Telangana High Court

Sri Pula Ranga, Punjagutta Colony, ... vs State Of Ap. Rep. By Pp.,Acb, City ... on 30 April, 2025

             HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.SURENDER

             CRIMINAL APPEAL No.567 OF 2012
JUDGMENT:

1. This appeal has been preferred by the appellant/accused,

aggrieved by the judgment dated 12.6.2012 in C.C. No. 34 of

2006, passed by the Principal Special Learned Learned Special

Judge for SPE and ACB Cases, Civil City Court, at Hyderabad,

whereby the appellant was convicted for the offences under

Sections 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the PC Act, 1988, and

sentenced to undergo rigorous imprisonment for one year and

pay a fine of Rs 1,000, in default, simple imprisonment for one

month for the offence under Section 7; and to undergo rigorous

imprisonment for two years and pay a fine of Rs 2,000, in default,

simple imprisonment for one month for the offence under

Sections 13(2) read with 13(1)(d). Both sentences were directed to

run concurrently.

2. Briefly, the facts of the case are that PW1 is the

complainant. According to him, his father, Bhoomanna, retired

from service as Head Master from Government High School,

Jumaratpet, Nirmal District. PW1's mother, Susheela, aged about

48 years, underwent bypass surgery at Care Hospital on

5.3.2005 and was discharged on 20.3.2005. In this regard, PW1's

father applied for reimbursement of medical expenses incurred,

amounting to around Rs 1,22,000.After scrutiny in the office of

the Director of Medical Education, the eligible reimbursement

amount was determined to be Rs 1,09,815, and the file was

forwarded to the Director of School Education of A.P., Hyderabad,

in October 2005.

3. It is the case of PW1 that he approached Sri P. Ranga

Rao/appellant, who was working as a Senior Assistant in the

office of the Director of School Education, on 18.10.2005 and

enquired about the status of the file. The appellant informed him

that the eligibility had been assessed under G.O. No. 74 dated

15.3.2005 instead of G.O. Ms. No. 175 dated 29.5.1997, as a

result of which an additional amount of Rs 50,000 would be

sanctioned. PW1 alleged that the appellant demanded a bribe of

Rs 5,000 to process the file accordingly and stated that he would

then forward it to the District Education Officer.On 10.11.2005,

when PW1 again approached the appellant, the appellant

allegedly reiterated the earlier demand and informed him that

unless the amount of Rs 5,000 was paid, the file would not be

processed. He instructed PW1 to bring the amount on the

following day.

4. As PW1 was unwilling to pay the bribe, he lodged a

complaint with PW5, the Deputy Superintendent of Police, ACB,

on 10.11.2005 at 11:30 hrs. PW5 registered the complaint as Cr.

No. 15/ACB-CR/2005 under Section 7 of the PC Act, 1988, on

11.11.2005 at 9:30 a.m., after verification and preliminary

inquiry.

5. During investigation, PW5 secured the services of PW2 and

LW9 to act as mediators. A trap was organized on 11.11.2005,

following all legal procedures, and details were recorded in

ExP3/Mediators' Report I.

6. During the trap on 11.11.2005, at about 1:30 p.m., when

PW1 met the appellant at the office premises of the Director of

School Education, the appellant demanded and accepted Rs

5,000 as illegal gratification other than legal remuneration from

PW1 with his right hand and placed the amount in his right-side

trouser pocket. Upon receiving the pre-arranged signal from PW1,

the trap party apprehended the appellant.

7. Subsequently, the phenolphthalein test was conducted on

the appellant's hands, and his right-hand fingers yielded a

positive result. The tainted amount of Rs.5,000/- was recovered

at the instance of the appellant from his right-side trouser

pocket. When the inner lining of that pocket was tested with

sodium carbonate solution, it also gave a positive result. The

appellant was arrested on 11.11.2005 and sent to judicial

remand. He was later granted bail.

8. Investigation revealed that the appellant had demanded and

accepted the bribe amount of Rs 5,000 from PW1 for doing an

official favour, i.e., for processing the medical reimbursement file

of PW1's father. Sanction for prosecution was accorded by the

Government of A.P., being the competent authority to remove the

appellant from service.

9. A charge sheet was filed against him for offences under

Sections 7 and 13(2) read with 13(1)(d) of the PC Act.

10. The learned Special Learned Special Judge, relying on the

evidence of PWs 1 to 6 (prosecution witnesses) and Exs.P1 to P14

(marked documents), found in favour of the prosecution version

that the appellant demanded and accepted the bribe on the date

of the trap. The learned Special Judge held that an official favour

was pending with the appellant as on the date of the trap, as

even though he had put up the note on 31.10.2005 and signed

the same, relying on PW3's evidence, it was found that after

approval of PW1's father's file by the Director of School

Education, the file would be returned to the Senior Assistant,

R1's section, for drafting the proceedings of the sanction order.

