Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

State Of Raj. And Ors vs Rajendra Kumar (2025:Rj-Jd:22078) on 8 May, 2025

Author: Yogendra Kumar Purohit

Bench: Yogendra Kumar Purohit

[2025:RJ-JD:22078]

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
                 S.B. Civil Second Appeal No. 121/2017
 1.      State Of Rajasthan Through The District Collector, Sirohi
         (Raj.)
 2.      Mining Engineer, Mines And Geology Department, Sirohi
         (Raj.)
 3.      Surveyor And Halka Adhikari Abu Road Area Mines And
         Geology Department, Sirohi (Raj.)
                                                                    ----Appellants
                                      Versus
 Rajendra Kumar S/o Shri Dhalu Ram, By Caste Khatri, Resident
 Of Manpur, Abu Road, Proprietor M/s Baba Crashing Company,
 Abu Road, Tehsil Abu Road, District Sirohi (Raj.)
                                                                   ----Respondent


For Appellant(s)            :     Mr. Aditya Gupta
                                  Mr. Lalit Pareek
For Respondent(s)           :     Mr. Amit Vyas


      HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE YOGENDRA KUMAR PUROHIT

Order

Reserved on 21/04/2025 Pronounced on 08/05/2025 Reportable

01- vihykFkhZx.k dh vksj ls ;g f}rh; vihy fo}ku v/khuLFk U;k;ky; flfoy U;k;k/kh'k ¼dfu"B [kaM½ ,oa U;kf;d eftLVªsV] vkcwjksM ftyk fljksgh ds fu.kZ; o fMØh fnukad 25-02-2009 o mlds fo:) izLrqr dh xbZ izFke vihy vij ftyk U;k;k/kh'k Øe la[;k 2] vkcwjksM+ ftyk fljksgh ds fu.kZ; o fMØh fnukad 22-08-2016] ftlds }kjk vihykFkhZ dh izFke vihy [kkfjt dj fo}ku v/khuLFk U;k;ky; ds fu.kZ; dh iqf"V dh xbZ Fkh] ls O;fFkr gksdj izLrqr dh xbZ gSA 02- la{ksi esa ekeys ds rF; bl izdkj ls gSa fd oknh dh vksj ls LFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk dk okn [email protected] ds fo:) izLrqr dj ;g fuosnu fd;k fd rglhy vkcw jksM+ ds xkao ik.Mqjh esa [kljk uEcj 319 esa oknh ds yht&gksYM jkbZV~l dh ykbZe LVksu ¼Øs'kj gsrq½ [kku gS] ftldk [kuu iV~Vk izfroknh la[;k ,d }kjk oknh ds gd esa dqy 7192 oxZehVj {ks=Qy dk chl o"kZ dh vof/k gsrq LOkhd`r gksdj fnukad 06-04-1998 dks fu"ikfnr gqvk vkSj mi&iath;d vkcwjksM+ ds dk;kZy; esa iathc) gS lkFk gh [kuu iV~Vs'kqnk Hkwfe ls yxrs gq, [kljk uEcj 319 esa rhu ch? kk Hkwfe izfroknh la[;k rhu us fnukad 03-03-1998 dks vkS|ksfxd iz;kstukFkZ lqjf{kr

