[Cites 10, Cited by 0]

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

All India Institute Of Medical Sciences vs Hansraj Sharma on 7 April, 2026

Author: Anand Sharma

Bench: Anand Sharma

[2026:RJ-JD:15316]

HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S. B. Civil Writ Petition No. 19575/2024

1. All India Institute of Medical Sciences, Jodhpur (AIIMS),
through its Director, Basni, Second Phase, Jodhpur, Raj.-
342005
2. All India Institute of Medical Sciences, Jodhpur (AIIMS),
through its Deputy Director (Administration), Basni,
Second Phase, Jodhpur, Raj.-342005
3. All India Institute of Medical Sciences, Jodhpur (AIIMS),
through its Executive Director, AIIMS Jodhpur and
Disciplinary Authority, Basni, Second Phase, Jodhpur,
Raj.-342005
4. All India Institute of Medical Sciences, Jodhpur (AIIMS),
through its President, Basni, Second Phase, Jodhpur, Raj.-
342005
----Petitioners
Versus
Hansraj Sharma S/o Shri Navratan Sharma, Resident of
Ugampura, Ward No. 2, Tehsil- Nokha, District Bikaner, Raj.-
306401.
----Respondent

For Petitioners : Ms. Nidhi Singhvi Advocate on behalf
of Mr. Deelip Kawadia Advocate.
For Respondent : Mr. Sunil Purohit Advocate.

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ANAND SHARMA

Judgment

REPORTABLE Date of conclusion of arguments :: 01.04.2026 Date on which judgment was reserved :: 01.04.2026 Whether the full judgment or only the operative part is pronounced :: Full Judgment Date of pronouncement :: 07.04.2026

1. The present writ petition has been filed by the

petitioners-All India Institute of Medical Sciences assailing order

dated 16.05.2024 passed by the learned Industrial Disputes

Tribunal and Labour Court, Jodhpur (hereinafter to be referred as

(D.B. SAW/12/2025 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Uploaded onon07/04/2026 (Downloaded 07/04/2026atat06:28:35 08:51:21PM) PM) [2026:RJ-JD:15316] (2 of 9) [CW-19575/2024]

'the Tribunal'), whereby the application filed by the respondent-

workman under Section 36 of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947

(for short 'the Act of 1947') has been allowed and the petitioners

has been restrained from being represented through a legal

practitioner.

2. Facts of the case, in brief, are that the petitioners are a

statutory body constituted under the All India Institutes of Medical

Sciences Act, 1956. The respondent was appointed as a Nursing

Officer in the petitioners-Institute and was subsequently removed

from service vide order dated 23.03.2023 after conclusion of

disciplinary proceedings.

3. Aggrieved thereof, the respondent invoked Section 33-A

of the Act of 1947 before the learned Tribunal, challenging the

order of termination. During pendency of the said proceedings, the

respondent moved an application under Section 36 of the Act of

1947 objecting to the representation of the petitioners through its

Advocate, namely Mr. K.S. Yadav.

4. The learned Tribunal, vide order dated 16.05.2024,

allowed the said application and restrained the petitioners from

being represented by a legal practitioner. Aggrieved thereby, the

present writ petition has been preferred by the petitioners.

5. Ms. Nidhi Singhvi, learned counsel for the petitioners

submits that the impugned order is ex facie illegal and contrary to

the scheme of Section 36 of the Act of 1947, which does not

impose an absolute bar on representation through legal

practitioners. The respondent himself is being represented by a

practicing advocate, namely Mr. Bhagirath Chandora, under the

guise of an office bearer of a Union; therefore, the respondent

cannot be permitted to adopt a contradictory stand.

6. The petitioners, not being an individual and rather

being a statutory body, is entitled to be represented through its

duly authorised counsel. However, learned Tribunal has utterly

failed to appreciate that denial of legal representation to the

petitioners' results in serious prejudice and violates principles of

natural justice, particularly when complex questions of law are

involved.

7. Learned counsel for the petitioners, in support of her

arguments, relied upon judgment of Orissa High Court in G.M, IB

Valley Area, Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. vs. The P.O., Central

Govt. Industrial Tribunal-cum-Labour Court, Bhubaneswar

& Ors. (MANU/ OR/ 0970/2017) and judgment of Bombay

High Court in the case of T.K. Varghese vs. Nichimen

Corporation (MANU/MH/0414/2001).

8. Per contra, Mr. Sunil Purohit, learned counsel for the

respondent, while vehemently opposing the writ petition,

submitted that the writ petition deserves dismissal on account of

being wholly misconceived. Section 36 of the Act of 1947 clearly

restricts representation through legal practitioners unless consent

of the opposite party and leave of the Tribunal is obtained.

