Telangana High Court

Ayyangari Ramesh vs The State Of A.P. Rep., By Its Pp on 12 February, 2025

           THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.SURENDER

             CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 1102 OF 2012

JUDGMENT:

This appeal is filed by the appellant/A1 aggrieved by the

conviction recorded by the IX Additional District and Sessions

Judge (FTC) Ranga Reddy District at L.B.Nagar, Hyderabad, in

SC.No.497 of 2010, dated 15.05.2012, for the offence under

Sections 498-A and 306 of the Indian Penal Code and sentencing

him to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of seven years

and to pay Rs.1,000/- for the offence under Section 306 of Indian

Penal Code; and to undergo Rigorous Imprisonment for a period of

three years and to pay a fine of Rs.500/- for the offence under

Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code.

2. Heard learned counsel for the appellant and learned

Asst.Public Prosecutor for the respondent-State.

3. Briefly, the facts of the case are that on 05.06.2010, at 11:20

P.M, a telephonic message was received by PS, Medchal from

Gandhi Hospital, stating that Smt. Ayyanagari (hereinafter,

referred to as 'deceased') had been admitted to the Burns Ward

with 50% burn injuries. Sri P. Venkat Rao, HC-1670 of P.S

Medchal proceeded to Gandhi Hospital and recorded her

statement. The deceased stated that she was married to Ramesh

(A1) 14 years ago and that they had a 12-year-old son and a 9-

year-old daughter. She further stated that their matrimonial life

was peaceful for the first year, but thereafter, A1, influenced by

his mother (A2), brother (A3), and sister-in-law (A4), started

harassing her for additional dowry, repeatedly demanding money

and household articles from her parental home, which she

provided on several occasions. On 05.06.2010, at night, A1, in an

inebriated state, attempted to assault her with an axe stick while

demanding additional dowry. Thereafter, the deceased poured

kerosene on herself and set herself ablaze. She was immediately

shifted to Gandhi Hospital for treatment.

4. Based on the deceased's statement, LW.12 - Inspector of

Police registered a case in Cr. No. 148/2010 under Sections 498-A

and 506 of IPC, categorized as Woman-BURNS, and entrusted the

investigation to PW.11, Sub-Inspector of Police. During the course

of the investigation, PW.11 examined and recorded the statements

of PWs. 1 to 4 and LW.3, visited the scene of offence, and prepared

the scene of offence panchanama and a rough sketch in the

presence of mediators, PWs. 5 and 6. PW.8, Magistrate, recorded

the deceased's dying declaration based on a requisition filed by

PW.11 on 06.06.2010. On 11.06.2010, a telephonic message from

Gandhi Hospital informed that the deceased succumbed to her

injuries at 3:50 P.M while undergoing treatment. Consequently,

the sections of law were altered from Sections 498-A and 506 of

IPC & Woman Burns to Sections 498-A and 306 of IPC. Thereafter,

an inquest over the deceased's dead body was conducted by

PW.11 in the presence of mediators, PW.7 and LW.9, and the

corpse was sent for post-mortem examination (PME). PW.11

conducted the autopsy and concluded that the cause of death was

due to burns. On 15.06.2010, A1 to A4 were arrested.

Subsequently, A1 to A4 were charge-sheeted for offences

punishable under Sections 498-A and 306 of IPC.

5. The learned Additional Sessions Judge having examined the

witnesses PWs.1 to 11 and also relying on the documents Exs.P1

to P8, convicted the appellant/A1, while acquitting A2 to A4.

6. PWs.1 to 4, who are the father, mother, sister, and brother of

the deceased, deposed regarding A1's harassment against the

deceased. According to their evidence, the marriage between the

deceased and A1 took place 15 years ago. After one year of

marriage, A1 began harassing the deceased for additional dowry,

and she informed them about his demands for money. Thereafter,

the deceased and A1 started residing separately from A1's family.

Since A1 was unable to afford the rent for a rented house, PW.1

purchased a small site and constructed two rooms for their stay.

