[Cites 6, Cited by 0]
Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Sqn. Ldr. Deepak Sindhu vs Union Of India on 30 March, 2026
Author: Farjand Ali
Bench: Farjand Ali
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HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 5942/2026
Sqn. Ldr. Deepak Sindhu S/o Shri Jaiprakash Sindhu, Aged
About 34 Years, R/o H. No. 1242/3, Dj Map Air Force Quarters,
Air Force Station Jodhpur, District Jodhpur, Rajasthan.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Union Of India, Through The Secretary, Ministry Of
Defense, Government Of India, New Delhi-110011.
2. The Chief Of The Air Staff, Air Headquarter, Vayu Bhawan,
Rafi Marg, New Delhi-110106.
3. The Air Officer Personnel, Air Headquarter, Vayu Bhawan,
Rafi Marg, New Delhi-110106.
4. The Air Officer Commanding, South Western Air
Command (Swac), Air Force Station, Gandhi Nagar,
Gujarat.
5. The Air Officer Commanding, 32 Wing, Air Force Station,
Jodhpur, District Jodhpur, Rajasthan.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Vikas Balia , Sr. Adv.
Assisted by Mr. Kailash Jangid
Mr. Priyansh Arora
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Bharatv Vyas ,ASG
with BP Bohra, Sr. CGC
Mr. Vaibhav Bhansali
Ms. Divyanshi Thanvi
Group Capt., Mr. Sanjeev Bindra
Wing Comm., Mr. Palash Ghosh
W.O., Mr. S.K. Trivedi
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HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI
Order
Reportable-
Date of Conclusion of Arguments : 27/03/2026
Date on which Order is Reserved : 27/03/2026
Full Order or Operative Part : Full Order
Date of Pronouncement : 30/03/2026
By the Court-
Grievance of the Case :
1. The instant civil writ petition is directed against the transfer/
signal dated 27.02.2026 claiming it to be arbitrary, unjust
and illegal. It is further claimed that the petitioner has been
transferred from 32 Wing, Air Force Station, Jodhpur to 11
Wing, Air Force Station, Tezpur (Assam), in gross violation of
the applicable policy governing posting of officers (Gp Capt &
below) (except Dental Branch) and settled principles of law.
Facts of the Case as narrated:
2. The petitioner is serving as a Squadron Leader in the Indian
Air Force and is presently posted at 32 Wing, Air Force
Station, Jodhpur. Since his commissioning, he has served at
various stations in accordance with the directions issued by
the competent authorities from time to time.
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3. By Signal dated 14.07.2022, the petitioner was transferred
from 260 SU to 5 Air Force Hospital, Jorhat (Assam), where
he served as an Accounts Officer. During the course of his
service, and in view of his qualification of LL.B., he was
deputed to undergo the Air Force Judge Advocate Course at
Coimbatore from 15.07.2024 to 08.03.2025, which he duly
completed. Thereafter, vide Signals dated 04.03.2025 and
06.03.2025, he was posted to 32 Wing, Air Force Station,
Jodhpur, where he joined on 08.03.2025 and has since been
serving as a Legal Officer.
4. While discharging his duties at Jodhpur, the respondents
issued a further Signal dated 27.02.2026 transferring the
petitioner to 11 Wing, Air Force Station, Tezpur, with a
direction to join on or before 30.03.2026. The petitioner has
thus been subjected to transfer after a short tenure of
approximately one year at his present posting, despite
earlier having served in the North-Eastern region at Jorhat,
Assam.
5. The petitioner's parents are suffering from serious medical
ailments and are undergoing continuous treatment at
Ambala and Chandigarh. His father has undergone major
surgery for a renal pelvis tumor, including removal of one
kidney, while his mother is a burn survivor requiring
prolonged medical care. The applicable posting policy
prescribes a normal tenure of two to four years, with an
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endeavor to provide at least three years' stability at a
station. Notwithstanding the same, and before completion of
the minimum tenure, the petitioner has been transferred,
leading him to submit a detailed representation dated
02.03.2026 seeking cancellation or modification of the
transfer on medical and compassionate grounds; however,
no decision has been taken thereon, compelling the
petitioner to file the present writ petition.
6. The present writ petition came to be instituted on
16.03.2026, challenging the impugned transfer order. During
the pendency of the present proceedings, the representation
preferred by the petitioner came to be rejected vide
communication dated 17.03.2026
7. It is pertinent to note that the respondents had already
lodged a caveat on 12.03.2026, evidently in anticipation of
the filing of the present writ petition.
8. Upon the matter being listed on 18.03.2026, time was
granted to the respondents to file their reply, and the case
was thereafter posted for further consideration on
25.03.2026.
9. On 25.03.2026, learned counsel for the respondents sought
additional time to address arguments, whereupon the matter
was adjourned and listed on 27.03.2026.
10.The Counsel for the Respondent submitted a written reply
where it is stated:
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That the petitioner, an Accounts Branch officer commissioned
in 2014, has no vested right to a specific station as transfer
is an inherent condition of service and an administrative
exigency. The current posting to Tezpur was issued to meet
organizational requirements and maintain operational
effectiveness, which takes precedence over individual welfare
policies as per settled legal principles and the petitioner's
own commissioning oath. The respondents further stated
that the petitioner's personal grievances regarding his
parents' health lack merit, as his father is a non-dependent
ex-serviceman with access to nationwide ECHS facilities, and
his administrative representation for cancellation has already
been considered and found non-feasible by the competent
authority.
11. The petitioner's transfer to Tezpur is a routine
administrative exercise necessitated by organizational
requirements and the officer's branch qualifications,
overriding any individual preference or welfare guidelines
which are not legally enforceable. They assert that the
petitioner has misquoted the posting policy and failed to
establish any mala fides, particularly since his claims
regarding parental dependency are contradicted by official
records and the availability of universal ECHS medical
coverage. Relying on settled judicial precedents, including
Shilpi Bose vs. State of Bihar 1991 Supp(2)SCC 659, the
respondents maintain that the scope of judicial interference
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in military transfers is extremely limited and that the present
writ petition, filed prematurely before the formal disposal of
the petitioner's administrative representation, is a misleading
attempt to bypass service discipline.
