Telangana High Court
Polepally Ruben, Hyderabad., vs The State Of Telangana, Rep Pp., on 10 September, 2024
Author: P. Sam Koshy
Bench: P.Sam Koshy, N.Tukaramji
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE P.SAM KOSHY
AND
THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N.TUKARAMJI
CRIMINAL APPEAL No.738 of 2016
JUDGMENT:
(per the Hon'ble Sri Justice P. SAM KOSHY)
Heard Mr. Mettu Goverdhan Reddy, learned counsel for the
appellant - accused and Mr. Syed Yasar Mamoon, learned
Additional Public Prosecutor for the respondent - State.
2. Aggrieved by the judgment of conviction dated 05.02.2016
in Sessions Case No.351 of 2012 passed by the V Addl.
Metropolitan Sessions Judge (Mahila Court) at Hyderabad, the
instant appeal under Section 374(2) of Cr.P.C has been filed by
the appellant.
3. Vide the impugned judgment, the Trial Court found the
appellant guilty for the offence punishable under Section 302 of
IPC and sentenced him to undergo rigorous imprisonment for life
with fine of Rs.1,000/- and with default stipulation of further
simple imprisonment for three months in the event of default.
4. The case of the prosecution in brief is that on the
intervening night of 24&25.02.2012, the appellant is said to have
strangulated his two children namely Polepally Teja aged around
12 years and Polepally Rechal aged around 11 years with the aid
of charger wire of his cellphone and after killing his two children
he informed the incident to his wife Smt. P.Shoba and neighbors.
The matter was thereafter reported at S.R. Nagar Police Station
where the case was registered as Cr.No.185 of 2012. The police
authorities investigated the matter and finally the charge sheet
was filed and the matter was put to trial before the V Addl.
Metropolitan Sessions Judge (Mahila Court) at Hyderabad where
the case was registered as Sessions Case No.351 of 2012. The
appellant was charged for the offences punishable under Section
302 and 498-A of IPC.
5. The prosecution in all examined nine witnesses PWs.1 to 9
and also marked thirteen documents Exs.P1 to P13. There were
no witnesses or any documents exhibited on behalf of defence.
Later on after recording the statement of the appellant under
Section 313 of Cr.P.C, the Trial Court after hearing the learned
counsel appearing on either side passed the impugned judgment
of conviction. The Trial Court did not find the appellant guilty so
far as the offence punishable under Section 498-A of IPC is
concerned and held that the prosecution has failed to prove the
said offence and accordingly he was acquitted of the said charge.
However, he was found guilty for the offence punishable under
Section 302 of IPC for killing his two children and accordingly
the appellant had been sentenced to undergo rigorous
imprisonment for life with fine of Rs.1000/- and default
stipulation.
6. It is this judgment of conviction which is under challenge
in the instant appeal.
7. Learned counsel for the appellant contended that except for
deposition of interested witnesses there does not seem to be any
independent witness examined on behalf of the prosecution to
substantiate the case of the prosecution. It was contended that
the entire case revolves around circumstantial evidence as there
was no eye witnesses to the incident and there does not seem to
be any strong cogent proof adduced by the prosecution by which
it could be conclusively held that it was the appellant and
appellant alone who could have committed the said offence.
8. It was further contended by the learned counsel for the
appellant that the evidence of Smt. K.Yellamma (PW.3) is also
highly doubtful and is not worth of credence because
immediately after the appellant is said to have confessed to
PW.3, PW.3 has not informed anybody in respect of the incident
which by itself gives rise to many a doubt. Therefore, the benefit
of doubt ought to have been given to the appellant and the
judgment of conviction therefore to the aforesaid extent is liable
to be set aside.
9. Learned Additional Public Prosecutor on the other hand
opposing the appeal drew the attention of the Court to the First
Information Report itself which has been recorded on the
confession of the appellant himself. The learned Additional
Public Prosecutor further took the Court to the statement of
PW.1 Smt. P.Shoba (the wife of the appellant), and PW.3, the
immediate neighbor. Both of them are the persons who were
immediately informed by none other than the appellant himself
of having committed the offence.
10. Thus, the learned Additional Public Prosecutor vehemently
contended that there was hardly any scope of interference
available in the instant case as the prosecution has been able to
prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts and thus prayed for
dismissal of the appeal.
11. Having heard the contentions put forth on either side and
on perusal of records, admittedly on the intervening night of
24&25.02.2012, PW.1 left to attend a function at Nalgonda with
her maternal aunt. The appellant stayed back at the house and
on the said day he did even go for his work. The deceased
children had gone to school and came back in the evening. The
presence of the appellant at his house is not in dispute which is
the place of incident. The presence of the children in the house
along with him is also not in dispute and all three i.e. the
appellant and the children went to dinner after sleep is an
admitted fact. During the said intervening night, the two
children died on strangulation.
12. There is no defence from the appellant's side of somebody
else having committed the offence when he was not at home.
There is also no defence from the appellant's side of him not
being at home on the said day when the incident occurred. In
the absence of the aforesaid two defences, the only inference and
conclusion that can be drawn is that the appellant being present
at the house on the said day and also at the time of incident. In
the said circumstances, in terms of Section 106 of the Indian
Evidence Act, 1872, the burden of proof shifts upon the
appellant to establish as to "if he was not available at the place of
incident at the time when the children were said to have been
killed, where was he at that point of time"?
13. Yet another aspect which needs consideration is that the
evidence of PW.3 who is an independent person not related to
either the appellant or PW.1 and resides in the neighborhood of
the place of incident. PW.3 has categorically stated in her
deposition that at around 3:30 A.M., the appellant knocked the
door and when PW.3 opened the door, the appellant informed
her that he had killed his children with the aid of charger wire of
his mobile phone, which again fortifies the statement of PW.3
who too was informed by the appellant at about the same time.
The cross-examination of these two witnesses PWs.1 and 3 also
does not elicit much, to give rise to any doubt so far as their
statements are concerned and there is also not much
contradiction or omission so far as their statements are
concerned and no strong reasons have been elicited from these
witnesses to even infer that they had made the statement before
the Court with any aggrieved intention or there were any inimical
terms or grudge so far as these witnesses are concerned towards
the appellant.
14. In the light of the clear statements of PWs.1 and 3, we are
of the considered opinion that the prosecution has been able to
prove its case beyond all reasonable doubts and as such there is
no illegality or perversity in the finding of the Trial Court in the
judgment under challenge in the instant appeal. Thus, affirming
the judgment of conviction passed by the Trial Court, the instant
appeal being devoid of merits, deserves to be and is accordingly
dismissed.
15. As a sequel, miscellaneous applications pending if any,
shall stand closed.
__________________
P.SAM KOSHY, J
__________________
N.TUKARAMJI, J
Date: 10.09.2024
GSD
