Telangana High Court

Komatireddy Janakiram Reddy vs The State Of Telangana on 4 February, 2022

Bench: Satish Chandra Sharma, N.Tukaramji

THE HON'BLE THE CHIEF JUSTICE SATISH CHANDRA SHARMA
                         AND
        THE HON'BLE SRI JUSTICE N. TUKARAMJI

                  WRIT APPEAL No.651 OF 2021

JUDGMENT:   (Per the Hon'ble the Chief Justice Satish Chandra Sharma)




     The present writ appeal is arising out of an order

dated 08.11.2021, passed in W.P.No.19769 of 2021 by the

learned Single Judge dismissing the writ petition filed by

the appellant/petitioner.


2.   The     facts       of      the       case        reveal           that   the

appellant/petitioner has filed the writ petition being

aggrieved by an order passed by the Special Tribunal,

Nalgonda in New Case No.F2/Spl.Tribunal/0264/2021

(Old Case No.F2/4244/ 2019), dated 10.07.2021 by which

the order passed by the Special Tribunal in Old Case

No.F2/4244/2019, dated 09.02.2021 was confirmed. The

Special Tribunal by order dated 09.02.2021 has reversed

the order passed by the Revenue Divisional Officer dated

Nil.05.2019.


3.   The facts further reveal that the appellant/petitioner

came up before this Court stating that his father K. Sathi

Reddy      expired       in       the       year        1970            and    the

appellant/petitioner, and his brother late K.Neela Reddy,
                                       2




who is the father of respondents 7, 9 and 10, have

succeeded to the ancestral land to an extent of Acs.56.00

guntas spread over in survey Nos.143, 144, 148, 149, 150,

151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 172, 175, 176, 187, 189, 190,

191, 192, 193, 201, 460 and 417 of Nomula Village,

Nakrekal      Mandal,      Nalgonda       District.    The     appellant/

petitioner     further     stated      that     the   properties       were

partitioned    between         the    appellant/petitioner      and     his

brother late K.Neela Reddy and their names were mutated

in the revenue records by the Tahsildar, Nakrekal Mandal,

Nalgonda District. It has been further stated that the

mother of the appellant/petitioner expired in the year

1977. The facts further reveal that the sixth respondent

before this Court, Smt. Kandala Saraswathi, who is the

real sister of the appellant/petitioner and late K.Neela

Reddy filed an Appeal under Section 5(5) of the Telangana

Rights in Land and Pattadar Pass Books Act, 1977 (for

short, 'Pattadar Pass Books Act') asserting her right on the

basis of pouthi issued by the Tahsildar in the year 1970-71

and claimed a share in the property and also sought

cancellation     of      patta       granted     in   favour      of    the

appellant/petitioner. The appellant/petitioner defended the

appeal and resisted the claim of the sister. The Appeal

preferred     before     the    Revenue        Divisional    Officer   was
                              3




dismissed on 09.08.2019 and the sixth respondent,

Smt.Kandala   Saraswathi     preferred     a    Revision   under

Section 9 of the Pattadar Pass Books Act in old case

No.F2/4244/2019     before       the   Additional      Collector,

Nalgonda and in the light of the G.O.Ms.No.4, Revenue

(Assignment-I) Department, dated 12.01.2021, the case

was transferred to the Special Tribunal and was re-

numbered as New case No.F2/Spl. Tribunal/0264/2021.

The Special Tribunal, after going through the material on

record, allowed the Revision by order dated 09.02.2021

setting aside the order of the Revenue Divisional Officer,

Nalgonda, dated nil.05.2019 with a direction to the

Tahsildar to restore the patta in the name of the original

pattadar   Komatireddy   Sathi     Reddy       by   deleting   the

subsequent entries. The appellant/petitioner preferred a

Review before the Special Tribunal and the Special

Tribunal has dismissed the Review Petition by order dated

10.07.2021.


4.   The appellant/petitioner came up before this Court

stating that the Appeal preferred by his sister before the

Revenue Divisional Officer, Nalgonda was rightly dismissed

by passing a well reasoned judgment and therefore, the

Special Tribunal has erred in law and on facts in setting
                                4




aside the order passed by the appellate authority. It was

also contended that the Special Tribunal has passed an

order contrary to the settled proposition of law by

accepting the claim of his sister as the properties were

partitioned way back in the year 1977, the names of the

co-parceners were mutated and therefore, the settled

position has been unsettled by cryptic and non-speaking

order, which amounts to colourable exercise of power and

therefore, the order passed by the Special Tribunal is bad

in law.


5.   Another    ground   was       raised   by   the   appellant/

petitioner   stating   that    the    Special    Tribunal    has

conveniently ignored the partition. The marriage of his

sister was performed in the year 1985 and the amendment

to the Hindu Succession Act came into force in the year

1986 and the daughters are entitled for share only with

prospective effect and not from retrospective effect, and

therefore the Special Tribunal has erred in law in passing

the order, ignoring the factum of partition.


