Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Smt. Priti Kalla vs Jai Narayan Vyas ... on 8 October, 2025
Author: Rekha Borana
Bench: Rekha Borana
[2025:RJ-JD:44251] (1 of 17) [CW-7729/2007]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 7729/2007
Smt. Priti Kalla W/o Sh. Rajendra Kalla, aged about 56 years,
R/o-205, Sector-7 Extension, New Power House Road, Jodhpur
(Raj.).
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Jai Narain Vyas University, Jodhpur through the Registrar, Jai
Narain Vyas University, Jodhpur.
2. The Vice-Chancellor, Jai Narain Vyas University, Jodhpur.
3. M.B.M. University, Jodhpur through the Registrar, M.B.M.
University, Jodhpur.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. R.S. Saluja
Mr. Achraj Saluja
For Respondent(s) : Mr. P.R. Singh Jodha
HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REKHA BORANA
Order
Reportable
08/10/2025
1. The present petition has been filed aggrieved of order dated
30.07.2007 (Annex.30) whereby the petitioner was terminated
from service.
2. The facts are that the petitioner was engaged as a Part time
Teacher with Jai Narain Vyas University, Jodhpur vide order dated
14.02.1992. Subsequently, a recruitment process for regular
recruitment to the post of 'Assistant Professor in Electronics and
Communication Engineering' was initiated and the petitioner too
participated in the same. Vide letter dated 12.08.1999, her name
was recommended for appointment and she was granted
appointment. After the completion of the probation period, vide
order dated 28.08.2000, she was confirmed on the post of
'Assistant Professor'. In the year 2002, the petitioner, being
(Uploaded on 10/10/2025 at 01:22:57 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:44251] (2 of 17) [CW-7729/2007]
desirous for undertaking her post-graduation degree, applied for
study leave and the same was granted, at the first instance, for a
period of one year vide order dated 22.10.2002. However, the
post-graduation course could not be completed in the period of
one year and hence, on applying, the period of study leave was
extended for a further period of one year i.e. till 08.11.2004. As
per the regulations governing the services of the petitioner, she
was required to submit a bond for the said study leave which she
did. The petitioner completed her M.E. Degree within the extended
period. But then, she did not rejoin on the pretext that she
undertook the studies for Ph.D.
3. As per the averments made in the writ petition, the
petitioner requested the authorities for extension of the study
leave but letter dated 02/05.07.2005 as issued by the Registrar of
the University was received by petitioner recalling her to join her
duties within a period of ten days, failing which the same would be
deemed to be a wilful absence from duties and appropriate action
would be taken. On receipt of the above letter, the petitioner then
made a request to the Vice-Chancellor to grant her Extra Ordinary
Leave (EOL) for a period of three years for completion of her Ph.D.
4. However, in response to the above request, letter dated
10.11.2006 was received by the petitioner with a reiteration that
despite the expiry of study leave, she did not resume duties and
hence, she was directed to join her duties within ten days. In
response, the petitioner again prayed for extension of study leave.
In reply to the said request, the petitioner was informed vide
letter dated 26.04.2007 that her request for extension of leave
was rejected and as per Syndicate Resolution No.93/2007 dated
(Uploaded on 10/10/2025 at 01:22:57 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:44251] (3 of 17) [CW-7729/2007]
11.03.2007, she was to join duties within a period of one month
from the date of notice, failing which her services would be
terminated as per the university rules.
5. Ultimately, impugned order dated 30.07.2007 was served on
the petitioner whereby her services were terminated in terms of
Ordinance 327(5) for wilful absence from duties. It is the above
order dated 30.07.2007, aggrieved of which the present petition
has been filed.
6. Learned counsel for the petitioner raised the following
grounds:
(i) Resolution No.93/2007 dated 11.03.2007 of the Syndicate was
to the effect that action would be taken against the petitioner in
accordance with University rules. The said resolution nowhere
directs for termination of the services of the petitioner. Therefore,
the order impugned passed by the Vice-Chancellor, is not in
consonance with the Syndicate Resolution.
