[Cites 17, Cited by 0]
Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Ramuram vs State Of Rajasthan on 3 February, 2026
Author: Farjand Ali
Bench: Farjand Ali
[2026:RJ-JD:5653]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Criminal Revision Petition No. 904/2025
Ramuram S/o Thana Ram, Aged About 62 Years, R/o Nathoosar
Bikaner Rajajsthan
----Petitioner
Versus
1. State Of Rajasthan, Through Pp
2. Seetaram S/o Multanaram, R/o Nathoosar Ps Panchu
District Bikaner
3. Chailu Singh S/o Roop Singh, R/o Nathoosar Ps Panchu
District Bikaner
4. Narpat Singh S/o Chailu Singh, R/o Nathoosar Ps Panchu
District Bikaner
5. Beerbalram S/o Ramuram, R/o Nathoosar Ps Panchu
District Bikaner
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. M.S. Purohit
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Vimal Prakash Chhangani
Mr. Suresh Bishnoi
Mr. N.S. Chandawat, Dy.G.A.
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI
Order
DATE OF CONCLUSION OF ARGUMENTS : 29/01/2026
DATE ON WHICH ORDER IS RESERVED : 29/01/2026
FULL ORDER OR OPERATIVE PART : Full Order
DATE OF PRONOUNCEMENT : 03/02/2026
Reportable
BY THE COURT:-
1. The present criminal revision petition has been instituted by
the petitioner under Sections 397 read with 401 of the CrPC
(corresponding to Sections 438 read with 442 of the BNSS),
assailing the order dated 04.07.2025 passed by the learned
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Additional Sessions Judge, Nokha, District Bikaner in Revision
Petition No. 15/2025, whereby the revision petition preferred by
respondent No. 2 was allowed and, consequently, the order of
attachment passed under Section 165(1) of BNSS dated
18.06.2025 by the learned Sub-Divisional Magistrate in Case No.
04/2025 came to be set aside.
2. Briefly stating the facts of the case are that a complaint
under Section 164 of the BNSS was submitted by the S.H.O.,
Police Station Panchu, regarding rival claims over the land in
question, pursuant to which multiple complaints were lodged by
the parties concerned. Upon inquiry, it was reported that the
petitioner and certain private respondents were in possession and
that the dispute was likely to occasion breach of peace,
whereupon the learned S.D.M., by order dated 18.06.2025,
directed attachment of the land and appointed the S.H.O. as
receiver. The said order was set aside by the learned Additional
Sessions Judge on 04.07.2025 in revision preferred by respondent
No. 2, giving rise to the present revision petition at the instance of
the petitioner.
3. Heard learned counsel appearing on behalf of the parties and
perused the material available on record.
4. Before delving into the merits of the present petition, it is
pertinent to discuss the legal framework under which the
revisional jurisdiction of the Court is invoked. Section 438 of the
BNSS, 2023 (corresponding to section 397 Cr.P.C.), outlines the
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powers of the High Court and Sessions Court to call for records
and revise orders passed by subordinate Courts. This provision
plays a crucial role in ensuring that justice is not only done but is
also seen to be done by correcting any legal or procedural errors
that may have occurred in the lower Courts. To fully appreciate
the scope and application of this Section, it is essential to
reproduce it here for reference.
438. Calling for records to exercise powers of revision.
(1) The High Court or any Sessions Judge may call for and
examine the record of any proceeding before any inferior Criminal
Court situate within its or his local jurisdiction for the purpose of
satisfying itself or himself as to the correctness, legality or
propriety of any finding, sentence or order, recorded or passed,
and as to the regularity of any proceedings of such inferior Court,
and may, when calling for such record, direct that the execution
of any sentence or order be suspended, and if the accused is in
confinement, that he be released on his own bond or bail bond
pending the examination of the record.
Explanation. - All Magistrates, whether Executive or Judicial, and
whether exercising original or appellate jurisdiction, shall be
deemed to be inferior to the Sessions Judge for the purposes of
this sub-section and of Section 439.
(2)The powers of revision conferred by sub-section (1) shall not
be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any
appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.
(3) If an application under this section has been made by any
person either to the High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no
further application by the same person shall be entertained by
the other of them.
4.1 The statutory power conferred upon the High Court and
Session Court under Section 438 BNSS serves the purpose of
examining the legality, correctness, and propriety of orders passed
by inferior Courts. This ensures that criminal procedures are
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strictly adhered to according to the law, preventing any deviation
from legal mandates. Legality entails the correct application and
interpretation of legal provisions. It is crucial that Courts do not
misunderstand or ignore the law, as any misinterpretation or
wrongful application can lead to significant procedural errors.