The learned Special Judge stated that upon approval of the file by

the Director, the appellant was still required to prepare the

proceedings and dispatch the same to the concerned individuals.

11. The learned counsel for the appellant argued the following

points:

i. That the father of PW1 submitted the medical reimbursement bills with several defects. While processing the bills, the appellant found discrepancies and returned them after noting the same. Thereafter, on 16.7.2005, PW1 approached the appellant with a letter, a new dispatch summary, and other documents. PW1 then picked up a

quarrel with the appellant, accusing him of intentionally delaying the file and even threatened that he would see how the appellant continued to work in the office. PW1 bore a grudge against the appellant.

ii. That according to PW1, the demand was made by the appellant on 18.10.2005, but the report was lodged only on 10.11.2005, and the delay was not explained. It was attempted during PW1's evidence to justify the delay by stating that he was unwell; however, this explanation does not appear either in the complaint or in the statement recorded under Section 164 CrPC. Hence, the unexplained delay is fatal to the case.

iii. That the investigating officer did not secure copies of G.O.Ms. No. 74 and 175 and did not examine whether an additional Rs 50,000 would be sanctioned if the old G.O. was applied. Thus, the claim of PW1 that the appellant informed him of a higher reimbursement under G.O.Ms. No. 175 is not substantiated. On the contrary, the appellant argued that a lesser amount would be sanctioned under the old G.O., thereby showing PW1's willingness to give false evidence.

iv. That no official favour was pending with the appellant since he had processed the file by 31.10.2005, and it was then pending with the Director of School Education. v. That while the appellant was parking his two-wheeler under a tree in front of his office, PW1 suddenly came from behind and thrust some currency notes into the pant pocket of the appellant's trousers. The appellant tried to stop him with

his hand, but PW1 ran away and ACB officials apprehended the appellant. DW2 supported the appellant's version. The appellant stated about the thrusting incident immediately upon being apprehended, and due weight should be given to this representation. Admittedly, several people would usually be present under the tree, yet the prosecution failed to examine any independent witnesses. Hence, DW2's evidence must be accepted.

vi. PW4's evidence indicated that the sanction order was merely copied from the draft sent by the ACB, and therefore, there was no application of mind in issuing it. Consequently, the sanction to prosecute the appellant is not valid.

12. Firstly, what needs to be considered is whether the

appellant had any official favour pending as on the date of the

trap.

13. PW1's evidence is that during March 2005, his mother

underwent bypass surgery at Care Hospital and was discharged

on 20.3.2005. In this connection, PW1's father, who retired as

Head Master from Government High School, applied for medical

reimbursement of approximately Rs.1,22,000/- and submitted

the application along with supporting documents to the Head

Master, Government High School, Jummeradpet.

14. PW1 stated that after submission to the Head Master, the

application was forwarded to the District Education Officer

(DEO), Adilabad, who in turn sent the documents to the Director

of School Education, Andhra Pradesh. The Director of School

Education then transmitted the file to the Director of Medical

Education for approval. The Director of Medical Education

sanctioned reimbursement of Rs 1,09,850 as per G.O. No. 74 of

2005. The file was thereafter returned to the Director of School

Education by the Director of Medical Education, confirming the

sanctioned amount. Since the file was received by the Director of

School Education in October 2005, PW1 approached the

appellant on 18.10.2005 to enquire about the status of his

mother's reimbursement.

15. According to PW1, and as reflected in ExP1, when he met

the appellant regarding the reimbursement application, the

appellant informed him that eligibility had been granted under

G.O. No. 74 dated 15.3.2005 instead of G.O. Ms. No. 175 dated

29.5.1997, which would have resulted in an additional sanction

of Rs 50,000. For processing the file accordingly and forwarding

it to the DEO, the appellant allegedly demanded a bribe of Rs.

5,000/-.

16. The key issue is whether the appellant was authorized to

determine the eligible reimbursement amount and whether he

could have applied G.O. Ms. No. 175 to secure an extra Rs

50,000/-.

17. Although PW1 denied knowledge during cross-examination

that eligibility is fixed by the Director of Medical Education and

not by the Director of School Education, he later admitted that

the latter's office merely forwards the medical reimbursement

bills received from the DEO to the Director of Medical Education,

where eligibility is decided. PW1 also acknowledged that the

Director of Medical Education determined the reimbursement

amount as Rs 1,09,815 on 19.9.2005 and returned the file to the

Director of School Education in October 2005.

