State Of Raj. And Ors vs Lrs Of Askaran Singh And Ors. ...
2026 Latest Caselaw 5678 Raj

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

State Of Raj. And Ors vs Lrs Of Askaran Singh And Ors. ... on 13 April, 2026

[2026:RJ-JD:18018]

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
                S.B. Review Petition (Writ) No. 55/2014

 1. State of Rajasthan through the Secretary, Local Self
    Department, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur.
 2. The Secretary, Revenue, Colonization and Soldiers Welfare
    Department
 3. The District Collector (Land records), District Barmer
 4. The Tehsildar, District Barmer
                                                                   ----Petitioners
                                    Versus
 1. Legal Representatives of Askaran Singh, aged about 80 years,
 S/o Late Shri Ram Singh, by caste Rajput, resident of Ward No.
 33, Shivkar House, Sardarpura, Barmer
 1A. Smt. Sugan Kanwar aged about 75 years W/o Lae Shri
 Askaran Singh
 1B. Bhagirath Singh, aged about 58 years S/o Late Shri Askaran
 Singh
 1C. Prithvi Singh aged about 56 years S/o Late Shri Askaran
 Singh
 All resident of Ward No. 33, Shivkar House, Sardarpura, Barmer
 2. Padam Singh aged about 72 years, S/o Late Shri Ram Singh
 by Cate Rajpur, resident of Ward No. 33, Shivkar House,
 Sardarpura, Barmer
 3. Mokam Singh aged about 69 years, S/o Late Shri Ram Singh
 by Cate Rajpur, resident of Ward No. 33, Shivkar House,
 Sardarpura, Barmer
 4. Municipal Board, Barmer through its, Commissioner.


                                                                 ----Respondents


For Petitioner(s)         :     Mr. Ayush Gehlot
For Respondent(s)         :     Mr. Ravi Bhansali Sr.Adv. assisted by
                                Mr. Usman Gani.
                                Mr. Vineet Dave


       HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANJEET PUROHIT

Judgment 13/04/2026

1. Date of Conclusion of arguments :: 17.03.2026

2. Date on which judgment was reserved :: 17.03.2026

3. Whether the full judgment or only the operative part is pronounced :: Full Judgment

4. Date of pronouncement :: 13.04.2026

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1. Present review petition has been preferred by State of

Rajasthan ("review petitioner") under Article 226 of the

Constitution of India, read with Order 47 Rule 1 CPC, seeking

review / recall of order dated 04.01.2013 passed by this Court in

S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11943/2010, whereby, on the basis of

specific averments and admission made in reply filed by

respondent No. 4 - Municipal Board, Barmer, writ petition was

disposed of while directing said respondent to pay compensation

to writ petitioner at the rate of reserved price of Rs.400/- per sq.

feet along with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the

date of filing of writ petition.

2. Learned counsel for review petitioner stated that challenging

said judgment dated 04.01.2013, D.B. Civil Special Appeal (Writ)

No. 369/2014 was filed, primarily on the ground that said

judgment was passed on the basis of concession made by counsel

for appellant, though he did not had instructions to that effect.

However, Hon'ble Division Bench observed that it would be

expedient for appellant - review petitioner to file an application for

review against said judgment dated 04.01.2013. Thus, while

closing said appeal, liberty was granted for filing of review

petition.

Hence, present review petition has been filed before this

Court, along with an application under Section 5 of the Limitation

Act seeking condonation of delay of 439 days.

3. Before proceeding with merits of review petition, heard

learned counsel for the parties upon application seeking

condonation of delay.

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4. Learned counsel for review petitioner stated that after

passing of judgment dated 01.04.2013, relevant file was obtained

from Municipal Board in May 2013, legal opinion was taken in the

month of October 2013, and final decision of filing special appeal

was taken in the month of December 2013 and special appeal was

filed on 04.02.2014. It was stated that after order dated

28.02.2014 passed by Hon'ble Division Bench, present review

petition was filed.