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Äksf"kr djus ls egkizca/kd ftyk m|ksx dsUnz fljksgh ls LVksu xzhVl ¼Øs'kj m|ksx½ gsrq 99 o"kZ ds iV~Vs ij nsdj fnukad 04-04-1998 dks iV~Vk foys[k fu"ikfnr dj mi&iath;d vkcwjksM+ ds dk;kZy; esa iathc) gSA izfroknh dh vksj ls [kuu dk;Z xzhV~l m|ksx ds lapkyu dks rRdky izHkko ls can djus dh /kedh nhA ftl ij okn&i= izLrqr dj LFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk ls ikcan fd, tkus dk fuosnu fd;kA 03- [email protected] dh vksj ls la;qDr :i ls tokc nkok izLrqr dj tks 7192 oxZ ehVj dk [kuu iV~Vk 20 o"kZ ds fy, Lohd`r fd;k og [kljk uEcj 241 esa fLFkr gksuk] [kljk uEcj 319 esa fLFkr ugha gksuk crk;k vkSj tks vkS|ksfxd iz;kstukFkZ Hkwfe vkoafVr dh xbZ og [kljk uEcj 319 esa Øs'kj dh LFkkiuk ds fy, dh xbZ Fkh] ftldk iV~Vk egkizca/kd ftyk m|ksx dsUnz fljksgh }kjk oknh ds i{k esa fu"ikfnr fd;k gS vkSj [kuu iV~Vk Øs'kj ls Ms<+ fdyksehVj dh nwjh ij gS ijarq oknh }kjk vukf/kd`r :i ls Øs'kj ds ikl gh [kuu dk;Z fd;k tk jgk gSA bl vk/kkj ij okn [kkfjt fd, tkus dk fuosnu fd;kA 04- i{kdkjku ds vfHkopuksa ds vk/kkj ij dqy 7 fook|d dk;e fd, x,A oknh dh vksj ls crkSj ih-MCY;w01 oknh jktsUnz dqekj Lo;a ijhf{kr gqvk o 18 nLrkost iznf'kZr djok,A 05- izfroknh i{k dks i;kZIr volj fn, tkus ds ckotwn lk{; is'k ugha djus ij izfroknh dh lk{; can dh xbZA fo}ku v/khuLFk U;k;ky; }kjk cgl i{kdkjku ds vfHkHkk"kdx.k dh lquh tkdj fook|d la[;k 1 ls 6 dk fu.kZ; oknh ds i{k esa o izfroknh ds fo:) djrs gq, oknh dk okn fMØh fd;k tkdj [email protected] dks LFkkbZ fu"ks/kkKk ls ikcan fd;k x;k] ftlls O;fFkr gksdj izFke vihy vihykFkhZx.k dh vksj ls izLrqr dh xbZA 06- izFke vihyh; U;k;ky; }kjk fo}ku v/khuLFk U;k;ky; }kjk fook|d la[;k 1 ls 6 dk fu.kZ; tks oknh ds i{k esa fd;k x;k] mldh iqf"V djrs gq, v/khuLFk U;k;ky; ds fu.kZ; dh iqf"V dh vkSj izFke vihy [kkfjt dhA ftl ij ;g f}rh; vihy] [email protected] dh vksj ls izLrqr dh xbZ gSA 07- vihykFkhZx.k dh vksj ls f}rh; vihy esa eq[; :i ls ;g vk/kkj fy;k x;k fd izFke vihyh; U;k;ky; ds le{k vihykFkhZx.k dh vksj ls ftl le; ekbfuax yht nh xbZ Fkh] ml le; ds ekbfuax bathfu;j] fljksgh dk 'kiFk&i= izLrqr dj crk;k fd oknh dks [kljk uEcj 241 o 394@239 dh d`f"k Hkwfe ij ekbfuax yht nh xbZ Fkh] ftlds ckcr gydk iVokjh }kjk ekbfuax yht ds le; fjiksVZ rS;kj dh xbZ Fkh vkSj nwljh fjiksVZ fnukad 05-06-2014 dks rS;kj dh xbZ Fkh tks fjdkWMZ ij izLrqr dh xbZ gSA mu 'kiFk&i= o gydk iVokjh dh fjiksVZ ls tks

