Telangana High Court
Mr. Syed Badruddin vs The State Of Telangana on 24 September, 2024
1
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W.P.No.17767 of 2024
IN THE HIGH COURT FOR THE STATE OF TELANGANA AT
HYDERABAD
*****
WRIT PETITION NO.17767 of 2024
Between:
Mr. Syed Badruddin.
...Applicant.
AND
1. The State of Telangana rep. by its Principal Secretary
Agriculture and Co-operation Department, Secretariat,
Hyderabad.
...Respondents
JUDGMENT PRONOUNCED ON: 24.09.2024
SUBMITTED FOR APPROVAL:
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.SARATH
1. Whether Reporters of Local : Yes/No
newspapers may be allowed to
see
the Judgment ?
2. Whether the copies of judgment : Yes/No
may be marked to Law
Reports/Journals
3. Whether Their : Yes/No
Lordship/Ladyship wish to see
the fair copy of judgment
_____________________
JUSTICE K.SARATH
2
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W.P.No.17767 of 2024
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.SARATH
+WRIT PETITION NO.17767 of 2024
%Dated 24.09.2024
# Mr. Syed Badruddin
...Applicant.
AND
$ 1. The State of Telagnana rep. by its Principal Secretary,
Agriculture and Cooperation Department, Secretariat,
Hyderabad and others.
...Respondents
! Counsel for Applicant : Sri Avinash Desai, learned
Senior Counsel for Sri Girija
Shankar Sharma.
^ Counsel for Respondents: Assistant Government
Pleader for Cooperation.
^Counsel for respondent No.6:Sri J. Ashvini Kumar.
< GIST :
> HEAD NOTE :
? Cases referred :
1
2023 SCC OnLine SC 95
2 (1998) 8 SCC 1
3 (2004)1 SCC 391
4 (2014) 3 SCC 502
5 Un-reported judgment in W.P.No.19230 of 2024
of the High Court for the State of Telangana.
6 (1964) 2 An WR 375
3
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W.P.No.17767 of 2024
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE K.SARATH
WRIT PETITION No.17767 of 2024
ORDER:
This writ petition is filed questioning the order
passed by the respondent No.3 vide Proceeding
R.C.No.1413/2016-WS dated 20.06.2024 in disqualifying
the petitioner from the post of Chairman of the
respondent No.5-Society in terms of provision of
Section 32(3) of the Telangana Cooperative Societies
Act,1964 and devolving the powers of the Chairman on
Vice-Chairman of the Society until conduct of election to
the post of Chairman of the Society as illegal and
arbitrary.
2. Heard Sri Avinash Desai, learned Senior Counsel for
Sri Girija Shankar Sharma, learned counsel for the
petitioner, learned Assistant Government Pleader for
Cooperation and Sri J. Ashvini Kumar, learned counsel
for the respondent No.6.
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3. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner submits
that the respondent No.5-Society functioning has been
governed by the provisions of the Telangana Cooperative
Societies Act, 1964 (for short 'the Act') read with Bye-
Laws of the respondent No.5-Society. The affairs of the
said Society have been managed by the Board of Directors
consisting of 12 Directors, who were elected among the
Members of the Society. Out of the 12 elected Directors,
one Director has to be elected as Chairman and another
one as Vice-Chairman.
4. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further
submits that as per the orders of this Court in W.P.
No.21940 of 2020 dated 20.09.2021, elections were
conducted on 27.03.2022, 12 candidates were
unanimously elected as Directors and among them,
the petitioner and the respondent No.6 were elected as
Chairman and Vice-Chairman of the respondent No.5-
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Society. While it being so, the respondent No.6 filed
W.P.No.29145 of 2023 for disqualification of the petitioner
as Chairman of the Society and this Court by order dated
08.04.2024 directed the respondent No.6 herein to file
appropriate representation to the respondent No.3 and on
receipt of the same, the respondent No.3 shall examine
the same and pass appropriate orders in accordance with
the provisions of the Act within a period of two (2) months
from the date of receipt of a copy of the said order duly
affording an opportunity of personal hearing to all the
concerned.
5. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further
submits that the petitioner has conducted the Managing
Committee meetings every quarterly i.e, every three
months and the respondents have not taken into account
of every quarter or three months as a unit and passed the
impugned order. As per Section 2(c) of the Act, the
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Co-operative year/ Financial Year means, the period
commencing on the 1st day of April of every year and
ending with the 31st day of March of the succeeding year
and the respondents have to calculate from the 1st April of
the year for calculating the three months period as one
quarter. Accordingly, the petitioner has conducted
meeting every quarter and without considering the same,
the respondent No.3 has issued the impugned
proceedings and moreover, there is no mention
specifically that the three months period will be counted
from the date of last meeting as per Section 32(3) of the
Act. He further submits that Section 32(3) of the Act has
not specified the date and the time to conduct the
meeting and as such, it is left to the discretion of the
President/Chairman to conduct meetings in every three
months and the petitioner has conducted all the meetings
of the Managing Committee each and every three months
of the cooperate year i.e., 01.04.2022 to 31.03.2023.
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6. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further
submits that the respondent No.3, without
communicating the representation submitted by the
respondent No.6, issued show cause notice to the
petitioner. The respondent No.3, without giving
opportunity of hearing in the enquiry as per the orders of
this Court in W.P.No.29145 of 2023 and in spite of the
representation of the petitioner on 18.06.2024, passed
impugned orders on 20.06.2024 and the same is in
violation of principles of natural justice and the impugned
order is liable to set aside on the ground of violation of
principles of natural justice.
7. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner further
submits that Section 32(3) of the Act prescribes the duty
of the President of the Society to conduct a meeting of the
Managing Committee once in every three months. During
Cooperative year 01.04.2022 to 31.03.2023, the petitioner
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has conveyed two general body meetings and five
meetings of the Managing Committee within time,
whereas the requirement of meetings of the Managing
Committee in a year is of four, but one extra meeting of
the Managing Committee was conveyed by the petitioner.
He submits that the petitioner has rightly conducted all
the meetings of the Managing Committee during each and
every three months period and there was no delay or
failure on the part of the petitioner in convening the said
meetings within time and even in the detailed report
dated 11.05.2023, the respondent No.4 stated that the
petitioner has conveyed required meetings as per Section
32(3) of the Act. He further submits that the respondent
No.3 has failed to consider the report dated 11.05.2023,
whereby the respondent No.4 specifically stated that the
petitioner has conveyed required Managing Committee
Meetings of the Society as per Section 32(3) of the Act and
the impugned order was passed without affording
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opportunity of hearing to the petitioner and requested to
set aside the impugned order by allowing the writ
petition.
8. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has relied
on the following decisions;
1. Godrej Sara Lee Ltd., Vs. Excise and Taxation
Officer-cum-Assessing Authority and others 1
2. Whirlpool Corporation Vs. Registrar of Trade
Marks, Mumbai and others2
3. Krishi Utpadan Mandi Samiti Vs. Pilibhit
Pantnagar Beej Limited 3
9. Learned Assistant Government Pleader for
Cooperation submits that as per the order passed by this
Court in W.P.No.29145 of 2023 dated 08.04.2024, the
respondent No.3 conducted hearings with parties present
on 28.05.2024 and 11.06.2024 and after perusing the
2023 SCC OnLine SC 95
(1998) 8 SCC 1
(2004)1 SCC 391
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records, passed the impugned order of disqualifying the
petitioner from the post of Chairman as the petitioner
failed to conduct the meetings of the Managing
Committee once in three months as contemplated under
Section 32(3) of the Act. Though the petitioner has
received notices dated 07.05.2024 and 28.05.2024 and
opportunity was given for personal hearing, he failed to
appear before the respondent No.3 on 28.05.2024 and
11.06.2024. He submits that the petitioner has convened
the Managing Committee meeting on 31.10.2022 and
thereafter he failed to convene meeting by 31.01.2023 or
followed by one month i.e., 28.02.2023 or by 01.03.2023,
but he has conducted the same on 17.03.2023/
18.03.2023 with a delay of 16 days and as such the
provision of Section 32(3) of the Act was applied for
disqualification of the petitioner. He further submits that
the report of the respondent No.4 is not a binding
precedent to the respondent No.3 for passing orders and
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the respondent No.3 has followed principles of natural
justice by giving reasonable opportunity to the petitioner
and passed reasoned orders and he requested to dismiss
the writ petition.
