Telangana High Court
Chintakuntla Raghavendra Rao vs The State Of Telangana on 25 July, 2024
THE HONOURABLE SMT. JUSTICE K. SUJANA
I.A.Nos.2 and 3 of 2023
In/And
CRIMINAL PETITION No.9078 of 2023
ORDER:
This Criminal Petition is filed under Section 482 of
Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short 'Cr.P.C.') to
quash the proceedings against the petitioner/accused in
S.C.No.399 of 2022 on the file of the learned XI Additional
Metropolitan Sessions Judge, Nampally, Hyderabad,
registered for the offences punishable under Sections 376 (2)
(n), 417 and 420 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 (for short
'I.P.C.')
2. Heard Sri P. Vishnuvardhana Reddy, learned counsel
appearing on behalf of the petitioner as well as Sri D. Arun
Kumar, learned Additional Public Prosecutor appearing on
behalf of respondent No.1-State.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that
respondent No.2/de facto complainant filed Interlocutory
Applications, vide I.A.Nos.2 and 3 of 2023, in the present
criminal petition to permit the petitioner and respondent
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No.2/de facto complainant to compound the offences and to
record the compromise, therefore, he prayed the Court to
quash the proceedings against the petitioner before the trial
Court in S.C.No.399 of 2022, as the matter has been settled
amicably.
4. In support of his submission, learned counsel for the
petitioner relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
court in Major Amrit Yadav vs. State of Telangana 1 ,
wherein in paragraph Nos.10, 11 and 12 are held as follows:
"10. The Hon'ble Supreme Court
in the case of Shambhu Kharwar vs. State of
Uttar Pradesh held as under:
"13. In this backdrop and taking
the allegations in the complaint as they
stand, it is impossible to find in the FIR or in
the charge sheet, the essential ingredients of
an offence under IPC. The crucial issue
which is to be considered is whether the
allegations indicate that the appellant had
given a promise to the second respondent to
marry which is at the inception was false
and on the basis of which the second
respondent was induced into a sexual
relationship. Taking the allegations in the
FIR and the charge sheet as they stand, the
crucial ingredients of the offence under IPC
2023 SCC OnLine TS 601
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are absent. The relationship between the
parties was purely of a consensual nature.
The relationship, as noted above, was in
existence to subsist during the term of the
marriage and after the second respondent
was granted a divorce by mutual consent."
11. A bare reading of the
complaint would indicate that the 2nd
respondent had sexual relation over a period
of four years with this petitioner
consensually. In the said circumstances,
when the 2nd respondent/de facto
complainant is not willing to prosecute the
case against the petitioner in the Court, the
proceedings would only result in wastage of
trial Court's time. Both on facts when the
allegations did not make out any offence of
rape or cheating and also when the parties
are inclined to compromise the matter, only
for the reason there being mention of rape in
the charge sheet and the parties have
compromised, intervention of this Court
under inherent powers under Section 482 of
Cr.P.C., cannot be denied.
12. Considering the said report of
the Secretary, Telangana High Court Legal
Services Committee, Hyderabad, and in view
of the compromise entered between the
petitioner and respondent No.2, I.A.Nos.2
and 3 of 2022 are allowed. Consequently,
the criminal petition is allowed and the
proceedings in P.R.C.No.74 of 2022 on the
file of the XXII Additional Chief Metropolitan
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Magistrate at Secunderabad, are hereby
quashed against the petitioner/accused."
5. Learned counsel for the petitioner further relied upon
the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Kapil Gupta
vs. State (NCT of Delhi) and Another 2 , wherein in
paragaraph No.16 it is held as under:
"16. In that view of the matter, we find
that though in a heinous or serious crime
like rape, the Court should not normally
exercise the powers of quashing the
proceedings, in the peculiar facts and
circumstances of the present case and in
order to give succor to respondent No.2 so
that she is saved from further agony of
facing two criminal trials, one as a victim
and one as an accused, we find that this is a
fit case, wherein the extraordinary powers of
this Court be exercised to quash the
criminal proceedings."
6. On the other hand, the learned Additional Public
Prosecutor appearing on behalf of respondent No.1-State
strongly opposed the compromise petitions filed by
respondent No.2/de facto complainant stating that one of the
offences charged against the petitioner/accused i.e., Section
376 (2) (n) of IPC, is non- compoundable offence. He further
(2022) 15 Supreme Court Cases 44
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submitted that there are serious allegations against the
petitioner and that the act of commission of offence by the
petitioner is also specifically mentioned in the complaint.
Therefore, on the ground of compromise by the parties out of
Court, the proceedings cannot be quashed and prayed the
Court to dismiss the criminal petition and the compromise
petitions.