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vykWVesaV fd;k x;k] og [kljk uEcj 319@3 ls Ms< fdyks ehVj nwj gSA izFke vihyh; U;k;ky; }kjk 'kiFk&i=@nLrkost dks fu.kZ; esa jsQj gh ugha fd;k vkSj ml ij bXukSj djrs gq, fu.kZ; ikfjr fd;k x;k gS] tks fu.kZ; fof/k fo:) gksuk crk;k gS o vihy esa ;g Hkh fuosnu fd;k fd izn'kZ 10 esa [kljk uEcj dk mYys[k ugha gksus ds ckotwn Vªsl uD'kk o fMekdsZ'ku fjiksVZ ds vk/kkj ij [kljk uEcj 319 esa vkoaVu gksuk ekuus esa fof/kd Hkwy dh gSA bl vk/kkj ij viuh vihy esa 5 lkjHkwr fof/kd iz'u ¼Substantial question of law½ izLrkfor fd, x, rFkk vihy Lohdkj dh tkdj izFke vihyh; U;k;ky; dk fu.kZ; o fMØh 22-08-2016 o v/khuLFk U;k;ky; ds fu.kZ; o fMØh fnukad 25-02-2009 dks fujLr fd, tkus dh izkFkZuk dhA 08- cgl ,Mfe'ku lquh xbZA 09- f}rh; vihy dks fopkjkFkZ xzg.k djus ls iwoZ bl iz'u ij fopkj djuk vko';d gS fd bl ekeys esa dksbZ lkjHkwr fof/kd iz'u ¼ Substantial question of law½ fo|eku gS vFkok ugha] tks /kkjk 100 lh-ih-lh- ds eqrkfcd 1976 esa gq, la'kks/ku

ds i'pkr gksuk vko';d gSA 10- f}rh; vihy ds laca/k esa ekuuh; mPpre U;k;ky; }kjk vius U;kf;d n`"Vkar Nazir Mohamed Vs. J. Kamala and Ors. [2020] 0 AIR(SC) 4321 ds ekeys esa fofHkUu U;kf;d n`"Vkar ij fopkj djrs gq, iSjk la[;k 25] 26] 29 ls 37 esa fuEukuqlkj fof/kd fLFkfr Li"V dh xbZ gS%&

25. A second appeal, or for that matter, any appeal is not a matter of right. The right of appeal is conferred by statute. A second appeal only lies on a substantial question of law. If statute confers a limited right of appeal, the Court cannot expand the scope of the appeal. It was not open to the Respondent-Plaintiff to re-agitate facts or to call upon the High Court to reanalyze or re-appreciate evidence in a Second Appeal.

26. Section 100 of the CPC, as amended, restricts the right of second appeal, to only those cases, where a substantial question of law is involved. The existence of a "substantial question of law" is the sine qua non for the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 100 of the CPC.

29. The principles for deciding when a question of law becomes a substantial question of law, have been enunciated by a Constitution Bench of this Court in Sir Chunilal v. Mehta & Sons Ltd. v. Century Spg. & Mfg. Co. Ltd., AIR 1962 SC 1314, where this Court held:

"The proper test for determining whether a question of law raised in the case is substantial would, in our opinion, be whether it is of general public importance or whether it directly and substantially affects the rights of

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the parties and if so whether it is either an open question in the sense that it is not finally settled by this Court or by the Privy Council or by the Federal Court or is not free from difficulty or calls for discussion of alternative views. If the question is settled by the highest court or the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and there is a mere question of applying those principles or that the plea raised is palpably absurd the question would not be a substantial question of law."

30. In Hero Vinoth v. Seshammal, (2006) 5 SCC 545, this Court referred to and relied upon Chunilal v. Mehta and Sons (supra) and other judgments and summarised the tests to find out whether a given set of questions of law were mere questions of law or substantial questions of law.