10. Learned Counsel for the respondent No.6 submits
that as per the directions of this Court in W.P.No.29145
of 2023 dated 08.04.2024, the respondent No.6 made a
representation dated 29.04.2024 to the respondent No.3,
who in turn issued notice to both sides on 07.05.2024 for
personal hearing on 28.05.2024, but the
petitioner has deliberately failed to appear before the
respondent No.3. He submits that the petitioner in his
reply dated 10.05.2024 did not raise any objection for not
providing a copy of the representation of the respondent
No.6 dated 29.04.2024 and the respondent No.3, after
taking into consideration of the reply submitted by the
petitioner and after following the mandatory procedure as
contemplated under Section 32(3) of the Act, has passed
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the impugned order and there is no illegality in the
impugned order.
11. Learned Counsel for the respondent No.6 further
submits that the petitioner has not followed the
mandatory procedure in conducting the Managing
Committee meetings in accordance with Section 32(3) of
the Act. He submits that even according to the dates of
the Managing Committee meeting held by the petitioner,
after the Managing Committee meeting dated 31.10.2022,
the next managing committee meeting was held on
17.03.2023 and 18.03.2023 i.e., beyond four months
from 31.10.2022, which is contrary to the time stipulated
under Section 32(3) of the Act. The Chairman has no
discretion in conducting the meetings except in
accordance with Section 32(3) of the Act. He submits that
pursuant to the orders passed by the respondent No.3,
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the respondent No.6 has taken charge as Chairman of the
respondent No.5-Society on 22.06.2024.
12. Learned Counsel for the respondent No.6 further
submits that the petitioner has alternative efficacious
remedy of appeal under Section 76 of the Act against the
orders passed under Section 32(3) of the Act and the
same was contended by the petitioner in earlier
W.P.No.29145 of 2023 and requested to dismiss the Writ
Petition.
13. Learned Counsel for the respondent No.6 has relied
on the following judgments;
1. Dipak Babaria Vs. State of Gujarat4
2. Bharat Petroleum Corporation Limited, Hyderabad
Vs. The Principal rent Controller, City Civil Court,
Secunderabad5
(2014) 3 SCC 502
Un-reported judgment in W.P.No.19230 of 2024
of the High Court for the State of Telangana.
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14. After hearing both sides and perusal of the material
on record, this Court is of the considered view that the
writ petition is filed questioning the impugned order of
disqualification of the petitioner from the post of
Chairman of the respondent No.5 Society and the said
order was passed on the ground that the petitioner has
violated the provisions of Section 32(3) of the Act. The
petitioner was elected as Chairman of the Society on
27.03.2022 and conducted meetings on 21.04.2022,
23.07.2022 (adjourned for no Quorum), 28.07.2022,
14.09.2022 (adjourned for no Quorum), 15.09.2022,
31.10.2022, 17.03.2023 (adjourned for no Quorum) and
18.03.2023.
15. Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has
vehemently argued that the respondent No.3 without
communicating the representation filed by the respondent
No.6 and without hearing the petitioner has passed the
impugned order on 20.06.2023 in violation of the
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principles of natural justice. But the record reveals that
earlier, the respondent No.6 has approached this Court
and filed W.P.No.29145 of 2023 questioning the inaction
of the official respondents in disqualifying the petitioner
herein as Chairman of the Society on failure of
conducting the meetings within the mandatory period as
contemplated under Section 32(3) of the Act. After
hearing both sides, this Court disposed of the said writ
petition on 08.04.2024 observing that without expressing
any opinion on the merits of the matter, granted liberty to
the respondent No.6 herein to file appropriate
representation to the respondent No.3 and on such
representation, the respondent No.3 shall examine the
same and pass appropriate orders in accordance with the
provisions of the Act, within a period of two (2) months
from the date of receipt a copy of the said order duly
affording an opportunity of personal hearing to the all the
concerned.