(ii) Ordinance 327 provides for a specific procedure for
termination of an employee on the grounds of wilful absence from
duties. No such procedure was adopted by the respondent
University before terminating the services of the petitioner.
Therefore, order impugned being in contravention to the rules
governing the services of the petitioner, deserves to be quashed.
(iii) Even otherwise, if it is observed that the petitioner was not
entitled for extension of study leave, she definitely was entitled for
EOL and the period which was treated to be a period of absence
from duties, definitely could have been converted into EOL. The
same is totally within the rules governing the services of the
petitioner.
(Uploaded on 10/10/2025 at 01:22:57 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:44251] (4 of 17) [CW-7729/2007]
(iv) The respondent University clearly adopted a discriminatory
approach between its employees. Similarly situated people, to be
specific, one Dr. G.K. Joshi who also did not resume duties after
expiry of the study leave, was permitted to get his leave period
converted into EOL. Similar order ought to have been passed in
case of the petitioner too.
(v) It had been / is a practice of the respondent University to
grant sanction for study leave after almost a year of the person
applying or after the study/course having been completed. The
study leave as applied for by the petitioner for her post-graduation
too was sanctioned after a period of one year. Therefore, the
petitioner was under an impression that the study leave as applied
by her for Ph.D. would also be sanctioned/granted subsequently
and therefore, it was not a case of wilful absence. Despite the
petitioner having informed the University of pursuing the Ph.D.
course in the year 2004, no response to the same was given by
the respondent University till the year 2005 and hence, the
petitioner was under a bonafide impression that her study leave
would be sanctioned.
7. In support of his submissions, counsel relied upon the
Hon'ble Apex Court judgments in Deokinandan Prasad Vs. The
State of Bihar and Ors.; AIR 1971 SC 1409 and
Krunshnakant B. Parmar Vs. Union of India & Anr.; 2012
AIR SCW 1633 and the Division Bench judgments of this Court in
I.M. Gauri Vs. Union of India & Ors.; D.B. Civil Writ Petition
No.6977/2006 (decided on 10.08.2007) and Dr. Ganesh Dutt
Sharma Vs. Jai Narayan Vyas University & Anr.; S.B. Civil
Special Appeal No.170/2012 (decided on 15.05.2013).
(Uploaded on 10/10/2025 at 01:22:57 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:44251] (5 of 17) [CW-7729/2007]
8.1 Per contra learned counsel for the respondents submits that
it was a clear case of wilful absence from duties as firstly, after
expiry of the period of study leave, the petitioner was under an
obligation to resume her duties. The specific bond submitted by
her for the purpose was to be complied with and the same having
not been complied with, the action taken against her was the most
natural consequence.
8.2 Secondly, the petitioner never applied for study leave for
pursuing Ph.D. The rules specifically provides for a formal
application if any employee intends to pray for a study leave. No
such formal application was ever filed by the petitioner and there
was only a request made to extend her study leave. There is no
provision in the rules to extend the study leave granted for one
specific course, for some other course and hence, no order on
request of the petitioner, could have been passed in terms of law.
8.3 Thirdly, the petitioner had not even completed the requisite
years of service to be eligible to be granted three years of EOL.
Therefore, the request of the petitioner for Extra ordinary leave
could also not have been entertained.
8.4 Fourthly, so far as the extension of study leave is granted,
the rules specifically limits the period of study leave to an
incumbent during his/her complete tenure of service. The
petitioner not being entitled for extension of study leave after
already having availed the two years study leave, her request
could not have been entertained.
8.5 Further, the petitioner was specifically informed that her
request for extension of study leave has been rejected and she
was called upon to resume her duties. But she completely ignored
(Uploaded on 10/10/2025 at 01:22:57 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:44251] (6 of 17) [CW-7729/2007]
the same and hence, it was a clear case of wilful absence from
duties. Therefore, the action in terms of Ordinance 327 was
perfectly legal.