31. The relevant paragraphs of the judgment of this Court in Hero Vinoth (supra) are set out hereinbelow:

"21. The phrase "substantial question of law", as occurring in the amended Section 100 CPC is not defined in the Code. The word substantial, as qualifying "question of law", means of having substance, essential, real, of sound worth, important or considerable. It is to be understood as something in contradistinction with-technical, of no substance or consequence, or academic merely. However, it is clear that the legislature has chosen not to qualify the scope of "substantial question of law" by suffixing the words "of general importance" as has been done in many other provisions such as Section 109 of the Code or Article 133(1)(a) of the Constitution. The substantial question of law on which a second appeal shall be heard need not necessarily be a substantial question of law of general importance. In Guran Ditta v. Ram Ditta [(1927-28) 5I5 IA 235 : AIR 1928 PC 172] the phrase substantial question of law as it was employed in the last clause of the then existing Section 100 CPC (since omitted by the Amendment Act, 1973) came up for consideration and their Lordships held that it did not mean a substantial question of general importance but a substantial question of law which was involved in the case. In Sir Chunilal case [1962 Supp (3) SCR 549 : AIR 1962 SC 1314] the Constitution Bench expressed agreement with the following view taken by a Full Bench of the Madras High Court in Rimmalapudi Subba Rao v. Noony Veeraju [ AIR 1951 Mad 969 : (3) SCR 549 : (1951) 2 MLJ 222 (FB)] : (Sir Chunilal case [1962 Supp AIR 1962 SC 1314], SCR p. 557) "When a question of law is fairly arguable, where there is room for difference of opinion on it or

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where the Court thought it necessary to deal with that question at some length and discuss alternative views, then the question would be a substantial question of law. On the other hand if the question was practically covered by the decision of the highest court or if the general principles to be applied in determining the question are well settled and the only question was of applying those principles to the particular fact of the case it would not be a substantial question of law."

32. To be "substantial", a question of law must be debatable, not previously settled by the law of the land or any binding precedent, and must have a material bearing on the decision of the case and/or the rights of the parties before it, if answered either way.

33. To be a question of law "involved in the case", there must be first, a foundation for it laid in the pleadings, and the question should emerge from the sustainable findings of fact, arrived at by Courts of facts, and it must be necessary to decide that question of law for a just and proper decision of the case.

34. Where no such question of law, nor even a mixed question of law and fact was urged before the Trial Court or the First Appellate Court, as in this case, a second appeal cannot be entertained, as held by this Court in Panchagopal Barua v. Vinesh Chandra Goswami, AIR 1997 SC 1047.

35. Whether a question of law is a substantial one and whether such question is involved in the case or not, would depend on the facts and circumstances of each case. The paramount overall consideration is the need for striking a judicious balance between the indispensable obligation to do justice at all stages and the impelling necessity of avoiding prolongation in the life of any lis. This proposition finds support from Santosh Hazari v. Purushottam Tiwari, (2001) 3 SCC

179.

36. In a Second Appeal, the jurisdiction of the High Court being confined to substantial question of law, a finding of fact is not open to challenge in second appeal, even if the appreciation of evidence is palpably erroneous and the finding of fact incorrect as held in Ramchandra v. Ramalingam, AIR 1963 SC 302. An entirely new point, raised for the first time, before the High Court, is not a question involved in the case, unless it goes to the root of the matter.

37. The principles relating to Section 100 CPC relevant for this case may be summarised thus :

(i) An inference of fact from the recitals or contents of a document is a question of fact, but the legal effect of the terms of a document is a question of law. Construction of a document,

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involving the application of any principle of law, is also a question of law. Therefore, when there is misconstruction of a document or wrong application of a principle of law in construing a document, it gives rise to a question of law.

(ii) The High Court should be satisfied that the case involves a substantial question of law, and not a mere question of law. A question of law having a material bearing on the decision of the case (that is, a question, answer to which affects the rights of parties to the suit) will be a substantial question of law, if it is not covered by any specific provisions of law or settled legal principle emerging from binding precedents, and, involves a debatable legal issue.

(iii) A substantial question of law will also arise in a contrary situation, where the legal position is clear, either on account of express provisions of law or binding precedents, but the Court below has decided the matter, either ignoring or acting contrary to such legal principle. In the second type of cases, the substantial question of law arises not because the law is still debatable, but because the decision rendered on a material question, violates the settled position of law.

(iv) The general rule is, that High Court will not interfere with the concurrent findings of the Courts below. But it is not an absolute rule.