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16. In view of the order passed by this Court, the
respondent No.6 made a representation to the respondent
No.3 on 29.04.2024. Based on the said representation,
the respondent No.3 issued notice to the petitioner and
the respondent No.6 and summoned them to appear
before him on 28.05.2024 vide proceedings RC
No.1413/2016-WS dated 07.05.2024. In response to the
same, the petitioner has submitted his detailed
explanation on 10.05.2024 to the respondent No.3 with
regard to conducting of Management Committee Meeting
and other issues. Thereafter, the respondent No.3 issued
another proceedings in Rc.No.1413/2016-WS
dated 28.05.2024 stating that the petitioner has not
attended the hearing on 28.05.2024 at 11.30 am to
defend his case and further directed the petitioner to
appear before the respondent No.3 on 11.06.2024 at
11.30 AM. After receiving the said notice, the petitioner
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sent an e-mail to the respondent No.3 on 10.06.2024
stating that he will discharge from the hospital on
13.06.2024 and requested four days time to appear either
on 15.06.2024 or any other later date without mentioning
the details of his illness and the particulars of the
hospital where he joined. Subsequently, the petitioner
has sent a letter to the respondent No.3 on 18.06.2024
and submitted the copies of writ affidavit, counter
affidavit and the order in W.P.No.29145 of 2023 and
stated that he has submitted the original record of CIEL
pertaining to all the Board Meetings and the General
Body Meetings in his letter dated 10.05.2024. In the said
letter, it was mentioned that he has not received the
representation or the complaint made by the respondent
No.6 on 29.04.2024 and requested to communicate the
same by the next date of hearing.
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17. The letter of the petitioner dated 18.06.2024
clearly shows that the petitioner has submitted his
explanation on 10.05.2024 and he has not appeared on
28.05.2024 and also on 11.06.2024 and thereafter, as
afterthought, the petitioner mentioned in the said letter
that he has not received the representation made by the
respondent No.6. Basing on that, the petitioner contended
before this Court that without communicating the
representation of the respondent No.6, the respondent
No.3 has passed the impugned order and the same is in
violation of principles of natural justice. The petitioner
has conveniently without asking the representation of the
respondent No.6 submitted his detailed explanation on
10.05.2024 and not attended for personal hearing on
28.05.2024 and also on 11.06.2024 and now raised the
dispute that he has not received the representation of the
respondent No.6 and also not afforded opportunity of
personal hearing as per the orders of this Court. The
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petitioner has given his explanation basing on the earlier
round of litigation before this Court in W.P.No.29145 of
2023, now the petitioner cannot contend before this
Court that there is violation of principles of natural
justice and the said contention is not acceptable.
18. The respondent No.6 contended that the petitioner
without availing the alternative remedy of appeal, has
approached this Court and in the earlier round of
litigation, the petitioner has specifically urged before this
Court that against the orders passed under Section 32(3)
of the Act, there is an alternative and efficacious remedy
of appeal under Section 76 of the Act and the writ petition
is liable be dismissed on that ground. Learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioner vehemently opposed the
contention of the respondent No.6 as the issue raised
before this Court is legal interpretation of Section 32(3) of
the Act and there is no bar for filing the writ petition and
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the Hon'ble Supreme Court time and again stated that
there is no bar for filing the writ petition under Article
226 of the Constitution of India.
19. The learned Counsel for both sides has relied on the
Judgments for maintainability of instant writ petition.
Learned Senior Counsel for the petitioner has relied on
the Judgment in Godrej Sara Lee Limited's case
(cited 1 supra) and in Whirlpool Corporation's case
(cited 2 supra), and the Learned Counsel for the
respondent No.6 has relied on the Judgment in
Bharath Petroleum Corporation Limited's case
(cited 5 supra).
20. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in Godrej Sara Lee
Limited's case (supra 1), at para No.8 held as
follows:
"8. That apart, we may also usefully refer to the
decisions of this Court reported in (1977) 2 SCC 724 (State
of U. P. v. Indian Hume Pipe Co. Ltd.) and (2000) 10 SCC
482 (Union of India v. State of Haryana). What appears on a
plain reading of the former decision is that whether a
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certain item falls within an entry in a sales tax statute,
raises a pure question of law and if investigation into facts is
unnecessary, the High Court could entertain a writ petition
in its discretion even though the alternative remedy was not
availed of; and, unless exercise of discretion is shown to be
unreasonable or perverse, this Court would not interfere. In
the latter decision, this court found the issue raised by the
appellant to be pristinely legal requiring determination by
the High Court without putting the appellant through the
mill of statutory appeals in the hierarchy. What follows from
the said decisions is that where the controversy is a purely
legal one and it does not involve disputed questions of fact
but only questions of law, then it should be decided by the
High Court instead of dismissing the writ petition on the
ground of an alternative remedy being available.
The above Judgment squarely apply to the instant
case as this writ petition is pertaining to interpretation of
Section 32(3) of the Act and in view of the same, the writ
petition is maintainable.