9. In support of his submissions, counsel relied upon the
Division Bench judgment of this Court in University of Jodhpur
Vs. Dr. Gopal Krishna Lohra; D.B. Civil Special Appeal (W)
No.241/1992 (decided on 10.05.2010) and single Bench
judgment of this Court in Dr. (Mrs.) Daksha Sankhla Vs. Jai
Narain Vyas University, Jodhpur & Ors.; 2001 (2) RLW
1035 (decided on 15.02.2001).
10. Heard the counsels. Perused the record.
11 Before proceeding on to adjudicate the issues involved, it
would be apt to take into consideration the service period of the
petitioner. Admittedly, the petitioner was appointed in the year
1992 on temporary basis. It is further admitted that she
participated in the recruitment process for regular selection and
was appointed on 12.08.1999. She completed the requisite
probation period after the said appointment and was confirmed in
the year 2000 vide order dated 28.08.2000. In view of the above,
in the year 2002, when she applied for study leave for post-
graduation, she had completed a period of three years regular
service.
12. Ordinance 327 of the Ordinances governing the services of
the University employees prescribes for grant of leave. Ordinance
327 (8)(v) provides for grant of a study leave and Ordinance 327
(22 to 28) provides for the conditions thereupon. For ready
reference, Ordinance 327 (22 to 28) is reproduced hereunder:
(Uploaded on 10/10/2025 at 01:22:57 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:44251] (7 of 17) [CW-7729/2007]
"*22. Study leave shall be granted if the University is of the
opinion that leave so granted is in the interest of higher learning
and specific areas of study. In one academic year not more than
4% of the teachers belonging to a faculty shall be eligible for grant
of study leave from out of the staff of the Faculty concerned.
*23. Study Leave shall be admissible to a University teacher who
has served the University for five years or more. It will not be
admissible to a teacher who has completed 55 years of age at the
time of making the application.
* Assented by the Hon'ble Chancellor vide No. 10239 dt.
25.10.1995 and notified on 7.11.1985.
24. Study leave may ordinarily be admissible to a servant once
only during his entire period of service in the University.
25. All applications for study leave shall be on prescribed form and
shall first be examined by the Vice-Chancellor, Dean of the Faculty
concerned and one member of the Syndicate nominated by the
Vice-Chancellor.
26. The allowance admissible to a servant who proceeds on Study
Leave be as follows:
(a) A servant who goes out without any aid or scholarship of any
type (excluding travel grants) be given his full salary and a
monthly allowance of not more than one fourth of his salary.
(b) A servant who goes out with any aid or scholarship of any
type (excluding travel grants) be granted a monthly allowance not
exceeding half of his salary
*27. The total period of study leave available to a teacher in the
whole period of his service shall be three years which may be
granted at one stretch or in parts as the circumstances of each
case require. The leave shall be inclusive of Holidays and vacations
falling within the period of leave.
"Assented by the Hon'ble Chancellor vide No. 10239 dt.
25.10.1985.
*28. The person concerned who is granted Study Leave must
given an under taking in the shape of a bond as given in the
Appendix 'D' to the University Hand Book, that he will serve the
University on return for the period noted below.
Period of Study Leave Period of which bond is to be executed
Upto 3 months 1 year
Upto 6 months 2 years
Upto 1 year 3 years
Upto 2 years 5 years
Upto 3 years 6 years
*Assented by the Hon'ble Chancellor vide No.10239
dt.25.10.1985.
13.1 A bare perusal of the above clause reflects that firstly, an
application for study leave has to be in a prescribed format which
is to be examined by the Vice-Chancellor of the University
(Uploaded on 10/10/2025 at 01:22:57 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:44251] (8 of 17) [CW-7729/2007]
concerned and one member of Syndicate nominated by the Vice
Chancellor. It is not the case of the petitioner that she ever
applied in the prescribed format for grant of study leave to pursue
her Ph.D.
13.2 Secondly, as per Clause 23, the study leave is admissible
only to a University Teacher who had served the University for five
years or more. Further, as per Clause 27, the total period of study
leave available to a Teacher in the whole period of his/her service
can be three years which could be granted at one stretch or in
parts.
