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Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Aslam Khan vs State Of Rajasthan (2026:Rj-Jd:18117) on 16 April, 2026

Author: Farjand Ali

Bench: Farjand Ali

    [2026:RJ-JD:18117]

          HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                           JODHPUR
                   S.B. Criminal Writ Petition No. 1646/2026

    Aslam Khan S/o Khurshid Ahmed, Aged About 42 Years, R/o
    Masjid Ke Pass Village Hinganpur Tehsil Pingwan Districty Mewat
    Haryana
                                                                               ----Petitioner
                                             Versus
    1.       State       Of      Rajasthan,            Through            Additional    Chief
             Secretarybdepartment                 Of     Home         Secretariat      Jaipur
             Rajasthan
    2.       The Superintendent Of Police, Chittorgarh Rajasthan
    3.       The Station House Officer, Police Station Nimbaher District
             Chittorgarh Rajasthan
    4.       Mahaveer Singh S/o Sxhri Ganpat Singh Rathore, R/o
             Gangashahar Road Bikaner Rakjasthan
                                                                            ----Respondents


    For Petitioner(s)              :     Mr. Zafar Khan
    For Respondent(s)              :     Mr. N.S. Chandawat, Dy.G.A.



                     HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI

Order

REPORTABLE

16/04/2026

1. By way of the present petition, the petitioner has invoked the

inherent/extraordinary jurisdiction of this Court seeking

appropriate relief in relation to FIR No. 590/2004 registered at

Police Station Nimbahera for the offence under Section 379 IPC,

with the grievance that despite lapse of an inordinate period of

time, the spectre of unresolved investigation continues to loom

over him, though no substantive material has ever surfaced

against him.

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2. Learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the impugned

FIR pertains to the year 2004 and was registered for the offence

under Section 379 IPC, wherein the petitioner was not named. It

is contended that after investigation, seven persons alone were

charge-sheeted and tried, who ultimately came to be acquitted

vide judgment dated 29.02.2012 passed by the learned Additional

District Judge, Nimbahera. It is further urged that no proceedings

were ever initiated against the petitioner, nor was any action for

abscondence or proclamation undertaken. Despite absence of

incriminating material, the petitioner was once subjected to

harassment by police officials, compelling him to seek anticipatory

bail, which was granted by the learned Sessions Judge vide order

dated 03.10.2020. Learned counsel submits that even thereafter

more than five years have elapsed and no further action has been

taken, yet the petitioner continues to remain under constant

apprehension of coercive proceedings. It is thus contended that

such indefinite pendency of investigation, without any progress or

material against the petitioner, is violative of the constitutional

guarantee of speedy justice under Article 21, and therefore, all

proceedings qua the petitioner deserve to be dropped.

3. Per contra, learned Dy.G.A. opposed the submissions

advanced on behalf of the petitioner and submitted that mere

lapse of time by itself does not ipso facto extinguish the authority

of the investigating agency to proceed in accordance with law. It is

contended that the powers of investigation are statutory in

character and unless the proceedings are shown to be wholly

without jurisdiction or patently mala fide, interference by this

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Court ought to be exercised with circumspection. Learned Dy.G.A.

further submits that the petitioner having obtained anticipatory

bail already stands sufficiently protected against unwarranted

arrest, and no prejudice can be said to have been occasioned

merely on account of pendency of the FIR. It is thus prayed that

the petition deserves dismissal.

4. This Court has bestowed anxious consideration to the rival

submissions advanced at the Bar and has carefully examined the

material available on record. Upon such consideration, certain

foundational and undisputed circumstances emerge with sufficient

clarity. Firstly, the FIR in question pertains to the year 2004.

Secondly, the petitioner was not named in the first information

report. Thirdly, during the original course of investigation, seven

other persons were proceeded against, charge-sheeted, and put to

trial. Fourthly, the said trial culminated in acquittal of all the

charge-sheeted accused in the year 2012. Fifthly, no proceedings

of any effective nature have ever been shown to have remained

pending against the present petitioner. Lastly, even after grant of

anticipatory bail in the year 2020, no consequential or meaningful

investigative action appears to have been undertaken. These

circumstances form the backdrop against which the controversy

requires adjudication.

4.1. It is significant to note that the petitioner was not named in

the FIR at the inception of the criminal proceedings. Ordinarily,

though non-naming in an FIR is not by itself decisive, yet where a

matter remains pending for decades and no subsequent material

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of probative value is shown to have emerged, such circumstance

assumes substantial importance. The omission to name the

petitioner at the earliest stage, coupled with prolonged inaction

thereafter, prima facie indicates that the investigating agency did

not possess any definite or credible material connecting him with

the alleged occurrence.

4.2. The record further reveals that the investigating agency, after

conducting inquiry into the matter, found it appropriate to file

charge-sheet only against seven persons. Those very persons,

against whom the prosecution had considered evidence sufficient

for trial, were subjected to full-fledged judicial scrutiny before the

competent Court and ultimately stood acquitted vide judgment

dated 29.02.2012 passed by the learned Additional District Judge,

Nimbahera. This circumstance cannot be viewed in isolation. Once

the persons against whom tangible material was allegedly

available have already been tried and acquitted, the continuance

of a dormant and indefinite suspicion qua the present petitioner,

against whom no stronger material is forthcoming, becomes

inherently questionable.