18. PW3, who was then Superintendent in the Director of

School Education's office, confirmed that their department had

no power to finalize the reimbursement amount, which solely lies

with the Director of Medical Education.

19. PW6, Inspector, ACB, further affirmed during his testimony

that his investigation revealed that only officials in the Director of

Medical Education's office are authorized to fix such amounts.

20. The testimonies of PWs 1, 3, and 6 collectively make it clear

that the authority to determine the admissible reimbursement

amount vests exclusively with the Director of Medical Education

and not with the Director of School Education, where the

appellant was posted. Even ExP4, the photocopy of File No.

646/R1-2/05 relating to PW1's father's reimbursement file,

includes a letter from the Director of Medical Education to the

Director of School Education outlining the calculated admissible

amount. The letter confirms that the sanctioned amount of Rs.

1,09,815/- had the approval of the Additional Director of Medical

Education.

21. Therefore, the evidence confirms that the appellant, being in

the Director of School Education's office, lacked the authority to

determine the eligible reimbursement amount and could not have

applied G.O. Ms. No. 175 to sanction an extra Rs.50,000/-. Since

PW1 admitted awareness that the reimbursement amount had

already been fixed by the Director of Medical Education on

19.9.2005 and the file had been received by the Director of

School Education in October 2005, there is no plausible reason

for him to have believed the appellant's claim of securing an

additional Rs.50,000/-.

22. It is also unclear why PW1 did not contact the officials of

the Director of Medical Education for nearly a month--from the

alleged demand on 18.10.2005 until he filed the complaint on

10.11.2005--to verify whether an additional amount could be

sanctioned.

23. Furthermore, PW5, DSP, ACB, admitted that he did not

verify with the appellant's office regarding who was competent to

determine reimbursement eligibility and whether it fell under the

jurisdiction of the Director of School Education or Medical

Education. This was also admitted by PW2, the mediator. PW5

stated that apart from seizing the file from the Deputy Director,

he did not verify its contents or review ExP4. He also

acknowledged his lack of awareness regarding the content of

PW1's complaint, including the claim that G.O. No. 74 was

applied instead of G.O. No. 175, resulting in a potential

additional reimbursement of Rs.50,000/- and a related bribe

demand of Rs.5,000/-. Moreover, PW5 admitted that he did not

seize copies of either G.O. Ms. No. 74 or G.O. Ms. No. 175 at the

time of the trap. PW6 similarly stated that during his

investigation, he did not examine any witnesses concerning G.O.

Ms. No. 175 to determine whether an additional amount of Rs.

50,000/- could actually have been sanctioned, as claimed in

PW1's complaint/ExP1. It remains unascertained why neither the

ACB nor the Inspector investigated whether the appellant had

any authority to approve an extra Rs.50,000/- or whether such a

benefit could have arisen under G.O. Ms. No. 175. The ACB also

failed to obtain or examine G.O. Ms. No. 74 or G.O. Ms. No. 175

to assess the legitimacy of PW1's claims.

24. Nonetheless, the record clearly establishes that only the

officials in the Director of Medical Education's office could

determine the eligible reimbursement amount, and the appellant

had no power to sanction additional sums. It was not within his

scope of duties to determine reimbursement eligibility, and PW1

was aware of this. Therefore, the alleged bribe demand for

performing an act outside the appellant's official functions does

not arise.

25. Now what needs to be considered is whether the appellant

did not process the file of PW1's father until the date of the trap

due to a demand for bribe and whether he intentionally kept the

file pending until that date.

26. PW3's evidence is relevant. He stated that the R1 section in

their office dealt with subjects of medical reimbursement and

pension for retired gazetted officers in the state and that the

appellant was working as a Senior Assistant in the said section.

The appellant's duty was to process medical reimbursement bills.

27. PW3 admitted that the file pertaining to PW1's mother was

received in their office on 29.4.2005. He further admitted that the

file was forwarded to the appellant, who raised five objections on

2.6.2005. These objections were approved by higher officials, and

the file was returned to the DEO. Later, the file was again

received in their office on 6.7.2005, and the appellant put up a

note on 11.7.2005. Based on this note, the then Superintendent,

H.Ramesh Babu, pointed out on 12.7.2005 that the discharge

date in the Essentiality Certificate did not match the Emergency

Certificate and Discharge Summary, and that an original

Appendix II, duly signed by the forwarding authority, was also

required. Subsequently, PW1 submitted a letter dated 16.7.2005

(ExP2) complying with the objections.