14. In the present case, it is evident that the petitioner was
granted study leave for a period of two years. As per Clause 28 of
Ordinance 327, she even submitted an undertaking in the form of
a Bond to serve the University on return for the period as
prescribed therein. Admittedly, after completing the period of her
sanctioned study leave, the petitioner did not rejoin and did not
serve the University, which clearly was in contravention to the
undertaking as submitted by her in form of a bond.
15. Further, she never ever applied in the prescribed format for
sanction of study leave to pursue Ph.D.
16. Furthermore, as is evident, she was not even entitled for the
grant of said study leave. As per the Ordinance, the complete
period of study leave which could have been granted to a Teacher
was of three years. The petitioner having already availed the study
leave for a period of two years, was clearly not entitled for a
further period of study leave of three years.
(Uploaded on 10/10/2025 at 01:22:57 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:44251] (9 of 17) [CW-7729/2007]
17.1 Coming on to the issue:- Whether in the circumstances when
the petitioner was not entitled for a further study leave, the leave
could have been converted into Extra Ordinary Leave?
17.2 Clause 5 of Ordinance 327 prescribes that the Vice-
Chancellor may condone the period of willful absence treating it as
Extra Ordinary Leave (without pay).
17.3. Vide notification dated 2.1.1995, a Syndicate Resolution
whereby the guidelines for grant of EOL to employees were
adopted, was notified. As per the said notification, only those
permanent employees who had completed five years of service in
university were held eligible for grant of EOL. Further, the
following criteria was directed to be adopted for grant of EOL
during the entire service period:
"(i) Upto 5 years NIL
(ii) Upto 10 years 1 Year
(iii) Upto 15 years 3 Year
(iv) After 15 years 5 Years"
17.4. A bare perusal of the above notification reflects that
even if it is assumed that the petitioner had completed her five
years of service till the year 2004, she was not entitled for any
EOL by that time. Further, she would have been entitled for one
year of EOL after having completed five years of service and uptil
ten years. Even if it is assumed that the petitioner falls within the
said slab i.e. 5 to 10 years, she definitely was entitled for EOL for
a period of one year only. Therefore, the request of the petitioner
to convert her period of absence from duties into EOL for a period
of three years, even otherwise was not tenable as she was not
even entitled for three years of EOL at that point of time.
(Uploaded on 10/10/2025 at 01:22:57 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:44251] (10 of 17) [CW-7729/2007]
17.5. This Court is therefore of the clear opinion that the
petitioner was neither entitled for extension of her study leave,
nor for conversion of the leave into EOL at that point of time. The
same was rightly not sanctioned by the respondent Authorities.
18. Now coming on to the issues:
i). Whether the non resuming of the duties by the petitioner after
expiry of her sanctioned study leave can be termed to be a
misconduct?
ii). Whether the respondents were under an obligation to comply
with the procedure as prescribed under Appendix 'B' to the
Ordinance 320 before terminating the services of the petitioner?
19. To adjudicate the above issues, this Court would be required
to ponder upon the fact whether the overall facts can be
concluded to the effect that the petitioner had already abandoned
her job and further whether the willful absence of the petitioner
can be termed to be a misconduct.
20. Before proceeding further, Ordinance No.327(5), being
relevant, is reproduced as under:-
"5. An employee who remains absent after the
expiry of his leave is not entitled to leave salary
during the period of such absence. Wilful absence
from duty involves forfeiture of appointment.
The Vice-Chancellor may condone such period of
wilful absence treating it as Extra ordinary leave
(without pay)."
21. In Dr.(Mrs.) Daksha Sankhla Vs. Jai Narain Vyas
University, Jodhpur and Ors. (supra), a Coordinate Bench of
this Court while dealing with akin facts, taking into consideration
Ordinance No.327(5), observed and held as under:-
(Uploaded on 10/10/2025 at 01:22:57 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:44251] (11 of 17) [CW-7729/2007]
"38. It has been submitted on behalf of the respondents
that petitioner's services stood terminated in terms of the
Ordinance No. 327/5 for remaining absent from duty
without leave. The said ordinance reads as under:
"The leave could be sanctioned by the Vice Chancellor
on merit, considering the facts and circumstances of
each application, provided it is supported by relevant
document."