4.1 Learned counsel for review petitioner submitted that delay

caused in filing instant review petition is bonafide and that review

petition has been filed promptly, pursuant to liberty granted by

Hon'ble Division Bench, and thus, requested for condonation of

delay.

4.2 Per contra, learned counsel for respondents submitted that

special appeal was filed after a lapse of more than 1 year, i.e. on

04.02.2014 and no sufficient reason for said delay has been

explained by review petitioner. It is contended that day-to-day

delay was required to be explained and such casual explanations

of procedural and administrative nature are wholly inadequate to

justify inordinate delay of 439 days.

4.3 This Court duly considered submissions made at Bar. Though

it is found that impugned order dated 04.01.2013 was challenged

before Hon'ble Division Bench after a lapse of more than 1 year,

however, the same only amounts to delayed filing of Special

Appeal (Writ). However, once said special appeal was entertained

by Hon'ble Division Bench and liberty was granted to file present

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review petition, this Court finds it justified to condone delay of 439

days and to adjudicate present review petition on its merits.

4.4 In view of aforesaid reasons, delay caused in filing present

review petition is hereby condoned.

5. Heard learned counsel for the parties upon merits of review

petition.

6. Controversy involved in original writ petition related to land

ad-measuring 2 bighas and 18 biswas, comprising in Khasra No.

1665/5/2 ("land in question"), said to be owned and possessed by

original writ petitioners, i.e. legal representatives of late Shri

Askaran Singh. It was contended in writ petition that Municipal

Board, Barmer had encroached upon land in question and included

/ utilized the same for development of a housing colony without

undertaking any formal acquisition proceedings and without

payment of compensation to the writ petitioners.

6.1 Writ petitioners challenged auction notice dated 05.12.2010

and in the alternative, petitioners prayed for directions to be

issued to Municipal Board, Barmer to pay compensation to

petitioners in lieu of land encroached upon by the Board.

6.2 A reply to writ petition was filed on behalf of Municipal

Board, Barmer, admitting that land of petitioner was taken over

for residential project and that auction notice was issued for sale

of said land for residential / commercial purposes. It is clearly

stated in the reply that Municipal Board is ready to pay

compensation to petitioners in lieu of the land in question at the

reserved price of Rs. 400/- per sq. feet.

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6.3 Review petitioner - State of Rajasthan, however, did not

actively contested the writ petition and rather stated in its reply

that petition was not maintainable qua State of Rajasthan.

6.4 This Court, while relying upon the admission on the part of

respondent Municipal Board as mentioned in its reply, vide

judgment dated 04.01.2013, disposed of the writ petition and

directed Municipal Board to pay compensation at the rate of

reserved price of Rs. 400/-per sq. feet alongwith 6% interest per

annum from the date of filing of writ petition.

6.5 By way of instant review petition, State of Rajasthan -

review petitioner prays for review / recall of said judgment dated

04.01.2013.

7. Learned counsel for review petitioner submitted that said

judgment dated 04.01.2013 suffers from an error apparent on the

face of record inasmuch as the same is based solely upon an

unauthorized concession made on behalf of the Municipal Board as

well as by the learned counsel representing Municipal Board before

this Court. It was contended that the then Executive Officer had

no authority to agree for payment of compensation to writ

petitioners @ Rs. 400/- per sq. feet or interest thereon.

7.1 Learned counsel argued that no resolution of Municipal Board

was passed to authorize such concession in that regard and

therefore, concession so recorded is absolutely illegal.

7.2 It was further submitted that the original writ petition

involved several disputed questions of fact relating to title and

measurement of land in question, which could not have been

adjudicated upon by the Writ Court. It was also contended that

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even fixation of compensation at the rate of Rs. 400/- per sq. feet

was not based upon any objective criteria or valuation. Learned

counsel submitted that said unauthorized concession had imposed

substantial financial liability upon Municipal Board, Barmer, and, in

turn, upon the public exchequer. Therefore, impugned order dated

04.01.2013 is liable to be reviewed.