21. The Judgment of this Court in Bharat Petroleum
Corporation Limited's case (cited 5 supra) is not
apply to the instant case as the facts are different.
22. The Section 32 of the Telangana Cooperative
Societies Act, 1964 reads as under;
"32. General Meetings and Committee Meetings:-
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(1) The committee may, at any time, call not less
than two general meetings of a society in a co-
operative year:
Provided that one meeting shall be held in
each half year.
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3) It shall be the duty of the President of the
society to call the meetings of the committee so
that atleast one meeting of the committee is held
in every three months. If the President fails to
discharge that duty with the result that no
meeting is held, within such period of three
months or within one month following such period,
he shall with effect from the date of expiration of
one month aforesaid cease to be the President. The
Registrar shall issue orders to that effect:
Provided that it shall also be the duty of
the President to call such meetings within fifteen
days of the date of receipt of requisition in writing
in that behalf from any of the requisitionists
specified in sub-section (2).
xxxx
23. In the above Sub-section (3), it clearly mentioned
that the duty of the President of the Society to call the
meetings of the committee at least one meeting in every
three months otherwise, he shall cease to be the
President. But there is no mention about the each
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quarter or three months to be taken into as a Unit for
conducting meetings.
24. The dispute is with regard to the meeting conducted
by the petitioner after 31.10.2022 to
17.03.2023/18.03.2023. In the impugned order, the
respondent No.3 has stated that the petitioner has failed
to conduct the meeting by 31.01.2023 or followed by one
month i.e., 28.02.2023 or by 01.03.2023, but he has
conducted meeting on 17.03.2023/18.03.2023 with a
delay of more than 16 days and as per Section 32(3) of
the Act, the petitioner has disqualified for the post of
Chairman of the Society.
25. The similar point was considered by this Court in V.
Ramachary vs. The State of Andhra Pradesh
represented by the Secretary for Planning, Hyderabad6
and held in para Nos.3 and 5 as under;
3. The law was amended for the first time on 15th
6 (1964) 2 An WR 375
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January, 1963, namely, section 22(7) [of the Panchayat
Samithisand Zilla ParishadsAct, which is as follows:--
Section 27(7).--"It shall be the duty of the President or the
person for the time being exercising the powers and performing
the functions of the President to convene the meetings of the
Panchayat Samithi so that at least one meeting of the
Panchayat Samithi is held in every three months. If the
President or such person fails to discharge that duty with the
result that no meeting is held within the said period of three
months or in the month following such period, he shall, with
effect from the date of expiration of the month foresaid, cease
to be the President, or as the case may be, cease to exercise the
powers and perform the functions of the President, unless
such cessation has otherwise occurred before that date, and
for a period of one year from such date he shall not be eligible
to be elected as President or to exercise the powers and
perform the functions of the President:
xxx
5. The principal contention of Mr. Y. Sivarama Sastry, the
learned Counsel for the petitioner, is that, the expression
"at least one meeting of the Panchayat Samithi is held in
every three months" should be construed to mean that
any meeting held shall be deemed to have been held for
three calendar months. His contention is that, the
meeting which was held on 11th January, 1963 should
be deemed to have been held for three months ending the
month of March, 1963. On this basis, he argues that the
next meeting could be held within three months from the
month of February, and if this period is thus calculated
and one month grace which is allowed under sub-section
(7) of section 22 is taken into account, the petitioner has
not incurred any disqualification. The same argument is put
in another way that although the amendment came into
force on 15th January, 1963, 1 should compute the period
on the abovesaid lines from 1st January, 1963. I am
unable to accept this contention. It is now a fairly settled
rule of law that the ordinary and normal meaning should be
given to a provision of law without straining the language
or doing any violence to it. If we apply this principle of
construction to sub-section (7) of section 22, it leaves no
one in doubt that the expression "so that at least one
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meeting of the Panchayat Samithi is held in every three
months" has to be understood to mean that computation
of three months would begin from the date of the last
meeting. If this construction is correct, as I understand it
to be, then in this case we have to calculate from nth
January, 1963, as the last meeting was held on that date.
That date cannot, however, be taken as the basic date
obviously because on that date there was no obligation on
the part of the President to convene any meeting at least
once in three months. Such obligation was, for the first
time, cast upon him on 15th January, 1963. The
computation in this case, therefore, will have to be made
not from 11th January 1963, but from 15th January, 1963.