On the day of the housewarming ceremony, A1 physically

assaulted the deceased without any reason. They further deposed

that previously, due to A1's frequent quarrels with the deceased, a

report was lodged with the police, and a case was filed before the

Mahila Court. However, since the deceased wished to reconcile

with A1, the case ended in a compromise. Later, the deceased

once again approached them for financial assistance, and PW.1

arranged Rs. 40,000. The deceased later informed them that all

accused were abusing her. Five to six days later, A3 informed

PWs.1 to 4 that the deceased had attempted suicide and was

admitted to Gandhi Hospital. Upon visiting her, they inquired

about the incident, and the deceased disclosed that A1's

harassment and physical assault had driven her to commit

suicide. PWs. 1 to 4, in unison, deposed about A1's persistent

harassment of the deceased for additional dowry. However, while

they mentioned that a police report was filed and a case was

initiated before the Mahila Court, no documentary evidence was

presented on record to substantiate this claim.

7. Additionally, PW1's statement regarding the purchase of A1's

father's land and the construction of two rooms does not establish

that it was in furtherance of a demand for additional dowry, as

PW.1 himself deposed that the construction was done because A1

lacked money to pay rent. Furthermore, PWs. 1 to 4 are interested

witnesses, and while the testimony of interested witnesses can be

sufficient for conviction, discrepancies exist in their statements

regarding how the deceased sustained burn injuries. According to

PWs.1 and 2, A1's harassment and physical assault led the

deceased to set herself on fire. However, PWs.3 and 4 did not

clearly state that the deceased set herself on fire. Instead, they

deposed that A1 threw her against a wall, causing her to fall and

lose consciousness, and upon regaining consciousness, she found

herself with burn injuries. No explanation has been provided for

the non-examination of the deceased and A1's children, a 12-year-

old son and a 9-year-old daughter, despite their presence being

specifically mentioned in the deceased's dying declaration. In her

dying declaration, the deceased stated that when A1 was beating

her, the children tried to intervene, but A1 assaulted them as well.

Moreover, while PWs .1 to 4 deposed about A1's harassment of the

deceased for additional dowry prior to the incident, none of them

lodged a complaint, even after inquiring with the deceased

regarding how she sustained burn injuries. Hence, it is apparent

that PWs.1 to 4 have improvised their version before court.

8. The prosecution's case states that Medchal P.S received a

telephonic message from Gandhi Hospital at 11:20 P.M on

5.6.2010, while FIR/ExP8 was lodged at 6:20 PM on 6.6.2010,

indicating a delay in the lodging of the FIR. As per PW.10, head

constable, on 6.6.2010, he was instructed by the inspector of

police to proceed to Gandhi Hospital to examine the deceased and

record her S.161 statement, which is Ex.P7. He further deposed

that the inspector of police directed him to record the deceased's

statement at 7:00 AM on 6.6.2010, and that he delivered Ex.P7 to

the inspector at 2:00 PM. However, no reason is provided for the

nearly 4-hour delay in registering the FIR, despite PW.10's

deposition stating that Ex.P7 was handed over to the inspector at

2:00 P.M. Conversely, PW.11, sub-inspector of police, deposed

that on 6.6.2010, they received information from Gandhi Hospital

regarding the admission of the deceased with burn injuries. He

further stated that PW.10 was deputed to record the deceased's

statement at 5:30 P.M. PW.11's testimony contradicts Ex.P4,

which is the requisition requesting the recording of the deceased's

dying declaration. Ex.P4 explicitly states that Medchal P.S

received a telephonic message on 5.6.2010 at 11:20 P.M.

Furthermore, PW.11's deposition not only contradicts the

prosecution's case regarding the receipt of telephonic information

on 5.6.2010 at 11:20 P.M but also conflicts with PW.10's

statement that Ex.P7 was handed over at 2:00 P.M, which is well

before 5:30 P.M--the time PW.11 claimed PW.10 was deputed to

record the deceased's statement. Additionally, PW.10 admitted

that he did not record the time on Ex.P7 when the deceased's

statement was taken, making it impossible to corroborate either

PW.10 or PW.11's testimonies regarding when PW.10 was deputed

to record the deceased's statement. Instead, Ex.P7 states that it

was received on 6.6.2010 at 6:20 P.M. If PW.11's testimony is to

be believed--that they received telephonic information on 6.6.2010

and that PW10 was deputed at 5:30 P.M to record the deceased's

statement--then it remains questionable how Ex.P7 was received

by the police at 6:20 P.M, particularly since, according to PW.11,

the hospital is approximately 15 k.m from the police station.