8. Per contra, learned Senior Counsel Mr. Ravi Bhansali,

appearing for respondents - writ petitioners, vehemently opposed

review petition and also raised preliminary objections regarding

maintainability of review petition at the instance of the State and

submitted that no direction as such was issued against State of

Rajasthan thus, State of Rajasthan cannot be said to be an

aggrieved party thereby. It was also contended that since the

State had chosen, not to contest the original writ petition, it lacks

locus standi to seek review of impugned order.

8.1 On merits, Learned Senior Counsel submitted that scope of

review under Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC is extremely narrow and

strictly confined to instances where the error is apparent on the

face of record. Whereas, by way of present review petition, review

petitioner has attempted to introduce entirely new set of facts and

arguments, which were not raised at the time of adjudication of

original writ petition and the same is impermissible in view of the

settled position of law.

It was contended that by way of additional affidavit, various

new documents and subsequent events have been sought to be

brought on record, to set up an entirely fresh case, and the same

cannot be considered in review proceedings. It was also stated

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that even respondent Municipal Board has now taken a stand

contrary to the stand taken in its reply to original writ petition, a

shift that is not permissible under law.

To substantiate these arguments, learned counsel has placed

reliance upon the judgments of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed

in the cases of Inderchand Jain Vs. Motilal, (2009) 14 SCC

663; S. Murali Sundaram Vs. Jothibai Kannan & Ors.,

(2023) 13 SCC 515; Malleswari Vs. K. Suguna & Anr., 2025

INSC 1080; Collector of 24 Parganas & Ors. Vs. Lalith

Mohan Mullick & Ors., AIR 1988 SC 2121; Union of India Vs.

Paul Monickam, AIR 2003 SC 4622; and Avinash Hansraj

Vs. Official Liquidator, AIR 2006 SC 1317.

8.2 Learned Senior Counsel further submitted that impugned

order was passed based on a clear, categorical stand taken by

Municipal Board and mentioned in its reply, rather than any

inadvertent or erroneous concession. It was contended that reply

was filed by the then Executive Officer, while acting as authorized

Officer-in-Charge, which was considered by this Court; therefore,

the order cannot be assailed as being based on an unauthorized

concession.

8.3 Learned Senior Counsel further stated that land of

petitioners was admittedly encroached upon without lawful

acquisition and the compensation agreed upon was based on the

reserved price fixed by Municipal Board for the purposes of auction

of said piece of land, therefore, no error was committed in

directing payment of compensation at said specific rate.

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8.4 It was also submitted that the factum of encroachment by

the Board was duly established through proceedings conducted by

District Administration. Learned Counsel argued that rights of writ

petitioners to get compensation have already crystallized pursuant

to order dated 04.01.2013 and cannot be unsettled at this belated

stage through review proceedings.

9. I have duly considered the submissions made at Bar and

have perused the material available on record.

10. Learned counsel for the respondent - writ petitioners has

questioned locus standi of State of Rajasthan for seeking review of

judgment dated 04.01.2013 on the ground that the State, despite

being a respondent in original writ petition, had chosen not to

contest the matter and had expressly pleaded in its reply that the

petition was not maintainable qua the State, thus, present review

petition on behalf of State of Rajasthan is not maintainable.

10.1 To deal with said objection, this Court has considered specific

averments made in this regard in paras 31-34 of reply filed on

behalf of State of Rajasthan. The same is reproduced herein

below:-

"31-34. That in reply to the averments made in para nos. 31 to 34 of the writ petition, it is respectfully submitted that the act, action and proceedings drawn by the present answering respondents are perfectly legal, valid, justified and in accordance with the law, governing the field. The petitioners have not impugned any of the act, action or order passed by the present answering respondents, nor any prayer qua the present answering respondents have been made. In this view of the matter, present writ petition preferred by the petitioners is not maintainable and sustainable in the

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eyes of law qua the present answering respondents on any of the grounds mentioned in the memo of the writ petition and the same deserves dismissal by this Hon'ble Court qua the present answering respondents."