28. Thereafter, the appellant put up a note on 21.7.2005,

recommending the bills be sent to the Director of Medical

Education. This note was approved by the Deputy Director, and a

letter was addressed to the Director of Medical Education on

27.7.2005. The office of the Director of Medical Education later

fixed the admissible amount for PW1's mother at Rs 1,09,815

and sent the file back to their office on 6.10.2005. The appellant

then put up a note on 31.10.2005, which was signed by PW3 on

5.11.2005. LW2, J.Satyanarayana, Assistant Pension Officer,

approved it on 9.11.2005 and forwarded it to the Special Officer,

Text Books (LW3/Sri Salam), who approved it on the same day

and forwarded the file to the Director of School Education, the

final sanctioning authority.

29. From the above, it is evident that the Director of Medical

Education fixed the admissible amount at Rs.1,09,815/- and

returned the file on 6.10.2005. Thereafter, the appellant put up a

note on 31.10.2005. PW1 admitted only that the Director of

Medical Education fixed the medical reimbursement amount for

PW1's mother as Rs.1,09,815/- on 19.9.2005 and sent the file to

the Director of School Education in October 2005. He denied

that the appellant put up a note on 31.10.2005.

30. PW5 also admitted that when he questioned the appellant

about the file, the appellant stated that it was not with him and

that he had already forwarded it on 31.10.2005 to the

Superintendent for onward submission to the Deputy Director

and Director, which was also confirmed by PW2. PW5 further

stated in his cross-examination that, according to his

investigation, the appellant processed the file on 31.10.2005 and

sent it to the Superintendent on 5.11.2005, who then forwarded

it to J.Satyanarayana, Assistant Director. He, in turn, sent the

file to the Deputy Director on 9.11.2005, who recommended and

sent it to the Director of School Education the same day. In ExP9

(Mediators' Report II), it is recorded that when the DSP, ACB

questioned the appellant regarding the official transaction of the

file for PW1's father's reimbursement, the appellant replied that

the file was received from the DEO on 8.7.2005 and a note was

put up to the Assistant Director on 11.7.2005. Another note was

made on 21.7.2005. The file was returned on 27.7.2005 after

approval and dispatched to the Director of Medical Education for

scrutiny. The file was received back from DME on 7.10.2005 and

again forwarded to the Assistant Director on 31.10.2005 for

sanction.

31. According to PW3's evidence, unless the Director,

Directorate of School Education, gives an order for issuing

proceedings and forwards the same, the appellant cannot proceed

further. However, there is no evidence that the Director issued

such an order. In fact, PW5 stated that on the date of the trap,

the Director of School Education was not available in the office.

He was unaware that the Director was on election duty in other

states. There is no explanation as to why PW5 did not examine

the Director to establish whether an order had been issued and if

the appellant deliberately kept the file pending.

32. Most significantly, the file concerning PW1's father was not

found with the appellant on the date of the trap. PW5, in his chief

examination, deposed that during post-trap proceedings, he

examined LW2, J Satyanarayana, Assistant Director, who stated

that the file related to PW1's mother was with the Special Officer,

Text Books (Deputy Director cadre). LW2 obtained ExP4 from the

Special Officer during post-trap proceedings. PW2 also confirmed

that the Assistant Director produced the file related to the

medical reimbursement bill of PW1's mother, and the ACB

officials seized it from the office room of the Director of School

Education on the trap date. Further, in ExP9 (Mediators' Report

II), it is recorded that DSP, ACB, examined J Satyanarayana, who

stated that the file related to PW1's father was received on

6.11.2005 from the Superintendent, R1 Section, for note

processing for sanction. He forwarded it to the Special Officer,

Text Books (Deputy Director), who cleared it on 9.11.2005. The

file was pending with the Special Officer. He also stated that after

approval from the Director, the file would be returned to the

Senior Assistant, R1 Section, for drafting sanction orders.

33. Lastly, PW3 clearly stated in his cross-examination: "there is

nothing to be done by the accused officer in the file/ExP4 as on the

date of the trap, i.e., 11.11.2005." PW5 also admitted during

cross-examination that no paper related to the medical

reimbursement of PW1's mother was pending with the appellant

as of the trap date. PW6, Inspector, ACB, similarly admitted that

"by the date of trap no document relating to medical

reimbursement of the mother of PW1 was pending with the

accused officer."

34. The above evidence clearly indicates that the appellant had

completed his responsibilities. He processed the file on

31.10.2005 and sent it to the Superintendent. The file was not

found with him on the trap date; rather, it was seized from the

office of the Director of School Education at the instance of LW2,

who obtained it from the Special Officer during post-trap

proceedings. Therefore, the evidence supports that the appellant

had discharged his duties by forwarding the file to the Director of

School Education and did not deliberately keep it pending. This

is also evident from the fact that the file was not seized from him

but was produced by LW2, J Satyanarayana.