Correctness involves the proper application of facts in accordance
with the legal provisions. It is essential that factual determinations
align with the governing laws to ensure accurate legal outcomes.
Propriety addresses situations where, despite the correct
application of law and facts, the resulting outcome is flawed. This
could occur when the exercise of legal power is technically correct,
and the facts support the decision, but the overall outcome is
deemed improper, unfair, or unjust in the broader sense of justice.
For an instance, if a husband earning ₹100,000 per month is
ordered to pay ₹2,000 as maintenance to his wife, the legal power
(legality) is exercised, and the wife's eligibility (correctness) is
considered, but the maintenance amount is not proper (propriety)
given the husband's income. The Court's power in this context is
supervisory and monitoring in nature. Its objective is to ensure
that proceedings and orders adhere to the law and principles of
justice, leading to the fair disposal of cases. Courts are established
to uphold these objectives, ensuring justice is served through
lawful processes. The mode of invoking this power can be through
applications by parties, or when the Court is made aware of
potential errors through publications, complaints, or letters. Upon
receiving such information, the Court must satisfy itself regarding
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the legality, correctness, and propriety of the order in question. At
this point, the Court can also exercise suo moto power to achieve
the ultimate objective of justice. When the matter has come up for
consideration or facts are brought to the notice of the Court, there
is no legal bar in exercising suo moto jurisdiction.
5. Now coming to the issue involved in this petition for which
revisional jurisdiction is to be exercised. To start with, it is
imperative to discuss the precedents set by Hon'ble the Supreme
Court concerning Sections 145 and 146 of Cr.P.C. and to fully
comprehend the legal position, it is necessary to first reproduce
these provisions, which are provided below for ready reference:-
"145. Procedure where dispute concerning land or water is
likely to cause breach of peace.--
(1) Whenever an Executive Magistrate is satisfied from a report of
a police officer or upon other information that a dispute likely to
cause a breach of the peace exists concerning any land or water
or the boundaries thereof, within his local jurisdiction, he shall
make an order in writing, stating the grounds of his being so
satisfied, and requiring the parties concerned in such dispute to
attend his Court in person or by pleader, on a specified date and
time, and to put in written statements of their respective claims
as respects the fact of actual possession of the subject of dispute.
(2) For the purposes of this section, the expression "land or
water" includes buildings, markets, fisheries, crops or other
produce of land, and the rents or profits of any such property.
(3) A copy of the order shall be served in the manner provided by
this Code for the service of a summons upon such person or
persons as the Magistrate may direct, and at least one copy shall
be published by being affixed to some conspicuous place at or
near the subject of dispute.
(4) The Magistrate shall then, without reference to the merits or
the claims of any of the parties to a right to possess the subject
of dispute, persue the statements so put in, hear the parties,
receive all such evidence as may be produced by them, take such
further evidence, if any, as he thinks necessary, and, if possible,
decide whether any and which of the parties was, at the date of
the order made by him under sub-section (1), in possession of
the subject of dispute:
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Provided that if it appears to the Magistrate that any party has
been forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed within two months next
before the date on which the report of a police officer or other
information was received by the Magistrate, or after that date and
before the date of his order under sub-section (1), he may treat
the party so dispossessed as if that party had been in possession
on the date of his order under sub-section (1).
(5) Nothing in this section shall preclude any party so required to
attend, or any other person interested, from showing that no
such dispute as aforesaid exists or has existed; and in such case
the Magistrate shall cancel his said order, and all further
proceedings thereon shall be stayed, but, subject to such
cancellation, the order of the Magistrate under sub-section (1)
shall be final.
(6) (a) If the Magistrate decides that one of the parties was, or
should under the proviso to sub -section (4) be treated as being,
in such possession of the said subject, he shall issue an order
declaring such party to be entitled to possession thereof until
evicted therefrom in due course of law, and forbidding all
disturbance of such possession until such eviction; and when he
proceeds under the proviso to sub-section (4), may restore to
possession the party forcibly and wrongfully dispossessed.
(b) The order made under this sub-section shall be served and
published in the manner laid down in sub-section (3).
(7) When any party to any such proceeding dies, the Magistrate
may cause the legal representative of the deceased party to be
made a party to the proceeding and shall thereupon continue the
inquiry, and if any question arises as to who the legal
representative of a deceased party for the purposes of such
proceeding is, all persons claiming to be representatives of the
deceased party shall be made parties thereto.