12.Heard learned counsels present for the parties and gone
through the materials available on record.
ORAL SUBMISSIONS OF LEARNED COUNSELS PRESENT
FOR THE PARTIES:
13.Learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that the
petitioner is confronted with grave and compelling personal
circumstances. It was urged that the petitioner's father is
suffering from a serious ailment, namely a tumor in the left
renal pelvis, and has already undergone a major surgical
procedure involving the removal of one kidney. It was further
submitted that the petitioner's mother is a 50% burn
survivor and continues to require constant care and
assistance.
14.Learned counsel further asserted that the petitioner is
presently serving in the Indian Air Force and is due to be
discharged in the year 2028, with only about two years and
three months of service remaining. In view of the aforesaid
precarious family situation, it was contended that the
petitioner does not seek posting at any particular station as
a matter of right, but only prays that he may be
accommodated at a place which is reasonably accessible to
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Ambala, so as to enable him to attend to his ailing parents in
times of need.
15.It was thus prayed that the petitioner is not pressing for any
specific or rigid relief, but seeks a humane and considerate
approach from the authorities, commensurate with the
peculiar facts and circumstances of the case.
16.In reply to that Learned ASG submitted that the petitioner,
being a member of the Indian Air Force, is a disciplined
"warrior" who is obligated to serve wherever he is posted, in
accordance with the exigencies of service. It was contended
that such service inherently demands unwavering readiness
and mobility, leaving little scope for individual preferences to
override administrative requirements.
17.It was further asserted that the petitioner's parents are not
financially dependent upon him, and therefore, no ground is
made out warranting indulgence, of this court in writ
jurisdiction. Learned counsel also urged that the
transfer/posting policy relied upon by the petitioner is
merely directory in nature and does not confer any
enforceable or vested right, nor does it impose a mandatory
obligation upon the authorities to adhere to it in every case.
OBSERVATIONS OF THIS COURT:
I. Limited Scope of Judicial Interference in Transfer
Orders
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18.At the very outset, it is imperative to underscore the settled
and well-entrenched legal position that matters relating to
transfer and posting of employees lie predominantly within
the exclusive administrative domain of the employer. This
principle applies with greater rigour in the context of
disciplined forces such as the Indian Air Force, where
considerations of operational preparedness, administrative
exigencies, strategic deployment, and institutional discipline
outweigh individual preferences. The scope of judicial review
under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, in such
matters, is inherently limited, and Courts have consistently
exercised restraint in interfering with transfer orders unless
compelling circumstances so warrant. Such restraint is
founded upon the recognition that the employer is best
suited to assess the requirements of the service and to
determine the appropriate placement of its personnel in
furtherance of organizational objectives.
19.It is equally trite that no government servant or member of
the armed forces possesses a vested or indefeasible right to
remain posted at a particular station of his choice. Transfer is
an ordinary incidence and condition of service, implicit in the
very nature of public employment. An employee, upon
entering service, accepts the possibility of being transferred
from one place to another in accordance with administrative
needs. Therefore, a transfer order, by itself, does not infringe
any legal right, unless it is shown to be vitiated by factors
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extraneous to service requirements. Judicial review in such
cases does not extend to examining the desirability or
propriety of the transfer but is confined to testing the
decision-making process on well-recognized legal
parameters.
20.The scope of interference is not that of an appellate authority
reassessing the merits of the decision, but rather that of a
constitutional court ensuring legality of the process. The
jurisprudence governing transfer matters is consistent and
unequivocal in laying down that judicial interference is
permissible only in narrowly circumscribed contingencies.
21.These include situations where-
• the transfer order is ex facie tainted by mala fide intention, or
• where it is issued in violation of a statutory provision or
binding policy having the force of law, or
• where the authority passing the order lacks jurisdiction or
competence.
22.Apart from these limited grounds, allegations relating to
personal hardship, inconvenience, or even compassionate
considerations, though deserving of sympathy, do not
ordinarily furnish a legally sustainable basis for judicial
interference, unless such factors are demonstrably ignored in
an arbitrary or discriminatory manner.
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23.Applying the aforesaid principles to the facts of the present
case, this Court does not find any material on record which
may, even prima facie, establish that the impugned transfer
order is actuated by mala fides or is the result of any oblique
or extraneous consideration. No statutory provision or
enforceable rule has been shown to have been violated in
issuing the transfer order, nor has the competence of the
authority concerned been called into question. In such
circumstances, this Court, being mindful of the limited scope
of its jurisdiction, consciously refrains from exercising
appellate-like scrutiny over the administrative decision in
question and accords due deference to the discretion vested
in the competent authority in matters of transfer and
posting.
II. Object, Purpose and Normative Force of Transfer
Policy
24.That said, while the power of transfer undoubtedly lies within
the administrative domain, it is equally well settled that such
power is not unbridled or unguided. The existence of a
structured transfer policy is not an ornamental exercise but a
substantive mechanism designed to ensure consistency,
predictability, and transparency in administrative functioning.
The very purpose of framing such a policy is to maintain
uniformity in decision-making and to ensure that similarly
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situated individuals are treated alike, thereby eliminating the
possibility of discrimination.
25.The fundamental objective of such a policy is to obviate
arbitrariness and prevent decision-making based on
subjective preferences or individual predilections of officers
occupying positions of authority at a given point in time. It is
precisely to avoid a situation where different officers adopt
different standards in identical factual circumstances that
such policies are formulated.
26.A policy serves as a normative guide to ensure that similar
circumstances and identical facts yield similar outcomes. This
ensures that no individual is left with a legitimate grievance
that while one person was treated in a particular manner,
another, despite being similarly placed, was subjected to a
different standard.
27.The underlying rationale is that administrative decisions
should not vary with the individual occupying the office, but
must be guided by objective and predetermined standards.
This is not a private domain where discretion may be
exercised at will; rather, it is a constitutional obligation of the
State to act fairly and uniformly, consistent with the mandate
of equality and non-discrimination.
28.It is, therefore, not open to the administration to treat the
policy as a mere guideline to be followed at its convenience
and disregarded at its whim. Such an approach would reduce
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the policy to a dead letter. If authorities are permitted to
follow the policy when convenient and ignore it otherwise,
the very purpose of its formulation would stand defeated.