10.2 In view of aforesaid averments, this Court is of considered

opinion that State of Rajasthan had taken a categorical stand that

writ petition was not maintainable against it since neither any

action of the State was challenged nor was any relief claimed

against it. Thus, the State had thereby declared its status as

neither a necessary nor a proper party to the litigation. Having

effectively disclaimed any interest in the adjudication, the State

has now challenged the order without assigning any justifiable

cause.

10.3 Once the State took categorical stand that it had no role in

the adjudication of original writ petition and chosen not to contest

the petition, no cause of action can be said to be arisen in its favor

to challenge the order dated 04.01.2013. State's current stand is

self-contradictory and its shifting stance and also to resile from its

own status in the writ petition, that to while raising entirely new

pleas and averments in the review petition, which is not

permissible in the eyes of law. Such action of State of Rajasthan

is, therefore, deprecated in strong terms.

10.4 However, in view of the fact that liberty for filing review

petition was granted by Hon'ble Division Bench and even while

deciding the D.B. Special Appeal No. 1218/2013 filed by

Municipal Board - Barmer, Hon'ble Division Bench, vide order

dated 29.01.2016 has granted liberty to Municipal Board, Barmer

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to contest its claim in the present review petition, this Court

deems it appropriate to decide the matter on merits.

11. Learned counsel for the respondent-writ petitioners also

contended that review petitioner had made false and misleading

statements before Hon'ble Division Bench, which laid to grant of

liberty by Hon'ble Division Bench.

11.1 It was submitted that that false statement has been made

by the review petitioner before Hon'ble Division Bench that order

dated 04.01.2013 was passed solely on the basis of concession

made by 'counsel for appellant', who did not have any instructions

in that respect. Whereas original writ petition was not decided on

the basis of the concession given by 'counsel for the appellant',

rather it was adjudicated based on the categorical averments

contained in the reply filed by the Municipal Board, wherein the

Board expressly agreed to pay compensation to writ petitioners at

the rate of Rs.400/- per sq. feet. The only concession recorded of

the counsel was relating to payment of interest.

11.2 On perusal of order under review dated 04.01.2013, this

Court finds that in para 3 of said judgment, learned Single Judge

took note of the admissions made in the reply of Municipal Board

and recorded the readiness of the Board to pay compensation to

writ petitioners accordingly. Relevant portions of said reply are

reproduced herein below: -

"30. That the contention raised in para 30 of the writ petition is admitted and the answering respondent is ready to pay reserved price to the tune of Rs.400/- per square feet.

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31. ...So far the matter pertains to price of the disputed land is concerned the answering respondent is ready to pay reserved price to the tune of Rs.400/- sq. ft.

32. ...despite of it the answering respondent is ready to pay the reserved price at the tune of Rs.400/- but the petitioner is determined to get market price."

11.3 This Court finds force in the objection of the respondents -

writ petitioners that direction for payment of compensation at the

reserved price was passed by this Court based on the written

pleadings of the Board itself and not merely on the basis of

concession made by counsel representing appellant - State of

Rajasthan. As a matter of fact, the appellant therein has not

chosen to contest the writ petition and the counsel for State of

Rajasthan was not even present at the time judgment dated

04.01.2013 being passed by the Court.

12. Considering the grounds raised in the present review

petition, it is found that the same is based on sole premise that

the then - Executive Officer of the Municipal Board lacked the

authority to concede that the Municipal Board was ready to pay

compensation at the reserved price. It is argued that no formal

resolution was passed by the Board to this effect and, therefore,

the stance taken by Executive Officer in the reply was

unauthorized and also detrimental to the interests of the Board.

12.1 In the considered opinion of this Court, the then Executive

Officer was acting as duly appointed Officer-in-charge on behalf of

the Board and was legally competent to file reply in the matter. It

can also be safely presumed that said reply was filed after proper

administrative review and legal vetting. In this background, the

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contention of the State that averments in the reply were made

without authorization is not acceptable.