In either case, it makes a little difference as far as the result
is concerned. The petitioner, therefore, ought to have
convened a meeting in three months either from 11th
January, 1963 or from 15th January, 1963 when the
amended provision came into force. When the next meeting
was held admittedly on 21st May 1963, calculated in any
one of the two ways, it was admittedly held beyond
the prescribed period of three months. Even if the grace
period of one month allowed by the subsection (7) is
calculated, the meeting ought to have been held on or
before 15th May, 1963. When once the President failed
to hold the meeting as above, by virtue of sub-section (7) of
section 22 of the Act he automatically incurs the
disqualification. It is not necessary for any officer to pass
any order declaring that he is disqualified. If he has failed
to hold the meeting as directed under section 22(7), that
provision of law comes immediately into operation and
the President gets disqualified automatically. I am not,
therefore, prepared to accept the argument that the meeting
held on 1 ith January, 1963 should be deemed to have been
held for the first quarter of the year, and for the purposes of
calculating the period for holding' the second meeting the
computation should be made from February, 1963. There
is no warrant or any justification for such calculation. The
argument that month means English calendar month, or
calender month means the number of days fixed in a
particular month, does not assist in any way the petitioner
in supporting his contention. The contention that "once in
every three months" should mean three months according
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to the English calendar commencing from first of every
month for the purposes of section 22(7) cannot thus be
accepted. Whatever may be the date of the last meeting, the
period of three months will have to be counted from that
date. I find no difficulty in computing the period in this
manner. There is no justification in either relating it
back to the first of the month or postpone it to the first of
the next month in order to compute the period. This
argument is not supported by any authority or provision of
law. If this, argument is accepted, it would produce
extraordinary results, which would defeat the very purpose
of the amendment.
xxxxxx
The true construction, therefore, would be to hold that the
President is now under a statutory obligation to convene
the next meeting within three months from the date of
the last meeting. He may, however, hold the meeting
during the period of these three months on any day he likes.
But he certainly cannot transgress the limit of three
months laid down under section 22(7) of the Act. Any
interpretation which extends the period beyond three
months obviously cannot be accepted as correct. The
contention of the learned Advocate, if accepted, would
produce only that result. I am, therefore, satisfied that by
holding the meeting on 21st May, 1963, the petitioner had
failed to discharge the duty put on him under section 22(7)
of the Act. He has thus immediately incurred the
disqualificationon 15th May, 1963 because that was the last
date which was allowed to him to hold the said meeting
under the amended provision. The order of the Collector,
therefore, would only mean that the petitioner would
discontinue to hold the post of the President, because that
is the result of the law and not the result of the Collector's
order.
26. The case of V. Ramachary's (cited 6 supra) is
similar to the instant case and the provisions of
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Section 32(3) of the Telangana Cooperative Societies
Act, 1964 and Section 27(7) of the Panchayat
Samithis and Zilla Parishads Act, 1959 are similar. In
the above Judgment, this Court held that 'once in
every three months' should mean three months
according to the English calendar commencing from
first of every month cannot be accepted. Whatever
may be the date of the last meeting, the period of
three months will have to be counted from that date
and held that the President is under a statutory
obligation to convene the next meeting within three
months from the date of the last meeting.
27. In the instant case, the petitoner being
Chairman of the Society has conducted Managing
Committee meeting on 31.10.2022 and thereafter
conducted meeting on 17.03.2023/18.03.2023 i.e.,
after more than 4 months 16 days. As per
Section 32(3) of the Act, the duty of the President of
the Society has to conduct one meeting of the
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committee in every three months. But the petitoner
has not conducted any meeting from 31.10.2022 to
17.03.2023/18.03.2023. In view of the same, the
finding given by this Court in V. Ramachary's case
(cited 6 supra) squarely apply to the instant case and
the petitoner has not complied with the provisions of
Section 32(3) of the Act for conducting the Managing
Committee Meeting and he has to conduct meeting
within three months from the last date of earlier
meeting. In view of the same, the impugned order
passed by the respondent No.3 is valid.