7. In support of his submission, learned Additional Public
Prosecutor relied upon the judgment of the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in The State of Madhya Pradesh v. Laxmi Narayan 3,
wherein it is held as under:
"i) that the power conferred under
Section 482 of the Code to quash the
criminal proceedings for the non-
compoundable offences under Section 320 of
the Code can be exercised having
overwhelmingly and predominantly the civil
character, particularly those arising out of
commercial transactions or arising out of
matrimonial relationship or family disputes
and when the parties have resolved the
entire dispute amongst themselves;
ii) such power is not to be exercised
in those prosecutions which involved
heinous and serious offences of mental
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depravity or offences like murder, rape,
dacoity, etc. Such offences are not private in
nature and have a serious impact on society;
iii) similarly, such power is not to be
exercised for the offences under the special
statutes like Prevention of Corruption Act or
the offences committed by public servants
while working in that capacity are not to be
quashed merely on the basis of compromise
between the victim and the offender;
iv) offences under Section 307 IPC
and the Arms Act etc. would fall in the
category of heinous and serious offences and
therefore are to be treated as crime against
the society and not against the individual
alone, and therefore, the criminal
proceedings for the offence under Section
307 IPC and/or the Arms Act etc. which
have a serious impact on the society cannot
be quashed in exercise of powers under
Section 482 of the Code, on the ground that
the parties have resolved their entire dispute
amongst themselves. However, the High
Court would not rest its decision merely
because there is a mention of Section 307
IPC in the FIR or the charge is framed under
this provision. It would be open to the High
Court to examine as to whether
incorporation of Section 307 IPC is there for
the sake of it or the prosecution has
collected sufficient evidence, which if proved,
would lead to framing the charge under
Section 307 IPC. For this purpose, it would
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be open to the High Court to go by the
nature of injury sustained, whether such
injury is inflicted on the vital/delegate parts
of the body, nature of weapons used etc.
However, such an exercise by the High Court
would be permissible only after the evidence
is collected after investigation and the
charge sheet is filed/charge is framed
and/or during the trial. Such exercise is not
permissible when the matter is still under
investigation. Therefore, the ultimate
conclusion in paragraphs 29.6 and 29.7 of
the decision of this Court in the case of
Narinder Singh (supra) should be read
harmoniously and to be read as a whole and
in the circumstances stated hereinabove;
v) while exercising the power under
Section 482 of the Code to quash the
criminal proceedings in respect of non-
compoundable offences, which are private in
nature and do not have a serious impact on
society, on the ground that there is a
settlement/compromise between the victim
and the offender, the High Court is required
to consider the antecedents of the accused;
the conduct of the accused, namely, whether
the accused was absconding and why he
was absconding, how he had managed with
the complainant to enter into a compromise
etc."
8. In the light of the submissions made by the learned
counsel for the petitioner and a perusal of the material
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available on record, it appears that the petitioner was charged
for the offences punishable under Sections 376 (2) (n), 417
and 420 of IPC in which, Section 376 (2) (n) is non-
compoundable. The prime contention of learned counsel for
the petitioner is that the matter was compromised between
the parties and filed compromise petitions to that effect and
as per the law laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Major Amrit Yadav (supra 1) and Kapil Gupta (supra 2), the
extraordinary powers of the Court can be exercised to quash
the criminal proceedings when the parties can be
compromised, though in a heinous or serious crime like rape,
as such, the proceedings against the are petitioner liable to be
quashed.
9. As seen from the record, there are serious allegations
against the petitioner and the offence under Section 376 (2)
(n) of IPC is heinous offence. Further, the judgments
rendered by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the cases of Major
Amrit Yadav (supra 1), and Kapil Gupta (supra 2), are not
applicable to the facts of the case on hand. Subsequently,
considering the parameters laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court in Laxmi Narayan (supra 3) and also considering the
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fact that one of the offence alleged against the petitioner is
heinous in nature, this Court is not inclined to quash the
proceedings against the petitioner in the aforesaid crime
merely on the ground that the parties have entered into
compromise.
9. In view of the aforesaid discussion, I.A.Nos.2 and 3 of
2023 are dismissed. Consequently, the present Criminal
Petition is disposed of directing the trial Court to conclude the
trial in S.C.No.399 of 2022 and dispose of the case, as
expeditiously as possible, preferably within a period of three
(3) months from the date of receipt of a copy of this order.
Miscellaneous applications, if any pending, shall also
stand closed.
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K.SUJANA, J
Date: 25.07.2024
Note: Issue C.C by 26.07.2024
B/o
SAI