Demand on 18.10.2005 by the appellant and subsequent filing of complaint:

35. The only evidence regarding the alleged demand by the

appellant for a bribe of Rs. 5,000 on 18.10.2005 is that of PW1.

What needs to be considered is whether PW1's testimony is

reliable enough to believe his version that a demand was made by

the appellant on that date.

36. According to PW1, when the file was forwarded to the

Director of School Education in October, 2005, he approached

the appellant on 18.10.2005 and enquired about the same, at

which point the appellant demanded a bribe for processing it. As

he was not willing to pay the demanded amount, on 10.11.2005,

he visited the office of the ACB and lodged a complaint--ExP1.

ExP1/Complaint was filed on 10.11.2005.

37. PW1, in his cross-examination, stated that he met the

appellant for the first time on 18.10.2005 and had not interacted

with him previously. However, there is a contradiction in his own

testimony. PW1 admitted in cross-examination that on

16.7.2005, he met the appellant and submitted a letter stating

that there were discrepancies in the date mentioned in the

discharge summary and hence a new discharge summary was

being submitted. He further stated that only xerox copies of the

documents were submitted for consideration. ExP2 is PW1's

letter dated 16.7.2005 submitted to the appellant in compliance

with the defects pointed out by the Superintendent.

38. On one hand, PW1 claims that he met the appellant for the

first time on 18.10.2005, whereas he also admits having

interacted with him earlier on 16.7.2005 and submitting ExP2.

39. In addition to this inconsistency, there is an unexplained

delay of nearly one month in lodging the complaint. Although the

alleged demand was on 18.10.2005, the complaint was not filed

until 10.11.2005. The explanation offered by PW1 is that he was

unwell from 18.10.2005 and, after recovering on 10.11.2005, he

gave the complaint. However, he admitted that he had not

mentioned this fact either in ExP1/Complaint, or in his Section

161 Cr.P.C statement before the DSP, ACB, or in his Section 164

Cr.P.C statement before the Magistrate. He further admitted that

the claim regarding his ill-health was made for the first time in

court.

40. It is evident from the above that PW1's statement regarding

being unwell from 18.10.2005, and that being the reason for the

delay in filing the complaint, is a clear omission and appears to

be an afterthought introduced for the first time during the trial.

41. Moreover, PW1 admitted that he did not inform anyone

about the appellant's alleged demand of Rs. 5,000 on 18.10.2005

until he approached the ACB officials on 10.11.2005. He also

admitted that between 18.10.2005 and 11.11.2005, he did not

lodge any oral or written complaint with the appellant's superior

officers, such as the Superintendent, Assistant Director, Deputy

Director, or the Director.

42. If PW1 was indeed sick for nearly a month, he ought to have

produced some medical evidence such as doctor's prescriptions

or certificates to convince the court that his ill-health genuinely

caused the delay. Further, there is no evidence in the testimonies

of PW2 and PW5 that they questioned PW1 about the delay or

that he provided an explanation.

43. In light of the delay, the contradiction in PW1's own

testimony about meeting the appellant for the first time, and the

absence of any corroborative evidence to support the alleged

demand of Rs. 5,000 on 18.10.2005, PW1's version cannot be

accepted as reliable to conclude that such a demand was made.

His testimony does not inspire confidence.

44. Demand and Acceptance on the Date of Trap:

According to PW1, he, along with the trap party, reached the

office of the appellant at 12:15 p.m. on 11.11.2005. The DSP

reiterated his earlier instructions and asked him to go into the

appellant's office. PW1 then went to the R1 section but found

that the appellant was not at his seat. He contacted the appellant

through a landline telephone, calling the appellant's mobile. The

appellant instructed him to wait near the tree outside the office

and said he would arrive within half an hour. At around 1:30

p.m., the appellant came on his two-wheeler, took PW1 into the

office, and told him to pay the bribe so that the work could be

completed quickly. The appellant then asked him to follow, and

both came out of the office. Outside, the appellant demanded the

bribe. PW1 handed over the tainted notes, which the appellant

accepted with his right hand and kept in his right pant pocket.

45. Thereafter, PW1 gave the pre-arranged signal. Even in

cross-examination, PW1 deposed that the transaction took place

in the open space in front of the appellant's office, under a tree.

