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Trilok Singh And Ors vs State (2025:Rj-Jd:25213)
2025 Latest Caselaw 1424 Raj

Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 1424 Raj
Judgement Date : 15 May, 2025

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Trilok Singh And Ors vs State (2025:Rj-Jd:25213) on 15 May, 2025

Author: Farjand Ali
Bench: Farjand Ali
[2025:RJ-JD:25213]

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
                     S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 248/1995

1.     Trilok Singh S/o Madho Singh ( Since Deceased)
2.     Balwant Singh S/o Trilok Singh
3.     Darshan Singh S/o Trilok Singh (Since Deceased)
       Residents of 26 KYD, P.S. Khajuwala, District Bikaner.
                                                                          ----Appellant
                                           Versus
The State of Rajasthan
                                                                        ----Respondent


For Appellant(s)               :     Mr. Digvijay Singh
For Respondent(s)              :     Mr. Sharwan Singh Rathor, Dy.G.A.



                 HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE FARJAND ALI

Order

Reportable

15/05/2025

1. By way of filing this instant appeal, the appellants have

assailed the judgment and order dated 27.05.1995 passed

by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Bikaner in

Sessions Case No. 17/94, whereby they were convicted for

offences under Sections 498-A/34 and 304/34 of the Indian

Penal Code and sentenced to undergo three years' simple

imprisonment on the first count and seven years'

imprisonment on the second count, with both sentences

directed to run concurrently.

2. During the pendency of the present appeal, it has been

officially verified by the learned Public Prosecutor that

Appellant Nos. 1 and 3 have expired. In light of this, the

appeal, to the extent it pertains to Appellant Nos. 1 and 3,

[2025:RJ-JD:25213] (2 of 10) [CRLA-248/1995]

stands abated and is accordingly disposed of as infructuous

qua them.

3. Breifly stated facts of the case are that in Sessions Case No.

17/94, based on FIR No. 66/94 registered at Police Station

Khajuwala, Bikaner, the accused Trilok Singh, his sons

Darshan Singh and Balwant Singh were charged under

Sections 498-A/34 and 304-B/34 IPC for subjecting Balwant

Singh's wife, Sunita (daughter of Joga Singh), to cruelty in

connection with dowry. Soon after this alleged cruelty, Sunita

died under suspicious circumstances on 10.05.1994 at the

accused's residence in village 26 K.Y.D. The accused claimed

that Sunita died by suicide, either by consuming poison or

due to pesticide inhalation. However, their versions were

inconsistent and shifted over time, especially as different

defense lawyers appeared. The prosecution examined 14

witnesses and produced 37 documents. Despite the hostile

stance of key witnesses like Joga Singh and his wife Jaspal

Kaur (Sunita's stepfather and mother), other credible

witnesses corroborated the allegations of dowry-related

cruelty. The court noted the alarming rate of dowry deaths in

the Bikaner district and the rarity of convictions, emphasizing

the need for courts to evaluate such cases with a nuanced

understanding of circumstantial and indirect evidence.

Applying the presumptions under Sections 113-B of the

Evidence Act and Section 304-B IPC, the trial court

concluded that the accused were guilty of causing Sunita's

[2025:RJ-JD:25213] (3 of 10) [CRLA-248/1995]

dowry death within seven years of marriage following

persistent cruelty.

4. Heard learned counsels present for the parties and gone

through the materials available on record.

5. It is evident from the record that prosecution witnesses PW-

1, PW-2, PW-3, and PW-4 were declared hostile, and their

testimonies do not support the prosecution's case.

Specifically, PW-4's statement is wholly exculpatory in nature

and does not in any manner establish or substantiate the

charge against the surviving appellant Balwant Singh.

Rather, the witness has categorically denied any demand for

dowry or cruelty, and has attributed the death of the

deceased to a medical condition triggered by pesticide

exposure, thus ruling out any culpability on the part of the

accused.