(8) If the Magistrate is of opinion that any crop or other produce
of the property, the subject of dispute in a proceeding under this
section pending before him, is subject to speedy and natural
decay, he may make an order for the proper custody or sale of
such property, and, upon the completion of the inquiry, shall
make such order for the disposal of such property, or the sale-
proceeds thereof, as he thinks fit.
(9) The Magistrate may, if he thinks fit, at any stage of the
proceedings under this section, on the application of either party,
issue a summons to any witness directing him to attend or to
produce any document or thing.
(10) Nothing in this section shall be deemed to be in derogation
of powers of the Magistrate to proceed under section 107.
146. Power to attach subject of dispute and to appoint
receiver.--
(1) If the Magistrate at any time after making the order under
sub-section (1) of section 145 considers the case to be one of
emergency, or if he decides that none of the parties was then in
such possession as is referred to in section 145, or if he is unable
to satisfy himself as to which of them was then in such
possession of the subject of dispute, he may attach the subject of
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dispute until a competent Court has determined the rights of the
parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to the
possession thereof: Provided that such Magistrate may withdraw
the attachment at any time if he is satisfied that there is no
longer any likelihood of breach of the peace with regard to the
subject of dispute.
(2) When the Magistrate attaches the subject of dispute, he may,
if no receiver in relation to such subject of dispute has been
appointed by any Civil Court, make such arrangements as he
considers proper for looking after the property or if he thinks fit,
appoint a receiver thereof, who shall have, subject to the control
of the Magistrate, all the powers of a receiver appointed under
the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908(5 of 1908):Provided that in the
event of a receiver being subsequently appointed in relation to
the subject of dispute by any Civil Court, the Magistrate--
(a) shall order the receiver appointed by him to hand over
the possession of the subject of dispute to the receiver
appointed by the Civil Court and shall thereafter discharge
the receiver appointed by him;
(b) may make such other incidental or consequential orders
as may be just."
From bare perusal of these Sections, this Court feels that
before initiating a proceeding under Section 145 Cr.P.C. or moving
an application under Section 146(1) of the Cr.P.C., circumstances
suggesting imminent danger of breach of peace or like
circumstance to presume instant threat to public peace and
tranquility has to be shown with the assistance of cogent and
reliable material. It should not be a vague or bald assertion rather
should be supported with strong material. The law in respect of
proceeding under Sections 145 & 146 Cr.P.C. is no more res-
integra that before initiating any proceeding under Sections 145 &
146 Cr.P.C. there has to be a serious question of possession and a
situation where it is not comprehensible as to which party was in
possession of the land in question at the relevant point of time or
the circumstances suggesting that parties are bent upon to take
forcible possession of the immovable property and therefore, there
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is an imminent danger to public peace and tranquility. The law in
this regard has been discussed and dealt with by Hon'ble the
Supreme Court in the matter of Ashok Kumar Vs. State of
Uttarakhand and Ors. reported in (2013) 3 SCC 366. The
relevant part of the order is being reproduced as under:-
"7. We are of the view that the SDM has not properly
appreciated the scope of Sections 145 and 146(1), Code of
Criminal Procedure. The object of Section 145, Code of
Criminal Procedure is merely to maintain law and order and
to prevent breach of peace by maintaining one or other of
the parties in possession, and not for evicting any person
from possession. The scope of enquiry Under Section 145 is
in respect of actual possession without reference to the
merits or claim of any of the parties to a right to possess
the subject of dispute.
8-11. 𝓍 𝓍 𝓍 𝓍 𝓍 𝓍 𝓍 𝓍 𝓍 𝓍 𝓍 𝓍 𝓍 𝓍 𝓍 𝓍 𝓍 𝓍 𝓍 𝓍 𝓍 𝓍 𝓍 𝓍 𝓍 𝓍
12. The above order would indicate that the SDM has, in our
view, wrongly invoked the powers Under Section 146(1),
Code of Criminal Procedure Under Section 146(1), a
Magistrate can pass an order of attachment of the subject of
dispute if it be a case of emergency, or if he decides that
none of the parties was in such possession, or he cannot
decide as to which of them was in possession. Sections 145
and 146 of the Code of Criminal Procedure together
constitute a scheme for the resolution of a situation where
there is a likelihood of a breach of the peace and Section
146 cannot be separated from Section 145, Code of
Criminal Procedure. It can only be read in the context of
Section 145, Code of Criminal Procedure If after the enquiry
Under Section 145 of the Code, the Magistrate is of the
opinion that none of the parties was in actual possession of
the subject of dispute at the time of the order passed Under
Section 145(1) or is unable to decide which of the parties
was in such possession, he may attach the subject of
dispute, until a competent court has determined the right of
the parties thereto with regard to the person entitled to
possession thereof.