29.Thus, as far as practicable, and in the ordinary course, a duly
framed policy is required to be followed in its true spirit.
Although such a policy may not have statutory force, it
carries significant persuasive and normative value, and
ensures that administrative discretion does not degenerate
into arbitrariness or "sweet will and caprice."
30.In this context, while it is well settled that in cases of
administrative exigency the employer retains the discretion
to transfer an employee to a suitable place, such discretion
is neither unfettered nor uncanalised. The exercise of
discretionary power in matters of transfer must remain
subject to the discipline of reasonableness, transparency,
and fairness. Even where the authority is vested with wide
latitude, such power cannot be exercised arbitrarily,
capriciously, or in disregard of established norms and
policies. The absence of cogent reasons for effecting a
transfer is indicative of non-application of mind, and an
unreasoned exercise of such power undermines the
credibility of administrative decision-making. Thus, even in
the realm of transfer and posting, discretion must be
exercised in a structured and principled manner, consistent
with the mandate of Article 14 of the Constitution of India.
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III. Deviation from Policy: Exceptional Circumstances
and Requirement of Cogent Reasons
31.It is no doubt permissible for administrative authorities to
deviate from policy; however, such deviation is inherently
exceptional in nature. The very existence of a policy implies
that ordinarily it is to be followed, and deviation is not the
rule but an exception. Whenever a deviation from the policy
is effected, exceptional circumstances must be demonstrated
to justify such departure.
32.Since a policy does not carry the force of law, deviation
therefrom may be permissible; however, such deviation must
be justified by the existence of special or exceptional
circumstances. Otherwise, a legitimate question arises as to
why the policy, once framed, is not being adhered to.
33.If deviation is permitted without restraint or reasoning, it
would render the policy illusory and redundant. A policy
cannot be reduced to a mere formality, to be observed at
convenience and ignored at will. If that were to be allowed,
the very exercise of policy formulation would lose its purpose
and credibility.
34.Therefore, the discretion to depart from policy must be
exercised judiciously and not arbitrarily. Such departure
must be supported by cogent, discernible, and rational
reasons which clearly demonstrate the existence of
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administrative exigency or special circumstances warranting
deviation.
35.In the present case, the petitioner has specifically relied
upon the policy prescribing a minimum tenure; however, no
reasons have been disclosed by the respondents for
curtailing such tenure. The respondents have merely
asserted their authority to transfer, without substantiating
the necessity for deviation.
36.When a policy is invoked before the Court, the burden lies
upon the respondents to justify departure therefrom. Failure
to disclose reasons, particularly when specifically questioned,
leads to a legitimate inference of arbitrariness.
Thus, while deviation from policy is permissible, it is
conditional upon the existence and disclosure of exceptional
circumstances; absent such justification, the action becomes
vulnerable to challenge.
IV. Absence of Proven Administrative Exigency:
Failure to Establish Exceptional Circumstances
37.Administrative exigency is often invoked as a justification for
deviation from policy norms governing transfers; however,
such exigency must be real, specific, and demonstrable, and
not merely a bald assertion.
38.Since deviation from policy is permissible only in exceptional
circumstances, the burden lies upon the respondents to
establish the existence of such compelling administrative
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necessity which warranted the petitioner's premature
transfer.
39.In the instant case, no material has been placed on record to
indicate that the petitioner's transfer to Tezpur was
necessitated by any urgent or unavoidable administrative
requirement. There is nothing to demonstrate that his
presence at the transferred station is indispensable or that
no alternative arrangement was feasible.
40.On the contrary, the petitioner has pointed out availability of
personnel and functional requirements at other stations,
which has not been effectively rebutted by the respondents.
This further weakens the plea of administrative necessity.
41.It is also pertinent to note that the petitioner is not asserting
any indefeasible right to be retained at a particular station of
his choice. The limited grievance projected is that even if a
transfer is to be effected, his case deserves to be considered
for posting at a comparatively convenient station, including
Delhi or any other station in the Northern or Western sector,
especially in view of the serious medical condition of his
parents. Such a submission, by its very nature, does not
trench upon the administrative prerogative of the
respondents, but merely invites a fair and reasonable
consideration within the framework of the existing policy.
42.The respondents, however, have attempted to justify the
impugned transfer by contending that there exists a
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shortage of Accounts Officers at Tezpur. This assertion, when
tested against the submissions advanced on behalf of the
petitioner, does not inspire confidence. The petitioner has
specifically pointed out that the shortage of Accounts
personnel is even more acute at stations such as Delhi,
which fact has not been effectively controverted by the
respondents by placing any cogent material on record. In
absence of comparative data or objective criteria, the
selective invocation of shortage at Tezpur appears to be
unsubstantiated and insufficient to constitute a compelling
administrative exigency.
43.This Court is conscious of the fact that it is neither equipped
nor expected to sit in judgment over the sufficiency of
administrative deployment at various stations. At the same
time, when "administrative exigency" is pressed into service
as the sole justification for deviation from a binding policy,
such exigency must be supported by some tangible material
indicating that the requirement is real, pressing, and
incapable of being met through alternative arrangements.
Mere ipsi dixit of the respondents cannot be accepted as a
substitute for demonstrable necessity.
44.Equally, it must be clarified that this Court is not a forum for
granting postings based on personal preferences or
conveniences of employees. Public service, particularly in a
disciplined force, carries with it an inherent obligation to
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serve wherever required. Once an individual opts for a
transferable service, he implicitly accepts the incidence of
transfer based on administrative needs. The Court cannot
assume the role of a placement authority or a "charity
forum" for securing postings at desired locations.
45.However, the above principle operates in tandem with the
equally important requirement that administrative power
must be exercised in a fair, just, and reasonable manner.
While the respondents undoubtedly possess the authority to
transfer personnel in accordance with service requirements,
such power is not unfettered. It must be exercised in
consonance with the applicable policy and supported by
rational justification, particularly when it results in
curtailment of prescribed tenure or affects an employee
facing genuine hardship.