However, PWs 2 and 5 deposed that the trap party reached the

appellant's office at 12:15 p.m. on 11.11.2005. The DSP

instructed PW1 to proceed into the office. After PW1 entered, the

rest of the trap party took their positions near the office. Around

1:45 p.m., they received the pre-arranged signal from

PW1.Neither PW2 nor PW5 mentioned PW1 coming out and going

back into the office with another person. PW2, in his cross-

examination, admitted that he and the other trap party officials

did not see the appellant and PW1 entering or exiting the office

together. PW1, on the other hand, denied the suggestion that he

was never asked by the appellant to come into the office and that

they did not go into the office together or return to the tree area.

46. Even in ExP9 (Mediators' Report II), PW1's version is that he

entered the office, found the appellant absent, waited for some

time, and then called the appellant. The appellant asked him to

wait outside. At around 1:30 p.m., the appellant arrived, both

entered the office, and then exited together to the area under the

tree. It is clear that PW1's version is inconsistent with the

testimonies of the other prosecution witnesses.

47. Further, PW1 stated that the money was handed over under

the tree, in front of the appellant's office. However, again, neither

PW2 nor PW5 deposed about PW1 exiting with someone and

going towards the tree. Their statements only confirm that PW1

entered the office and gave the pre-arranged signal at 1:45 p.m.

According to PW1, he and the appellant came out together, the

bribe was given, and only then was the signal given. This

contradiction becomes more significant because ExP8, the rough

sketch of the scene, does not indicate where the trap party

members were positioned. If they had taken positions near the

office, they would have witnessed PW1 exiting and re-entering.

Yet, PWs 2 and 5 remain silent on this point.

48. Moreover, while PW1 in his chief stated that he contacted

the appellant via a landline call to his mobile, in cross-

examination, he stated he does not remember the mobile number

he dialled from a public telephone booth on the trap date. If he

had used a public booth, he would have had to step outside, and

someone from the trap team would have observed him. However,

no witness supports this part of PW1's version. The location of

the public booth is also not indicated in ExP8, making it unclear

whether it was inside or outside the premises.

49. Additionally, the prosecution's case is that the appellant

was caught by the ACB under the tree in front of the office. PW1

admitted that vehicles were commonly parked under the tree and

that it was a public area. On the day of the trap as well, the

appellant parked his two-wheeler under the tree. PW5 denied

that any visitors were present at that time, while PW2 admitted

that there were several people at the location where the appellant

was apprehended. Their statements contradict each other, and

ExP8 only shows the appellant and PW1 at that spot. PW5

admitted that ExP9 (Mediators' Report II) does not mention

whether the appellant was alone or whether others were present.

PW2 also admitted that ACB did not examine or question any of

the visitors who were at the scene when the appellant was

caught. No reason has been provided for this failure by PW5.

50. The appellant's defence that he parked his two-wheeler

under the tree and PW1 suddenly thrust currency notes into his

pant pocket, and that the appellant tried to prevent it, appears

plausible in view of PW2's admission that visitors and staff

parked their vehicles in that area. Even PW1 admitted that the

appellant parked his vehicle there on the trap day.

51. Further, the appellant's version has remained consistent

since the beginning. He stated during the post-trap proceedings

and in his S.313 CrPC examination that PW1 forcibly placed

money into his right hand, and when he resisted, pushed it into

his pant pocket. PW2 admitted that when the DSP questioned the

appellant, he stated that PW1 forcibly placed the currency in his

hand and then into his pocket. PW5 also confirmed that the

appellant, when questioned about the alleged demand and

acceptance, denied both and explained that PW1 pushed the

currency notes into his hand and then into his pocket despite his

refusal. Even in ExP9, it is mentioned that the appellant's

explanation was that PW1 forcibly placed a wad of currency in

his right hand and also forcibly inserted the cash into the right-

side pocket.

52. DW2, a typist in the office of the Director of School

Education, was examined by the defence and deposed that on

11.11.2005, around 1:40 p.m., he was about to go for lunch and

came out of the office. At that time, he saw the appellant arrive

on a scooter and park it under the tree. As the appellant walked

towards the entrance, a man came from behind and thrust

currency notes into the appellant's pant pocket while the

appellant attempted to stop him with his hand. The man then

ran away, and ACB officials immediately apprehended the

appellant. However, DW2 admitted that he did not report this

incident to his superiors or to the ACB till date and did not raise

any complaint. While this limits the reliability of DW2's evidence,

when seen along with the inconsistencies in PW1's version and

the appellant's consistent defence, it cannot be completely

ignored.