Some of the well-recognised exceptions are where (i) the courts below have ignored material evidence or acted on no evidence; (ii) the courts have drawn wrong inferences from proved facts by applying the law erroneously; or (iii)the courts have wrongly cast the burden of proof. A decision based on no evidence, does not refer only to cases where there is a total dearth of evidence, but also refers to case, where the evidence, taken as a whole, is not reasonably capable of supporting the finding 11- iwoZ esa of.kZr uthj eksgEen okys ekeys esa izfrikfnr fl)karksa dks en~nsutj j[krs gq, gLrxr ekeys ij fopkj fd;k x;kA gLrxr ekeys esa eq[; :i ls vihykFkhZx.k dk ;g vk/kkj gS fd vihykFkhZx.k dh vksj ls ,d 'kiFk&i= izLrqr fd;k x;k Fkk ftl ij izFke vihyh; U;k;ky; }kjk fopkj ugha fd;k x;kA vihyh; U;k;ky; dh i=koyh esa ewyflag nsoM+k iq= pSuflag nsoM+k gky [kfut vfHk;ark dk 'kiFk&i= fnukafdr 09-07-2014 fjdkWMZ ij gS] tks vihyh; U;k;ky; esa fnukad 09-07-2014 dks QnZ vgdke vij ftyk U;k;k/kh'k] vkcw jksM+ ds eqrkfcd is'k gksuk Li"V gSA ijarq vihy esa ;g vafdr ugha fd;k fd vkns'k 41 fu;e 27 lh-ih- lh- ds rgr dksbZ vkosnu&i=] 'kiFk&i= ds lkFk is'k fd;k vFkok ughaA vihyh;

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U;k;ky; dh i=koyh esa dksbZ izkFkZuk&i= vkns'k 41 fu;e 27 lh-ih-lh- layXu ugha gSA nkSjkus cgl fo}ku vf/koDrk vihykFkhZ }kjk ;g Lohdkj fd;k x;k fd mudh vksj ls vkns'k 41 fu;e 27 lh-ih-lh- ds rgr dksbZ vkosnu i= is'k ugha fd;k x;kA bl laca/k esa vkns'k 41 fu;e 27 o 28 lh-ih-lh- lqlaxr gS tks fuEukuqlkj gS%& Rule 27. Production of Additional Evidence in Appellate Court.

(1) The parties to an appeal shall not be entitled to produce additional evidence, whether oral or documentary, in the Appellate Court, But if-

(a) the Court from whose decree the appeal is preferred has refused to admit evidence which ought to have been admitted, or

(aa) the party seeking to produce additional evidence, establishes that notwithstanding the exercise of due diligence, such evidence was not within his knowledge or could not, after the exercise of due diligence, be produced by him at the time when the decree appealed against was passed, or

(b) the Appellate Court requires any document to be produced or any witness to be examined to enable it to pronounce judgment, or for any other substantial cause, the Appellate Court may allow such evidence or document to be produced, or witness to be examined.

(2) Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced by an Appellate Court, the Court shall record the reason for its admission

Rule 28. Mode of taking additional evidence.

Wherever additional evidence is allowed to be produced, the appellate court may either take such evidence, or direct the court from whose decree the appeal is preferred, or any other subordinate court, to take such evidence and to send it when taken to the appellate court.

12- vkns'k 41 fu;e 27 o 28 lh-ih-lh- dks la;qDr :i ls i<+us ls ;g Li"V gS fd fcuk U;k;ky; dh vuqefr ds vfrfjDr ekSf[kd ,oa nLrkosth lk{; vihyh; U;k;ky; esa is'k ugha dh tk ldrh vkSj vkns'k 41 fu;e 27 esa vfrfjDr lk{; ds fy, vihyh; U;k;ky; dc vuqefr nsxk] mldk mYys[k Hkh vkns'k 41 fu;e 27 esa Li"V :i ls fd;k x;k gS vkSj vkns'k 41 fu;e 28 ds eqrkfcd tc vihyh; U;k;ky; }kjk vfrfjDr lk{; dh vuqefr nh tkrh gS rks dksbZ ekSf[kd lk{; ysuh gksrh gS rks viyh; U;k;ky; ;k rks Lo;a ys ldrk gS ;k ml U;k;ky; dks funsZf'kr dj ldrk gS] ftlds }kjk fu.kZ; ,oa fMØh fopkj.k ds nkSjku ikfjr

