Ragam Venkata Santosh Amitav vs State Of Telangana
2025 Latest Caselaw 5232 Tel

Telangana High Court

Ragam Venkata Santosh Amitav vs State Of Telangana on 30 April, 2025

Author: Juvvadi Sridevi

Bench: Juvvadi Sridevi

  THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI

            CRIMINAL PETITION No.3321 OF 2022

O R D E R:

This Criminal Petition is filed by the petitioner-accused

No.2 seeking to quash the proceedings against him in

C.C.No.5945 of 2021 pending on the file of learned II

Additional Junior Civil Judge-cum-X Additional Metropolitan

Magistrate, Kukatpally, Cyberabad, registered for the

offences under Sections 304 Part II read with 109 of the

Indian Penal Code (for short 'IPC'), 184 read with 188 of the

Motor Vehicles Act (for short 'the Act').

02. Heard Sri Avinash Desai, learned Senior

Counsel representing Sri V. Aneesh, learned counsel for the

petitioner-accused No.2 and Smt.S.Madhavi, learned

Assistant Public Prosecutor for the State-respondent No.1.

No representation on behalf of the unofficial respondent

No.2. Perused the record.

03. Brief facts of the case are that Sri A.Mahipal

Reddy, ASI (for short 'the deceased') has been working at

KPHB PS. On 27.03.2021 he was performing duty of Night

Round Officer in the limits of KPHB PS. At about 22:00

hours the deceased along with mobile driver, left the Police

Station in Government Bolero Vehicle bearing No

TS09PA3377 and while performing night patrolling duty at

SBI Bank near Pragathinagar road, at about 00:00 hours the

deceased received a call from cyber control regarding an

incident took place at Kolari Raghava Reddy Garden,

Nizampet, which pertains to Crime No.250 of 2021.

03.1. The deceased along with Home-guard visited the

scene of offence on 28.03.2021 at about 00:10 hours and

observing the scene, in the meanwhile the accused No.1-taxi

driver running Uber Cab bearing No.TS08UD2984 (for short

'the crime vehicle'), who received a booking online call on

27.03.2021 at about 2300 hours from a passenger and he

picked up the said passenger and left RGI Airport towards

Hill County, Nizampet.

03.2. On the way, the accused No.1 reached at Kolan

Raghava Reddy Garden function hall at about 00:15 hours

and dashed the deceased causing severe injuries his head,

legs and other parts of his body. After the said incident, the

accused left the vehicle at the spot and fled away. On

30.03.2021 at 23:30 hours the deceased was declared as

'dead'.

03.3. The petitioner-accused No.2 i.e. management of

Uber Private TAXI have abetted the offence, by encouraging

their drivers to drive at high speed to meet targets. Hence,

the petitioner-accused No.2 has abetted the crime by way of

instigating their driver to work over time without ample rest

for earning more money by announcing perks for driving in

Odd hours and extra hours. Thereby, the petitioner-accused

No.2 has committed the alleged offences.

04. Learned Senior Counsel appearing for the

petitioner submitted that the petitioner is nothing to do with

the alleged offences. The petitioner-accused No.2 i.e. Uber

India, enables customers to avail ride-hailing services by

connecting them with drivers. The petitioner-accused No.2

neither employs the driver nor owns the vehicle. The

petitioner-accused No.2 has no role in the present criminal

case. The petitioner-accused No.2 was merely a platform to

connect the customers. There is no employee and employer

relationship between the accused No.1 and the petitioner-

accused No.2. The contents of the FIR or charge sheet do

not disclose the essential ingredients required for

constituting the offences under Sections 304 Part II read with

109 of IPC, 184 read with 188 of the Act.

05. With the above submissions, learned Senior

Counsel appearing for the petitioner-accused No.2 while

praying for the quashment of criminal proceedings relied

upon a decision in Yuvraj Laxmilal Kanther and another v.

State of Maharasthtra1, wherein the Honourable Supreme

Court of India at Paragraph Nos.12.4, 13, 14, 15 and 16 held

that:

"12.4. Coming back to Section 304 Part II IPC, we find that the said section would be attracted if anyone commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Therefore, the requirement of Section 304 Part

(2025) 3 S.C.R. 502: 2025 INSC 338

II IPC is that the doer must have the knowledge that the act performed is likely to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death but without any intention to cause death.