Clause 5 of the said Ordinance reads as under:
"An employee who remains absent after the expiry
of his leave, is not entitled to leave salary during the
period of such absence. Wilful absence from the
duty involves forfeiture of appointment. The
Vice Chancellor may condone such period of wilful
absence treating it as extraordinary leave (without
pay)."
Ordinance 320, read with Appendix-B and Schedule-II
provides for a procedure for imposing the punishment
on delinquent. The punishment can be imposed on the
ground of grave misconduct and/or persistent
negligence on duty and the same provides for issuing
the charge sheet, giving an opportunity to the
delinquent to defend himself and lead evidence in
support of his case. Such term has also been
incorporated in the agreement entered into by the
parties at the time of employment.
39. If both these Ordinances are read together and it is
presumed that there was an agreement between the
parties which provided for holding a full-fledged inquiry
in case of wilful absence or any other misconduct or
persistent negligence, the question does arise: whether
not holding such an inquiry has vitiated the order of
termination?
40. Petitioner left India without prior sanction of her
leave and without permission from the learned Vice
Chancellor to leave the Headquarters. She was informed
telegraphically that her leave application had been
rejected. Petitioner failed to produce any kind of
Progress Report regarding his Post-Doctoral Research
Work before the respondent University. She was given
this facility for betterment of the students of the
University and to serve the institution in a better way.
In absence of any proof of such Research Work, the
purpose of granting leave stood defeated. She did not
produce any medical certificate before the respondent
University to satisfy the Authorities concerned that she
was not able to join the institution. Thus, in such a fact-
situation, the law does not require any interference with
the impugned order of termination.
41. In absence of allegations of malafides against any
individual or impleading him by name, the issue:
(Uploaded on 10/10/2025 at 01:22:57 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:44251] (12 of 17) [CW-7729/2007]
whether her application for voluntary retirement ought
to have been accepted, is not worth consideration. If the
petitioner herself had behaved in such a casual and
irresponsible manner, there was no obligation on the
part of the University to accept her application for
voluntary retirement.
42. It has further been submitted by Mr. Purohit that in
large number of cases, the respondent-University has
granted the leave exceeding the period provided under
the Rules and petitioner has been refused this
concession, thus, it violates the mandate of equality
enshrined under Article 14 of the Constitution of India
and the impugned order is liable to be quashed. The
submission made by Mr. Purohit is devoid of any merit
for the reason that it is settled law that Article 14 of the
Constitution is not meant to perpetuate an illegality or
give benefit of a wrong order, nor illegality once
committed can be pleaded to legalise other illegal act.
(Vide Harpal Kaur Chahal Vs. Director, Punjab
Instructions & Anr., 1995 (Supp) 4 SCC 706; Sneh
Prabha Vs. State of U.P. & ors., AIR 1996 SC
540; Jaipur Development Authority Vs. Daulat Ram
Jain, JT 1996(8) SC 387; State of Haryana Vs. Ram
Kumar Maan, (1997) 3 SCC 321; M/s. Faridabad Ct.
Scan Centre Vs. Director General, Health Services &
ors., (1997) 7 SCC 752; and Jalandhar Improvement
Trust Vs. Sampuran Singh, AIR 1999 SC 1347).
43. In view of the above, it remains undisputed that
petitioner had availed the maximum permissible
extraordinary leave for a period of five years. Over and
above, she remained on leave for a further period of
one year and after completing six years, when she
applied for further extension, her application was
rejected. Petitioner was informed that her leave
application had been rejected and was asked to join the
institution. Petitioner did not pay any heed to it. She
was issued a notice to show cause, which she
considered, for the reasons best known to her, not to
reply at all. Thus, in a case like this, there was no
occasion for the respondent University to hold a full-
fledged inquiry to prove the delinquency. Moreso,
provisions of Clause 5 of Ordinance 327 does not
require such a course. Even if it is so required, holding
such an inquiry could have been a useless formality. I
find no ground to interfere with the impugned order."
