions from the Chief Vigilance Officer of

MHRD and UGC to ensure accountability. It is emphasized that

disciplinary proceedings initiated against petitioner was after

following due process and the charge sheet issued is not a

ground for invoking the extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court.

Hence, the Writ Petition is deemed premature, as petitioner has

not yet submitted a reply to the charges. This respondent

asserts that this Writ Petition is an attempt to stall the

disciplinary proceedings initiated by the 4th respondent on the

recommendations of Respondents 1 to 3.

5. The 4th respondent University opposed the writ

petition contending that, as a Central University established

under an Act of Parliament, it was governed by Central

Government rules, including CCS (CCA) Rules and CCS

(Pension) Rules. The Rules are applicable to petitioner as a

Central Government pensioner. It is stated, as the University

has been framing the Rules one by one related to the service

matters of Teaching and Non-Teaching Staff, the rules regarding

disciplinary proceedings after retirement of employees would be

framed in due course. In the meanwhile, the issue of petitioner

has come up. It is also stated that EFL University is at the

formative stage and certain Rules of University are yet to be

framed, it does not mean that petitioner can get away from the

Rules more so because he was an employee of an organisation

governed and funded by the Central Government. It is implied

that he is automatically covered by the Central Government

Rules in vogue. Therefore, the action initiated by the 4th

respondent is in order. It is argued that disciplinary

proceedings could be initiated against retired employees under

Rule 9 of the CCS (Pension) Rules, provided charges pertained

to misconduct during service. The 4th respondent detailed the

allegations against petitioner including awarding contracts

without following due process, unauthorized financial

transactions and misuse of official resources. The charges were

deemed serious and warranted investigation. It is asserted that

proceedings were initiated within the permissible period under

Rule 9(2)(b) and were in compliance with procedural

requirements. The 4th respondent relied on judgments

supporting the view that judicial interference in disciplinary

proceedings at the interlocutory stage was unwarranted.

6. In its reply to the counter of the 4th respondent,

petitioner reiterated that the 4th respondent's admission

regarding the absence of specific rules for post-retirement

disciplinary proceedings invalidated the entire process. The

reliance on CCS Rules was misplaced as they were neither

adopted nor applicable. The respondents maintained that the

requirement of Presidential sanction was not absolute and

argued that the charges justified the invocation of disciplinary

proceedings. The petitioner emphasized that the delay of nearly

a year in initiating the proceedings and further delays during

the inquiry process were unjustifiable and prejudiced the

petitioner's defense. The respondents underscored the gravity

of the charges, asserting that procedural lapses, if any, did not

dilute the substance of the allegations. Petitioner countered that

procedural irregularities, including vague charges and non-

disclosure of documents, violated principles of natural justice

and rendered the proceedings untenable.

7. Learned counsel for petitioner Smt. Goda

Ramalakshmi submits that the 4th respondent lacked

jurisdiction to initiate disciplinary proceedings against a retired

employee. The University's rules, framed under the English and

Foreign Languages University Act, 2006, did not provide for

post-retirement disciplinary action. According to her, CCS (CCA)

Rules and CCS (Pension) Rules are not applicable to the 4th

respondent University unless explicitly adopted. The

University's counter-affidavit admitted that specific rules for

disciplinary proceedings post-retirement were yet to be framed.

It is also submitted that charge memorandum lacked requisite

Presidential sanction under Rule 9(2)(b). Additionally, the

charges pertained to a period beyond the prescribed limitation.

He submits that alleged non-compliance with principles of

natural justice, as the charges were vague and unsupported by

necessary documents. Learned counsel highlighted the

unexplained delay in initiating disciplinary proceedings,

asserting that it undermined the credibility and validity of the

charges.

8. Heard Sri Gadi Praveen Kumar, learned Deputy

Solicitor General, Sri A. Satya Prasad, learned Senior Counsel

on behalf of Sri Ch. Srikanth, learned counsel for the 4th

respondent.

9. Learned Senior Counsel for the 4th respondent

relied upon the judgment reported in Transport

Commissioner, Madras-5 v. A. Radha Krishna Murthy 1,

Bank of India v. Degala Suryanarayana 2 and Brajendra

Singh Yambem v. Union of India 3.