6.   The appellant/petitioner has placed reliance upon the

order passed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court in C.A.Diary

No.32061 of 2018 and took a ground that there was a

partition between the parties and by no stretch of
                                  5




imagination, the factum of partition could have been

ignored by the Special Tribunal as has been done in the

present case and the sister was not at all entitled for a

share. The appellant/petitioner took another ground that

the appellant/petitioner and the legal representatives of his

real brother, namely late K.Neela Reddy are having a

litigation in O.S.Nos.151 of 2014, 89 of 2017 and 15 of

2018 and the factum of partition is in existence and the

lands, which were the subject matter before the Special

Tribunal, are also the subject matter of all the civil suits

and therefore, no order could have been passed by the

Special Tribunal. The appellant/petitioner also took a

ground that out of the land admeasuring Acs.56.00

guntas,    which     was         partitioned    between     the

appellant/petitioner and his brother, late K.Neela Reddy, is

not available as most of the land has been alienated and

therefore, as third party rights have been involved, the

Special   Tribunal   in    the       absence   of   such   third

parties/successors in title could not have decided the

matter and in fact, the order passed by the Special

Tribunal is not at all executable. The appellant/petitioner

also took a ground that his sister Smt. Kandala Saraswathi

filed an Appeal against the order of the Tahsildar and the

same was rightly dismissed keeping in view the delay and
                                  6




laches and the settled position is being unsettled after

lapse of about 40 years. A prayer was made for quashment

of the order passed by the Special Tribunal and the learned

Single Judge has dismissed the writ petition.


7.     This Court has heard the learned counsel for the

parties and perused the record. The writ appeal is being

disposed of at the motion hearing stage itself with the

consent of the parties.


8.     The undisputed facts of the case reveal that late

K.Sathi Reddy was the owner of land to an extent of

Acs.56.00 guntas spread over in survey Nos.143, 144, 148,

149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 154, 155, 172, 175, 176, 187,

189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 201, 460 and 417 of Nomula

Village, Nakrekal Mandal, Nalgonda District. Late K.Sathi

Reddy expired in the year 1970 leaving behind his wife, the

appellant/petitioner,     late   K.Neela    Reddy      and    the

respondent No.6, who is the daughter, as his legal heirs.

The undisputed facts also reveal that succession was

granted in favour of the wife and children of late K.Sathi

Reddy in the year 1970-71. The documents on record filed

by the appellant/petitioner reveal that the appellant/

petitioner has filed a copy of Faisal Patti granted in the

year    1970-71,   which    categorically   reflects   that   the
                               7




succession was granted in favour of widow of late K.Sathi

Reddy, two sons, namely K.Janakiram Reddy (appellant/

petitioner) and late K.Neela Reddy and the daughter, Smt.

Kandala   Saraswathi.    In   spite   of   the   fact   that   the

succession was granted in favour of all the legal legal heirs,

the appellant/petitioner and late K.Neela Reddy, who are

the two brothers, partitioned the subject land between

themselves and got mutation done in the revenue records,

without giving any share to the daughter or putting her to

notice contrary to pouthi already granted in the year 1970-

71. The undisputed facts reveal that the daughter was not

heard in the matter at all by the Tahsildar while mutating

the names of the appellant/petitioner and his brother in

the revenue records.


9.   Much has been argued before this Court stating that

the mutation done based upon the partition between the

brothers could not have been disturbed after long settled

position which is in subsistence for the last 40 years. The

facts of the present case reveal that a fraud was played

upon the sister by her real brothers and in spite of the fact

that the succession was granted in favour of all the legal

heirs of late K.Sathi Reddy in the year 1970-71, a faisal

patti was granted in the year 1970-71, the daughter was
                                  8




granted a share in the property, behind her back both the

brothers, i.e., the appellant/petitioner and late K.Neela

Reddy got the property partitioned between themselves and

certainly has played a fraud upon their sister. Therefore,

the learned Single Judge has rightly held that fraud

vitiates everything and the subsequent entries based upon

the partition, which was held behind the back of their

sister, will not deprive the original owner of her legitimate

right to claim share in the property. The learned Single

Judge has dismissed the writ petition and relevant portion

of the order reads as under:-

           "The main contention of the learned counsel for
     the petitioner is that the Special Tribunal has gone to the
     extent of dividing the property as per the Hindu
     Succession Act, which it had no authority to do so, as it
     is the exclusive domain of the civil court to go into all
     those disputed questions of fact and render a judgment
     based on the evidence let in by the parties.      But the
     Special Tribunal without taking into account that there
     was a partition between the brothers and that the
     mutation was done in their favour way back in the year
     1970-71 and that the entries are in existence for the last
     forty years, has erroneously allowed the revision filed by
     the respondent No. 6. The said contention of the learned
     counsel for the petitioner merits no consideration.
     Because a perusal of the impugned orders passed by the
     learned Tribunal shows that the learned Tribunal, taking
     into consideration the Faisal Patti of 1970-71, has
     allowed the revision setting aside the orders of the
     Revenue Divisional Officer and has directed the Tahsildar
                                               9




         to restore the entries as they stood prior to the death of
         late Sathi Reddy with a further direction to take up
         succession proceedings.