13. The ingredients necessary for passing an order Under
Section 145 (1) of the Code would not automatically attract
for the attachment of the property. Under Section 146, a
Magistrate has to satisfy himself as to whether emergency
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exists before he passes an order of attachment. A case of
emergency, as contemplated Under Section 146 of the
Code, has to be distinguished from a mere case of
apprehension of breach of the peace. The Magistrate, before
passing an order Under Section 146, must explain the
circumstances why he thinks it to be a case of emergency.
In other words, to infer a situation of emergency, there
must be a material on record before Magistrate when the
submission of the parties filed, documents produced or
evidence adduced.
14. We find from this case there is nothing to show that an
emergency exists so as to invoke Section 146(1) and to
attach the property in question. A case of emergency, as per
Section 146 of the Code has to be distinguished from a
mere case of apprehension of breach of peace. When the
reports indicate that one of the parties is in possession,
rightly or wrongly, the Magistrate cannot pass an order of
attachment on the ground of emergency. The order
acknowledges the fact that Ashok Kumar has started
construction in the property in question, therefore,
possession of property is with the Appellant - Ashok Kumar,
whether it is legal or not, is not for the SDM to decide."
6. Moving to the matter in hand, it is apparent from the record
that the SDM passed the impugned order dated 18.06.2025,
whereby on the very same day not only was notice purportedly
issued, but invoking an alleged emergent circumstance, a receiver
was straightaway appointed. A careful perusal of the original file,
which has been tagged with the record, reveals that the complaint
bears the date 28.05.2025 and is stated to have been submitted
by the SHO. However, conspicuously, there is no endorsement of
receipt by the Court, nor does the record disclose that the said
complaint was ever formally taken on file. The record reveals that
a complaint dated 28.05.2025 remains entirely untouched. Even
more significantly, no order-sheet was drawn, either separately or
on the face of the complaint itself, at any point of time. If, indeed,
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the situation was so emergent as to warrant immediate
intervention, nothing prevented the authority from issuing notice
or passing appropriate orders on 28.05.2025 itself. The
interregnum between 28.05.2025 and 18.06.2025 is a substantial
period, during which no action whatsoever appears to have been
taken. Neither the parties approached the Court, nor did the SHO
place any fresh material on record on 18.06.2025. In the absence
of any intervening development, it is incomprehensible as to from
where and how an emergent circumstance suddenly arose on that
date. The record, taken as a whole, does not reflect any situation
on 18.06.2025 justifying the drastic step of appointment of a
receiver.
7. The Court below has proceeded on conjectures, observing
that a dispute may arise, despite there being no material to
demonstrate that any incident ever occurred or that the situation
warranted preventive action. Such an approach results in an
unwarranted assumption of jurisdiction and reflects a mechanical
exercise of power. In the absence of any procedural trace, the
passing of an order premised on a supposed apprehension of
breach of peace and the consequential appointment of a receiver
appears wholly unsustainable.
8. This Court finds that the exercise undertaken by the SDM
amounts to a clear misuse of power and an abuse of the process
of the Court. Upon a close reading of the complaint dated
28.05.2025, it nowhere emerges that any criminal case had ever
been registered, that there was any instance of bloodshed, that
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the parties had assembled at the property in question, or that
there was any grappling, commotion, or disturbance of public
peace, violence being far from the record. It is beyond
comprehension that in the absence of any actual dispute or law
and order situation, the SDM, merely at the behest of the police,
could divest persons of possession over immovable property, the
property in which civil rights vest, protected not only by statute
but also by the Constitution and hand it over to another. Such an
approach strikes at the very root of the rule of law and deserves
to be deprecated.
9. Even the revisional proceedings arising out of Section 146
CrPC, wherein the learned Additional Sessions Judge remanded
the matter, suffer from inherent infirmities. The remand order
proceeds on the premise that no complaint dated 28.05.2025 has
ever been filed by an SHO and such a complaint does not exists,
whereas the document does form part of the case file. The
absence of endorsement or order-sheet entries may indicate
procedural lapse, but it cannot lead to a declaration that such a
document never existed. Before making such categorical
observations, the revisional court was expected to exercise due
caution and judicial sensitivity, particularly when the record itself
tells a different story.