12.2 Although the review petitioner has leveled serious allegations

against the then - Executive Officer for making unauthorized

concession resulting in causing financial loss to the Municipal

Board, however, no substantial proof has been produced to show

that any definitive action was taken against the said so-called

erring official.

Notably, even on earlier occasion, Co-ordinate Bench of this

Court had specifically directed review petitioner to apprise the

Court regarding any action being taken against said government

official, i.e., the then Executive Officer. However, apart from

issuance of show cause notice to said officer, the State has failed

to place on record any document establishing a concluded inquiry

or consequential punishment to the said officer.

12.3 During the course of arguments, a specific query was raised

to the counsel for review petitioner regarding action being taken

against the said officer, to which it is stated that an FIR was

lodged against the official in the year 2020. However, the State

could not offer any justification for the inordinate delay in filing

said FIR (seven years after the original order), nor could counsel

apprise the Court of its outcome.

12.4 This Court is of the considered opinion that such a casual and

lackadaisical approach cannot be permitted to be sustained, nor

can it constitute a valid ground for review of a judgment delivered

after a holistic consideration of specific pleadings of the parties

and record of the case. If on such grounds, indulgence in review

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proceedings is allowed to be extended, it would open floodgates

for filing of review petitions merely on the basis of so-called

initiation of subsequent inquiries or on the strength of subsequent

documents, which would frustrate adjudications already made by

a Court of law on the basis of material available on record. Such a

course would seriously undermine the sanctity and finality of

judicial proceedings.

13. It is a settled position of law that the scope of review is very

limited and that a Civil Court, while exercising its review

jurisdiction, does not sit in appeal over the matter at hand and

cannot undertake a re-hearing of all the issues raised. In this

regard it is appropriate to note observations of the Hon'ble

Supreme Court in Haridas Das v. Usha Rani Banik (2006) 4

SCC 78, wherein it has been held: -

"The parameters are prescribed in Order 47 CPC and for the purposes of this lis, permit the defendant to press for a rehearing "on account of some mistake or error apparent on the face of the records or for any other sufficient reason".

The former part of the rule deals with a situation attributable to the applicant, and the latter to a jural action which is manifestly incorrect or on which two conclusions are not possible. Neither of them postulate a rehearing of the dispute because a party had not highlighted all the aspects of the case or could perhaps have argued them more forcefully and/or cited binding precedents to the court and thereby enjoyed a favourable verdict."

13.1 Recently, in S. Murali Sundaram (supra), the Hon'ble Apex

Court, while placing reliance upon Perry Kansagra vs. Smriti

Madan Kansagra, (2019) 20 SCC 753, has reiterated the

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principles governing the exercise of the powers of review and has

held thus: -

"17. After considering catena of decisions on exercise of review powers and principles relating to exercise of review jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC this Court had summed upon as under: (Perry Kansagra case, SCC pp. 768-69, para 15.1)

"15.1. '33. ... " ... Review proceedings are not by way of appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 CPC.

(ii) Power of review may be exercised when some mistake or error apparent on the fact of record is found. But error on the face of record must be such an error which must strike one on mere looking at the record and would not require any long−drawn process of reasoning on the points where there may conceivably by two opinions.

(iii) Power of review may not be exercised on the ground that the decision was erroneous on merits.

(iv) Power of review can also be exercised for any sufficient reason which is wide enough to include a misconception of fact or law by a court or even an advocate.

(v) An application for review may be necessitated by way of invoking the doctrine actus curiae neminem gravabit." '(As observed in : Inderchand Jain v. Motilal, (2009) 14 SCC 663, p. 675, para 33)

It is further observed in the said decision that an error which is required to be detected by a process of reasoning can hardly be said to be an error on the face of the record."

13.2 In the aforesaid case of S. Murali Sundaram (supra),

reliance was also placed upon the case of Shanti Conductors (P)

Ltd. v. Assam SEB, (2020) 2 SCC 677 and was held as under: -

"18. In the case of Shanti Conductors (P) Ltd. (supra), it is observed and held that scope of review under Order 47 Rule

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1 CPC read with Section 114 CPC is limited and under the guise of review, the petitioner cannot be permitted to reagitate and reargue questions which have already been addressed and decided. It is further observed that an error which is not self−evident and has to be detected by a process of reasoning, can hardly be said to be an error apparent on the face of record justifying the court to exercise its power of review under Order 47 Rule 1 CPC."