                    Admittedly, in the present case, succession in
         favour of legal heirs of late Sathi Reddy was granted in
         the year 1970-71 and the same was recorded in the
         Faisal Patti. The writ petitioner himself has filed a copy
         of the said proceedings. When such is the case, it is not
         understandable as to how two sons of late Sathi Reddy
         can deny the share of his daughter, the respondent No. 6.
         Furthermore, there is nothing on record to show that the
         respondent No. 6 was put on notice before the mutation
         was effected in favour of petitioner and his late brother.
         It is also not the case of the petitioner that the
         respondent No. 6 was given any other property in lieu of
         her share in the subject land in the settlement, if any, or
         she has executed any deed of relinquishment in their
         favour. Admittedly, late Sathi Reddy had died in the year
         1970 intestate and the learned Special Tribunal, duly
         taking       into   account    the       provisions   of   the   Hindu
         Succession Act, more particularly, Section 8 of the Hindu
         Succession Act, has merely directed the Tahsildar to
         restore the name of late Sathi Reddy and take up
         succession proceedings, but has not decided the shares
         of the parties, as contended by the learned counsel for
         the petitioner.

                    In Chinnam Pandurangam vs. Mandal Revenue
         Officer1, a Full Bench of this Court, at paras 7 and 10,
         has held as under:
                    "7.   The above analysis of the relevant statutory
             provisions shows that proviso to Section 5 (1) and Section
             5(3)     represent   statutory   embodiment       of   the   most
             important facet of the rules of natural justice i.e. audi
             alterem partem. These provisions contemplate issue of


1   2007 (6) ALD 348 (FB)
                                 10




  notice to the persons likely to be affected by the
  action/decision of the Mandal Revenue Officer to carry
  out or not to carry out amendment in the Record of
  Rights. Section 5 (3) provides for issue of written notice to
  all persons whose names are entered in the Record of
  Rights and who are interested in or affected by the
  amendment. A copy of the amendment and the notice is
  also required to be published in the prescribed manner. If
  the Legislature thought that publication of a general
  notice in Form-VIII will be sufficient compliance of the
  rules of natural justice, then there was no occasion to
  incorporate a specific requirement of issuing written
  notice to the persons whose names are entered in the
  Record of Rights and who are interested in or affected by
  the amendment and also to other person whom the
  recording authority has reason to believe to be interested
  in or affected by the amendment.

      10. The issue deserves to be considered from another
  angle. He can do so only if a notice regarding the
  proposed amendment is given to him by the recording
  authority. It need no emphasis that the rules of natural
  justice are applicable in all judicial and quasi-judicial
  proceedings. The rule of hearing is also applicable in
  purely administrative proceedings and actions where any
  public authority passes an order affecting the rights of
  any individual. The applicability of the rules of natural
  justice   to   purely   administrative   actions   has   been
  recognized by the Supreme Court in State of Orissa v. Dr.
  (Miss) Binapani Dei, AIR 1967 SC 1269 and has been
  reiterated in various judgments including those of A.K.
  Kraipak v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 150, Maneka
  Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597, S.L. Kapoor
  v. Jagmohan, AIR 1981 SC 136, Swadeshi Cotton Mills v.
  Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 818, and Olga Tellis v.
  Bombay Municipal Corporation, AIR 1986 SC 180."


     Therefore, in view of the above settled legal
position, once it is admitted that succession has been
granted in favour of the children of late Sathi Reddy,
                                             11




         including the respondent No. 6, the revenue authorities
         ought to have put her on notice before mutating the
         subject land in favour of the petitioner and his late
         brother, Neela Reddy. As seen from the record, the two
         sons of late Sathi Reddy have not disclosed to the
         revenue authorities about the fact that late Sathi Reddy
         had a daughter and that the she is also entitled to a
         share in the property. The said suppression amounts to
         fraud. It is well settled principle of law that fraud vitiates
         all solemn acts and any advantage that the party may
         claim on the basis of fraud has to be set aside.

                 In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath2, the
         Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that a judgment or
         decree which is obtained by fraud is to be treated as a
         nullity     and    can     be   questioned     even        in    collateral
         proceedings.           Non-disclosure     of    relevant          material
         documents with a view to obtain advantage amounts to
         fraud. At paragraph Nos.5 and 6, the Hon'ble Supreme
         Court has further held as under:
                     "The courts of law are meant for imparting justice
             between the parties. One who comes to the court, must
             come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that
             more often than not, process of the court is being abused.
             Property-grabbers, tax-evaders, bank-loan-dodgers and
             other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the
             court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal-gains
             indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person,
             who's case is based on falsehood, has no right to
             approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at
             any stage of the litigation.

                     A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the
             design of securing something by taking unfair advantage
             of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's
             loss.   It    is   a    cheating    intended      to        get   an
             advantage. .............. A litigant, who approaches the


2   (1994) 1 SCC 1
                                              12




            court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by
            him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a
            vital document in order to gain advantage on the other
            side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court
            as well as on the opposite party."


