[Cites 9, Cited by 0]
Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Supriya vs State Of Rajasthan on 18 March, 2026
Author: Farjand Ali
Bench: Farjand Ali
[2026:RJ-JD:12170]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Misc. Appli No. 147/2024
Supriya D/o Shri Manish Choudhary, Aged About 21 Years, 18/19
Kamla Nehru Nagar, P.s Pratap Nagar, Jodhpur (Raj)
Complainant.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp
2. Jay Gehlot S/o Dinesh Gehlot, Aged About 26 Years, R/o
04 Vidhya Nagar, Chakra Wala Bera, Nayapura Petrol
Pump, Jodhpur (Raj)
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Himmat Jagga
Ms. Taniya Chug
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Sri Ram Choudhary, AGA
Mr. Gokulesh Bohra
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI
Order
DATE OF CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENTS 11/02/2026
DATE ON WHICH ORDER IS RESERVED 11/02/2026
FULL ORDER OR OPERATIVE PART Full Order
DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT 18/03/2026
REPORTABLE
BY THE COURT:-
1. The present matter arises out of an instant Miscellaneous
Application seeking recall of a portion of the order dated
07.03.2024 passed by this Court in S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition
No.790/2024.
2. The aforementioned Criminal Misc. Petition No.790/2024 was
instituted by the petitioner Jay Gehlot invoking the inherent
jurisdiction of this Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C., praying for
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quashing of the FIR and all consequential proceedings on the basis
of a compromise allegedly arrived at between the petitioner and
the complainant.
3. During the hearing of the said petition, the complainant-
applicant Supriya D/o Manish Choudhary, who was arrayed as
respondent No.2, appeared before this Court along with her
counsel and unequivocally acknowledged that a compromise had
been amicably effected between herself and the petitioner Jay
Gehlot. She further categorically stated before the Court that she
did not wish to pursue any criminal proceedings against the
petitioner in light of the compromise.
4. In view of the aforesaid compromise and relying upon the
authoritative pronouncement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in
Gian Singh v. State of Punjab, this Court deemed it appropriate
to exercise its inherent jurisdiction and accordingly passed an
order dated 07.03.2024 quashing the FIR and subsequent
proceedings. However, it has subsequently come to the notice of
this Court that due to a slip of mind or inadvertent error, the
language employed in paragraph No.7 of the said order resulted in
quashing of the entire FIR, whereas the compromise was confined
only to the petitioner Jay Gehlot and one Kaushal Sankhla.
5. The complainant-applicant Supriya has therefore filed the
present application asserting that the compromise was entered
into exclusively with Jay Gehlot and Kaushal Sankhla, and not with
the other accused persons named in the FIR. She has contended
that her consent for compromise and consequent quashing was
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limited only to the said two individuals, and the proceedings
against the remaining accused were never intended to be
terminated.
6. Notice of the instant application was issued by this Court
vide order dated 19.05.2025, and the matter was thereafter heard
at length. This Court has also carefully perused the written
compromise placed on record.
7. A scrutiny of the compromise document reveals that the
complainant Supriya, along with her family members Manish
Choudhary, Sushila Choudhary and Anil Choudhary, acknowledged
settlement of the dispute with Kaushal Sankhla. The compromise
appears to have arisen out of a property dispute relating to certain
plots, which the parties resolved through mutual understanding
and in the larger interest of maintaining harmony.
8. In the compromise, particularly Clause No.3, it is recorded
that the possession of the disputed plots had been handed over to
the second party, thereby resolving the underlying dispute.
Furthermore, Clause No.4 explicitly mentions that in relation to
Case No.390/2023, the parties no longer wish to pursue any
further proceedings.
9. Considering the submissions advanced before the Court, this
Court directed the learned AGA to place a factual report on record.
In compliance thereof, the learned AGA submitted a report dated
18.08.2025.
10. Upon perusal of the said factual report, it transpires that the
investigation revealed involvement of fifteen persons, namely:
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Deendayal Choudhary, Kaushal Sankhla, Pintu Rajnat, Suresh
Goyal, Rakesh Lohar, Shaitan Singh, Ajay Dawara, Kana Ram,
Praveen Singh, Smt. Tara, Smt. Saraswati, Smt. Laxmi, Smt.