9. Mr. Purohit further submitted that the respondent is not

represented by a legal practitioner in his professional capacity;

rather, his representative is an office bearer of the Union, which is

permissible under Section 36(1) of the Act of 1947. The

petitioners' request to have representation before the Tribunal

through an advocate was in direct contravention to the legal

provision, which was rightly disallowed by the Tribunal. The

impugned order is well reasoned and does not warrant

interference in writ jurisdiction.

10. Learned counsel for the respondent, in order to support

his arguments, placed reliance upon judgments of Hon'ble

Supreme Court in the case of Thyssen Krupp Industries India

Private Limited & Ors. vs. Suresh Maruti Chougule & Ors.

(Civil Appeal No.6586/2019 decided on 04.10.2023) and

Paradip Port Trust, Paradip vs. Their Workmen, (1977) 2

SCC 339 as well as judgment of Co-ordinate Bench of this Court

in the case of Ambuja Cements Limited vs Hema Ram & Anr.

(S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 13161/2022 decided on

19.12.2023).

11. Having heard learned counsel for the parties and

perused the record, this Court finds that the controversy involved

in this case revolves around Section 36 of the Act of 1947, which

is being reproduced as under:

"1[36. Representation of parties.--(1) A workman who is a party to dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceeding under this Act by--

(a) 2[any member of the executive or other office bearer] of a registered trade union of which he is a member;

(b) 2[any member of the executive or other office bearer] of a federation of trade unions to which the trade union referred to in clause (a) is affiliated;

(c) where the worker is not a member of any trade union, by

[any member of the executive or other office bearer] of any trade union connected with, or by any other workman employed in, the industry in which the worker is employed and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed.

(2) An employer who is a party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented in any proceeding under this Act by--

(a) an officer of an association of employers of which he is a member;

(b) an officer of a federation of association of employers to which the association referred to in clause (a) is affiliated;

(c) where the employer is not a member of any association of employers, by an officer of any association of employers connected with, or by any other employer engaged in, the industry in which the employer is engaged and authorised in such manner as may be prescribed.

(3) No party to a dispute shall be entitled to be represented by a legal practitioner in any conciliation proceedings under this Act or in any proceedings before a Court.

(4) In any proceeding 3[before a Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal], a party to a dispute may be represented by a legal practitioner with the consent of the other parties to the proceedings and 4[with the leave of the Labour Court, Tribunal or National Tribunal, as the case may be].]"

12. In order to decide the controversy that whether the

learned Tribunal was justified in restraining the petitioners from

being represented by counsel in the facts of the present case, or

not, the core question arises for consideration is as to whether

Section 36 of the Act of 1947 imposes an absolute bar on

representation by legal practitioners?

13. Bare perusal of Section 36 of the Act of 1947 would

reveal that the aforesaid provision regulates representation of

parties in industrial adjudication. The legislative intent is to

maintain informality in industrial adjudication while ensuring

fairness. A plain reading of Section 36(4) of the Act of 1947

reveals that representation by a legal practitioner is permissible

with the consent of the other party and with the leave of the

Tribunal. Thus, the provision does not create an absolute

prohibition rather, it confers discretion upon the Tribunal. However,

such discretion is required to be exercised judiciously and not

mechanically.

14. In the present case, it is not disputed that the

respondent is being represented by Shri Bhagirath Chandora, who

is an enrolled advocate. The plea that he is appearing merely as

an office bearer of the Union does not change his professional

status, particularly when he, being an active legal practitioner and

an advocate, in substance is rendering legal assistance.

15. This Court finds that permitting one party to avail legal

expertise while denying the same to the opposite party results in

manifest inequality and violates the principles of natural justice.

Industrial adjudication, though less formal, cannot be rendered

one-sided.

16. While examining the impugned order passed by the

Tribunal, this Court found that the learned Tribunal has failed to

consider that discretion under Section 36 of the Act of 1947 must

be exercised on sound judicial principles. Therefore, in the light of

the fact that the respondent was effectively availing legal

assistance; no prejudice would have been caused by permitting

the petitioners to be represented through counsel. Aforesaid

aspect has not been properly appreciated by the Tribunal, hence,

this court finds that the impugned order reflects a mechanical

application of Section 36 of the Act of 1947 and ignores the

requirement of parity and fairness.

17. This court has meticulously examined the judgments

relied upon by the counsel for the respondent. In Thyssen Krupp

Industries India Private Limited & Ors. (supra), the Hon'ble

Supreme Court upheld restriction on legal representation without

following the conditions laid down in Section 36 of the Act of 1947.