Moreover, the scribe on Ex.P7, indicating its receipt at 6:20 P.M,

again contradicts PW.10's testimony that he handed over Ex.P7 to

the inspector at 2:00 P.M.

9. Furthermore, PW.2 deposed that the police visited the

hospital before their arrival. However, PW.1 testified that he and

PW.2 reached the hospital around 12:00/1:00 A.M on the night of

the incident and that the police arrived after them. This

discrepancy between the testimonies of PWs. 1 and 2 regarding

whether the police arrived before or after them is significant.

However, both confirmed that the police did arrive at the hospital

on the night of the incident, which raises a critical question as to

why no initial statement of the deceased was recorded if the police

were indeed present at the hospital that night. Such

inconsistencies strike at the core of the prosecution's case. Not

only is there uncertainty regarding when the police received the

telephonic message, but there is also ambiguity regarding when

the deceased's statement was recorded. These discrepancies

further cast doubt on the delay in the lodging of the FIR. With

regard to Ex.P7, the deceased's statement does not mention A1

pushing her against a wall, causing her to become unconscious.

Instead, Ex.P7 states that on 5.6.2010, A1, in a heavily drunken

state, assaulted her with the handle of an axe, again demanded

additional dowry from her parents, and, when she refused, A1

threatened her to either leave the house or die, which led her to

committing suicide. There are contradictions and embellishments

in the testimonies of PWs.1 to 4 regarding how the deceased

sustained her injuries compared to Ex.P7. According to PW.1,

when he and PW.2 arrived at the hospital, the deceased stated

that A1 had beaten her and attempted to kill her with an axe

stick, and due to this harassment, she committed suicide by

setting herself on fire. PW.2, on the other hand, deposed that

when she and PW.1 arrived at the hospital, the deceased stated

that A1 had harassed her for money, pushed her against a wall by

holding her head, and assaulted her. She further stated that the

other accused had instigated A1 to harass her, ultimately leading

her to commit suicide. PW.3 deposed that when she met the

deceased at the hospital, the deceased told her that the accused

had threatened her and that A1 had attempted to strike her with

an axe stick. She also stated that A1 threw her against a wall,

causing her to fall unconscious, and upon regaining

consciousness, she found herself with burn injuries. PW.4

deposed that when he met the deceased at the hospital, she told

him that an argument had taken place over payment of electricity

charges, during which A1 struck her on the head, threw her

against a wall, causing her to fall unconscious, and upon

regaining consciousness, she found herself with burn injuries.

While E.xP7 and the testimonies of PWs. 1 and 2 consistently

state that due to A1's harassment and assault, the deceased

poured kerosene on herself and set herself ablaze, PWs.3 and 4

did not testify that the deceased set herself on fire. According to

them, she lost consciousness after being thrown against a wall,

and upon regaining consciousness, she noticed the burn injuries

on her body.

10. In light of the contradictions between the testimonies of

PWs.1 and 2, on one hand, and PWs.3 and 4, on the other,

regarding how the deceased sustained burn injuries--along with

the inconsistencies and discrepancies in the testimonies of PWs.

10 and 11 concerning Ex.P7--the possibility of the deceased being

tutored cannot be ruled out. This is particularly concerning, given

that no complaint was lodged by PWs.1 to 4 prior to the

registration of FIR/Ex.P8 at 6:20 P.M.

11. In Ex.P5, the dying declaration, recorded by PW.8-

Magistrate, the deceased stated that she poured kerosene on

herself and set herself ablaze due to the accused's beating and

harassment for additional dowry. However, Ex.P5 was recorded at

12:30 pm on 6.6.2010. Ex.P4 is the requisition sent requesting the

recording of the dying declaration, and it is scribed on Ex.P4 that

it was received at 12:00 pm on 6.6.2010. However, it is not

mentioned when Ex.P4 was sent.

12. PW.8, the Magistrate, deposed that he did not inquire

whether the deceased had met her parents before he arrived at the

hospital. However, the testimonies of PWs.1 to 4 clearly establish

that they reached the hospital on the night of 5.6.2010. PW.1

specifically deposed that they arrived at the hospital at

approximately 12:30 am-1:00 a.m on the night of the incident.