10. This Court is of the view that the power under Section 146
CrPC is not envisaged to be exercised at the whims or sweet will
of the Executive Magistrate, nor is it intended to decide rights of
possession which fall squarely within the domain of the civil court
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after a full-fledged trial. It is well settled that questions relating to
right, title, possession and interest fall squarely within the
exclusive domain of the competent Civil Court, and it is only such
Court which is legally empowered to adjudicate upon the same.
Property, being the hard-earned capital and valuable asset of an
individual, cannot be lightly interfered with. Handing over
possession of such property to a third person, without first
determining the rights, title and interest of the parties, is wholly
impermissible in law, more so in the absence of any imminent
apprehension of breach of peace or bloodshed. Such extraordinary
interference may be justified only in a situation where both the
rival claimants are poised at the spot, each asserting their
respective entitlements, and the circumstances are such that a
real and immediate threat of violence or bloodshed looms large.
The object and purpose of invoking the said provision is essentially
preventive in nature, intended to pacify the situation and to cool
off the parties so as to obviate the possibility of any immediate
confrontation or breach of peace. The temporary distancing of
both parties from the disputed property is contemplated only for a
short and limited duration, till such time the competent Civil Court
adjudicates upon the rights of the parties. The provision has not
been enacted to confer jurisdiction upon the criminal court to
determine questions of ownership, possession, or entitlement in
respect of immovable property. Its limited aim is to thwart the
likelihood of an imminent dispute, to maintain public tranquility,
and to prevent any apprehension of bloodshed. The determination
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as to who is the lawful owner or who is entitled to possession is a
matter squarely falling within the realm of civil adjudication and
can be decided only after due process of law by a competent Civil
Court. The role of the Executive Magistrate, while passing a
preventive order, is thus circumscribed and confined to addressing
the apprehension that the rival parties, asserting competing
claims, may indulge in violence at the spot. Once such an order is
passed, the jurisdiction of the criminal court remains strictly
limited and cannot extend beyond the point at which a competent
court of civil jurisdiction renders a decision concerning the
property. Till such adjudication by the competent Civil Court, the
preventive order operates merely as a measure to separate the
parties and preserve peace, and not as an instrument to
adjudicate or confer any right, title, or interest in the property. In
the absence of such compelling and emergent circumstances,
divesting a person of possession and placing the property under
third-party control would amount to an unwarranted exercise of
jurisdiction and a serious infraction of settled legal principles.
Accordingly, the order passed under Section 146 Cr.P.C. is liable to
be set aside.
11. It is well settled that while exercising revisional jurisdiction,
the Court is empowered to act suo motu in exceptional
circumstances. The invocation of such extraordinary jurisdiction
does not hinge upon a formal application by a party; rather, once
an order is brought to the notice of the Court, or otherwise comes
within its judicial gaze, the Court is duty-bound to examine its
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legality, correctness and propriety. While considering the issue of
suo motu exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction, this Court finds
that prima facie no material whatsoever exists to satisfy the very
object of Section 145 Cr.P.C. The continuation of proceedings
under Section 145 before the Executive Magistrate, in such
circumstances, would itself amount to an abuse of the process of
law. Preventing such abuse is not only within the power of this
Court, but is indeed its solemn duty. Therefore, exercising its
extraordinary powers, the proceedings under Section 145 Cr.P.C.
are also quashed.
12. After considering the facts and circumstances of the case, as
well as the legal principles discussed above, this Court finds that,
in the absence of any breach of peace or imminent danger thereof,
initiating criminal proceedings under Sections 145 and 146 of the
CrPC constitutes a misuse of the legal process. In view of the
foregoing discussion, Section 146 of the CrPC has already lost its
substratum. Consequently, the foundational proceedings under
Section 145 CrPC also deserve to be terminated, as their
continuance would amount to nothing but an abuse of the process
of law. This Court finds that the entire proceedings are vitiated by
procedural irregularities and non-application of mind.
13. Accordingly, the revision petition is allowed. The impugned
order dated 18.06.2025 passed by the learned Sub-Divisional
Magistrate and order dated 04.07.2025 passed by the learned
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Additional Sessions Judge, Nokha, District Bikaner are hereby
quashed and set aside.
14. It is clarified that if the parties have any inter se dispute
relating to civil rights or title, they are at liberty to approach the
competent civil or revenue court for adjudication of their rights.
However, in the event of any apprehension of breach of public
peace between the parties, appropriate action may be taken under
Sections 107 and 116, read with Section 151 of the Cr.P.C
(corresponding to Sections 126, 135 r/w 170 of BNSS
respectively).
15. Stay petition or any pending applications stands disposed of.
(FARJAND ALI),J
222-Mamta/-
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