Telangana High Court

Pachipulusu Subramanyam vs C.Chandramma Died on 12 July, 2024

           THE HONOURABLE SRI JUSTICE SUJOY PAUL


            CIVIL REVISION PETITION No.1495 of 2024

ORDER:

With consent finally heard Sri G. VasanthaRayudu, learned

counsel for the petitioners and Sri R. Anurag, learned counsel for

respondents.

2. This petition filed under Article 227 of the Constitution

challenges the order dated 18.03.2024 whereby, I.A.No.6336 of

2023 in O.S.No.210 of 2020 on the file of Chief Judge, City Civil

Court at Hyderabad, is decided.

FACTS:-

3. The admitted facts between the parties are that the main

suit is filed by the deceased/plaintiff No.1 and her husband

seeking eviction, recovery of arrears of rent and damages against

the defendants. Plaintiff No.1 died on 16.10.2023 leaving behind

her husband i.e., plaintiff No.2 and her children by names C.

Chandrashekar, C. Sridhar, Navageetha, Sangeetha and Saritha.

4. Learned counsel for the petitioners/defendants submits that

the deceased/plaintiff No.1 had allegedly executed a Will Deed

dated 06.01.2022 bequeathing her half share in the suit schedule

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property in favour of her sons C. Chandrashekar and C. Sridhar.

Thus, plaintiff No.2 intended to implead them as proposed plaintiff

Nos.3 and 4 in the main suit and to carry out consequential

corrections to the plaint.

5. The respondents filed their counter to the said interlocutory

application before the Court below and raised question regarding

the existence and genesis of the Will Deed dated 06.02.2022. It

was urged that adding legal representatives to the suit and

bequeathing some property in between some legal representatives

are two different and distinct aspects. It was also urged before the

Court below that the daughters may be added as parties to the

suit since they are blood relatives along with sons of

deceased/plaintiff No.1. The respondents pleaded that the

daughters are necessary and proper parties to the suit and

without their participation, the suit cannot be decided.

6. The Court below heard the parties and framed the following

question:

"Whether the petitioner is entitled to the relief prayed for, i.e., impleading the proposed parties as plaintiff Nos.3 and 4 in the main suit and for consequential amendments to the plaint?"

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7. The Court below after considering certain judgments relied

upon by the parties, came to hold that the interlocutory

application is liable to be allowed and the proposed parties were

brought on record as plaintiff Nos.3 and 4 and also directed for

consequential amendments to the plaint.

8. Learned counsel for the petitioners/defendants submits that

the Court below has erred in directing the legal representatives to

be impleaded in view of Will Deed of the deceased/plaintiff No.1.

Since all are having equal and joint rights on the suit schedule

property, the Court below erred in permitting the legal

representatives to be impleaded. The alleged legal representatives

were not necessary parties. In support of his submission, he

placed reliance on judgment of Division Bench of Apex Court in

the case of Suresh Kumar Bansal vs. Krishna Bansal 1.

9. Per contra, learned counsel for the plaintiff submits that the

instant suit was suit for eviction/recovery of rent and damages.

The suit has no relation with declaration of title or partition etc,.

Thus, the Court below has not committed any error of law in

passing the impugned order. He supported the impugned order

2010 (2) SCC 162

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on the strength of judgment of Andhra Pradesh High Court in the

case of AkkarayoyinaApparao vs. KoradAmmoru 2. Lastly, by

placing reliance on the judgment of Apex Court in the case of

KasthuriRadhakrishnan vs. M. Chinniyan 3, the impugned order

was supported.

10. No other point is pressed by the learned counsel for the

parties.

11. The core issue is pertaining to joinder of legal

representatives in eviction petition filed against the tenant.

Learned counsel for the parties are at loggerheads on the aspect of

joinder of all the parties. Pertinently, learned counsel for the

petitioners/defendants placed reliance on the judgment of Division

Bench of Apex Court in the case of Suresh Kumar Bansal (cited

supra) whereas, the learned counsel for the respondents placed

reliance on the judgment of Apex Court in the case of

KasthuriRadhakrishnan(cited supra). This point deserves

serious consideration.

1998 (2) ALD 296

(2016) 3 SCC 296

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12. The legal journey shows that the singular question involved

in this case is no more res integra. A Three Judge Division Bench

of Apex Court way back in 1977 in the case of KantaGoel vs.

B.P.Pathak 4 took a view that in a suit for ejectment of tenant, one

of the co-owner can file a suit. The same view was taken by

another Division Bench of Apex Court in the case of Dhannalal vs.

Kalawatibai 5. After taking stock of aforementioned previous

judgments in the case of KasthuriRadhakrishnan(cited supra), it

was held as under at relevant paras:

"29. Likewise, so far as issue pertaining to joinder of all co- owners in eviction petition filed against the tenant under the rent laws is concerned, the same also remains no more res integra and stands settled by several decisions of this Court. In Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai [Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai, 2002) 6 SCC 16] , this Court took note of all case laws on the subject and explained the legal position governing the issue. R.C. Lahoti, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Bench held in para 16 as under : (SCC pp. 27-28)

"16. It is well settled by at least three decisions of this Court, namely, Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath [Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, (1976) 4 SCC 184], KantaGoel v. B.P. Pathak [KantaGoel v. B.P. Pathak, (1977) 2 SCC 814] and Pal Singh v. Sunder Singh [Pal Singh v. Sunder Singh, (1989) 1 SCC 444] that one of the co-owners can alone and in his own right file a suit for ejectment of the tenant and it is no defence open to the tenant to question the maintainability of the suit on the ground that the other co-owners were not joined as parties to the suit. When the property forming the subject-matter

1977 (2) SCC 814

2002 (6) SCC 16

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of eviction proceedings is owned by several owners, every co-owner owns every part and every bit of the joint property along with others and it cannot be said that he is only a part-owner or a fractional owner of the property so long as the property has not been partitioned. He can alone maintain a suit for eviction of the tenant without joining the other co-owners if such other co-owners do not object.