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fd;k x;k gS ;k fdlh vU; v/khuLFk U;k;ky; dks Hkh bl ckcr funsZf'kr dj ldrk gSA 13- bl ekeys esa Lohd`r :i ls vkns'k 41 fu;e 27 lh-ih-lh- ds rgr dksbZ vkosnu&i= vihykFkhZx.k dh vksj ls is'k ugha fd;k x;k] ml voLFkk esa tks 'kiFk&i= vihykFkhZx.k }kjk izFke vihy ds le; is'k fd;k og 'kiFk&i= fof/kuqlkj lqlaxr ugha gks ldrk vkSj izFke vihyh; U;k;ky; ,sls vfrfjDr lk{; ij fopkj ugha dj ldrk] ftldh fd vuqefr izFke vihyh; U;k;ky; }kjk u nh xbZ gksA ,slh voLFkk esa vihyh; U;k;ky; }kjk vihykFkhZ dh vksj ls izLrqr "kiFk i= ij fopkj ugha djus esa dksbZ fof/kd Hkwy ugha dh xbZ gS vr% izFke n`"V;k gh vihykFkhZx.k }kjk tks vk/kkj fy;k x;k fd mudh vksj ls izLrqr 'kiFk&i= ij izFke vihyh; U;k;ky; }kjk xkSj ugha fd;k x;k] mlls bl vihy esa dksbZ lkjHkwr fof/kd iz'u ¼Substantial question of law½ mRiUu ugha gksrkA 14- nksuksa v/khuLFk U;k;ky;ksa }kjk ekSf[kd ,oa nLrkosth lk{; ds vk/kkj ij vkSj tekcanh o Vªsl uD'ks ds vk/kkj ij ;g Li"V fu"d"kZ fudkyk gS fd [kljk uEcj 319@3 esa gh 7192 oxZ ehVj ds fy, [kuu iV~Vk fn;k x;k Fkk] nksuksa U;k;ky;ksa dh bl rF; ds fo"k; ij concurrent findings miyC/k gS vkSj v/khuLFk U;k;ky; esa vihykFkhZ dh vksj ls tokc nsgh ds vykok ekSf[kd ;k nLrkosth lk{; izLrqr ugha dh xbZ gS vkSj izFke vihyh; U;k;ky; esa Hkh fof/kuqlkj vkns'k 41 fu;e 27 lh-ih-lh- ds rgr vkosnu&i= izLrqr dj dksbZ nLrkosth lk{; ;k ekSf[kd lk{; is'k ugha dh xbZ gSA ,slh lwjr esa bl laca/k esa fd [kuu iV~Vk [kljk uEcj 319@3 ds fy, fn;k x;k vFkok [kljk uEcj 241 ds fy, dksbZ lkjHkwr fof/kd iz'u ¼Substantial question of law½ mRiUu gksuk izrhr ugha gksrkA 15- ,slh voLFkk esa bl ekeys esa fdlh izdkj dk lkjHkwr fof/kd iz'u ¼Substantial question of law½ mRiUu gksuk ugha ik, tkus ls vihy vihykFkhZ ,Mfe'ku dh LVst ij gh [kkfjt fd, tkus ;ksX; gSA 16- vr% vihy vihykFkhZx.k vUrxZr /kkjk 100 lh-ih-lh- ,Mfe'ku dh LVst ij [kkfjt dh tkrh gS vkSj LFkxu izkFkZuk&i= dk Hkh fuLrkj.k fd;k tkrk gSA fu.kZ; dh izfr v/khuLFk U;k;ky; o vihyh; U;k;ky; dks Hksth tkosA

(YOGENDRA KUMAR PUROHIT),J 301-mayank/-