46.Mere invocation of "administrative exigency" without
disclosing its factual basis cannot suffice. Such a plea, in
absence of supporting material, fails to meet the threshold of
exceptional circumstances required to justify deviation from
policy.
47.Administrative exigency cannot be reduced to a ritualistic
incantation to validate every transfer irrespective of facts. If
accepted in such a manner, it would render the very concept
of policy otiose and defeat the guarantee against
arbitrariness.
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48.In the absence of any concrete, verifiable, and compelling
justification, the impugned transfer appears not to have been
made in accordance with the applicable policy, and no
reasonable grounds have been demonstrated to justify any
deviation therefrom.
V. Judicial Review as a Check on Arbitrariness: Policy
Deviation Only in Exceptional Circumstances
49.The power of judicial review vested in this Court is not
confined merely to examining the legality of administrative
action but extends to ensuring that such action conforms to
the broader constitutional mandate of fairness,
reasonableness, and non-arbitrariness.
50.It is well-settled that where an administrative authority
frames a policy governing transfers, such policy is not an
empty formality but a guiding framework intended to ensure
consistency, transparency, and predictability in decision-
making. Ordinarily, such policy deserves to be adhered to in
its true spirit, as any departure therefrom has the potential
to introduce arbitrariness.
51.Deviation from the prescribed policy, therefore, cannot be
resorted to as a matter of routine. It is permissible only in
exceptional circumstances, where compelling administrative
reasons exist, which must be real, substantial, and
discernible from the record. The element of exceptionality
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must not be illusory or based on vague assertions, but must
withstand objective scrutiny.
52.In this context, the scope of judicial review assumes
significance. While the Court does not sit in appeal over
administrative decisions, it is well within its jurisdiction to
examine whether the decision-making process reflects due
consideration of relevant factors, exclusion of irrelevant
considerations, and existence of a rational nexus between
the decision and the reasons assigned.
53.Thus, where deviation from policy is alleged, and particularly
where reasons are either absent or unsubstantiated, the
Court is duty-bound to invoke its power of judicial review to
ascertain whether the case truly falls within the realm of
exceptional circumstances or whether the deviation is merely
a product of unstructured discretion.
54.In the present case, the petitioner has been transferred
before completion of even the minimum tenure contemplated
under the applicable policy, thereby giving rise to a
legitimate concern regarding the fairness and justness of the
decision. The absence of any cogent or discernible
justification further necessitates judicial scrutiny.
55.It is further borne out from the record that the
representation submitted by the petitioner seeking
cancellation of the transfer has been rejected in a
perfunctory and mechanical manner, as is evident from the
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communication placed on record. The rejection reflects a
degree of administrative indifference, inasmuch as it fails to
disclose any substantive reason, much less any compelling
administrative exigency, warranting denial of the request. It
is submitted that a representation of this nature merits due
and meaningful consideration particularly in cases where
there exists some identifiable administrative necessity,
inevitability of posting at a particular station, or where the
exigencies of service genuinely demand such deployment in
the larger interest of the State. However, in the present
case, no such circumstance is either disclosed or discernible.
56.In fact, the manner in which the representation has been
rejected exhibits a clear element of non-application of mind
and administrative rigidity. A representation cannot be
treated as an empty formality, to be disposed of cursorily,
especially when the employee has specifically questioned the
absence of any administrative exigency. The very purpose of
entertaining a representation is to assess whether there
exists any compelling, unavoidable, or service-driven
necessity justifying the decision. Where such necessity is
absent, the authority is expected to re-evaluate its decision
with fairness and objectivity. The record, however, does not
indicate that the posting of the petitioner at the transferred
place is inevitable, indispensable, or required in the interest
of service. There is no material to suggest that the
petitioner's presence at the said station is necessitated by
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any pressing administrative demand or public interest. In
such a situation, the rejection of the representation, without
addressing these core aspects, renders the decision arbitrary
and reflective of mere administrative obstinacy rather than
reasoned determination.
57.The insistence on enforcing the transfer, despite absence of
any unavoidable or compelling circumstance, renders the
decision susceptible to the charge of unreasonableness.
Where no administrative exigency exists, and yet the
authority chooses to adhere rigidly to its decision without
proper consideration of the representation, the same ceases
to be a reasoned administrative action and instead assumes
the character of arbitrary exercise of power. The rejection,
therefore, appears to be not founded on necessity, but rather
reflective of a rigid and unjustified approach, which cannot
be sustained in law.
58.It is a settled principle that administrative decisions must be
guided by necessity and purpose, and not by mere insistence
or inflexibility. If there are no unavoidable circumstances, no
demonstrable requirement of service, and no compelling
administrative reason necessitating the petitioner's
continuance at the transferred station, then a rigid stand
that the petitioner must nevertheless comply, despite raising
legitimate grounds in representation, becomes inherently
unreasonable. The law does not countenance a situation
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where, in the absence of any discernible justification, the
authority persists with its decision merely for the sake of
maintaining it. Such an approach defeats the very essence of
fair administrative process, where consideration of
representation is intended to introduce flexibility,
responsiveness, and justice into decision-making.
59.In the present case, the absence of any administrative
exigency, coupled with the mechanical rejection of the
representation, leads to a reasonable inference that the
decision is not driven by necessity, but rather by an
unwarranted rigidity. Such an exercise of power, devoid of
justification and insensitive to the requirement of fair
consideration, falls foul of the principles of reasonableness
and non-arbitrariness enshrined in administrative law.
60.Therefore, while transfer is primarily an administrative
function, it is not immune from judicial review where the
action impugned fails to satisfy the test of fairness,
reasonableness, and non-arbitrariness, particularly when it
involves unexplained deviation from an established policy.
61.At this juncture, it is apposite to fortify the aforesaid
principles by adverting to the authoritative pronouncement
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Rajendra Roy vs. Union
of India (1993) 1 SCC 148, wherein the contours of
judicial interference in transfer matters were succinctly
delineated.
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62.The Hon'ble Court categorically held that transfer is an
ordinary incidence of service and should not ordinarily be
interfered with by Courts or Tribunals. The Supreme Court,
however, carved out well-defined exceptions to this rule by
holding that interference is warranted where the transfer
order is vitiated by mala fides or is in violation of statutory
provisions or binding guidelines governing transfers. It was
emphatically observed that unless such infirmities are clearly
established, Courts ought to refrain from substituting their
own decision in place of that of the competent authority.