4.3. The petitioner, therefore, stands on a footing at least no

worse, if not demonstrably better, than those persons who were

actually prosecuted. The prosecution has not pointed out any fresh

incriminating circumstance, discovery, confession admissible in

law, documentary linkage, or other legally sustainable material

subsequently emerging against the petitioner after conclusion of

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the earlier trial. In absence thereof, continuation of latent

proceedings would amount to preserving suspicion in vacuum.

4.4. Another striking feature of the case is the complete absence

of any coercive or substantive proceedings against the petitioner

over the intervening years. No supplementary challan implicating

him has been filed. No notice requiring participation in

investigation has been shown. No warrant proceedings were

initiated. No proclamation proceedings under law were

undertaken. No declaration of abscondence was ever sought. No

judicial order requiring his presence has been brought to the

notice of this Court. Such sustained omission over a long span of

time is eloquent in itself and militates against the contention that

any live investigation of substance survived against the petitioner.

4.5. The grant of anticipatory bail by the learned Sessions Judge

vide order dated 03.10.2020 also assumes relevance. The

petitioner approached the Court only after apprehending

harassment at the hands of police officials. Judicial protection was

extended to him. Yet, even after lapse of more than five years

thereafter, no meaningful step appears to have been taken by the

investigating agency. Neither has any report been filed nor has

any legally cognizable action been pursued. This prolonged

dormancy post grant of anticipatory bail further fortifies the

inference that the matter survives merely as a technical pendency

bereft of substantive prosecutorial purpose.

4.6. The criminal justice system exists to investigate offences and

prosecute offenders in accordance with law; it is not designed to

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keep citizens under perpetual clouds of uncertainty. An unresolved

investigation hanging over an individual for twenty to twenty-five

years creates a continuing civil disability. It impairs reputation,

engenders mental distress, inhibits normal social and economic

life, and leaves the citizen under recurring apprehension that

coercive measures may suddenly be revived. Such a state of

affairs is antithetical to rule of law.

4.7. The guarantee under Article 21 of the Constitution extends

beyond mere protection against unlawful detention. It

encompasses fairness, reasonableness, and expedition in every

stage of criminal process, including investigation. Delay which is

unexplained, oppressive, and prejudicial strikes at the

constitutional promise of just procedure. The Hon'ble Supreme

Court in Vakil Prasad Singh v. State of Bihar AIR 2009 SC

1822 has recognised that inordinate delay in investigation cannot

be countenanced and that the sword of pending criminal

proceedings cannot be permitted to hang endlessly over a person.

4.8. The ratio of the aforesaid decision applies with greater force

to the present matter. Here, not only has there been extraordinary

lapse of time, but no trial is pending, no discernible investigative

progress is shown, and no fresh incriminating material has

surfaced. If constitutional concern arises where proceedings are

delayed despite active prosecution, it arises with even greater

intensity where the State keeps a matter notionally alive while

doing nothing in substance. Indefinite investigative inertia is no

less prejudicial than delayed trial.

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4.9. The contention raised by learned Dy.G.A. that mere passage

of time would not by itself extinguish the power of investigation is,

in principle, correct and unexceptionable. However, the present

matter does not turn upon delay simpliciter. The issue here is not

mere chronology, but cumulative arbitrariness flowing from a

combination of factors: the petitioner being unnamed in the FIR;

earlier prosecution of others ending in acquittal; absence of

supplementary material; absence of proclamation or coercive

steps; anticipatory bail having been granted years ago; and total

investigative stagnation thereafter. These circumstances

collectively distinguish the case from one of ordinary delay.

4.10. Criminal law is a serious sovereign instrument and cannot be

reduced to a ceremonial file capable of being reopened at

convenience after decades. To allow a stale FIR to subsist

indefinitely against a person who was never named and against

whom no material is forthcoming would be to legitimise perpetual

insecurity. Courts, as guardians of constitutional liberty, cannot

remain indifferent where procedural dormancy itself becomes

oppressive.

4.11. This Court is therefore of the considered view that keeping

alive the possibility of coercive action against the petitioner for an

indefinite duration, without progress, without pending trial, and

without demonstrable incriminating material, is manifestly

arbitrary and incompatible with the right to speedy justice implicit

in Article 21 of the Constitution. Continuation of such proceedings

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would serve no legitimate investigational purpose and would

instead amount to abuse of the criminal process.

4.12. In the totality of facts and circumstances, especially

considering that:

(i) the FIR is of the year 2004;

(ii) the petitioner was not named therein;

(iii) seven accused were charge-sheeted, tried and acquitted;

(iv) no supplementary material implicating the petitioner has been

shown;

(v) no proceedings of abscondence, proclamation, or warrant were

ever initiated against him;

(vi) anticipatory bail was granted in the year 2020; and

(vii) no meaningful action has thereafter been taken,

this Court finds no justifiable reason to permit the shadow of stale

criminal proceedings to continue qua the petitioner.

4.13. Judicial discretion under inherent and extraordinary

jurisdiction is intended precisely to remedy such situations where

technical pendency outlives substantive justice. The continuance

of proceedings in the present case would be oppressive,

purposeless, and contrary to the constitutional mandate of

fairness. Hence, interference by this Court is not only warranted,

but necessary to secure the ends of justice.

5. Consequently, the present petition deserves to be and is

hereby allowed. All proceedings arising out of FIR No. 590/2004

registered at Police Station Nimbahera for the offence under

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