In Sri Ram Pasricha case [Sri Ram Pasricha v. Jagannath, (1976) 4 SCC 184] reliance was placed by the tenant on the English rule that if two or more landlords institute a suit for possession on the ground that a dwelling house is required for occupation of one of them as a residence the suit would fail; the requirement must be of all the landlords. The Court noted that the English rule was not followed by the High Courts of Calcutta and Gujarat which High Courts have respectfully dissented from the rule of English law. This Court held that a decree could be passed in favour of the plaintiff though he was not the absolute and full owner of the premises because he required the premises for his own use and also satisfied the requirement of being 'if he is the owner', the expression as employed by Section 13(1)(f) of the W.B. Premises Tenancy Act, 1956."

30. ...

31. Coming to the first question, in our considered opinion, the High Court erred in holding that the daughter of late A. Radhakrishnan i.e. R. Kanjana was a necessary party to the eviction petition filed by the appellants and hence failure to implead her rendered the eviction petition as not maintainable. This finding of the High Court, in our view, is against the law laid down by this Court in Dhannalal [Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai, (2002) 6 SCC 16] , wherein it is laid down that it is not necessary to implead all the co-owners in the eviction petition.

32. In the light of the law laid down in Dhannalal [Dhannalal v. Kalawatibai, (2002) 6 SCC 16] , in our view, it was not necessary for the appellants to implead R. Kanjana, the daughter of late A. Radhakrishnan in the eviction petition. Even otherwise, as rightly argued by

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the learned counsel for the appellants, the High Court should not have allowed Respondent 1 to raise such objection for the first time in the revision because it was not raised in the courts below. Be that as it may, the daughter having been later impleaded in the proceedings, this objection was not even available to Respondent 1.

13. The Three Judge Division Bench judgment in the case of

Kanta Goel(cited supra) was not considered by the Apex Court in

the case of Suresh Kumar Bansal (cited supra). The judgment of

Shri Ram Pasricha vs. JaganNath 6and Pal Singh vs. Sunder

Singh 7 were also not considered by the Division Bench in the case

of Suresh Kumar Bansal (cited supra). The Five Judge Bench of

Madhya Pradesh High Court in the case of Jabalpur Bus

Operators Association vs. State of M.P. 8, held as under:

"With regard to the High Court, a Single Bench is bound by the decision of another Single Bench. In case, he does not agree with the view of the other Single Bench, he should refer the matter to the Larger Bench. Similarly, Division Bench is bound by the judgment of earlier Division Bench. In case, it does not agree with the view of the earlier Division Bench, it should refer the matter to Larger Bench. In case of conflict between judgments of two Division Benches of equal strength, the decision of earlier Division Bench shall be followed except when it is explained by the latter Division Bench in which case the decision of later Division Bench shall be binding. The decision of Larger Bench is binding on Smaller Benches.

In case of conflict between two decisions of the Apex Court, Benches comprising of equal number of Judges, decision of earlier Bench is binding unless explained by the latter Bench of equal strength, in which case the later decision is binding. Decision of a Larger Bench is binding on smaller

(1976) 4 SCC 184

(1989) 1 SCC 444

2003 (1) MPHT (FB) 226

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Benches. Therefore, the decision of earlier Division Bench, unless distinguished by latter Division Bench, is binding on the High Courts and the Subordinate Courts. Similarly, in presence of Division Bench decisions and Larger Bench decisions, the decisions of Larger Bench are binding on the High Courts and the Subordinate Courts. [No decision of Apex Court has been brought to our notice which holds that in case of conflict between the two decisions by equal number of Judges, the later decision in binding in all circumstances, or the High Courts and Subordinate Courts can follow any decision which is found correct and accurate to the case under consideration.

High Courts and Subordinate Courts should lack competence to interpret decisions of Apex Court since that would not only defeat what is envisaged under Article 141 of the Constitution of India but also militate hierarchical supremacy of Courts. The common thread which runs through various decisions of Apex Court seems to be that great value has to be attached to precedent which has taken the shape of rule being followed by it for the purpose of consistency and exactness in decisions of Court, unless the Court can clearly distinguish the decision put up as a precedent or is per incuriam, having been rendered without noticing some earlier precedents with which the Court agrees. Full Bench decision in Balbir Singh's case (supra) which holds that if there is conflict of views between the two co-equal Benches of the Apex Court, the High Court has to follow the judgment which appears to it to state the law more elaborately and more accurately and in conformity with the scheme of the Act, in our considered opinion, for reasons recorded in the preceding paragraph of this judgment, does not lay down the correct law as to application of precedent and is, therefore, over-ruled on this point.]"