Thus, the basic ingredient of Section 304 Part II IPC is presence of knowledge and absence of intention. The doer must have the knowledge that the act performed by him would likely cause death etc but there should not be any intention to cause death.

13. This being the legal framework, let us now deal with the charge against the appellants taking the same as correct. According to the prosecution and accepted by the Trial Court and the High Court, the two accused persons had not taken proper care and caution by providing safety shoes, safety belt etc to the two employees though they were asked to perform the job of working on the sign board as part of decorating the front side of the shop which was approximately at a height of 12 feet from the ground level. The accused persons had provided only an iron ladder to the two employees but while working they were struck by electricity as a result of which they suffered electrocution and fell down. They suffered multiple injuries which led to their death.

Therefore, both the accused persons were declared to be responsible for the unnatural death of the two deceased employees.

14. Even if we take the allegation against the appellants as correct, we are afraid no prima facie case can be said to have been made out against the appellants for committing an offence under Section 304 Part II IPC. From the record of the case, it is evident that there was no intention on the part of the two appellants to cause the death or cause such bodily injury as was likely to cause the death of the two deceased employees. It cannot also be said that the appellants had knowledge that by asking the two deceased employees to work on the sign board as part of the work of decoration of the frontage of the shop, they had the knowledge that such an act was likely to cause the death of the two deceased employees. As such, no prima facie case of culpable homicide can be said to have been made out against the appellants. If that be so, the subsequent requirement of having knowledge that the act was likely to cause the death but not having any intention to cause death would become irrelevant though we may hasten to add that nothing is discernible from the record of the

case that the appellants had the knowledge that by asking the two employees to work on the sign board would likely cause their death or cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause their death.

15. Therefore, the basic ingredients for commission of offence under Section 304 Part II IPC are absent in the present case.

16. Section 227 CrPC deals with discharge. What Section 227 CrPC contemplates is that if upon consideration of the record of the case and the documents submitted therewith and after hearing the submissions of the accused and the prosecution in this behalf, the judge considers that there is no sufficient grounds for proceeding against the accused, he shall discharge the accused and record his reasons for doing so. At the stage of consideration of discharge, the court is not required to undertake a threadbare analysis of the materials gathered by the prosecution. All that is required to be seen at this stage is that there are sufficient grounds to proceed against the accused. In other words, the materials should be sufficient to enable the court to initiate a criminal trial against the accused. It may be so that at the end of the trial, the accused may still be

acquitted. At the stage of discharge, court is only required to consider as to whether there are sufficient materials which can justify launch of a criminal trial against the accused. By its very nature, a discharge is at a higher pedestal than an acquittal. Acquittal is at the end of the trial process, may be for a technicality or on benefit of doubt or the prosecution could not prove the charge against the accused; but when an accused is discharged, it means that there are no materials to justify launch of a criminal trial against the accused. Once he is discharged, he is no longer an accused."

06. Further, he relied upon a decision of the High

Court of Delhi in Baldev Raj Kapur v. State2 wherein it was

held at Paragraph Nos.17 and 18 that:

"17. In Vijay Mafatlal Solanki and Anr. v. The State of Gujarat - MANU/GJ/0775/2005 wherein a building in Ahmedabad city was seriously damaged and major portion of the said building collapsed on 26.1.2001 and the prosecution had chargesheeted the petitioners as persons responsible for offences under Section 304 Part II besides other sections, for the collapse of the

MANU/DE/0141/2009

building on the plea that super structure had collapsed because of irresponsible pattern of construction and certain omissions and commissions in constructing the building which ultimately collapsed resulting into the loss of lives and properties of the individuals who were occupying the flats in the said apartment, it was observed:

"9. Having considered the totality emerging from record and in view of the discussion made above, the Court is of the view that, prima facie, the accused persons could not have been chargesheeted for the offence punishable under Section 304 Part : II of the IPC along with other sections which the accused is charged, as there is no element of knowledge or intention on the part of the petitioner. As there is also no element of any criminal conspiracy, the petitioners could not have been chargesheeted for the offence punishable under Section 120-B of IPC. This section has a direct nexus with an intention and mitigation of mind. When a major change is found to be related to the element of negligence, may be by overt act or by omission, there cannot be even assumption of conspiracy. Lack of reasons, to earn some more profit or to get illegal gratification may result in to

negligence and also criminal negligence. The same is an independent offence punishable under IPC. The court is prima facie satisfied that the element of intention to commit a criminal wrong is lacking and, therefore, the accused could not have been chargesheeted for the said offence. So, the petitioners at least should have been discharged from the offence punishable under section 304 & 120 -B of the IPC and ld. Addl. Sessions Judge ought to have said that the accused should be asked to face charge of the offence punishable under Section 304-A of IPC along with other offences charges referred to above."