63.The Hon'ble Court further observed that allegations of mala
fide cannot be sustained on mere insinuations or vague
assertions, and that a "firm foundation" based on cogent
material must exist before any such inference is drawn. At
the same time, it was recognized that mala fide may, in
appropriate cases, be inferred from surrounding
circumstances, but only where such circumstances are
clearly pleaded and established.
64.Importantly, the Supreme Court reiterated that personal
hardship, inconvenience, or family dislocation, though
genuine concerns, do not by themselves furnish a legally
sustainable ground for quashing a transfer order. Such
considerations fall within the administrative domain and are
to be addressed by the department upon representation.
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65.The ratio laid down in the aforesaid judgment thus reinforces
a dual principle: firstly, that judicial restraint must be
exercised in transfer matters; and secondly, that such
restraint is not absolute, and judicial review can be
legitimately invoked where the decision is shown to be
arbitrary, mala fide, or in violation of governing norms.
66.Applying the said principles to the facts of the present case,
it becomes evident that while this Court does not intend to
sit in appeal over the administrative decision of transfer, it is
nevertheless obligated to examine whether the impugned
action withstands the test laid down by the Hon'ble Supreme
Court. In particular, where a structured policy prescribes a
minimum tenure and the same is curtailed without disclosure
of any exceptional circumstance or administrative necessity,
the action prima facie falls within the zone warranting
judicial scrutiny.
67.Thus, the present case stands on a distinguishable footing,
inasmuch as the challenge is not predicated merely on
personal hardship, but on the foundational ground of
unexplained deviation from an established policy, coupled
with absence of reasons, thereby attracting the limited but
well-recognized scope of judicial review as elucidated in the
aforesaid judgment.
68.Consequently, while reaffirming the principle that transfer is
an incidence of service and ordinarily immune from
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interference, it must equally be held that where such
transfer is effected in disregard of policy norms without any
discernible justification, the same ceases to be a routine
administrative act and becomes susceptible to correction in
exercise of writ jurisdiction.
VI. Distinguishing the Judgments Relied Upon by the
Respondents
69.The reliance placed by the respondents upon the judgment
rendered in Shilpi Bose v. State of Bihar 1991
Supp(2)SCC 659 is wholly misplaced and misconceived, as
the said decision operates in an entirely different factual and
legal matrix and does not govern the controversy involved in
the present writ petition. A close and contextual reading of
the said judgment itself reveals that the ratio laid down
therein is confined to circumstances which are conspicuously
absent in the present case.
70.At the outset, it is respectfully submitted that this Court is
in complete agreement with the settled proposition
enunciated in Shilpi Bose that a government servant holding
a transferable post has no vested right to remain posted at a
particular place, and that ordinarily transfer orders should
not be interfered with when made in public interest or on
administrative grounds. However, the applicability of this
principle is conditional and not absolute, as is evident from
the very language employed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court,
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which clearly carves out exceptions in cases involving
violation of statutory rules or mala fide exercise of power .
71.In this context, it is crucial to note that the primary ground
on which the Hon'ble High Court had interfered in Shilpi Bose
was the alleged lack of jurisdiction of the District Education
Establishment Committee to effect transfers. The Hon'ble
Supreme Court, upon examination, found that such authority
did in fact possess the requisite jurisdiction and that the
transfers had been effected to accommodate employees on
request in order to mitigate hardship. Thus, the Supreme
Court reversed the High Court's decision primarily on the
premise that (i) the competent authority had jurisdiction, (ii)
the transfers were made to alleviate hardship, and (iii) there
was no violation of any mandatory statutory rule .
72.In stark contrast, the present case does not involve any such
question of jurisdiction of the authority; rather, the challenge
herein is predicated upon arbitrariness and violation of the
governing posting policy, particularly the mandate regarding
minimum tenure and the obligation to consider medical and
compassionate grounds. The issue as to whether an order
passed in violation of a binding policy framework warrants
judicial interference was neither raised nor adjudicated in
Shilpi Bose. Thus, the said judgment does not deal with the
precise legal issue which arises in the present case.
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73.Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Shilpi Bose expressly
observed that non-interference is warranted only where the
transfer is made "in public interest and for administrative
reasons" . In the present case, however, there is no material
on record to demonstrate that the impugned transfer has
been effected in public interest or due to any compelling
administrative exigency. On the contrary, the facts clearly
disclose that the petitioner has been prematurely transferred
within a short span of approximately one year, despite the
policy prescribing a normal tenure of two to four years, with
an endeavor to ensure stability of at least three years. Thus,
the essential conditions which weighed with the Hon'ble
Supreme Court in declining interference in Shilpi Bose are
conspicuously absent here.
74.Moreover, the factual background of Shilpi Bose itself reflects
that the transfers in question were effected on the request of
the employees concerned to accommodate them and to
alleviate hardship, which was considered a valid
administrative exercise by the competent authority. In
contradistinction, the present case involves a non-request,
involuntary transfer, which has been effected despite the
petitioner's compelling personal circumstances, including
serious medical conditions of his parents and a pending
representation seeking compassionate consideration.
Therefore, the very factual foundation of the two cases is
fundamentally dissimilar.
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75.It is also pertinent to emphasize that Shilpi Bose does not
lay down an absolute bar against judicial review in transfer
matters; rather, it recognizes that interference would be
justified where the order is vitiated by illegality,
arbitrariness, mala fides, or violation of binding norms. The
present case squarely falls within these recognized
exceptions, inasmuch as the impugned transfer has been
effected in disregard of the applicable policy governing
tenure, and without due consideration of the petitioner's
representation and humanitarian circumstances.
76.Thus, while the general principle stated in Shilpi Bose
regarding limited judicial interference is not disputed, the
said judgment cannot be applied to the factual matrix of the
present case, as the same does not involve any issue
pertaining to transfer policy, including (i) absence of
demonstrated public interest or administrative necessity, (ii)
violation of policy governing minimum tenure, (iii) existence
of compelling medical and compassionate grounds, and (iv)
absence of any claim by the petitioner to remain at a
particular station as a matter of right.