13.3 The latest in this long line of authoritative pronouncements

is the judgment delivered in Malleswari v. K. Suguna & Anr.

(supra), wherein the differences between appellate and review

powers and the limitation on the exercise of the power of review

were summed up as follows: -

"15.1 The review proceedings are not by way of an appeal and have to be strictly confined to the scope and ambit of Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC.

15.2 Review is not to be confused with appellate powers, which may enable an appellate court to correct all manner of errors committed by the subordinate court.

15.3 In exercise of the jurisdiction under Order 47 Rule 1 of CPC, it is not permissible for an erroneous decision to be reheard and corrected. A review petition, it must be remembered, has a limited purpose and cannot be allowed to be an appeal in disguise.

15.4 The power of review can be exercised for the correction of a mistake, but not to substitute a view. Such powers can be exercised within the limits specified in the statute governing the exercise of power.

15.5 The review court does not sit in appeal over its own order. A rehearing of the matter is impermissible. It constitutes an exception to the general rule that once a judgment is signed or pronounced, it should not be altered.

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Hence, it is invoked only to prevent a miscarriage of justice or to correct grave and palpable errors."

14. Considering the factual matrix of the case at hand in light of

aforementioned established legal principles, this Court finds that

impugned judgment was found to be based on specific, categorical

averments contained in the reply filed on behalf of respondent

Municipal Board and no error, much less an error apparent on the

face of record was found in judgment dated 04.01.2013.

Furthermore, this Court is of the considered opinion that the

factum of encroachment upon the land of petitioner without lawful

acquisition was not disputed by any party before the Writ Court,

consequently, the award of compensation was both just and

necessary. So far as quantum of compensation is concerned, the

record reveals that the Municipal Board itself had fixed the

reserved price for the land in question at Rs. 400/- per sq. feet in

its own auction notice. In this light, the direction to pay

compensation based on Board's own valuation cannot be termed

unjustified, disproportionate, or erroneous. The grant of interest

upon delayed payment of compensation is also well settled and

thus, the judgment under review is found to be justified.

15. Counsel for respondents - writ petitioners also objected that

respondent Municipal Board, Barmer, through its reply and

additional affidavit, has attempted to bring on record several new

facts and has adopted an entirely new stand, which is not

permissible. It is contended that such new pleas cannot be

entertained in a review petition as the same would amount to

rehearing, which is against settled position of law.

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15.1 In response to said contention, it is stated that in a Special

Appeal filed on behalf of Municipal Board, Barmer i.e. D.B.

Special Appeal No. 1218/2013 titled Municipal Board,

Barmer Vs. LR's of Askaran Singh & Ors., Hon'ble Division

Bench, vide order dated 29.01.2016, granted liberty to the Board

to advance additional facts, and thus, facts stated in additional

affidavit are required to be considered by this Court.

15.2 The stand so taken by the respondent Board is not only

against the law settled in this regard but also against the

directions contained in order dated 29.01.2016. For ready

reference, order dated 29.01.2016 passed by Hon'ble Division

Bench in D.B. Special Appeal No. 1218/2013 is quoted below: -

"The judgment impugned dated 4th of January, 2013 is subject matter of a review petition preferred by the State of Rajasthan i.e. S.B. Civil Review Petition No.55/2014, wherein the present appellant is also a party.

In view of this fact, we deem it appropriate to dispose of this appeal by keeping the respondent-Municipal Board at liberty to contest the matter as per its reply to the writ petition. The appellant shall also be at liberty to advance additional facts, if necessary, to meet the ends of justice, subject to all just objections available to the original petitioner."