                 In Madhukar Sadbha Shivarkar v. State of
         Maharashtra3, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held that
         fraud    vitiates   the    entire    proceedings    and   can       be
         challenged at any time.

                 Lastly, merely because the mutation entries are in
         existence for the last forty years, the petitioners cannot
         contend that the respondent No. 6 should be relegated to
         the civil court to pursue her remedies. In State of U.P.
         vs. Amar Singh4, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has held as
         under:
                 "It is settled law that mutation entries are only for the
            purpose of enabling the State to collect the land revenue
            from the person in possession but it does not confer any
            title to the land.     The title would be derived from an
            instrument executed by the owner in favour of an alienee
            as per Stamp Act and registered under Registration Act.
            The alienees being sons and daughters-in-law, the
            tenure-holder remained to be the owner and holder of the
            land."


                 Likewise, in Balwant Singh vs. Daulat Singh
         (dead) by L.Rs.5, the Hon'ble Supreme Court has
         reiterated a similar proposition, as under:
                 "We have already noticed that mutation entries do
             not convey or extinguish any title and those entries are
             relevant only for the purpose of collection of land
             revenue."


                 For the forgoing reasons, the writ petition fails and
         the same is accordingly dismissed confirming the orders

3   (2015) 6 SCC 557
4   AIR 1997 SC 1534
5   AIR 1997 SC 2719
                                   13




       of    the   respondent   No.    2   in   New    Case   No.
       F2/Spl.Tribunal/0264/2021 (Old Case No. F2/4244/
       2019), dated 10.07.2021 confirming the orders passed by
       it on 09.02.2021."


10. The undisputed facts of the case reveal that after the

death of late K.Sathi Reddy, succession was granted in

favour of the legal heirs of late K.Sathi Reddy, which

included the daughter, namely Smt. Kandala Saraswathi

and the same was recorded in faisal patti. It was the

appellant/petitioner and his real brother, namely late

K.Neela Reddy, who played fraud in the matter ignoring the

succession and partitioned the properties. Their names

were mutated in the revenue records and they are now

raising hue and cry in the matter. The order of the Special

Tribunal on the issue of Hindu Succession Act is also very

clear and the same reflects that the Special Tribunal has

not decided the share of the parties and the Special

Tribunal has simply directed the restoration of the names

of the persons, in whose favour succession was granted in

the year 1970-71 and the same was recorded in faisal

patti.


11.      In the present case, a fraud has taken place as the

appellant/petitioner and his brother in spite of the fact

that     a   succession     was   granted       in   favour   of    their
                                    14




sister/respondent No.6, Smt. Kandala Saraswathi in the

year 1970-71 and the same was recorded in faisal patti, got

a partition done behind the back of their sister and

therefore, as fraud vitiates everything, the Special Tribunal

was justified in passing the order. (See The State of Bihar v.

Kripalu Shankar6, S.P.Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath7 and

Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) Private Limited8). It is a

settled proposition of law that fraud vitiates every solemn

proceedings and no right can be claimed by a fraudster on

the ground of technicalities. (See Badami v. Bhali9, Venture

Global Engineering LLC v. Tech Mahindra Limited10 and Satluj

Jal Vidyut Nigam v. Raj Kumar Rajinder Singh11.)



12.     This Court has not reproduced the law laid down in

the aforesaid cases, however, is reproducing certain

paragraphs only in respect of the last judgment on the

subject delivered in the case of Satluj Jal Vidyut Nigam v. Raj

Kumar Rajinder Singh (supra). Paragraphs 65 to 81 of the

aforesaid judgment read as under:-

           "65. The question in the instant case is as to whether
       an incumbent can be permitted to play blatant fraud time
       and again and court has to be silent spectator under the
       guise of label of the various legal proceedings at different

6
  AIR 1987 SC 1554
7
  AIR 1994 SC 853
8
  (1996) 5 SCC 550
9
  (2012) 11 SCC 574
10
   (2018) 1 SCC 656
11
   (2019) 14 SCC 449
                             15




stages by taking different untenable stands whether
compensation can be claimed several times as done in
the instant case and its effect. Before the land acquisition
had been commenced in 1987, the land more than 1000
bighas had been declared a surplus in ceiling case and
compensation collected, which indeed (quaere included)
disputed land at Jhakari, it would be a perpetuating
fraud in case such a person is permitted to claim
compensation for same very land. Fraud vitiates the
solemn proceedings; such plea can be set up even in
collateral proceedings. The label on the petition is not
much material and this Court has already permitted the
plea of fraud to be raised. Moreover, the appeal arising
out of 72 awards is still pending in the High Court in
which Reference Court has declined compensation on the
aforesaid ground.

   66. Reliance has also been placed on the observations
made in Meher Rusi Dalal v. Union of India [(2004) 7 SCC
362], in which this Court has dealt with the issue of
apportionment of compensation for which claim was
raised by the Union of India, not in the capacity of the
owner but as a protected tenant. The claim of tenancy
was not put forth before the LAO, though represented in
the acquisition proceedings. This Court observed that in
such a case it could reasonably be inferred that no right
was being claimed and it ought to have been made before
the LAO if it had any such claim in respect of pre-existing
right. The LAO was not under a duty to make an enquiry.
The claim of tenancy at the belated stage was an
afterthought to frustrate the payment. The decision has
no application to the instant case as the LAO in the
awards passed, noted the factum of ceiling proceedings
as such the effects of the same can always be considered.