22. The Division Bench of this Court in University of Jodhpur
Vs. Dr. Gopal Krishna Lohra; (supra) while dealing with a
(Uploaded on 10/10/2025 at 01:22:57 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:44251] (13 of 17) [CW-7729/2007]
situation wherein the incumbent after going on casual leave did
not join, held, that the omission to report on duty despite non-
extension of leave re-enforced the fact that the incumbent had
abandoned the job. Therein the Court held that abandonment or
relinquishment of service is essential proposition of intention and
the same could definitely be determined in light of the surrounding
circumstances. Therein, the Court held that when the incumbent
failed to report on duty despite having been asked to do so by the
University and despite his leave having not been extended, it
fortified the position that he had abandoned the service of the
University. Therein, the Court observed as under:-
"Apart from the above, we are clearly of the opinion
that even if the University be deemed to have granted
leave and leave-extension to the writ petitioner, he
had no such legal right whereby he could have
forced the appellant-University to grant him
further leave-extension as desired and to the
extent demanded. The learned Single Judge has
discussed in detail the aspects that several persons
were sent on foreign assignments that were considered
to be of public interest but, in our opinion, has
exceeded the jurisdiction in observing that granting of
leave for five years ought to be taken a matter of
routine. We are unable to find such a broad proposition
supported by any statutory provision. In our view, if
at all the petitioner was relying on the leave
granted and earlier extended by the University, it
was incumbent for him to have reported on duty
when the University did not extend the leave
further. However, joining the University was not the
intention of the petitioner at all. As aforesaid, the
petitioner had abandoned the service of the University
on 01.12.1979 itself when he joined the State service
without informing the University in that regard. The
fact that he failed to report on duty despite
having been asked to do so by the University, and
despite his leave having not been extended only
fortifies the position that he had abandoned the
service of the University."
(Uploaded on 10/10/2025 at 01:22:57 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:44251] (14 of 17) [CW-7729/2007]
23. Applying the above ratio to the present matter, it is evident
on record that the study leave as sanctioned in favour of the
petitioner stood expired in the month of November 2004 but she
did not join till the year 2007.
24. It is further evident that she did not even apply for study
leave for her Ph.D. Furthermore, it is admitted that the petitioner
did not even complete her Ph.D. course.
25. It is also evident on record that the petitioner was for the
first time, called upon to rejoin her duties vide letter dated
2/5.7.2005. Vide letter dated 10.11.2006, she was again directed
to rejoin her duties within 10 days. The same also remained of no
avail and vide last notice dated 26.04.2007, it was again informed
to her that her request for extension of the study leave was
rejected by the Syndicate and she was therefore called upon to
join the duties within a period of one month.
26. Admittedly, the petitioner did not join despite all the above
letters / communications and notices been served on her.
27. In view of the above facts, this Court is of the clear opinion
that the same was definitely a misconduct which amounted not
only to willful absence, but also to abandonment of services by the
petitioner.
28. The issue now is Whether the respondent University was
under an obligation to conduct an inquiry in terms of Ordinance
320?
29. A reply to the above issue can be found in the Apex Court
judgment in Union of India Vs. Bishamber Das Dogra: (2009)
13 SCC 102. Therein, the Court, while relying upon the earlier
Apex Court judgment in Aligarh Muslim University Vs.
(Uploaded on 10/10/2025 at 01:22:57 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:44251] (15 of 17) [CW-7729/2007]
Mansoor Ali Khan (2000) 7 SCC 529, observed and held as
under:
19. In Aligarh Muslim University v. Mansoor Ali
Khan [(2000) 7 SCC 529 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 965] this
Court considered the judgment in M.C. Mehta v. Union
of India [(1999) 6 SCC 237] wherein it has been held
that an order passed in violation of natural justice need
not be set aside in exercise of the writ jurisdiction unless
it is shown that non-observance has caused prejudice to
the person concerned for the reason that quashing the
order may revive another order which itself is illegal or
unjustified.
20. This Court in Mansoor Ali Khan case [(2000) 7 SCC
529 : 2000 SCC (L&S) 965] also considered the
judgment in S.L. Kapoor v. Jagmohan [(1980) 4 SCC
379 : AIR 1981 SC 136] wherein it has been held that in
a peculiar circumstance observance of the
principles of natural justice may merely be an
empty formality as if no other conclusion may be
possible on admitted or indisputable facts. In such
a fact situation, the order does not require to be
quashed if passed in violation of natural justice.