10. Having heard learned counsel on either side and

having perused the material on record, it is to be seen that as

regards the competence and jurisdiction, issuance of charge

memorandum under the provisions of CCS (CCA) Rules and

reference to Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules is legally-

unsustainable, as the 4th respondent University had framed the

(1995) 1 SCC 332

(1999) 5 SCC 762

(2016) 9 SCC 20

English and Foreign Languages University (Control and Appeal)

Rules, as per which, there was no provision for continuing

enquiry even if the same was issued prior to retirement and in

the instant case, the charge was issued almost after an year of

retirement, hence, it is clearly without jurisdiction. The above

Rules are also not applicable as the 4th respondent famed Rules

which are self-contained and in the absence of any specific

provision made for continuance/proceeding as a measure of

discipline of the employees, who retired is impermissible.

Learned counsel relied upon the judgment in UCO Bank v.

Rajinder Lal Capoor 4 to support the contention that

proceeding against an individual after retirement can only be

done where there is a specific rule which support such an

action. In the present case, as the self-contained provisions of

the English and Foreign Languages University Act do not

contemplate conduct of proceedings after retirement, the same

is illegal.

11. Further, as can be seen from the counter-affidavit

of the 4th respondent, at paragraph 4(b), it is stated 'university

has been framing rules one by one related to the service matters

of teaching and non-teaching staff, the rules regarding the

(2007) 6 SCC 694

disciplinary proceedings after retirement of the employees would

be framed in due course'. Hence, the submission of learned

counsel for petitioner that there is no provision for proceeding

against the retired employees is to be accepted.

12. Insofar as applicability of CCS (CCA) Rules and CCS

(Pension ) Rules is concerned, the averment made in the counter

to the effect that 'any Central Government Organisation may

adopt the Central Civil Services (Classification, Control and

Appeal) Rules, 1965 and the Central Services (Pension) Rules,

1972 under Rule 9' would make it very clear that the said Rule

is applicable if and when adopted. The language of the counter

would only indicate that they can be adopted but does not

assert that they have been adopted. However, in the same

counter, at para 4(c), opposite stand was taken that 'the

Government of India rules in vogue are automatically

applicable'. Assuming for the sake of argument that CCS

(Pension) Rules would apply, according to learned counsel for

petitioner, the charge memorandum impugned will have to be

quashed on two grounds (i) President assent / sanction was not

obtained and (ii) it is beyond the limitation contemplated under

Rule 9(2)(b) of the Pension Rules. The 4th respondent primarily

contended that the method and manner in which inquiry will

have to be conducted is the prerogative of the employer. What is

required is only compliance with the principles of natural

justice, as such, the objection of petitioner is liable to be

rejected.

13. In this connection, a perusal of the charge

memorandum, would go to show that sanction has been

accorded by the Ministry of Human Resources Development. To

juxtapose the same and to contend that it was not in

accordance with the Rules, learned counsel has drawn attention

of this Court to Standard Form of Sanction under Rule 9

(Art.351) of the Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972,

placed at page 150 of the writ affidavit, wherein it has been

stated that 'Now, therefore, in exercise of the powers conferred on

him by sub-clause (1), Clause (b) of sub-rule (2) of Rule 9 of the

Central Civil Services (Pension) Rules, 1972, the President hereby

accord sanction to the departmental proceedings against the

said.....'. From the counter-affidavit of the 4th respondent also, it

is clear that the 4th respondent initiated action on the directions

received from the University Grants Commission and at the

advice of Ministry of Human Resource Development, the

proforma of the memoradnum was also supplied to the UGC. In

view of the same, it is evident that sanction of the President was

not obtained at all. Hence, the contention of the 4th respondent

is liable to be rejected on the sole ground that it is too basic

principle of law that a particular act will have to be done in

accordance with the procedure as prescribed or not done at all.

In view of the self-contained Code relating to conduct of

disciplinary proceedings on employees of the university, it would

not lie in the mouth of the respondent to say that it need not

follow the same. Further, the 4th respondent contended that

existence of a specific bar to hold inquiry was necessary and in

the absence of such an embargo, the Disciplinary authority has

every power to initiate proceedings post-retirement is untenable

as incorporation of Rule 9 and other Rules which permit it

specifically, would be unnecessary. The law is well-settled that

unless there is a specific provision for conduct of disciplinary

proceedings after retirement, power does not vest in the

authorities, hence, the contention of the 4th respondent is liable

to be rejected.