53. There is no independent evidence apart from PW1's

testimony regarding the alleged demand and acceptance of the

bribe on the trap date. Since PW1's testimony contains material

contradictions, and both PWs 2 and 5 confirm the appellant's

denial of the demand and acceptance when questioned, it cannot

be said that the prosecution has established beyond doubt that

the appellant demanded and accepted the bribe on 11.11.2005.

54. The Hon'ble Supreme Court, in the case of Ram Prakash

Arora v. State of Punjab 1 , found that a trap witness is a

partisan witness, who is interested in the trap. Such evidence

must be tested like any other interested witnesses, and the Court

should look for independent corroboration before recording

conviction.

55. In V.Venkata Subbarao v. State rep. by Inspector of

Police, A.P 2 , the Hon'ble Supreme Court held that once the

prosecution fails to prove the evidence of demand, the question of

raising presumption against the accused does not arise. The

Hon'ble Supreme Court further held that the delay in filing the

complaint also adds to the infirmity in the prosecution case.

(1972) 3 Supreme Court Cases 652

(2006) 13 Supreme Court Cases 305

Recovery:

56. Though the sodium carbonate test conducted on the

appellant's right-hand fingers yielded a positive result and

though the bribe amount was recovered from the appellant's

right-side wearing pant pocket at his instance, the same is of no

consequence in light of the prosecution not being able to prove

demand for bribe on 18.10.2005 and the demand and acceptance

of bribe on 11.11.2005, i.e., the date of trap.

Motive:

57. It is the defence of the appellant that PW1 lodged a false

complaint against him since PW1 bore a grudge. According to the

appellant, the father of PW1 submitted medical reimbursement

bills with several defects. While processing the bills, the appellant

identified the defects and returned them after clearly noting the

same. Thereafter, on 16.7.2005, PW1 approached the appellant

with a letter, a new dispatch summary, and other documents,

and picked up a quarrel, alleging that the appellant was

intentionally delaying the processing of the file. PW1 also

threatened that he would see how the appellant would continue

working in the office and bore a grudge against him.

58. PW1 admitted that after receiving the file, the appellant

scrutinized it and raised five objections, namely: emergency

certificate without name and seal of the doctor; essentiality

certificate not signed by the doctor; discharge certificate without

name and seal of the doctor; all medical bills not attested by the

treating doctor; and a non-drawl certificate duly mentioning the

amount, Spell-I, II, III, and disease, as per G.O.Ms No. 601 dated

15.10.2003. PW1 admitted that based on these objections, the

appellant recommended that the file be returned. Accordingly,

the file was sent back to the DEO, then to the Head Master, and

finally to PW1. After addressing the objections, it was

resubmitted to the DEO on 6.7.2005. PW1 further admitted that

on 11.7.2005, the appellant put up a note, and the

Superintendent, Ramesh Babu, pointed out additional defects on

12.7.2005, stating that the discharge date mentioned in the

Essentiality Certificate did not tally with the emergency certificate

and discharge summary. Additionally, one more Appendix-II in

original, duly signed by the forwarding authority, was required.

The Superintendent endorsed to obtain the same and return the

file to the appellant. On 16.7.2005, PW1 met the appellant and

submitted a letter stating there were mistakes in the discharge

summary date and that a new discharge summary was being

submitted, along with xerox copies of all documents for

consideration. ExP2 is PW1's letter dated 16.7.2005, submitted

to the appellant, complying with the defects pointed out by the

Superintendent.

59. PW3 also admitted that the appellant had raised five

objections on 2.6.2005. He confirmed that the objections were

approved by higher officials, and the file was returned to the

DEO. The file was again received in their office on 6.7.2005, and

the appellant put up a note on 11.7.2005. Based on this, the

then Superintendent pointed out further defects on 12.7.2005.

Thereafter, PW1 submitted ExP2/letter dated 16.7.2005,

complying with the objections. PW6 admitted that as per

ExP4/file, the appellant returned the medical reimbursement file

of PW1's mother on 2.6.2005 with five objections.

60. DW1, who was then the Senior Assistant in the Director of

School Education, stated that his seat was adjacent to that of the

appellant. On 16.7.2005, around 12:00/12:30 p.m., a person

came to the appellant and picked up a quarrel regarding his

mother's medical reimbursement. He left angrily, challenging how

long the appellant would remain in office and that he would see

his end. DW1 later confirmed from the appellant that the person

was PW1. DW1 also deposed that the appellant informed him the

file was not in proper order, and the objections raised led to the

altercation, due to which PW1 bore a grudge. However, in cross-

examination, DW1 admitted that this was the first time he was

stating before the Court about the quarrel. He also stated that

out of fear, he did not inform anyone earlier.

