Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Taga Ram vs State Of Rajasthan (2025:Rj-Jd:50856) on 25 November, 2025

Author: Rekha Borana

Bench: Rekha Borana

[2025:RJ-JD:50856]

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
                     S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 354/2021

Taga Ram S/o Shri Babu Lal, Aged About 26 Years, R/o Pancha Ki
Dhani, Khariya Tala, Barmer, Rajasthan.
                                                                          ----Petitioner
                                        Versus
1.       State Of Rajasthan, Through The Secretary, Department
         Of Secondary Education, Govt. Of Rajasthan, Secretariat,
         Jaipur.
2.       The Director, Secondary Education, Govt. Of Rajasthan,
         Bikaner.
3.       The Joint Director, School Education, Jodhpur Zone,
         Jodhpur.
4.       The       District     Education           Officer     (H.q.),     Secondary
         Education, Barmer, District Barmer (Raj.)
5.       The Chief Block Education Officer, Dhanau, Barmer.
6.       The    Principal      Cum       Panchayat          Elementary       Education
         Officer, Govt. Sec. School, Kharawala, Dhanau, Barmer.
                                                                     ----Respondents


For Petitioner(s)              :    Mr. VLS Rajpurohit
For Respondent(s)              :    Mr. N.K. Mehta, Dy.G.C.



               HON'BLE MS. JUSTICE REKHA BORANA

Order

25/11/2025

1. The present writ petition has been filed with a prayer that

the petitioner be permitted to join as a Senior Teacher in Subject

Social Science in pursuance to appointment order dated

14.12.2020 (Annexure-9).

2. The facts are that the petitioner found place in final select list

for Senior Teacher and even appointment order dated 14.12.2020

was issued in his favour but then, in police verification it was

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found that an FIR had been lodged against him and he was facing

a trial qua the same. On the said pretext, the petitioner was not

permitted to join. Aggrieved of the same, the present writ petition

has been filed.

3. Vide interim order dated 13.01.2021, the selection of the

petitioner was saved and it was directed that his selection shall

not be cancelled.

4. Counsel for the petitioner relied upon a Co-ordinate Bench

judgment of this Court in S.B. Civil Writ Petition

No.756/2022; Shanker Lal vs. State of Rajasthan & Ors.

(decided on 18.11.2024) and submitted that in almost akin facts,

the Court allowed the writ petition.

5. Counsel for the respondents is not in a position to refute the

ratio as laid down in Shanker Lal (supra). He however, while

relying upon the Hon'ble Apex Court judgment in Avtar Singh vs.

Union of India & Ors.; 2016 (8) SCC 471 submitted that the

acquittal in the present case is not an honorable acquittal and

hence, the petitioner does not deserve to be granted appointment.

6. Heard the counsels. Perused the record as well as the

judgment as passed in Shanker Lal (supra).

7. It is evident that the facts of Shanker Lal (supra) and the

present matter are almost akin. Therein too, the FIR was of a date

subsequent to the submission of the application form by the

incumbent. Therein too, the acquittal of the incumbent was after

giving benefit of doubt. Herein, admittedly, the FIR was of

25.05.2020 i.e. after the last date specified for filling up of

application form i.e. 09.06.2018. Even the examination had been

conducted prior to the FIR been lodged. In that event, the

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petitioner definitely could not have submitted the details of the

FIR while filling up the application form. So far as the details of

FIR been provided at the time of filling up of the option form is

concerned, it is not denied that the same were submitted at that

point of time.

8. Further, it is evident that vide order/judgment dated

17.10.2025 passed by the Sessions Judge, Barmer in Criminal

Case No.146/2025 (CIS No.132/2020), the petitioner has been

acquitted of the charges while giving him a benefit of doubt.

9. In Shanker Lal (supra), the Court, while relying upon the

judgment passed in S.B. Civil Writ Petition No.15957/2021;

Rajendra Meena vs. State of Rajasthan (decided on

13.05.2024) observed as under:

"20. The controversy in this respect has already been put to rest by my earlier judgment in a case titled Sukhjit Singh & Ors.vs. State of Punjab & Anr. (CWP No. 9808 of 2003), decided on 13.08.2019, which I rendered while being puisne Judge of Punjab and Haryana High Court, which in turn is based on Division Bench judgments rendered by both Punjab and Haryana as well as Madras High Court. For ready reference, relevant thereof is reproduced hereinbelow:-

"12. Every acquittal is honourable acquittal. There is nothing in the Criminal Procedure Code nor is there any rule of criminal jurisprudence for treating the effects and consequences of an honourable acquittal from an acquittal on failure of the prosecution to prove the case beyond reasonable doubt.