13. Thus, the presence of PWs.1 to 4 with the deceased before

the recording of her dying declaration is evident. Given that Ex.P5

was recorded the next day, i.e., at 12:30 pm on 6.6.2010, the

possibility of the deceased being tutored cannot be ruled out,

especially considering that Ex.P7, the deceased's statement, was

also not recorded before the dying declaration. This concern is

further compounded by the delay in lodging the FIR, which was

registered at 6:20 pm on 6.6.2010, despite PS Medchal receiving

telephonic information at 11:20 p.m on 5.6.2010. Additionally,

PW.8 admitted that no crime number was noted on Ex.P4.

14. PW.11 stated that he examined PWs.1 to 4 at Gandhi

Hospital on 7.6.2010. He admitted that their statements under

Section 161 Cr.P.C are dated 6.6.2010, however the date of death

of deceased was mentioned as 11.06.2010 in the 161 Cr.P.C.

statements. The 161 Cr.P.C statements are ante-dated.

15. Learned Counsel for the appellant argued that the witnesses

have deliberately stated against the accused, and developed their

case during trial. Counsel relied on the following Judgments:

i) In case of Laksham v. State of Maharastra 1 the

Honourable Supreme Court cautioned that the Court should

always be on guard to see whether the statement of the deceased

was a result of tutoring, prompting, or a product of imagination.

ii) The Apex Court held in case of Gananath Patnaik v.

State of Orissa 2 that the Dying Declaration recorded by the

Magistrate falls under the statement contemplated under Section

32 of the Evidence Act, pertaining to the cause of death.

iii) In case of Nanhar v. State of Haryana 3 the Honourable

Supreme Court held that a dying declaration should carry the

impression of being genuine and true. It should be free from all

doubts.

iv) The Honourable Supreme Court in case of Kashibai and

others v. State of Karnataka 4, at paras 6 and 7 observed as

under:

2002 (6) SCC 110

2002 (2) SCC 619

JT 2010 (6) SC 196

2023 SCC OnLine SC 575

"6. At this juncture, it would beneficial to reproduce the relevant provision contained in Section 306 IPC pertaining to Abetment of suicide.

306 of IPC: Abetment of suicide: If any person commits suicide, whoever abets the commission of such suicide, shall be punishable with imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to ten years, and shall also be liable to fine.

7. What is 'Abetment of a thing' has been described in Section 107 of IPC which reads as under:

107.A person abets the doing of a thing, who first instigates any person to do that thing; or secondly engages with one or more other person or persons in any conspiracy for the doing of that thing, if an act or illegal omission takes place in pursuance of that conspiracy, and in order to the doing of that thing; or thirdly, intentionally aids, by any act or illegal omission, the doing of that thing.

      Explanation.1:         A     person      who,      by        willful
      misrepresentation, or by         willful concealment of           a

material fact which he is bound to disclose, voluntarily causes or procures, or attempts to cause or procure, a thing to be done, is said to instigate the doing of that thing."

16. From the bare reading of the said provisions, it clearly

transpires that in order to convict a person for the offence under

Section 306 of IPC, the basic constituents of the offence namely,

the death was suicidal, and there was an abetment on the part of

the accused as contemplated in Section 107 IPC have to be

established.

17. As held by the Honourable Supreme Court in various

Judgments, abetment involves a mental process of instigating a

person intentionally in doing a thing. The facts of a given case

should indicate that deliberate acts were done by an accused,

compelling a person to commit suicide. The said ingredients are

missing in the present case. No allegation of constant harassment

was made by the witnesses. However, the suicide according to the

prosecution case, was on account of an act of beating by the

appellant on the date of incident. It cannot be said that the said

beating on the day of incident involves abetment, as observed by

the Honourable Supreme Court.

18. However, from the narration of the victim in the Dying

Declaration and also corroborating testimonies of the family

members, as discussed, it is evident that the appellant was

harassing the deceased for additional dowry.

19. For the said reason, conviction under Section 306 of Indian

Penal Code is set aside. However, while sustaining the conviction

under Section 498-A of the Indian Penal Code, the sentence of

imprisonment is reduced to one year.