18. Reading of Section 304 Part II makes it clear that an accused can be charged under the said provision for an offence of culpable homicide not amounting to murder only when being so charged, it is alleged that the accused has done the act with the knowledge that it is likely to cause death or to cause such bodily injury as is likely to cause death; under such circumstances the charged offences would fall under Section 304 Part II. But, before any charge is framed under Section 304 Part II, the material on record must at least prima facie show that the accused is guilty of homicide and

the act committed must amount to culpable homicide. Where the material relied upon for framing such a charge against the accused concerned falls short of even prima facie indicating that the accused appeared to be guilty of an offence of culpable homicide under Section 304 Part II IPC not amounting to murder, it is in the interest of justice that provisions of Section 304 Part II IPC are eliminated."

07. On the other hand, learned Assistant Public

Prosecutor appearing for the State contended that there are

triable issues and factual aspects to be examined by the

learned trial Court and it is not a fit case to quash the

proceedings against the petitioner at this juncture and the

matter has to be decided after conducting trial by the learned

trial Court and prayed to dismiss this Criminal Petition.

08. Having regard to the submissions made on

either side and on perusal of the record, it is apparent on the

face of the record that the petitioner-accused No.2 operates

solely as a technology intermediary, connecting riders with

drivers via mobile application 'Uber'. It is an admitted fact

that the accused No.1 was not employed with the petitioner-

accused No.2. So also, the petitioner-accused No.2 was not

the owner of the crime vehicle. The crime vehicle belongs to

one Mohammed Akbar. Hence, the employer and employee

relationship cannot be attributed to the accused No.1 and the

petitioner-accused No.2. Therefore, there is no direct nexus

between the accused No.1-driver and the petitioner-accused

No.2.

09. Section 304 Part II of IPC would be attracted if

anyone commits culpable homicide not amounting to murder,

if the act is done with the knowledge that it is likely to cause

death but without any intention to cause death or to cause

such bodily injury as is likely to cause death. Therefore, the

requirement of Section 304 Part II IPC is that the petitioner-

accused No.2 must have the knowledge that the act

performed is likely to cause death or to cause such bodily

injury as is likely to cause death but without any intention to

cause death. Thus, the basic ingredient of Section 304 Part

II IPC is presence of knowledge and absence of intention.

The accused must have the knowledge that the act

performed by him would likely to cause death etc but there

should not be any intention to cause death.

10. This being the settled principle of law, the

petitioner-accused No.2 being a platform to connect the

customers and cab drivers, there was no intention or

knowledge on the part of the petitioner-accused No.2 to

cause the death or cause such bodily injury as was likely to

cause the death of the deceased. Generally, when an online

booking ride arrives on the mobile application, it is for the

driver to opt whether to accept the said ride or not. However,

it is for the driver to follow the rules and regulations of the

traffic. Therefore, the petitioner-accused No.2 is no way

connected to the death of the deceased. The essential

ingredients required for constituting the alleged offences are

not made out against the petitioner-accused No.2.

11. In view of the aforesaid facts and circumstances

of the case including the settled principle of law laid down by

the Hon'ble Supreme Court of India, this Court is of the firm

opinion that the allegations levelled against the petitioner-

accused No.2 do not attract the alleged offences. Therefore,

the continuation of the criminal proceedings against the

petitioner-accused No.2 amounts to abuse of process of law

and the same are liable to be quashed.

12. Accordingly, this Criminal Petition is allowed and

the criminal proceedings against the petitioner-accused No.2

in C.C.No.5945 of 2021 pending on the file of learned II

Additional Junior Civil Judge-cum-X Additional Metropolitan

Magistrate, Kukatpally, Cyberabad, are hereby quashed.

As a sequel, pending miscellaneous applications, if

any, shall stand closed.

__________________ JUVVADI SRIDEVI, J Dated: 30-APR-2025 KHRM

THE HONOURABLE SMT JUSTICE JUVVADI SRIDEVI

PD JUDGMENT IN CRIMINAL PETITION No.3321 OF 2022 Dated: 30-APR-2025 KHRM