28. The other contention of the petitioner is that the
respondent No.3 has failed to consider the report of
the Respondent No.4 dated 11.05.2023 as the
petitioner conducted meetings as per the requirement
of Section 32 (3) of the Act. In fact, the report of the
respondent No.4 is not binding on the respondent
No.3 and moreover the said report of the respondent
No.4 is not in consonance with the Section 32 (3) of
SK,J
the Act. Therefore, the contention of the petitioner
cannot be acceptable.
29. The Judgment relied on by the learned Senior
Counsel for the petitioner in Krishi Utpadan Mandi
Samiti's case (cited 3 supra), the Hon'ble Supreme
Court held as under;
58. In the case of London and North Eastern Rly. Co.
v. Berriman, Lord Simonds quoted with approval (at All ER
p. 270 C-D) the following observations of Lord Esher, M.R.
in the case of Tuck & Sons v. Priester, QBD at p. 638:
"We must be very careful in construing that section,
because it imposes a penalty. If there is a reasonable
interpretation which will avoid the penalty in any particular
case we must adopt that construction. If there are two
reasonable constructions we must give the more lenient one.
That is the settled rule for the construction of penal
sections."
It is trite that fiscal statute must not only be construed
literally, but also strictly. It is further well known that if in
terms of the provisions of a penal statute a person becomes
liable to follow the provisions thereof it should be clear and
unambiguous so as to let him know his legal obligations and
liabilities thereunder.
The above Judgment is not apply to the instant
case as there are no two reasonable interpretations in
Section 32(3) of the Act.
SK,J
30. The Judgment relied on by the learned counsel
for the respondent No.6 in Dipak Babaria's case (cited
4 supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court held in para
No.61 as under;
"61. It is well settled that where the statute provides
for a thing to be done in a particular manner, then it has to
be done in that manner and in no other manner. This
proposition of law laid down in Taylor v. Taylor was first
adopted by the Judicial Committee in Nazir Ahmad v. King
Emperor and then followed by a Bench of three Judges of
this Court in Rao Shiv Bahadur Singh v. State of Vindhya
Pradesh. This proposition was further explained in para 8 of
State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh24 by a Bench of three
Judges in the following words: (AIR p. 361)
"8. The rule adopted in Taylor v. Taylor21 is well recognised
and is founded on sound principle. Its result is that if a
statute has conferred a power to do an act and has laid
down the method in which that power has to be exercised, it
necessarily prohibits the doing of the act in any other
manner than that which has been prescribed. The principle
behind the rule is that if this were not so, the statutory
provision might as well not have been enacted."
This proposition has been later on reiterated in Chandra
Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad, Dhanajaya Reddy v. State of
Karnataka26 and Gujarat Urja Vikas Nigam Ltd. v. Essar
Power Ltd. 27
The above Judgment squarely apply to the
instant case. The statute provides in Section 32 (3) of
the Act that it shall be the duty of the President of the
Society to call the meeting of the Committee at least
one meeting of the committee in every three months.
SK,J
But there is no mention of every quarter or three
months as one unit. In view of the same, the
contention of the writ petitioner cannot be acceptable.
31. In spite of receipt of notice, the petitioner failed
to attend the enquiry. The petitioner, in the writ
affidavit, no where mentioned the reason for not
attending the personal hearing on 28.05.2024 and
also not mentioned in his letter dated 18.06.2024. On
the second date of personal hearing i.e., 11.06.2024
also, the petitioner has not attended, but sent an
e-mail on 10.06.2024 stating that he will be
discharged from the hospital on 13.06.2024 without
giving any particulars and asked for four days time. In
view of the same, the petitioner was not utilized the
opportunity of personal hearing. As per Section 32(3)
of the Act, once, the petitioner failed to conduct the
Management Committee Meeting in every three
months, he shall be ceased from the post of
Chairman/President of the Society. The respondent
SK,J
No.3, after giving reasonable opportunity to the
petitioner, passed the impugned order and there is no
irregularity in passing the said order.
32. In view of the above findings, there are no
grounds to interfere with the impugned order in
R.C.No.1413/2016-WS dated 20.06.2024 passed by
the respondent No.3 under Article 226 of the
Constitution of India. In view of the same, the writ
petition is liable to be dismissed.
33. Accordingly, the Writ Petition is dismissed as
devoid of merits. No order as to costs.
34. Miscellaneous petitions, if any pending in this
writ petition, shall stand dismissed.
________________
K. SARATH, J
Date: .09.2024
Note: LR Copy to be marked
Issue CC tomorrow
sj