14. It is the further case of the 4th respondent that

petitioner having not responded to the charge memorandum

charge wise, it was impermissible for him to urge before this

Court regarding tenability or otherwise of the charges. It is also

contended that except a technical objection, petitioner has not

preferred to deal with the merit of the case when an opportunity

to reply to the charge memorandum was available with him. In

this regard, learned counsel for petitioner submits that the

purpose of drawing attention of this Court to imputation of

charges was not to persuade this Court as to the merits of the

matter but to satisfy that the jurisdictional fact of the

allegations being within the period of limitation is conspicuous

by its absence. The very objection relating to jurisdiction could

not have been brushed aside as being a technical objection as it

goes to the root of the matter and the competence of the

authority to proceed against petitioner. The 4th respondent also

urged that it would not be appropriate for this Court to interfere

with the proceedings at this stage and if there was any illegality,

the same would be questioned after action is taken by the

disciplinary authority. While it may be true that Court would

loathe to interfere in the interlocutory proceedings of an

enquiry, it is very clear from the pleadings and arguments on

behalf of petitioner that the objection raised is not regarding the

modalities of the inquiry but to the very jurisdiction of the

authority to initiate the impugned proceedings.

15. The 4th respondent also relied upon the judgment

reported in A. Radha Krishna Murthy's case (supra), wherein

the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that correctness of the charges

would not be subject to judicial review prior to the conclusion of

the departmental enquiry. Even after the conclusion of the

departmental enquiry, the scope of judicial review is restricted

to charge based on no evidence. This judgment would be of no

help in the instant case as the objection raised to the impugned

action is not relating to the correctness or otherwise of the

charges but the very jurisdiction of the authority the issue one

and more importantly as being in violation of the express

provisions of the law governing the field, assuming only for the

sake of the argument that CCS (Pension) Rules would apply at

all. Reliance has also been placed on the judgment in Bank of

India's case (supra) to state that strict principle of evidence

would not apply. It is necessary to state that the situation of

pleading regarding the credibility or otherwise has not come in

the present case. The very case, at the cost of repetition, was

that the authority had no jurisdiction to initiate proceedings at

all. Thus, even this judgment cannot come to the rescue of the

respondents in successfully defending in challenging the

impugned charge memorandum.

16. Insofar as the 2nd limb regarding limitation is

concerned, this Court was taken through the entire charges to

support the contention that the allegations related to period

beyond the period of limitation contemplated in Rule 9(2)(b). In

so far as the contention that delay of institution of proceedings,

reliance has also been placed on the judgment in

P.V.Mahadevan vs. MD, T.N. Housing Board 5. The said

judgment specifically held that delaying of the proceeding itself

would cause unnecessary hardship to an employee and that

would be sufficient for this Court to interfere with the same. It

has been pleaded on the ground that the allegations relate to

period between 01.06.2001 and 31.05.2006 and there is no

explanation forthcoming in the counter-affidavit as to the

reason for issuing charge memorandum only on 09.03.2009 and

this, undoubtedly, is an unexplained delay warranting

interference by this court. The 4th respondent relied on the

judgment in Brajendra Singh Yambem's case (supra) to

support that contention that serious nature of allegations would

permit the authority to proceed even though it is beyond

limitation. It was also pressed into service to state that once the

assent of the President is obtained, the question of limitation

cannot be gone into by the Court. This judgment also cannot

come to the rescue of the 4th respondent for two reasons- i) the

(2005) 6 SCC 636

assent of the President was not obtained has been pleaded and

urged and the counter-affidavit filed by the 4th Respondent also

asserts that only the sanction of Minister of Human Resource

Development was obtained. Therefore, the purpose for which

this judgment was cited would be of no avail in the present

case. In so far as the 1st principle of this judgment is

concerned, reference to Para 53 at page 43 would be sufficient

to state that it has no precedential value and the said order was

passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India exercising its

power under article 142 of the Constitution. To highlight the

same, the relevant portion is extracted hereunder:

"53: Though we have answered the questions of law framed in this case in favour of the appellant and set aside the impugned judgment by allowing these appeals, however, having regard to the seriousness of the allegations made against the appellant, in exercise of power of this court under Article 142 of the Constitution of India, we direct the disciplinary authority to continue the disciplinary proceedings and conclude them within six months in accordance with the relevant provisions of Law..."

17. In light of the foregoing discussion, it is to be held

that the disciplinary proceedings initiated against petitioner are

without jurisdiction, procedurally-flawed and unsustainable in

law. The Writ Petition therefore, deserves to be allowed.

18. The Writ Petition is accordingly, allowed. The charge

memorandum dated 09.03.2009 issued by the 4th respondent

University and all consequential proceedings are hereby

quashed. Respondents are directed to release all the retirement

benefits due to him forthwith. No costs.

19. Consequently, miscellaneous Applications, if any

shall stand closed.

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