   67. In Ahad Bros. v. State of M.P. [(2005) 1 SCC 545] ,
this Court observed that question of the title of the State
                                 16




over the acquired land, cannot be decided under Section
18 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1894. This Court
considered that when an award has been passed and the
appellant was recorded as owner in the revenue papers,
he was entitled to receive compensation. There is no
dispute in the aforesaid proposition, however, in the
instant case facts are different and a person cannot be
permitted to receive the compensation of vested land in
the State under the Abolition Act and when the land had
been declared surplus and compensation paid on wrong
entry continued. The same wrong entry could not have
been permitted to be utilised for award of compensation
to a person under the LA Act. In the instant case, there
had been earlier proceedings which make it clear that
Rajinder Singh was not entitled to claim compensation
under the LA Act. It is apparent that there was no
subsisting right, title or interest left with Rajinder Singh
or his LRs, thus, they could not be permitted to obtain
the compensation.

   68. Fraud vitiates every solemn proceeding and no
right can be claimed by a fraudster on the ground of
technicalities. On behalf of the appellants, reliance has
been placed on the definition of "fraud" as defined
in Black's Law Dictionary, which is as under:
      "Fraud : (1) A knowing misrepresentation of the truth or
   concealment of a material fact to induce another to act to his
   or her detriment. Fraud is usually a tort, but in some cases
   (esp. when the conduct is wilful) it may be a crime. ... (2) A
   misrepresentation made recklessly without belief in its truth
   to induce another person to act. (3) A tort arising from a
   knowing misrepresentation, concealment of material fact, or
   reckless misrepresentation made to induce another to act to
   his or her detriment. (4) Unconscionable dealing; esp., in
   contract law, the unconscientious use of the power arising
   out of the parties' relative positions and resulting in an
   unconscionable bargain."
                                      17




   69. Halsbury's Laws of England has defined "fraud" as
follows:
         "Whenever a person makes a false statement which he
      does not actually and honestly believe to be true, for purpose
      of civil liability, the statement is as fraudulent as if he had
      stated that which he did know to be true, or know or
      believed to be false. Proof of absence of actual and honest
      belief is all that is necessary to satisfy the requirement of the
      law, whether the representation has been made recklessly or
      deliberately, indifference or recklessness on the part of the
      representor as to the truth or falsity of the representation
      affords merely an instance of absence of such a belief."


   70. In Kerr on the Law of Fraud and Mistake, "fraud"
has been defined thus:
         "It is not easy to give a definition of what constitutes
      fraud in the extensive significance in which that term is
      understood by Civil Courts of Justice. The courts have
      always avoided hampering themselves by defining or laying
      down as a general proposition what shall be held to
      constitute fraud. Fraud is infinite in variety... Courts have
      always declined to define it, ... reserving to themselves the
      liberty to deal with it under whatever form it may present
      itself. Fraud ... may be said to include property (sic properly)
      all acts, omissions, and concealments which involve a breach
      of legal or equitable duty, trust or confidence, justly reposed,
      and are injurious to another, or by which an undue or
      unconscientious advantage is taken of another. All surprise,
      trick, cunning, dissembling and other unfair way that is
      used to cheat anyone is considered as fraud. Fraud in all
      cases implies a wilful act on the part of anyone, whereby
      another is sought to be deprived, by illegal or inequitable
      means, of what he is entitled to."



   71. In Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi [(2003) 8
SCC 319], it was observed that fraud vitiates every
solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwell together and it
cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any
equitable doctrine including res judicata. This Court
observed as under: (SCC pp. 327-29, paras 15-18, 23 &
25)
                                      18




      "15. Commission of fraud on court and suppression of
   material facts are the core issues involved in these
   matters. Fraud, as is well known, vitiates every solemn act.
   Fraud and justice never dwell together.

      16. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which
   induces the other person or authority to take a definite
   determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former
   either by word or letter.

      17. It is also well settled that misrepresentation itself
   amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent misrepresentation may
   also give reason to claim relief against fraud.