Rekha, Smt. Balam Smt. Kamla and offences were found to be
prima facie established against them under Sections 143, 323,
354, 382, 427, 440 and 455 IPC.
11. It is therefore manifest that the compromise was confined
only between the complainant and two individuals, namely Jay
Gehlot and Kaushal Sankhla. Consequently, the intention of this
Court while passing the earlier order was to quash the proceedings
only to the limited extent of the petitioner before the Court.
However, owing to an inadvertent clerical lapse and an accidental
slip in drafting, paragraph No.7 of the order dated 07.03.2024
inadvertently resulted in quashing of the FIR in its entirety, which
was clearly not the contemplation of the Court. At this juncture, it
becomes necessary to clarify that the present exercise undertaken
by this Court does not amount to a review of the earlier order.
12. At this stage, it becomes apposite for this Court to elucidate,
with greater doctrinal precision, the well-recognized and
jurisprudentially entrenched distinction between the exercise of
the power of review and that of recall. A review, in its classical
legal sense, contemplates a substantive re-consideration of a
matter already adjudicated upon, whereby the Court is invited to
revisit its earlier determination on the merits. Such jurisdiction is
ordinarily circumscribed by statutory limitations and is exercised
only upon the demonstration of narrowly defined grounds, such as
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the discovery of new and material evidence which could not be
produced earlier despite due diligence, an error apparent on the
face of the record, or other legally recognized contingencies. In
essence, the exercise of review entails a re-examination of the
correctness or propriety of the conclusions already reached,
thereby reopening the adjudicatory process to a limited extent.
13. Contrariwise, the power of recall occupies an altogether
distinct doctrinal plane. Recall does not involve a re-evaluation of
the merits of the case nor does it amount to a judicial
reconsideration of the conclusions previously arrived at. Rather, it
is invoked in circumstances where the order of the Court has been
affected by an inadvertent procedural irregularity, accidental
omission, clerical lapse, or a manifest slip of pen or mind, which
has the effect of causing the recorded order to deviate from the
true intent and contemplation of the Court at the time of its
pronouncement. In such situations, the Court merely undertakes
the ministerial act of restoring its order to the form and substance
which it had originally intended, thereby aligning the written
record with the actual judicial determination.
14. Thus understood, the exercise of recall does not partake of
the character of appellate or review jurisdiction; rather, it
constitutes a limited corrective authority inherent in every Court of
record, enabling it to rectify accidental errors and procedural
aberrations so that the judicial record may accurately mirror the
true judicial intent. The invocation of such power is guided not by
a desire to re-adjudicate the controversy but by the imperative
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necessity of preventing the perpetuation of an unintended
consequence arising from a mere clerical or accidental lapse, and
thereby safeguarding the purity of the judicial process and
securing the overarching ends of justice.
15. In the case at hand, the fifteen accused persons named in
the investigation report were never petitioners before this Court,
nor had they approached this Court seeking quashing of the FIR.
Their cases were never placed for consideration, nor did this Court
undertake any adjudication concerning their culpability. Therefore,
the quashing of the FIR qua those accused persons was neither
prayed for nor examined by this Court, and the inadvertent
inclusion of their names within the ambit of the quashing order
can only be attributed to a slip of the pen or mind.
16. Consequently, rectifying such an inadvertent error by
recalling the relevant portion of the order does not amount to
exercising the power of review, but rather constitutes a legitimate
exercise of the Court's inherent authority to correct accidental or
clerical mistakes in order to prevent miscarriage of justice.
17. In view of the above discussion, paragraph No.7 of the order
dated 07.03.2024 passed in S.B. Criminal Misc. Petition
No.790/2024 is hereby recalled and modified to the extent that
the quashing of the FIR shall remain operative only in relation to
the petitioner Jay Gehlot (and the compromised party Kaushal
Sankhla). It is further clarified that the investigating agency shall
remain at liberty to proceed in accordance with law against the
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remaining accused persons named in the investigation report, and
the criminal proceedings against them shall continue unaffected.
18. Accordingly, the present Miscellaneous Application stands
allowed.
19. Ordered accordingly.
(FARJAND ALI),J
214-Mamta/-
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