77.In view of the aforesaid distinguishing features, this Court is
of the considered opinion that the reliance placed by the
respondents on Shilpi Bose v. State of Bihar is wholly
untenable, and the said judgment does not apply to the facts
and circumstances of the present case.
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78.Further, the reliance placed by the respondents on the
judgment rendered in D.B. Special Appeal Writ No.
738/2024 (Union of India & Ors. vs. Surendra Kumar)
is wholly misconceived, inasmuch as the said judgment is
clearly distinguishable on facts, law, and the issues involved,
and therefore does not apply to the present case. A careful
and contextual reading of the said judgment itself
demonstrates that the foundation of the decision therein is
materially different from the controversy involved in the
present writ petition.
79.Firstly, as is evident from para 7 of the said judgment , the
Hon'ble Division Bench categorically observed that the Policy
of 2020 stood superseded by the Policy of 2022, and the
entire adjudication in that case turned upon the
interpretation of a "request posting" under the Policy of
2022, particularly the stipulation that such postings
ordinarily carry a restricted tenure of two years. Thus, the
principal ground on which the Division Bench interfered was
that the employee therein had already completed the
prescribed tenure of a request/co-location posting, and
therefore could not claim extension. In stark contrast, in the
present case, the petitioner's transfer is not founded upon
the completion of any such restricted tenure of a "request
posting", nor is the respondents' action justified on that
footing. Rather, the petitioner has been prematurely
transferred before completion of the minimum prescribed
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tenure, thereby directly violating the very policy which
governs normal postings. Thus, the ratio of the said
judgment, which is premised on completion of a limited
tenure under a request posting, is wholly inapplicable here.
80.Secondly, the controversy before the Hon'ble Division Bench
was intrinsically linked to co-location/spouse posting
grounds, as is apparent from paras 2.1 and 8 of the
judgment , wherein the respondent therein sought
continuation at a particular station on account of his wife
being employed and his minor child. The entire adjudication
revolved around the interplay between co-location policy and
administrative exigencies. However, in the present case, no
such claim of spouse co-location or right to remain at a
particular station has been raised at all. The petitioner herein
has not asserted any entitlement to be posted at Jodhpur or
any specific place; rather, the grievance is confined to the
arbitrariness and prematurity of the transfer, coupled with
compelling medical and compassionate circumstances. Thus,
the factual substratum itself is fundamentally different,
rendering the said precedent inapplicable.
81.Thirdly, although the Hon'ble Division Bench in para 9 relied
upon the judgment in Major General J.K. Bansal, which in
turn is based on Shilpi Bose, the legal principle emanating
therefrom is limited to the well-settled proposition regarding
restricted scope of judicial interference in transfer matters.
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This proposition is not in dispute even in the present case. In
fact, this court respectfully adopts the same principle as
noted by the Hon'ble Court in para 10 of the said judgment,
namely that posting at a particular place cannot be claimed
as a matter of right. However, the crucial distinction is that
the present petition does not seek enforcement of any such
right. There is no prayer or assertion seeking posting at a
specific station. The challenge herein is directed against the
illegality, arbitrariness, and violation of policy norms
governing minimum tenure, which squarely falls within the
recognized exceptions where judicial interference is
warranted even as per Shilpi Bose and subsequent
judgments.
82.Fourthly, the Hon'ble Division Bench itself, while reiterating
the limited scope of interference, proceeded on the premise
that there was no violation of statutory rules or policy in that
case, and the transfer was justified on administrative
exigency after completion of tenure. Conversely, in the
present case, the petitioner has specifically demonstrated a
clear infraction of the applicable posting policy, particularly
the mandate of minimum tenure and the obligation to
consider compassionate/medical grounds. Therefore, the
foundational assumption which weighed with the Division
Bench, namely absence of policy violation, is entirely absent
here.
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83.Lastly, the ratio of the said judgment is confined to a
situation where an employee, after availing the benefit of a
request/co-location posting for a defined tenure, seeks its
continuation as a matter of right, which was rightly negated
by the Hon'ble Court. The present case stands on an
altogether different footing, where the petitioner is not
seeking extension of any special benefit, but is only asserting
that the premature curtailment of tenure, without
consideration of binding policy norms and humanitarian
factors, is arbitrary and unsustainable in law.
84.In view of the aforesaid distinguishing features--namely
(i) reliance in the cited judgment on a superseded 2020
policy and its interpretation vis-à-vis the 2022 policy in the
context of request postings,
(ii) the centrality of spouse/co-location grounds in that case,
(iii) absence therein of any policy violation, and
(iv) the fact that no claim for a specific posting is made in
the present petition, it is respectfully submitted that the said
Division Bench judgment is clearly distinguishable and does
not govern the controversy at hand. Hence, the reliance
placed by the respondents thereon is misplaced and liable to
be rejected.
85.The another reliance placed by the respondents on State of
U.P. & Ors. vs. Gobardhan Lal, (2004) 11 SCC 402, is
wholly misplaced and distinguishable both on facts and in
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law. The said judgment primarily reiterates the limited scope
of judicial interference in transfer matters, particularly where
the challenge is founded upon disputed allegations such as
mala fides or political interference, unsupported by cogent
material. In that case, the Hon'ble Supreme Court declined
interference as the controversy involved seriously disputed
questions of fact and the High Court had erred in issuing
sweeping, generalized directions affecting administrative
autonomy. In stark contrast, the present case does not
involve any such disputed factual matrix; rather, the material
facts, namely the petitioner's premature transfer within
approximately one year, his prior tenure in the North-Eastern
region, and the serious medical condition of his parents, are
borne out from record and remain uncontroverted. The
challenge herein is not premised on conjectural allegations
but on demonstrable arbitrariness, violation of the governing
transfer policy, and non-consideration of relevant and
material circumstances, thereby squarely attracting the well-
recognized exceptions even under the ratio of the said
judgment.
86.Furthermore, unlike Gobardhan Lal (supra), where the
transfer was justified on grounds of administrative exigency
and attendant service considerations, the respondents in the
present case have failed to disclose any compelling public
interest or administrative necessity warranting such
premature displacement of the petitioner, particularly when
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he has recently been trained and posted as a Legal Officer.