      18. A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and
   consists in leading a man into damage by wilfully or
   recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a
   fraud in law if a party makes representations which he
   knows to be false, and injury ensues therefrom although the
   motive from which the representations proceeded may not
   have been bad.
                                ***

23. An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous.

***

25. Although in a given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata."

(emphasis supplied)

72. In Madhukar Sadbha Shivarkar v. State of Maharashtra [(2015) 6 SCC 557 : (2015) 3 SCC (Civ) 368 : (2015) 3 SCC (Cri) 239] , this Court observed that fraud had been played by showing the records and the orders obtained unlawfully by the declarant, would be a nullity in the eye of the law though such orders have attained finality. Following observations were made: (SCC pp. 569- 70, para 27)

"27. The said order is passed by the State Government only to enquire into the landholding records with a view to find out as to whether original land revenue records have been destroyed and fabricated to substantiate their unjustifiable claim by playing fraud upon the Tahsildar and appellate authorities to obtain the orders unlawfully in their favour by showing that there is no surplus land with the Company and its shareholders as the valid sub-leases are made and they are accepted by them in the proceedings under Section 21 of the Act, on the basis of the alleged false declarations filed by the shareholders and sub-lessees under Section 6 of the Act. The plea urged on behalf of the State Government and the de facto complainant owners, at whose instance the orders are passed by the State Government on the alleged ground of fraud played by the declarants upon the Tahsildar and appellate authorities to get the illegal orders obtained by them to come out from the clutches of the land ceiling provisions of the Act by creating the revenue records, which is the fraudulent act on their part which unravels everything and therefore, the question of limitation under the provisions to exercise power by the State Government does not arise at all. For this purpose, the Deputy Commissioner of Pune Division was appointed as the enquiry officer to hold such an enquiry to enquire into the matter and submit his report for consideration of the Government to take further action in the matter. The legal contentions urged by Mr Naphade, in justification of the impugned judgment and order prima facie at this stage, we are satisfied that the allegation of fraud in relation to getting the landholdings of the villages referred to supra by the declarants on the alleged ground of destroying original revenue records and fabricating revenue records to show that there are 384 sub-leases of the land involved in the proceedings to retain the surplus land illegally as alleged, to the extent of more than 3000 acres of land and the orders are obtained unlawfully by the declarants in the land ceiling limits will be nullity in the eye of the law though such orders have attained finality; if it is found in the enquiry by the enquiry officer that they are tainted with fraud, the same can be interfered with by the State Government and its officers to pass appropriate orders. The landowners are also aggrieved parties to agitate their rights to get the orders which are obtained by the declarants as they are vitiated in law on account of nullity is the tenable submission and the same is

well founded and therefore, we accept the submission to justify the impugned judgment and order Babu Maruti Dukare v. State of Maharashtra [2006 SCC OnLine Bom 1268 : (2007) 2 AIR Bom R 361] of the Division Bench of the High Court."

(emphasis supplied)

73. In Jai Narain Parasrampuria v. Pushpa Devi Saraf [(2006) 7 SCC 756], this Court observed that fraud vitiates every solemn act. Any order or decree obtained by practising fraud is a nullity. This Court held as under:

"55. It is now well settled that fraud vitiates all solemn act. Any order or decree obtained by practising fraud is a nullity. [See (1) Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi [Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi, (2003) 8 SCC 319] followed in (2) Kendriya Vidyalaya Sangathan v. Girdharilal Yadav [(2004) 6 SCC 325 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 785] ; (3) State of A.P. v. T. Suryachandra Rao [(2005) 6 SCC 149] ; (4) Ishwar Dutt v. LAO [(2005) 7 SCC 190] ; (5) Lillykutty v. Scrutiny Committee, SC & ST [(2005) 8 SCC 283] ; (6) Maharashtra SEB v. Suresh Raghunath Bhokare [(2005) 10 SCC 465 : 2005 SCC (L&S) 765] ; (7) Satya v. Teja Singh [(1975) 1 SCC 120 : 1975 SCC (Cri) 50] ; (8) Mahboob Sahab v. Syed Ismail [(1995) 3 SCC 693] ; and (9) Asharfi Lal v. Koili [(1995) 4 SCC 163] .]"

(emphasis supplied)

74. In State of A.P. v. T. Suryachandra Rao [(2005) 6 SCC 149], it was observed that where the land which was offered for surrender had already been acquired by the State and the same had vested in it. It was held that merely because an enquiry was made, the Tribunal was not divested of the power to correct the error when the respondent had clearly committed a fraud. Following observations were made: (SCC pp. 152-53 & 155, paras 7-10 & 13-16)

"7. The order of the High Court is clearly erroneous. There is no dispute that the land which was offered for surrender by the respondent had already been acquired by the State and the same had vested in it. This was clearly a case of fraud. Merely because an enquiry was made,

the Tribunal was not divested of the power to correct the error when the respondent had clearly committed a fraud.

8. By "fraud" is meant an intention to deceive; whether it is from any expectation of advantage to the party himself or from ill-will towards the other is immaterial. The expression "fraud" involves two elements, deceit and injury to the person deceived. Injury is something other than economic loss, that is, deprivation of property, whether movable or immovable or of money and it will include any harm whatever caused to any person in body, mind, reputation or such others. In short, it is a non-economic or non-pecuniary loss. A benefit or advantage to the deceiver, will almost always cause loss or detriment to the deceived. Even in those rare cases where there is a benefit or advantage to the deceiver, but no corresponding loss to the deceived, the second condition is satisfied. [See Vimla v. Delhi Admn. [1963 Supp (2) SCR 585 : AIR 1963 SC 1572 : (1963) 2 Cri LJ 434] and Indian Bank v. Satyam Fibres (India) (P) Ltd. [(1996) 5 SCC 550] ]

9. A "fraud" is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. (See S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath [(1994) 1 SCC 1] .)