Similarly, in Paradip Port Trust, Paradip (supra), the Hon'ble

Supreme Court emphasised the need to prevent domination of

proceedings by legal practitioners. Co-ordinate Bench of this Court

in the case of Ambuja Cements Limited (supra) relied upon the

above two judgments of Hon'ble Supreme Court to deny legal

representation by the employer before the Industrial Tribunal/

Labour Court as objection was raised on behalf of the workman.

18. Upon a careful consideration of the aforesaid

judgments, this Court finds that none of the authorities cited by

the respondent deal with a factual situation akin to the present

case, wherein one of the parties to the proceedings was already

being represented through a legal practitioner, yet the Labour

Court/ Tribunal declined to extend a similar opportunity of legal

representation to the opposite party.

19. Certainly, there can be no dispute with regard to the

legal proposition enunciated in the judgments relied upon by

learned counsel for the respondents that Section 36 of the Act of

1947 places a restriction on representation through legal

practitioners in proceedings before the Labour Court/Tribunal.

However, it is equally well settled that a precedent is an authority

only for what it actually decides and is applicable only when the

facts of the case are substantially similar. In the present case, the

factual matrix stands on an entirely different footing, inasmuch as

one of the parties has already engaged a legal practitioner and is

being represented through an advocate, and yet seeks to object to

similar representation being availed by the opposite party. Such a

stance, if accepted, would result in manifest inequality and would

run contrary to the fundamental principle of parity embedded in

the concept of fairness and equality before law. The statutory

restriction under Section 36 of the Act of 1947 cannot be

interpreted in a manner so as to permit one party to enjoy the

benefit of legal assistance while denying the same to the other,

particularly when such objection emanates from a party who is

itself in breach of the said norm. In these circumstances, the

judgments relied upon by the respondent, being distinguishable on

facts, do not advance his case and are, thus, inapplicable to the

controversy at hand.

20. This Court finds supports from the judgment of the

Bombay High Court in T.K. Varghese (supra), wherein, in the

similar circumstances, it has been held that discretion under

Section 36 of the Act of 1947 must be exercised to ensure fairness

and parity between parties. Similarly, the Orissa High Court in

G.M, IB Valley Area, Mahanadi Coalfields Ltd. (supra), has

held that denial of legal representation to one party, when the

other is effectively assisted by a legally trained person, is unjust

and unsustainable. Para 7 of the above judgment reads as under:

"7. In the case at hand, the Workers' Union is being represented by Mr. D. Mohanta in the capacity of its Vice-President, who is none other than a seasoned Practitioner of this Court having specialty in Labour Laws. Thus, possibility of putting the Management- petitioner in a difficult position while interpreting the provisions of law, cannot be ruled out. Thus, in order to maintain equity, learned CGIT ought to have allowed the prayer of the Management-petitioner for being represented by a Legal Practitioner. Even otherwise, the impugned order under Annexure-2 is a non speaking order."

21. It is significant to note that the Madras High Court in

the case of The Registrar, Anna University & Ors. Vs. The

Presiding Officer, First Additional Labour Court & Ors.

(MANU/TN/3946/2023) has held as under:-

"14. Further held that if the same benefit is denied to the management on the basis of the workmen not giving consent in terms of Section 36(4) of the Industrial Dispute Act, certainly it will result in an imbalance being created in defending the case before the quasi-judicial body and it will violate Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Therefore, in the above case, this Court held that in the case of the workmen engaging a trained reasoned lawyer in the garb of a trade union leader, the management should not be denied the very same right by relying upon the Section 36(4) of the Industrial Dispute Act."

22. In view of the aforesaid discussion, this Court is of the

considered opinion that the learned Tribunal has failed to exercise

its discretion under Section 36 of the Act of 1947 in a judicious

manner and the impugned order results in denial of fair

opportunity to the petitioners. Hence, the order impugned suffers

from illegality and perversity warranting interference under writ

jurisdiction.

23. Accordingly, the writ petition is allowed. Impugned

order dated 16.05.2024 passed by the learned Industrial Disputes

Tribunal and Labour Court, Jodhpur is hereby quashed and set

aside. The petitioners are permitted to be represented through

their Advocate, Mr. K.S. Yadav, or any other Advocate of their

choice before the Tribunal in the aforesaid case. The learned

Tribunal is directed to proceed further in accordance with law,

expeditiously.

24. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

(ANAND SHARMA),J Jatin/83

(D.B. SAW/12/2025 has been filed in this matter. Please refer the same for further orders) (Uploaded onon07/04/2026 (Downloaded 07/04/2026atat06:28:35 08:51:21PM) PM)