[Cites 3, Cited by 0]
Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
State vs Moola Ram (2026:Rj-Jd:11252) on 7 March, 2026
Author: Farjand Ali
Bench: Farjand Ali
[2026:RJ-JD:11252]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 140/1996
State of Rajasthan
----Appellant
Versus
Moola Ram son of Kalla, resident of Rawatsar, P.S. Sadar, Barmer
District Barmer.
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. N.S. Chandawat, Dy.G.A.
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Tananjay Parmar, Amicus Curiae
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI
Order
Reportable-
07/03/2026
1. By way of filing the instant criminal appeal, the State has
made challenge to the order dated 02.01.1990 passed by the
Judicial Magistrate, Barmer in criminal regular case No.264/1989
whereby the learned Magistrate allowed the application for
compromise and acquitted the accused-respondent from the
charge under Section 429 of the IPC by compounding the offence.
2. The sum and substance of the State's plea would be that the
party who entered into compromise with the accused-respondent
was not a competent person to make a plea for compounding the
offence. It is their case that the goats were belonging to one
Bhuraram, however, the compromise in this case was executed by
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one Ramaram who happened to be the first informant of the case.
It is their plea that in cognizable offences, the first informant may
be termed as complainant; however, when it comes to the
question of compounding an offence, only the person who is
competent as envisaged under Section 320 of the Cr.P.C. can
move an application for compounding the offence. The learned
Magistrate attested the compromise entered into between accused
Mularam and the complainant Ramaram, and on the basis of such
compromise, acquitted the accused-respondent from the charges
under Section 429 of the Cr.P.C.
3. Since no one was present for the respondent, this Court
appointed Mr. Tananjay Parmar as amicus curiae. He was given
sufficient time to go through the file for a considerable period and
whereafter heard this submission canvased on his behalf.
4. I pondered over the issue and minutely gone through the
impugned order dated 02.01.1990 as well as the FIR No.264/1989
of Police Station Sadar, Barmer, lodged at the instance of the
complainant Ramaram, which contains a clear recital regarding the
killing of goats belonging to one Bhuraram. As per section 320 of
the Cr.P.C., only the owner of the property, who was Bhuraram in
this case, was competent to enter into the compromise with the
accused. Ramaram, who entered into the compromise with the
accused, had no authority and was not a competent person as per
the statutory provision to make a plea for compounding the
offence.
5. It is true that the compromise was not furnished by a
competent person and therefore, the learned Magistrate was not
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supposed to attest the same and place reliance on it for
compounding the offence and acquitting the accused. Since the
acceptance of the application for compounding the offence was not
in accordance with law, the pronouncement of order of acquittal is
also not strictly in accordance with law.
6. At the same time, this Court feels that though Shri Ramaram
was not the owner of the property but he was full-blood brother of
the Bhuraram, and the goats were grazing in his field, still he was
not a competent person as per provisions to enter into the
compromise. However, looking to the fact that the incident took
place in the year 1989 and the case is exclusively triable by the
Court of a Magistrate which contains punishment which do not
extend to five years, remanding the matter back for conducting a
fresh trial after a lapse of 37 years, in my view, would not secure
the ends of justice.
7. Having regard to the peculiar facts and circumstances of the
case, this Court is of the considered opinion that although the
impugned order dated 02.01.1990 passed by the learned
Magistrate cannot be said to be strictly in consonance with the
statutory mandate of Section 320 of the Cr.P.C., nevertheless, the
incident in question pertains to the year 1989 and more than
thirty-seven years have elapsed since the alleged occurrence. At
this distant point of time, reopening the entire matter and
directing a fresh trial would neither serve any meaningful purpose
nor advance the cause of justice. Rather, such a course would only
revive a stale controversy and subject the parties to unnecessary
hardship and protracted litigation. This Court is, therefore, of the
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view that after such an inordinate lapse of time, it would not be
appropriate for this Court to reopen the issue and unsettle the
position which has remained undisturbed for decades. In order to
balance the technical infirmity in the impugned order with the
overarching requirement of securing the ends of justice, this Court
deems it proper to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to bring
quietus to the proceedings. Consequently, while observing that the
impugned order dated 02.01.1990 may not strictly withstand legal
scrutiny, the continuation or revival of the criminal proceedings at
this stage is considered wholly unwarranted.
8. It is also trite law that the High Court, being a constitutional
Court of record, is vested with wide inherent powers to secure the
ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of the Court.
The availability and exercise of such inherent jurisdiction is not
dependent upon the form or stage of the proceedings in which the
matter comes before the Court. Merely because the present
matter has been placed before this Court in the form of an appeal
against acquittal would not operate as a legal impediment upon
the Court in invoking its inherent powers, if the facts and
circumstances of the case so demand. The inherent jurisdiction of
the High Court is preserved to meet extraordinary situations
where strict adherence to procedural technicalities may result in
injustice or perpetuation of a futile litigation. The High Court,
therefore, is competent to exercise such powers even while sitting
in its appellate jurisdiction, if doing so is necessary to secure the
ends of justice or to prevent misuse of the judicial process. In the
present case, although the impugned order of the learned
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Magistrate may not strictly conform to the statutory requirement
of Section 320 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, yet the
occurrence in question dates back to the year 1989 and more than
three decades have elapsed since then. Directing a retrial at this
distant point of time would neither subserve the interest of justice
nor serve any fruitful purpose. Rather, it would only reopen a
matter which has long remained settled and would unnecessarily
revive litigation between the parties after an inordinate lapse of
time. In these peculiar circumstances, this Court is of the
considered view that the ends of justice would be better served by
bringing a quietus to the entire controversy instead of unsettling
the position which has prevailed for decades.
9. Accordingly, this Court, in exercise of its inherent powers,
deems it appropriate to put a quietus to the proceedings and to
prevent further prolongation of a stale dispute. By invoking the
inherent powers of this Court to secure the ends of justice, the
entire proceedings against the accused-respondent are hereby
quashed and set aside, and the criminal appeal stands disposed
of.
10. The accused need not to surrender. If bail bonds are
furnished, the same shall be discharged. Record be sent back.
11. The remuneration payable to the learned Amicus Curiae shall
be borne by the RSLSA, in accordance with the rules governing
such appointments.
(FARJAND ALI),J
3-Arjun/-
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