15.3 A perusal of said order dated 29.01.2016 reveals that

Hon'ble Division Bench has granted liberty to respondent Board to

contest in the review petition filed by the State of Rajasthan "as

per its reply to the writ petition". It is a settled principle that

directions contained in a judicial order cannot be read in isolation,

but they must be considered in the context in which they have

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been issued. Since the liberty granted was to contest the matter

only in terms of reply already filed in writ petition, the Board

cannot now be permitted to adopt a self-contradictory stand or

introduce additional documents which were not produced at the

time of adjudication of original writ petition with a view to set up

entirely new case.

16. Above said observation of this Court also gets support from

the settled position of law that review proceedings cannot be

converted into a re-hearing of original case. Permitting the Board

to raise entirely new arguments at this stage would not only

violate the principles of Order XLVII Rule 1 CPC but would also

result in grave miscarriage of justice by unsettling rights that have

already crystallized. It has repeatedly been held that new grounds

cannot be raised while invoking the review jurisdiction. In the case

of Collector of 24 Parganas and Others (supra), Hon'ble

Supreme Court, on the issue of new grounds being raised in

review petition, held as under: -

"So far as this ground is concerned, it was not raised before this Court when the appeal was heard on merits. It does not appear to have been raised even before the High Court. The new ground cannot be taken into consideration for the purposes of the review application, apart from the fact that it would also involve investigation of new facts which were not on record till the point of time when the appeal was disposed of by this Court on 13-2-1986. We see no reason to entertain this review petition which accordingly fails and is dismissed."

16.1 Similarly, in Union of India v. Paul Monickam (supra),

where the issue related to preventive detention and consideration

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of representation under Article 22(5) of the Constitution, the

Hon'ble Supreme Court, while criticizing the exercise of the review

jurisdiction by the High Court in the matter at hand, held as

follows:

"19. As noted supra, for the first time in the review application it was disclosed that the representation was made to the President of India and no representation was made to the State of Tamil Nadu or the Union of India who were arrayed in the writ petition as parties. This attempt to create a deliberate doubt to create confusion and reap an undeserved benefit by adopting such dubious device. The High Court also transgressed its jurisdiction in entertaining the review petition with an entirely new substratum of issues. Considering the limited scope for review, the High Court ought not to have taken into account factual aspects which were not disclosed or were concealed in the writ petition."

16.2 Again, in Avinash Hansraj (supra), special appeal was filed

before the Hon'ble Supreme Court against the order of the

Division Bench of the Hon'ble Bombay High Court refusing to

review its judgment passed in a Company Appeal. Upholding the

judgment of the Division Bench, the Hon'ble Supreme Court

observed as follows:

"5...Therefore, what was involved in Company Appeal No. 3 of 2002 was only the correctness of that order of the Company Judge and the Division Bench by its judgment dated 19-9-2002, found no reason to interfere. The review was sought by the appellant on the basis of certain additional material which according to him had relevance and the Company Judge had found that no ground based on discovery of new and important matter which after the exercise of due diligence was not within the knowledge of the appellant or could not be produced by him at the time

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when the original order was passed, was made out. This finding by the Company Judge was affirmed by the Division Bench in its order dated 19-9-2002. When the appellant sought a review of that order, as indicated earlier, the Division Bench considered the conduct of the appellant right through the proceedings and found that the appellant was indulging in dilatory tactics just to thwart the order passed by the Company Judge on the misfeasance application. The Court also found that there was no ground made out for reviewing its order dated 19-9-2002. On a consideration of the relevant aspects, we find that the Division Bench and the learned Single Judge were both justified in not acceding to the prayer for review made by the appellant."

17. In light of foregoing discussion, this Court is of the firm

opinion that subsequent documents cannot be considered during

adjudication of a review petition. Parties cannot be permitted to

shift their stance or resile from positions already adopted in

original proceedings. Given the restricted scope of review

jurisdiction, new facts sought to be introduced by way of reply /

additional affidavit filed by Municipal Board, Barmer, cannot be

taken into consideration by this Court at this stage.