10. "Fraud" as is well known vitiates every solemn act. Fraud and justice never dwell together. Fraud is a conduct either by letter or words, which includes the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by words or letter. It is also well settled that misrepresentation itself amounts to fraud. Indeed, innocent misrepresentation may also give reason to claim relief against fraud. A fraudulent misrepresentation is called deceit and consists in leading a man into damage by wilfully or recklessly causing him to believe and act on falsehood. It is a fraud in law if a party makes representations, which he knows to be false, and injury enures therefrom although the motive from which the representations proceeded may not have been bad. An act of fraud on court is always viewed seriously. A collusion or conspiracy with a view to deprive the rights of the others in relation to a property would render the transaction void ab initio. Fraud and deception are synonymous. Although in a

given case a deception may not amount to fraud, fraud is an anathema to all equitable principles and any affair tainted with fraud cannot be perpetuated or saved by the application of any equitable doctrine including res judicata. (See Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi [(2003) 8 SCC 319] .) ***

13. This aspect of the matter has been considered recently by this Court in Roshan Deen v. Preeti Lal [(2002) 1 SCC 100 : 2002 SCC (L&S) 97] , Ram Preeti Yadav v. U.P. Board of High School and Intermediate Education [(2003) 8 SCC 311], Ram Chandra Singh v. Savitri Devi [(2003) 8 SCC 319] and Ashok Leyland Ltd. v. State of T.N. [(2004) 3 SCC 1]

14. Suppression of a material document would also amount to a fraud on the court. (See Gowrishankar v. Joshi Amba Shankar Family Trust [(1996) 3 SCC 310] and S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath [(1994) 1 SCC 1] .)

15. "Fraud" is a conduct either by letter or words, which induces the other person or authority to take a definite determinative stand as a response to the conduct of the former either by words or letter. Although negligence is not fraud but it can be evidence of fraud; as observed in Ram Preeti Yadav [(2003) 8 SCC 311] .

16. In Lazarus Estates Ltd. v. Beasley [(1956) 1 QB 702 : (1956) 2 WLR 502 : (1956) 1 All ER 341 (CA)] , Lord Denning observed at QB pp. 712 and 713 : (All ER p. 345 C)

'No judgment of a court, no order of a minister can be allowed to stand if it has been obtained by fraud. Fraud unravels everything.'

In the same judgment, Lord Parker, L.J. observed that fraud 'vitiates all transactions known to the law of however high a degree of solemnity' (All ER p. 351 E-F)."

(emphasis supplied)

75. In A.V. Papayya Sastry v. State of A.P. [(2007) 4 SCC 221], this Court as to the effect of fraud on the judgment or order observed thus: (SCC pp. 231 & 236- 37, paras 21-22 & 38-39) "21. Now, it is well-settled principle of law that if any judgment or order is obtained by fraud, it cannot be said to

be a judgment or order in law. Before three centuries, Chief Justice Edward Coke proclaimed:

'Fraud avoids all judicial acts, ecclesiastical or temporal.'

22. It is thus settled proposition of law that a judgment, decree or order obtained by playing fraud on the court, tribunal or authority is a nullity and non est in the eye of the law. Such a judgment, decree or order--by the first court or by the final court--has to be treated as nullity by every court, superior or inferior. It can be challenged in any court, at any time, in appeal, revision, writ or even in collateral proceedings.

***

38. The matter can be looked at from a different angle as well. Suppose, a case is decided by a competent court of law after hearing the parties and an order is passed in favour of the plaintiff applicant which is upheld by all the courts including the final court. Let us also think of a case where this Court does not dismiss special leave petition but after granting leave decides the appeal finally by recording reasons. Such order can truly be said to be a judgment to which Article 141 of the Constitution applies. Likewise, the doctrine of merger also gets attracted. All orders passed by the courts/authorities below, therefore, merge in the judgment of this Court and after such judgment, it is not open to any party to the judgment to approach any court or authority to review, recall or reconsider the order.

39. The above principle, however, is subject to exception of fraud. Once it is established that the order was obtained by a successful party by practising or playing fraud, it is vitiated. Such order cannot be held legal, valid or in consonance with law. It is non-existent and non est and cannot be allowed to stand. This is the fundamental principle of law and needs no further elaboration. Therefore, it has been said that a judgment, decree or order obtained by fraud has to be treated as a nullity, whether by the court of first instance or by the final court. And it has to be treated as non est by every court, superior or inferior."

Supervisory jurisdiction of the court can be exercised in case of error apparent on the face of the record, abuse of process and if the issue goes to the root of the matter.

