Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Parmeshwar Lal Thori vs The State Of Rajasthan ... on 27 November, 2025

[2025:RJ-JD:51436]

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
                S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 18340/2025
Parmeshwar Lal Thori S/o Shri Nopa Ram Thori, Aged About 28
Years, Resident Of Village Bachharara Tehsil Ratangarh District
Churu.                                           ----Petitioner
                                    Versus
1.       The State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary, Department
         Of Education (Gr.2), Government Of Rajasthan,
         Secretariat, Rajasthan, Jaipur.
2.       The Director, Elementary Education, Rajasthan, Bikaner.
3.       The District Education Officer, HQ, Elementary Education,
         Bharatpur.                               ----Respondents


For Petitioner(s)         :     Mr. Yuvraj Singh
For Respondent(s)         :     Mr. Digvijay Singh Sodha for
                                Mr. Kamlesh Sharma, AGC


            HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MUNNURI LAXMAN
                                     Order
27/11/2025

1.    Heard.

2.    The present writ petition has been filed challenging the

action of the respondents in not granting appointment to the

petitioner, to the post on which he was selected, on the ground

that an FIR is pending against him.

2.    The main grievance of the petitioner is that he was selected

on the post of Teacher Grade-III Level-II (Hindi) and after the

selection he was also allotted the district, however, he was not

allowed to sit in the counseling which was held for posting of

selected candidates. There is no speaking order assigning any

reason for not allowing the petitioner to participate in the

counseling. The petitioner further apprehends that such decision

has been taken only on the ground that an FIR is pending against

the petitioner for the offences under Sections 143, 323, 336, 341,

427 and 447 IPC.

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3.    Learned counsel for the respondents submitted that on such

issues, the committee has to take a decision depending on the

facts of each case, seriousness of the offences, relevancy of such

allegation to the post to be appointed and whether such offence

amounts to any moral turpitude.

4.    This Court while dealing with a similar issue, vide order

dated 11.11.2025 passed in the case of Pankaj Vishnoi Vs.

State    of    Rajasthan       &     Ors.        (S.B.    Civil   Writ   Petition

No.21673/2025), held as follows:

      "4. It is apt to refer to the relevant paragraphs of the
      judgment relied upon by the petitioner in the case of
      Neeraj Kanwar (supra). The relevant portion of the
      judgment in the case of Neeraj Kanwar (supra) reads as
      follows:
              "20. Perusal of circular dated 04.12.2019
              (Annexure R-1) shows that the same is in the
              nature of the Government's administrative
              guidelines to its functionaries and the ultimate
              decision-whether or not to appoint a candidate
              is to be taken by the appointing authority taking
              into consideration the facts and circumstances
              of each case, the nature of work and status of
              the post on merits and that in each case, while
              deciding on the suitability or unsuitability of a
              candidate, the appointing authority should
              assess his (candidate's) character by taking into
              consideration the circumstances of the offence.
              ......

20.4. The Circular ibid, relied upon by the respondents, no doubt stipulates that candidates against whom cases under Chapters XVI and XVII of the IPC are pending investigation or trial, or who have been convicted, should be deemed ineligible for appointment. However, this blanket disqualification must be read in harmony with the nuanced principles laid down by the three-judge bench of the Supreme Court in Avtar Singh v. Union of India, which emphasize that the appointing authority must

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assess the suitability of a candidate based on the nature of the offence, its relevance to the post, and whether it involves moral turpitude, rather than mechanically denying appointment due to the mere pendency of a case. The judgments cited by the respondents, such as Union of India v. Methu Meda and Bhinya Ram Jajra v. State of Rajasthan, no doubt, underscore the employer's discretion to evaluate antecedents, but they do not override the Avtar Singh's framework, which permits flexibility in cases of trivial offences or those not involving moral turpitude. In the petitioner's case, the offences under Sections 452, 341, 323, and 143 IPC, arising from a matrimonial dispute, do not prima facie reflect a character flaw that would render her unfit for the RAS post, warranting such a contextual evaluation as to attract a rigid application of the Circular.

20.5. The judgment in Avtar Singh's case explicitly cautions against arbitrary denials of appointment, and requires a proportionate response after considering the factual matrix, including the absence of any suppression by the petitioner and if offences are not multiple or heinous. This approach is also reflected in and the intent of the Circular ibid. As already observed, the appointing authority should weigh merits and demerits specific to each case, rather than applying a blanket bar. Consequently, the High Court and Supreme Court judgments cited by the respondents, while affirming employer discretion, must yield to the broader, reformative perspective of Avtar Singh, ensuring that the petitioner's appointment is not unjustly withheld based solely on the pendency of a criminal case like the one in hand arising out of matrimonial discord and not involving any heinous offence or moral turpitude."

From a close reading of the above judgment relied upon by the petitioner, it is clear that it is the appointing authority who has to assess the suitability of a candidate based on the nature of offence, its relevancy to the post and whether it involves moral turpitude. This means that the employer has to apply his mind to the facts of each case and take a decision thereon and there cannot be

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any blanket denial of appointment merely on the ground that an FIR has been lodged. Each case must be assessed in the context of its own facts.

5. In the present case, there is no such occasion for the appointing authority to assess the nature of offence, relevancy of such allegation to the post to be appointed and whether such allegation amounts to any moral turpitude. Issuing any directions to appoint the petitioner would amount to supplementing the decision to be taken by the appointing authority. Therefore, this Court is not inclined to pass any directions. However, this Court is inclined to direct respondent No. 2 - Directorate, Medical, Health And Family Welfare Services (SIHEW), Govt. Of Rajasthan, Jaipur to assess the suitability of the petitioner basing on the parameters referred hereinabove. Such decision shall be taken within a period of one month from the date of receipt of this order. If any adverse orders are passed by the respondent authorities in this regard, liberty is given to the petitioner to challenge the same."

5. In view of the order cited above, the present writ petition is

disposed of. The respondent No. 2 - Director, Elementary

Education, Rajasthan, Bikaner is directed to assess the suitability

of the petitioner basing on the parameters referred in the decision

of this Court in the case of Pankaj Vishnoi (supra) and take a

decision thereon within a period of one month from the date of

receipt of this order. If any adverse orders are passed by the

respondent authorities in this regard, liberty is given to the

petitioner to challenge the same.

6. All pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

(MUNNURI LAXMAN),J 194-BhumikaP/-

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