18. The power of review is an extraordinary jurisdiction;

however, it is extremely circumscribed in scope. It is neither a

substitute for an appeal nor a license to re-agitate a matter on its

merits. To permit parties to introduce new documents at this stage

would be tantamount to inviting this Court to disturb adjudications

that have attained finality. Such a course is not only beyond the

review jurisdiction of Courts but also contravenes the Doctrine of

Finality. Interest Reipublicae ut Sit Finis Litium - it is in the

interest of the State that there be an end to litigation. Were every

adjudged cause to be reopened under the guise of review, the

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resulting perpetuation of litigation would not only prejudice the

parties but also unnecessarily burden judicial forums and public

resources.

19. Allowing the fresh contentions sought to be raised would

necessarily result in a de novo adjudication of the dispute under

the guise of review, thereby defeating the principle of judicial

finality.

Thus, taken from any stand point, this Court finds that no

case for review of the order dated 04.01.2013 is made out in the

present case.

20. During the pendency of review petition, an application was

filed under Order I Rule 10 CPC by applicants, who identify

themselves as residents of Barmer, seeking impleadment in the

instant review petition.

20.1 Learned counsel appearing on behalf of applicants submitted

that several irregularities were committed in the allotment of land

in question and applicants seek to bring the true state of facts to

the notice of this Court. It was further argued that since issues at

hand concerns financial liability upon the public exchequer, the

applicants, being vigilant citizens, are necessary and proper

parties for final adjudication of the matter.

20.2 Learned counsel for respondents vehemently opposed said

impleadment application and submitted that said application is

wholly frivolous, vexatious and has been filed with an oblique

motive. It was contended that application is stereotyped in nature

and is an attempt to mislead the Court and unnecessarily enlarge

the limited scope of review petition.

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20.3 Heard, learned counsel for the parties on said application.

This Court finds that applicants were not parties in original writ

proceedings or the Special Appeal filed by the State Government.

Even present review petition was filed in the year 2014,

application for impleadment was filed after gross delay of seven

years i.e. in the year 2017, for which no sufficient explanation has

been given.

A perusal of application shows that several disputed

questions of facts / allegations are levelled by the applicants,

which cannot be adjudicated by this Court. Core issue involved in

present review petition pertains to the grant of compensation to

writ petitioners for land taken upon by Municipal Board, Barmer,

without lawful acquisition. Consequently, the averments in

impleadment application are extraneous to the specific

controversy currently before this Court. More so, outcome of

present review petition is nowhere going to affect any vested

rights of the applicants. No relief as such has been prayed for

against the applicants, in the writ petition, therefore, the

applicants are neither necessary nor proper parties to the present

review petition.

20.4 This Court is considered opinion that present application is

filed with oblique motives, therefore, application seeking

impleadment as party respondents is hereby dismissed.

21. An application under Article 226 of the Constitution of India,

read with Order 22 Rule 10-A CPC, has been filed by respondent -

writ petitioners placing to inform the factum of demise of

respondent no. 2.

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21.1 This Court finds that while said application was filed on

26.08.2025, however, review petitioner - State of Rajasthan has

failed to take any steps to bring legal representatives of deceased

respondent no. 2 on record even till date. Consequently, review

petitioner is no longer entitled to pursue present petition against

deceased Respondent No. 2. The review petition to the extent of

respondent no.2 is, therefore, dismissed as abated.

22. As an upshot of above discussion, it is found that original

writ petition was decided on the basis of averments made in the

reply and submissions advanced before the Writ Court.

Notwithstanding the same, present review petition was filed by

State of Rajasthan, which, during adjudication before the Writ

Court, had specifically denied any involvement in the matter. The

pendency of this review petition has only resulted in depriving the

writ petitioners of both their land as well as the compensation

lawfully due to them for over a decade.

23. Accordingly, present review petition, being devoid of any

merit, is hereby dismissed. Impugned order dated 04.01.2013

passed by learned Single Judge is upheld.

(SANJEET PUROHIT),J 39-sumer-praveen/-

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