The applicable policy itself contemplates a normal tenure of
two to four years with an endeavor to ensure stability, which
has been disregarded without any justification. Additionally,
the petitioner's detailed representation on serious medical
and compassionate grounds has not even been considered,
rendering the decision arbitrary and violative of principles of
fairness under Article 14. Thus, the present case falls within
the permissible scope of judicial review as envisaged even in
Gobardhan Lal (supra), and the said judgment, far from
supporting the respondents, in fact reinforces that
interference is warranted where the administrative action is
arbitrary, unreasonable, or ignores relevant considerations.
87.Additionally, a careful and meaningful distinction is required
to be drawn between the judgment relied upon by the
respondents (rendered in Sunil Samdaria vs. State of
Rajasthan & Anr., D.B. Civil Special Appeal No.
151/2025) and the facts of the present case, for the reason
that the said judgment operates in an entirely different legal
domain and is founded upon a distinct factual and
constitutional matrix, rendering it wholly inapplicable to the
controversy at hand.
88.In the said judgment, as it is evident that , the core issue
before the Hon'ble Division Bench pertained to a writ of quo
warranto challenging the appointment of an Additional
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Advocate General, primarily on the ground of alleged lack of
requisite experience and the validity of Clause 14.8 of the
Rajasthan State Litigation Policy, 2018. The controversy,
therefore, revolved around
(i) the eligibility and suitability of a law officer for
appointment,
(ii) the scope and enforceability of a State policy governing
such appointments, and
(iii) the extent of judicial review in matters concerning policy
decisions and professional engagements of legal counsel by
the State.
89.The Court, in that context, examined whether the State
could deviate from its own policy and whether such policy
had statutory force, ultimately holding that the Litigation
Policy was merely directory in nature and that the
appointment of law officers remained within the discretionary
domain of the State, subject to limited judicial review.
90.Contrastingly, the present case does not concern the
appointment to any public or quasi-public office, nor does it
involve a challenge to the validity of any policy amendment
or the eligibility criteria for such appointment. Rather, the
controversy herein pertains to the premature and arbitrary
transfer of a serving officer of the Indian Air Force, governed
by a structured and binding posting policy, which prescribes
a minimum tenure and contemplates stability in service. The
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petitioner's grievance is rooted in the violation of such policy,
coupled with compelling humanitarian and medical
circumstances, and the non-consideration of his
representation. Thus, the nature of rights asserted in the
present case flows from service jurisprudence and
administrative fairness, unlike in the cited judgment where
no enforceable right was found to exist in favour of the
petitioner seeking appointment-related relief.
91.Further, in the relied-upon judgment, the Hon'ble Court was
dealing with the question as to "who can be appointed" as an
Additional Advocate General and whether experience is an
inflexible criterion- essentially holding that professional
competence and suitability cannot be reduced to rigid
parameters and that the State enjoys wide latitude in such
matters. The issue therein was not one of transfer, tenure
protection, or service conditions of an employee. In fact, the
Court explicitly recognized that such appointments are in the
nature of professional engagements based on trust and
confidence, and not governed by statutory service rules. In
stark contrast, the present case involves a disciplined force
where transfers are regulated by specific policies and norms,
and where deviation therefrom, especially mid-tenure,
invites judicial scrutiny on well-settled grounds such as
arbitrariness, malafides, and violation of legitimate
expectation.
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92.Moreover, the judgment relied upon by the respondents does
not deal with, nor even remotely consider, the parameters
governing judicial review of transfer orders. It neither lays
down nor applies the principles relating to premature
transfer, compassionate grounds, or the obligation of the
authorities to consider representations. The ratio of the said
judgment is confined to the limited scope of interference in
policy decisions concerning appointment of legal officers and
the non-enforceability of executive guidelines in that context.
Therefore, importing the said ratio into the present factual
matrix would amount to a misapplication of precedent.
93.It is also significant to note that in the cited case, the Court
found absence of any statutory violation or enforceable legal
right, whereas in the present case, the petitioner asserts
violation of a binding posting policy which envisages a
minimum tenure, thereby giving rise to a legitimate
expectation of continuity.
94.In view of the aforesaid distinctions, it is manifest that the
judgment relied upon by the respondents is clearly
distinguishable both on facts and in law. The issues involved
therein- namely, the validity of policy amendment, discretion
of the State in appointing law officers, and the scope of quo
warranto, are entirely alien to the present dispute, which
concerns arbitrary transfer in violation of service norms and
non-consideration of representation. Consequently, the
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reliance placed by the respondents on the said judgment is
misplaced and does not advance their case in any manner.
VII. Compassionate Grounds and Humanisation in
Administrative Law
95.In the Dharmashastra tradition, law was never conceived as
a rigid or ruthless command, but as an instrument of
Dharma, guided by compassion (daya), aimed at reform
(prāyaścitta), and restrained by moral conscience. Any
application of law devoid of empathy was considered
adharm. Law is not a mechanical instrument devoid of
human sensitivity; rather, it is a living system that must
respond to human realities, balancing authority with fairness
and discipline with humanity.
96.The civilisational ethos of Indian jurisprudence finds a
profound articulation in the following verse from the
Mahabharata (Book 12, Chapter 316, Shloka 12):
"आनृशंस्यं परो धर्मः क्षमा च परमं बलम्।
आत्मज्ञानं परं ज्ञानं न सत्याद् विद्यते परम्॥"
97.The aforesaid shloka encapsulates the foundational
philosophy that compassion (ānṛśaṁsyam-non-cruelty,
kindness) constitutes the highest form of Dharma, while
forgiveness is regarded as the greatest strength. It further
affirms that introspection represents the highest form of
wisdom, and that truth remains the supreme guiding
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principle. In essence, it conveys that the exercise of
power,whether moral, social, or legal-must be anchored in
empathy, restraint, and an unwavering commitment to truth.
98.In the context of modern administrative law, the said
principle assumes particular significance. It reinforces that
the State and its instrumentalities, while vested with wide
discretionary powers, are equally bound by a duty to act
fairly, reasonably, and with due regard to human
circumstances. The rule of law does not postulate a sterile or
mechanical application of norms; rather, it mandates a
purposive and humane interpretation, especially where
individual hardship is evident and capable of being mitigated
without detriment to administrative efficiency.
