Mohd. Khaja Moinuddin vs State Of Telangana And 3 Others
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Telangana High Court

Mohd. Khaja Moinuddin vs State Of Telangana And 3 Others on 13 February, 2025

Author: G.Radha Rani

Bench: G.Radha Rani

      THE HONOURABLE Dr. JUSTICE G.RADHA RANI

            CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.914 of 2021

ORDER:

This Civil Revision Petition is filed by the petitioner - plaintiff to set

aside the order dated 26.10.2018 passed in I.A.No.1 of 2017 in I.A.No.320 of

2015 in O.S.No.738 of 2007 by the learned Principal District Judge,

Rangareddy District at L.B.Nagar.

2. The petitioner No.1 died during the pendency of the revision and the

petitioners 2 to 11 were brought on record as legal representatives of deceased

petitioner No.1 as per the orders in I.A.No.3 of 2021 dated 16.09.2022.

3. Heard Ms.Vedula Chitralekha, learned counsel for the petitioner.

4. No representation by the learned Government Pleader for Revenue for

respondents 1 to 3. Notice was served on respondent No.4 through substitute

service. But there is no representation for respondent No.4.

5. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the petitioner No.1 was

the plaintiff. He filed O.S.No.738 of 2007 seeking declaration of his right and

consequential injunction that he was the owner of the agricultural land

admeasuring Ac.1-01 guntas in Survey No.247 situated at Injapur Village,

Hayathnagar Mandal, Rangareddy District. But the said suit was dismissed for

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default on 28.09.2011. Thereafter, the petitioner filed I.A.No.320 of 2015 on

07.04.2015 with a delay of 1195 days. However, the said petition was also

dismissed due to non-representation on 10.06.2015. Thereafter, the petitioner

filed I.A.No.1 of 2017 with a delay of 533 days to restore I.A.No.320 of 2015

and the said petition was dismissed by the learned Principal District Judge,

Rangareddy District at L.B.Nagar.

5.1. Learned counsel for the petitioner further submitted that the suit

underwent transfer from one Court to another Court between the years 2010 and

2011 twice. As such, no proceedings took place in the suit and not followed up

by parties. There was no lack of diligence on the part of the petitioner in

following up the same. Substantial rights of the petitioners were involved in the

case and the interest of justice would warrant condonation of delay and prayed

to restore the suit to its file and to set aside the order dated 26.10.2018 passed in

I.A.No.1 of 2017 in I.A.No.320 of 2015 in O.S.No.738 of 2007 by the learned

Principal District Judge, Rangareddy District at L.B.Nagar.

6. Perused the record.

7. As seen from the impugned order, there was delay of more than three (03)

years in leading evidence in O.S.No.738 of 2007 by the plaintiff after framing

of the issues on 30.07.2008 resulting in dismissal of the suit and the petitioner

filed restoration petition vide I.A.No.320 of 2015 with a delay of four (04)

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years, but failed to pursue the matter. Due to which, the said petition was also

dismissed for non-representation on 10.06.2015. The petitioner filed I.A.No.1

of 2017 to restore I.A.No.320 of 2015 with a delay of 533 days and filed an

affidavit stating that on account of Telangana agitation and due to his ill-health

as he was suffering with Sugar and BP including heart and lungs problem, the

delay was caused. But as he failed to file any medical evidence in support of

the said illnesses cited by him, the learned Principal District Judge, Rangareddy

District at L.B.Nagar observed that "failure to represent the case on one or two

occasions can be condoned but continuous absence and lack of due diligence

cannot be condoned. The petitioner failed to give proper reasons for non

prosecuting I.A.No.320 of 2015 and not filed any medical evidence to believe

the version about his illness being the reason for delay", dismissed the petition

as devoid of merits.