76. In S.P. Chengalvaraya Naidu v. Jagannath [(1994) 1 SCC 1], this Court noted that the issue of fraud goes to the root of the matter and it exercised powers under Article 136 to cure the defect. The Court observed: (SCC p. 5, paras 5-6) "5. The High Court [Jagannadh v. Perumal Naidu, 1967 SCC OnLine Mad 103 : (1969) 82 LW 167] , in our view, fell into patent error. The short question before the High Court was whether in the facts and circumstances of this case, Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. The High Court, however, went haywire and made observations which are wholly perverse. We do not agree with the High Court that 'there is no legal duty cast upon the plaintiff to come to court with a true case and prove it by true evidence'. The principle of 'finality of litigation' cannot be pressed to the extent of such an absurdity that it becomes an engine of fraud in the hands of dishonest litigants. The courts of law are meant for imparting justice between the parties. One who comes to the court, must come with clean hands. We are constrained to say that more often than not, the process of the court is being abused. Property-grabbers, tax evaders, bank loan- dodgers and other unscrupulous persons from all walks of life find the court-process a convenient lever to retain the illegal gains indefinitely. We have no hesitation to say that a person, whose case is based on falsehood, has no right to approach the court. He can be summarily thrown out at any stage of the litigation.

6. The facts of the present case leave no manner of doubt that Jagannath obtained the preliminary decree by playing fraud on the court. A fraud is an act of deliberate deception with the design of securing something by taking unfair advantage of another. It is a deception in order to gain by another's loss. It is a cheating intended to get an advantage. Jagannath was working as a clerk with Chunilal Sowcar. He purchased the property in the court auction on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. He had, on his own volition, executed the registered release deed (Ext. B-15) in favour of Chunilal Sowcar regarding the property in dispute. He knew that the appellants had paid the total decretal amount to his master Chunilal Sowcar. Without disclosing all these facts, he filed

the suit for the partition of the property on the ground that he had purchased the property on his own behalf and not on behalf of Chunilal Sowcar. Non-production and even non- mentioning of the release deed at the trial is tantamount to playing fraud on the court. We do not agree with the observations of the High Court that the appellant-defendants could have easily produced the certified registered copy of Ext. B-15 and non-suited the plaintiff. A litigant, who approaches the court, is bound to produce all the documents executed by him which are relevant to the litigation. If he withholds a vital document in order to gain advantage on the other side then he would be guilty of playing fraud on the court as well as on the opposite party."

77. In K.K. Modi v. K.N. Modi [(1998) 3 SCC 573], it was observed that one of the examples cited as an abuse of the process of the court is re-litigation. It is an abuse of the process of the court and contrary to justice and public policy for a party to re-litigate the same issue which has already been tried and decided earlier against him.

78. The learned counsel for the respondent has placed reliance on the decision rendered in Ujjagar Singh v. Collector [(1996) 5 SCC 14] , wherein this Court examined the effect of coming into force of the Punjab Land Reforms Act, 1972 and vesting of the surplus area in the State. In this case, the area in possession of landlord was declared surplus under the Pepsu Act, but possession had not been taken by the State. It was held that area did not vest finally as the surplus area under the Pepsu Act, owing to coming into force of the new Act, the ceiling area must be determined afresh under the new Punjab Act. In the instant case, the order was passed in ceiling matter in the year 1980 and the adjudication order of the Collector (Ceiling) was not questioned nor the order of remand to declare land as surplus and then the additional land was declared surplus in 1993. It was not the case of re-opening of the

case. In fact, the land has vested in the State under the Abolition Act. Thereafter, compensation has been obtained, obviously once land has vested in the State, the possession of such land/open land is deemed to be that of the owner. In any view of the matter, in the facts and circumstances of the instant case, compensation could not have been claimed.

79. In State of H.P. v. Harnama [(2004) 13 SCC 534], this Court observed that possession of land was not taken and the tenant was in occupation of the land and had acquired ownership rights before the land was declared surplus as against the landlord. It was further observed that the land in question had been notified as surplus and the fact that the original owner of the land had been paid compensation, would be of no avail to the State if before the date of actual vesting non-occupant tenant in possession of the land had acquired ownership rights. It is totally distinguishable and cannot be applied to the instant case.

80. The learned counsel on behalf of the respondent has referred to the decision rendered in Madan Kishore v. Sudhir Sewal [(2008) 8 SCC 744] , wherein question arose with respect to entitlement of sub-tenant to apply under Section 27(4). It was held that the expression in Section 27(4), such tenant who cultivates such land, does not entitle a sub-tenant either to claim proprietary rights or apply for the same under Section 27(4). It was held that he was not a sub-tenant. The decision is of no help to the cause espoused on behalf of LRs of Rajinder Singh.

81. In the peculiar facts projected in the case the principle fraud vitiates is clearly applicable, it cannot be ignored and overlooked under the guise of the scope of proceedings under Sections 18/30 of the LA Act."

13. In the light of the aforesaid Judgment, as fraud

vitiates everything and in the present case, the

appellant/petitioner and his brother have played a fraud

upon their sister, no case for interference is made out in

the matter.

14. In the considered opinion of this Court, the learned

Single Judge has rightly dismissed the writ petition and it

is nobody's case that the succession granted in favour of

the legal heirs of late K.Sathi Reddy, which included the

respondent No.6/Smt. Kandala Saraswathi was set aside

by any Court/Tribunal and therefore, the Special Tribunal

was right in directing the restoration of the entries which