The Court came to the conclusion that a person
complaining of non-observance of the principles of
natural justice must satisfy that some real prejudice has
been caused to him for the reason that there is no such
thing as a merely technical infringement of natural
justice."
30. In Dr.(Mrs.) Daksha Sankhla (supra) while dealing with
Ordinance 327(5) and 320, the Court framed the following
questions:
"39. If both these Ordinances are read together and it is
presumed that there was an agreement between the
parties which provided for holding a full-fledged inquiry
in case of wilful absence or any other misconduct or
persistent negligence, the question does arise: whether
not holding such an inquiry has vitiated the order of
termination?"
31. Relying to the above question, the Court observed and held
as under:
(Uploaded on 10/10/2025 at 01:22:57 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:44251] (16 of 17) [CW-7729/2007]
"43. In view of the above, it remains undisputed that
petitioner had availed the maximum permissible
extraordinary leave for a period of five years. Over and
above, she remained on leave for a further period of
one year and after completing six years, when she
applied for further extension, her application was
rejected. Petitioner was informed that her leave
application had been rejected and was asked to join the
institution. Petitioner did not pay any heed to it. She
was issued a notice to show cause, which she
considered, for the reasons best known to her, not to
reply at all. Thus, in a case like this, there was no
occasion for the respondent University to hold a full-
fledged inquiry to prove the delinquency. Moreso,
provisions of Clause 5 of Ordinance 327 does not
require such a course. Even if it is so required, holding
such an inquiry could have been a useless formality. I
find no ground to interfere with the impugned order."
32. Applying the above ratio to the present matter, this Court is
also of the clear opinion that in the present matter, no purpose
would have been served even by initiating any inquiry. As held by
this Court in the preceding paras, the petitioner was not entitled
either for extension of study leave or for conversion of her leave
into extra-ordinary leave and hence, conducting of an inquiry
would definitely have proved to be a futile effort.
33. So far as the judgments relied upon by counsel for the
petitioner are concerned, the same would be of no aid to the
petitioner as all of them are distinguishable so far as the present
matter is concerned.
34. Krushnakant B. Parmar (supra) was a matter where the
Court observed that the absence was not willful, but was because
some compelling circumstances. Therein the Court recorded a
specific finding to the effect that the authorities failed to prove
that the absence from duty was willful.
35. Deokinandan Prasad (supra) was a matter wherein it was
admitted by the respondents that no opportunity was given to the
(Uploaded on 10/10/2025 at 01:22:57 PM)
[2025:RJ-JD:44251] (17 of 17) [CW-7729/2007]
petitioner to show cause against the order proposed. Therefore,
the Court held the same to be a clear violation of Article 311.
36. Dr. Ganesh Dutt Sharma (supra) was a matter wherein no
appropriate time to file a reply was granted to the incumbent
therein as show cause notice dated 09.08.2010 itself was served
on 09.09.2010. Therefore, the Court held that no opportunity of
hearing was granted to the incumbent therein.
37. The ratio of all the above judgments would definitely not
apply to the present matter as herein it is clear on record that the
petitioner was served not only with communications, but also with
a show cause notice. Vide the last show cause notice, the
petitioner was even granted a month's time to rejoin. Further, it is
not the case of the petitioner that she was not able to join
because of any compelling circumstances. The only case of the
petitioner is that she had undertaken the Ph.D. course and her
study leave earlier sanctioned for post-graduation course ought to
be extended and that too, without applying for the same.
42. In view of the findings as recorded by this Court and the
observations as made, this Court does no find any ground to
interfere in order dated 30.07.2007 and the writ petition is hence
dismissed.
43. Pending application, if any, stands disposed of.
(REKHA BORANA),J
161-Manila/DhananjayS/-
(Uploaded on 10/10/2025 at 01:22:57 PM)
Powered by TCPDF (www.tcpdf.org)