8. The Hon'ble Apex Court in Esha Bhattacharjee v. Managing

Committee of Raghunathpur Nafar Academy & Others 1 while referring to

several judgments rendered by the Court in the said regard, observed that:

10. In this context, we may refer with profit to the authority in Oriental Aroma Chemical Industries Limited v. Gujarat Industrial Development Corporation and another [(2010) 4 SCC 459], where a two-Judge Bench of this Court has observed that the law of limitation is founded on public policy. The

(2013) 12 SCC 649

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legislature does not prescribe limitation with the object of destroying the rights of the parties but to ensure that they do not resort to dilatory tactics and seek remedy without delay. The idea is that every legal remedy must be kept alive for a period fixed by the legislature. To put it differently, the law of limitation prescribes a period within which legal remedy can be availed for redress of the legal injury. At the same time, the courts are bestowed with the power to condone the delay, if sufficient cause is shown for not availing the remedy within the stipulated time. Thereafter, the learned Judges proceeded to state that this Court has justifiably advocated adoption of liberal approach in condoning the delay of short duration and a stricter approach where the delay is inordinate.

11. In Improvement Trust, Ludhiana v. Ujagar Singh and others [(2010) 6 SCC 786], it has been held that while considering an application for condonation of delay no straitjacket formula is prescribed to come to the conclusion if sufficient and good grounds have been made out or not. It has been further stated therein that each case has to be weighed from its facts and the circumstances in which the party acts and behaves.

12. A reference to the principle stated in Balwant Singh (dead) v. Jagdish Singh and others [(2010) 8 SCC 685] would be quite fruitful. In the said case the Court referred to the pronouncements in Union of India v. Ram Charan [AIR 1964 SC 215], P.K. Ramachandran v. State of Kerala [(1997) 7 SCC 556] and Katari Suryanarayana v. Koppisetti Subba Rao [(2009) 11 SCC 183] and stated thus:-

"25. We may state that even if the term "sufficient cause" has to receive liberal construction, it must squarely fall within the

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concept of reasonable time and proper conduct of the party concerned. The purpose of introducing liberal construction normally is to introduce the concept of "reasonableness" as it is understood in its general connotation.

26. The law of limitation is a substantive law and has definite consequences on the right and obligation of a party to arise. These principles should be adhered to and applied appropriately depending on the facts and circumstances of a given case. Once a valuable right has accrued in favor of one party as a result of the failure of the other party to explain the delay by showing sufficient cause and its own conduct, it will be unreasonable to take away that right on the mere asking of the applicant, particularly when the delay is directly a result of negligence, default or inaction of that party."

Justice must be done to both parties equally. Then alone the ends of justice can be achieved. If a party has been thoroughly negligent in implementing its rights and remedies, it will be equally unfair to deprive the other party of a valuable right that has accrued to it in law as a result of his acting vigilantly."

13. Recently in Maniben Devraj Shah v. Municipal Corporation of Brihan Mumbai [(2012) 5 SC 157], the learned Judges referred to the pronouncement in Vedabai v. Shantaram Baburao Patil [(2001) 9 SCC 106] wherein it has been opined that a distinction must be made between a case where the delay is inordinate and a case where the delay is of few days and whereas in the former case the consideration of prejudice to the other side will be a relevant factor, in the latter

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case no such consideration arises. Thereafter, the two-Judge Bench ruled thus: -

"23. What needs to be emphasized is that even though a liberal and justice-oriented approach is required to be adopted in the exercise of power under Section 5 of the Limitation Act and other similar statutes, the courts can neither become oblivious of the fact that the successful litigant has acquired certain rights on the basis of the judgment under challenge and a lot of time is consumed at various stages of litigation apart from the cost.

24. What color the expression "sufficient cause"

would get in the factual matrix of a given case would largely depend on bona fide nature of the explanation. If the court finds that there has been no negligence on the part of the applicant and the cause shown for the delay does not lack bona fides, then it may condone the delay. If, on the other hand, the explanation given by the applicant is found to be concocted or he is thoroughly negligent in prosecuting his cause, then it would be a legitimate exercise of discretion not to condone the delay."

Eventually, the Bench upon perusal of the application for condonation of delay and the affidavit on record came to hold that certain necessary facts were conspicuously silent and, accordingly, reversed the decision of the High Court which had condoned the delay of more than seven years."