99.The concept of, आनृशंस्यं ,non-cruelty or compassion- thus
operates as an ethical limitation on the exercise of
administrative discretion. It obligates authorities to eschew
decisions that, though technically permissible, produce
disproportionately harsh consequences. The law, in its
highest form, does not merely command obedience but
inspires fairness; it does not merely regulate conduct but
seeks to uphold dignity.
100.This ethical limitation on the exercise of power is not
confined to the Dharmashastra corpus alone but is equally
reflected in the enduring legacy of King Raja Vikramaditya,
who is celebrated in Indian tradition as an embodiment of
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न्याय (justice), धर्म (righteousness), and करुणा (compassion).
The accounts associated with his reign consistently portray a
sovereign who did not administer justice in a rigid or
mechanical manner, but with a deep sense of moral
discernment, balancing the letter of the law with the
demands of equity asnd humanity. It is this synthesis of
authority with empathy that elevated his न्यायप्रियता
(commitment to justice) beyond mere adjudication into a
model of ethical governance. The enduring principle
emerging from such traditions is that the legitimacy of any
decision-making authority, whether royal or administrative,
rests not merely in its power to decide, but in its capacity to
temper such power with compassion, fairness, and a
conscientious regard for human consequences.
101. Equally, the enduring principle that "दया धर्मस्य मूलम्"
(compassion is the very foundation of Dharma) serves as a
guiding reminder that the true strength of institutional
authority lies in its capacity for empathy and magnanimity.
Authority does not stand diminished when it accommodates
genuine hardship; rather, it is elevated when exercised with
sensitivity and humane consideration. The ability of the
administration to respond with करुणा (compassion) and उदारता
(magnanimity), particularly in situations involving compelling
personal or medical exigencies, reflects not leniency but a
higher standard of just and responsible governance
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102. It is in this backdrop that the role of judicial review
assumes importance. Courts, while exercising restraint in
matters of transfer and administrative policy, are
nevertheless duty-bound to ensure that discretion is not
exercised in a manner that is arbitrary, unreasonable, or
oblivious to material considerations. Where relevant factors,
such as grave medical exigencies, are ignored or cursorily
dealt with, the decision-making process stands vitiated for
non-application of mind.
103. Thus, the highest conception of law is not one of
unyielding severity, but of balanced justice, where mercy
tempers authority, and compassion informs discretion.
Administrative power, when exercised without regard to
genuine human hardship, risks degenerating into
arbitrariness; whereas, when guided by empathy and
reason, it advances the cause of substantive justice and
reinforces public confidence in the fairness of the system.
104. The petitioner's case presents compelling
compassionate circumstances, particularly the serious
medical condition of his parents, which cannot be brushed
aside as routine or inconsequential. It is an admitted
position, even on the part of the respondents, that the
petitioner's parents are seriously ill and are undergoing
regular medical treatment at a hospital in Ambala, which
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further reinforces the genuineness and urgency of the
compassionate grounds urged by the petitioner.
105. Illness of an ordinary nature stands on a different
footing than grave ailments such as malignancy and major
surgical conditions. The medical condition of the petitioner's
father, involving a renal pelvis tumor and removal of a
kidney, coupled with the mother being a burn survivor
requiring prolonged care, clearly falls within the category of
exceptional hardship warranting due consideration. To
disregard such circumstances and to deny space for empathy
and compassion in matters of this nature would amount to
nothing but an exercise in undue rigidity.
106. The policy itself contemplates stability of tenure, which
in the present case has not been adhered to. The petitioner
has been transferred before completion of even the minimum
prescribed tenure, thereby defeating the very objective of
ensuring continuity and stability. It is also significant that the
petitioner had earlier served in the North-Eastern region, and
his present transfer again to a distant station, without
adequate justification, exacerbates the hardship. The
petitioner is not seeking immunity from transfer but only a
reasonable accommodation in terms of posting, so as to
enable him to discharge both his professional duties and
familial obligations. The petitioner is the sole child of his
parents, and it is a well-recognized facet of Indian ethos that
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caring for and serving one's parents constitutes an essential
moral and social obligation, which further warrants due
consideration in the matter of his posting.
107. Compassion is not antithetical to law; it is an integral
part of justice. A legal system that disregards human
suffering in the name of administrative expediency ceases to
be just, even if it remains formally correct.
108. Administrative decisions which ignore genuine hardship,
particularly when supported by cogent material and policy
considerations, risk becoming unduly harsh,
disproportionate, and ultimately unjust, thereby inviting
judicial correction.
VIII. Judicial Determination: Illegality of Impugned
Transfer Order and Consequential Relief
109. Having regard to the totality of circumstances, this
Court is of the considered view that the impugned transfer
order, though not illegal per se, suffers from lack of justness,
fairness and non-consideration of relevant factors.
110. In view of the foregoing discussion, and having held
that the impugned transfer/signal dated 27.02.2026 has
been issued in violation of the applicable posting policy,
without due consideration of the petitioner's minimum
tenure, and in complete disregard of the compelling medical
and compassionate circumstances placed on record, as also
in the absence of proper application of mind in a determined
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manner, while disposing of the representation, this Court is
of the considered opinion that the said transfer order cannot
be sustained in the eyes of law and deserves to be quashed
and set aside.
111. Accordingly, the instant writ petition succeeds and the
impugned transfer/signal dated 27.02.2026 transferring the
petitioner from 32 Wing, Air Force Station, Jodhpur to 11
Wing, Air Force Station, Tezpur (Assam) is hereby quashed
and set aside.
112. It is, however, clarified that in future the respondents
shall be at liberty to pass a fresh order, if so required, strictly
in accordance with law, the applicable posting policy, and
upon due consideration of the petitioner's tenure, medical
circumstances, and representation moved by him.
113. The writ petition stands allowed in the aforesaid terms.
114. The pending application(s),if any, also stands disposed of.
(FARJAND ALI),J
406-Mamta/-
(Uploaded on 30/03/2026 at 12:26:06 PM)
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