13. A Division Bench of this Court in a case titled as Shashi Kumar Vs. Uttar Haryana Bijli Vitran Nigamand another, 2005 (1) SCT 576 relying in turn on another Division Bench of Madras High Court has held that the terms honourable acquittal or fully exonerated unknown in the Criminal Jurisprudence. His Lordship S.S.Nijjar, J. (as he then was of this Court) speaking for the Division Bench observed as below:-

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7. In any event, the terms "honourable acquittal" or "fully exonerated" are unknown in the Code of Criminal Procedure or in Criminal Jurisprudence. These terms came up for consideration before aDivision Bench of the Madras High Court in the caseof Union of India Vs. Jayaram, AIR 1960 Madras 325. Rajammannar, C.J. Delivering the judgment of the Division Bench observed as under:-

There is no conception like "honourable acquittal" in Criminal Procedure Code The onus of establishing the guilt of accused is on the prosecution, and if it fails to establish the guilt beyond reasonable doubt, the accused is entitled to be acquitted.

Clause (b) of Article 193 of the Civil Service Regulations which says that when a Government servant who was under suspension is honourably acquitted, he may be given the full salary to which he would have been entitled if he had not been suspended applies only to the case of departmental Inquiry.

Where the servant was suspended because there was a criminal prosecution against him, and he was acquitted therein, and reinstated he is entitled under the general law, to the full pay during the period of his suspension. To such a case Article 193(b) does not apply."

8. The aforesaid judgment of the Madras High Court was considered and followed by this Court in the case of Jagmohan Lal Vs. State of Punjab through Secy, to Punjab Govt. Irrigation and others, AIR 1967 (54) Punjab and Haryana 422 (punjab). In that case, on acquittal, the petitioner was reinstated in service, but his period of suspension was not treated as the period spent on duty. He had, therefore, filed writ petition under Articles 226/227 of the Constitution o fIndia claiming that he was entitled to full pay and allowances for the period of his suspension. Considering the impact of Rules 7.3,7.5 and 7.6 of the Punjab Civil Services Rules Vol.I Part-1, it was observed as follows:-

(2) XXX XXX XXX

The interpretation which has been put by the Government on the rule is incorrect. The blame which attached to the petitioner was that there was a criminal charge against him under which he was standing his trial.

The moment he is acquitted of the charge, he is acquitted of the blame. In criminal law, the Courts are called upon to decide whether the prosecution has succeeded in bringing

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home the guilt to the accused. The moment the Court is not satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused, he is acquitted. Whether a person is acquitted after being given a benefit of doubt or for that reasons, the result is that his guilt is not proved. The Code of Criminal Procedure does not contemplate honourable acquittal. The only words known to the Code are 'discharged' or 'acquitted'. The effect of a person being discharged or acquitted is the same in the eyes of law. Since, according to the accepted notions of imparting criminal justice, the Court has to be satisfied regarding the guilt of the accused beyond a reasonable doubt, it is generally held that there being a doubt in the mind of the court, the accused is acquitted.

I am, therefore, quite clear in my mind that the intention underlying Rule 7.5 can be no other except this the moment the criminal charge on account of which an officer was suspended fails in a court of law, he should be deemed to be acquitted of the blame. Any other interpretation would defeat the very purpose of the rule. It is futile to expect a finding of either honourable acquittal or complete innocence in a judgment of acquittal. The reason is obvious; the criminal courts are not concerned to find the innocence of the accused. They are only concerned to find whether the prosecution has succeeded in proving beyond a reasonable doubt the guilt of the accused."

10. Therein, the Court proceeded on to hold that denying an

employment opportunity to an accused who is acquitted, is against

the principle of re-integration of such individuals into society. The

Court therein while analysing the provisions of the Code of

Criminal Procedure held that the said Code does not contemplate

the term "honorable acquittal". The terms used in the Code are

'discharged' or 'acquitted' and hence, the effect of a person being

discharged or acquitted is the same in the eyes of law. Further, it

is not the case of the respondents that the petitioner is a habitual

offender or had been facing trial for any other offence expect the

FIR in question.

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