6. PW-5 and PW-6 were also declared hostile and did not

support the prosecution's case. PW-5 stated that the

deceased suffered a seizure due to pesticide spray and

denied having ever witnessed any harassment or dowry

demand by the accused. PW-6 similarly deposed that the

deceased had a history of seizures, received no

mistreatment from the accused, and confirmed her death

was due to a seizure caused by pesticide exposure. Their

statements clearly negate the prosecution's allegations of

cruelty or dowry demands. PW-7, the formal witness

regarding seizure and storage of chemical evidence, merely

[2025:RJ-JD:25213] (4 of 10) [CRLA-248/1995]

proved procedural aspects of handling the seized spray bottle

and did not contribute towards proving the charge against

the accused

7. PW-8 Heera Singh, a neighbour of the complainant

Jogasingh, has broadly supported the factum of a panchayat

being convened at the instance of Jogasingh, in which the

deceased Sunita allegedly disclosed instances of harassment

and dowry demands by her in-laws. However, upon critical

scrutiny, it becomes evident that the witness's deposition

lacks specificity or any direct imputation against the present

surviving appellant Balwant Singh. PW-8 does not attribute

any overt act or statement to Balwant Singh indicating

cruelty, harassment, or demand for dowry. On the contrary,

his narration of the panchayat proceedings shows that

Balwant Singh, along with others, merely gave assurance of

non-repetition of alleged misbehaviour and took the

deceased back with them. There is no reference to Balwant

Singh having made any demand or threat, nor is there any

assertion of him having played a dominant or instigating

role. The role of the surviving appellant, Balwant Singh, thus

appears to be more in the nature of a passive participant or

a mediator, rather than a perpetrator of the alleged cruelty.

The overall tenor of PW-8's testimony does not disclose any

material indicating specific culpability of Balwant Singh under

the alleged offences. Hence, in absence of direct

incriminating evidence, the testimony of PW-8 does not

advance the prosecution case qua the present appellant.

[2025:RJ-JD:25213] (5 of 10) [CRLA-248/1995]

8. PW-9 Gurudev Singh, who identifies himself as the uncle of

the deceased Sunita and brother of Jogasingh, has testified

regarding the circumstances surrounding Sunita's marriage

to the appellant Balwant Singh and the subsequent demands

for dowry. According to PW-9, after the marriage, Balwant

Singh demanded a motorcycle, a gold bracelet (kada), and a

ring. He also confirms that a panchayat was held

approximately six months after the marriage to address

disputes between Sunita and her in-laws over dowry. The

panchayat members included several persons such as

Gurdeep Singh, Heera Singh, and others, and it was agreed

that no further harassment would take place. However,

critically examining the testimony of PW-9 reveals that,

despite his close familial relationship and knowledge of the

alleged demands and disputes, there is no specific or direct

evidence brought out against the surviving appellant Balwant

Singh regarding any act of cruelty or harassment beyond the

mention of dowry demands. There is no indication that

Balwant Singh engaged in any overt acts of ill-treatment or

violence towards the deceased in this witness's deposition.

Furthermore, PW-9 does not provide any corroborative

evidence about Balwant Singh's conduct post-panchayat or

any direct involvement in the circumstances leading to

Sunita's death. His testimony, while relevant to establishing

a backdrop of dowry-related issues, does not directly

implicate Balwant Singh in any punishable offence.

Therefore, similar to PW-8, the role of the surviving

[2025:RJ-JD:25213] (6 of 10) [CRLA-248/1995]

appellant Balwant Singh, as per PW-9's evidence, appears to

be limited to the mention of dowry demands, with no

concrete evidence pointing to cruelty or culpable actions by

him. The testimony falls short of establishing Balwant Singh's

guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

9. PW-12 Gejo Bai deposes regarding the circumstances around

the deceased Sunita and the appellant Balwant Singh. She

confirms that Sunita, her niece, was harassed and beaten by

her in-laws over dowry demands, including a motorcycle and

gold ornaments. Gejo Bai narrates the incident when Sunita

was taken back to her in-laws' house in the evening with

folded hands, but later did not return alive. She states that

when she and family members went to see Sunita at her in-

laws' place, they found her lying dead on a cot with foam

coming from her mouth. Sunita's mother-in-law told them

she had a seizure. She also testifies that Sunita had confided

in her once about the demands for dowry items, but there is

no specific instance of sustained cruelty mentioned.

Importantly, PW-12's evidence does not establish any overt

acts of cruelty, physical or mental harassment, or assault by

the accused after the marriage other than the initial demand

for dowry. The seizure explanation by the mother-in-law and

absence of other direct proof weakens the prosecution's

claim for offences under Section 304B IPC (dowry death).

Hence, on a careful reading, the ingredients required to

attract Section 304B IPC -- i.e., death caused by harassment

or cruelty over dowry -- are not sufficiently made out from

[2025:RJ-JD:25213] (7 of 10) [CRLA-248/1995]

PW-12's testimony alone or in conjunction with other

evidence.