61. PW5 admitted that during the post-trap proceedings, when

he questioned the appellant, the appellant represented that PW1

bore a grudge against him because he was not disclosing the

movement and processing of the file. This was also admitted by

PW2.

62. In light of the above, it is clear that the appellant had raised

objections, and because of those, PW1 had to resubmit the

application. The process evidently took nearly seven months.

Even assuming that no quarrel occurred on 16.7.2005, in view of

PW1's contradictory testimony without corroboration, the

unexplained delay in lodging the complaint, the absence of any

official favour pending with the appellant, and the appellant's

prompt explanation, it is apparent that PW1 falsely lodged a

complaint against the appellant.

63. In P.Satyanarayana Murthy v. District Inspector of

Police and State of Andhra Pradesh and another 3, it was held

that mere recovery or acceptance of the amount, dehors the proof

of demand, will not be sufficient to bring home the charge under

Sections 7 and 13 of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1988

Regarding Sanction:

64. Lastly, the argument of the counsel is that the sanction

order was simply copied from the draft sanction order sent by the

ACB and that there was no application of mind by the competent

authority.

65. In CBI v. Ashok Kumar Aggarwal, (2014) 14 SCC 295,

the Hon'ble Supreme Court held as follows:

"13. The prosecution has to satisfy the court that at the time of sending the matter for grant of sanction by the competent authority, adequate material for such grant was made available to the said authority. This may also be evident from the sanction order, in case it is extremely comprehensive, as all the facts and circumstances of the case may be spelt out in the sanction order. However, in every individual case, the court has to find out whether there has been an application of mind on the part of the sanctioning authority concerned on the material placed

(2015) 10 Supreme Court Cases 152

before it. It is so necessary for the reason that there is an obligation on the sanctioning authority to discharge its duty to give or withhold sanction only after having full knowledge of the material facts of the case. Grant of sanction is not a mere formality. Therefore, the provisions in regard to the sanction must be observed with complete strictness keeping in mind the public interest and the protection available to the accused against whom the sanction is sought.

14. It is to be kept in mind that sanction lifts the bar for prosecution. Therefore, it is not an acrimonious exercise but a solemn and sacrosanct act which affords protection to the government servant against frivolous prosecution. Further, it is a weapon to discourage vexatious prosecution and is a safeguard for the innocent, though not a shield for the guilty.

15. Consideration of the material implies application of mind. Therefore, the order of sanction must ex facie disclose that the sanctioning authority had considered the evidence and other material placed before it. In every individual case, the prosecution has to establish and satisfy the court by leading evidence that those facts were placed before the sanctioning authority and the authority had applied its mind on the same. If the sanction order on its face indicates that all relevant material i.e. FIR, disclosure statements, recovery memos, draft charge-sheet and other materials on record were placed before the sanctioning authority and if it is further discernible from the recital of the sanction order that the sanctioning authority perused all the material, an inference may be drawn that the sanction had been granted in accordance with law. This becomes necessary in case the court is to examine the validity of the order of sanction inter alia on the ground that the order suffers from the vice of total non-application of mind. (Vide Gokulchand Dwarkadas Morarka v. R. [(1947-48) 75 IA 30 : (1948) 61 LW 257 :

AIR 1948 PC 82] ; Jaswant Singh v. State of Punjab [AIR 1958 SC 124 : 1958 Cri LJ 265] , Mohd. Iqbal Ahmed v. State of A.P. [(1979) 4 SCC 172 : 1979 SCC (Cri) 926] , State v. KrishanchandKhushalchand Jagtiani [(1996) 4 SCC 472 : 1996 SCC (Cri) 755] , State of Punjab v. Mohd. Iqbal Bhatti [(2009) 17 SCC 92 : (2011) 1 SCC (Cri) 949] , Satyavir Singh Rathi,

ACP v. State [(2011) 6 SCC 1 : (2011) 2 SCC (Cri) 782] and State of Maharashtra v. Mahesh G. Jain [(2013) 8 SCC 119 : (2014) 1 SCC (Cri) 515 : (2014) 1 SCC (L&S) 85] .)"

66. ExP11 is the sanction order. It contains only seven

paragraphs, out of which the first five are a verbatim copy of the

charge sheet submitted by the ACB. In the last paragraph, it is

merely stated that in exercise of the powers conferred, sanction is

hereby accorded. In the sixth paragraph, it is mentioned that

after fully and carefully examining the material placed, it was

decided that the appellant must be prosecuted. However, the

sanction order, on its face, does not indicate what material was

considered or even refer to any specific material. It is evident that

the sanction order was passed without any application of mind.

67. In view of the above discussion, the prosecution has failed

to prove that there was a demand made by the appellant. The