10. PW-13 Jaspal Kaur is the biological mother of deceased

Sunita and Neeta. She states on oath that both daughters

were married to Balwant Singh (surviving appellant) and

Jaswant Singh (since deceased), sons of Trilok Singh. She

confirms that the marriages were solemnised approximately

14-15 months prior to Sunita's death.

However, PW-13 turned hostile during her deposition. She

clearly stated:

• She does not know the circumstances under which Sunita

died.

• The police never recorded her statement nor interrogated

her.

• She gave dowry according to her means.

• When confronted with her police statement (Ex. P-26 Part

A), she denied having made any such statement to the

police.

Most importantly, she expressly denied that Sunita ever

informed her of any harassment or cruelty by her in-laws, or

that there was any demand for dowry.

• She repeatedly maintained that Sunita was living happily in

her matrimonial home, and any minor disputes with husband

or in-laws were not related to dowry.

[2025:RJ-JD:25213] (8 of 10) [CRLA-248/1995]

• In cross-examination by the Public Prosecutor, her testimony

remained non-incriminating and exculpatory toward the

accused. She categorically denied the essentials required to

invoke Section 304B IPC. Therefore, her evidence, as the

natural and primary witness (mother of the deceased), does

not support the prosecution case. Rather, her hostile turn

and denial of cruelty or dowry demand seriously dents the

prosecution's version. Hence, the ingredients of Section

304B IPC -- dowry demand and cruelty soon before death --

are not made out from the testimony of PW-13.

11. It is pertinent to note that the term "dowry" has not

been defined in the Indian Penal Code. For its legal

connotation, reference must be made to Section 2 of the

Dowry Prohibition Act, 1961, which defines "dowry" to mean

any property or valuable security given or agreed to be given

either directly or indirectly by one party to a marriage to the

other, or by the parents or any other person to either party,

at or before or any time after the marriage, in connection

with the marriage of the said parties. The definition explicitly

excludes dower or mahr as applicable under Muslim Personal

Law.

12. A cursory yet purposeful examination of the statutory

definition reveals that dowry is inextricably linked to the

institution of marriage, and its demand or transfer may occur

in three distinct phases: prior to, at the time of, or

[2025:RJ-JD:25213] (9 of 10) [CRLA-248/1995]

subsequent to the marriage, provided it is in connection with

the marriage.

13. In legal parlance, for any demand or transaction to

qualify as "dowry," there must be a discernible nexus with

the solemnization of marriage, whereby such transfer of

property or valuable security is a condition or consideration

for the marriage taking place. The Hon'ble Supreme Court in

Satvir Singh & Ors. v. State of Punjab & Anr., AIR

2001 SC 2828, laid down the tripartite test for invoking the

presumption of guilt under Section 304-B IPC, namely:

(a) That the woman was subjected to cruelty or harassment;

(b) That such cruelty or harassment was in connection with a

demand for dowry; and

(c) That such cruelty or harassment occurred "soon before

her death.

14. It is only upon the successful establishment of these

foundational facts that the statutory presumption under

Section 113-B of the Indian Evidence Act, 1872 can be

invoked against the accused.

15. In the present case, however, upon a holistic

appreciation of the evidence adduced, it becomes manifest

that these essential ingredients remain unsubstantiated.

Notably, PW-13 Jaspal Kaur, the mother of the deceased and

a natural witness, turned hostile and unequivocally deposed

that her daughter Sunita never complained of any dowry-

related cruelty. She further asserted that the deceased was

[2025:RJ-JD:25213] (10 of 10) [CRLA-248/1995]

living 'raajikhushi' at her matrimonial home and categorically

denied any dowry demand by the accused persons. Other

prosecution witnesses also failed to attribute specific or

proximate acts of dowry-related harassment to the accused,

particularly to appellant No. 2 Balwant Singh.

16. In the absence of any credible, cogent, and consistent

evidence regarding cruelty qua dowry demand inflicted upon

the deceased soon before her unnatural death, the

mandatory legal requirements to attract Section 304-B IPC

remain unfulfilled. The presumption under Section 113-B of

the Indian Evidence Act, therefore, cannot be pressed into

service in the prosecution's favour.

17. Accordingly, the instant appeal is allowed. The

conviction and sentence recorded by the learned trial court

are set aside.

18. In view of the above:

• Appellant No. 2, Balwant Singh, is acquitted of all charges.

He is on bail, he need not to surrender back. His bail bonds

are discharged hereby.

• As regards appellant Nos. 1 and 3, who are reported to have

died during the pendency of appeal, the appeal against them

is deemed to have abated.

• Disposed of accordingly.

(FARJAND ALI),J 19-Mamta/-

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