Chaturbhuj And Ors vs State (2025:Rj-Jd:24994)
2025 Latest Caselaw 10101 Raj

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Chaturbhuj And Ors vs State (2025:Rj-Jd:24994) on 22 May, 2025

Author: Manoj Kumar Garg

Bench: Manoj Kumar Garg

[2025:RJ-JD:24994]

       HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                        JODHPUR
                     S.B. Criminal Appeal No. 97/1996

1. Chaturbhuj S/o Bherulal,
2. Shyama S/o Chaturbhuj,
3. Pappulal S/o Chaturbhuj,
4. Smt. Bhanwari W/o Chaturbhuj,
   All by caste Kumhar R/o Badolia.
5. Lal Chand S/o Ratna Gujar,
    R/o Badolia, P.S. Rawatbhata, District Chittorgarh.
                                                                       ----Appellant
                                      Versus
State of Rajasthan
                                                                     ----Respondent


For Appellant(s)            :     Mr. N.K. Rastogi
For Respondent(s)           :     Mr. Pawan Kumar Bhati, PP



          HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE MANOJ KUMAR GARG

Order

22/05/2025

Instant criminal appeal has been filed by the appellants

against the judgment dated 23.01.1996 passed by learned Special

Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities Act Cases), Pratapgarh, in

Special Session Case No.254/1992 by which the learned Judge

convicted and sentenced the appellants as under :-

S.No.      Offence          Sentence                 Fine          Sentence        in
                                                                   default of fine
  1.    147 IPC           6 months' RI               ----                 ---
  2.    447 IPC           6 months' RI                ---                 ---
  3.    504 IPC           6 months' RI                ---                 ---
  4.    Section 3(1) 6 months' RI Rs.200/-                          1 month's S.I.
        (x) of SC/ST
        Act

All the sentences were ordered to run concurrently.

[2025:RJ-JD:24994] (2 of 11) [CRLA-97/1996]

Brief facts of the case are that on 09.07.1992 complainant

Pyara gave a written report before the concerned Police Station to

the effect that the appellants entered in the chowk of complainant

and uttered abusive language to humiliate the complainant and

also gave threatening to kill him. Based on this report, Police

registered a case against the accused-appellants and started

investigation.

On completion of investigation, police filed challan against

the accused-appellants. Thereafter, the charges for offence under

Sections 147, 447 & 504 IPC and Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act,

were framed by the trial court against the accused-appellants,

who pleaded not guilty and claimed trial.

During the course of trial, the prosecution examined as many

as seven witnesses in support of its case and also exhibited some

documents. Thereafter, statement of the accused appellants were

recorded under section 313 Cr.P.C.

Upon conclusion of the trial, the learned trial court vide

impugned judgment dated 23.01.1996 convicted and sentenced

the accused-appellants for the offences as aforesaid. Hence, this

criminal appeal.

Learned counsel for the appellants submits that accused

appellant No.1 Chaturbhuj has expired and the appeal to the

extent of him, is already abated.

So far as accused-appellants No.2 to 5 are concerned,

counsel for the appellants submits that the prosecution has failed

to establish the elements of an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of

the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of

Atrocities) Act, 1989. It is argued that the according to the First

[2025:RJ-JD:24994] (3 of 11) [CRLA-97/1996]

Information Report, in which complainant Pyara explicitly

mentioned that he was seated within his house alongwith family

members when all the accused appellants entered in his house

and used abusive language towards them. Additionally, the Court

testimonies of the witnesses unequivocally corroborate that the

accused-appellants introduced into the house of complainant and

uttered abusive words to them. So far as the offence under SC/ST

(Prevention of Atrocities) Act is concerned, the complainant's

testimony does not indicate that the appellant used abusive

language in a public place with the intent to humiliate them.

Based on this evidence, it is argued that no offence under Section

3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act is substantiated against the appellants.

Counsel for the appellants cited some judgments of the Hon'ble

Apex Court in the case of Deepak Kumar Tala Vs. State of

Andhra Pradesh & Ors. (Criminal Appeal No.1471/2015)

decided on 25.03.2025, Karuppudayar Vs. State Rep. By the

Deputy Superintendent of Police, Lalgudi Trichy & Ors.

reported in 2025 Cr.L.R. (SC) 17 decided on 31.01.2025 and

Rabindra Kumar Chhatoi Vs. State of Odhisha & Anr.

reported in AIR 2025 SC 705 decided on 05.12.2024, in which it

is clearly mentioned that private house cannot be deemed to be

within the public view. Therefore, the impugned judgment may be

quashed and set aside and the appellant may be acquitted from

the offences under SC/ST Act.

So far as offence under Sections 147, 447 & 504 IPC are

concerned. Counsel for the accused-appellants No.2 to 5 submits

that he does not challenge the finding of conviction but since the

occurrence is related to the year 1992 and the accused appellants

[2025:RJ-JD:24994] (4 of 11) [CRLA-97/1996]

has so far suffered a sentence for certain period including remission,

out of total sentence of six months' R.I., therefore, it is prayed that

the sentence awarded to the appellants No.2 to 5 for the aforesaid

offences may be reduced to the period already undergone by

them.

Learned Public Prosecutor opposed the submissions made by

the learned counsel for the appellants. The learned PP submitted

that there is neither any occasion to interfere with the sentence

awarded to the accused appellants nor any compassion or

sympathy is called for in the said case.

I have given my thoughtful consideration to the arguments

advanced at bar and meticulously examined the impugned

judgment alongwith material available on record.

For appreciating the rival submissions, it will be apposite to

refer to the provisions of Section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act, which

read thus:

"3. Punishments for offences of atrocities.-(1) Whoever, not being a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe,--

(i) ......................................................

(ii) ...................................................... xxx xxx xxx

(x) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;"

The Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention

of Atrocities) Act was enacted with a commendable objective: to

deter and penalize the commission of atrocities against individuals

[2025:RJ-JD:24994] (5 of 11) [CRLA-97/1996]

belonging to Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes, to establish

Special and Exclusive Special Courts for the expeditious trial of

such offences, and to ensure appropriate relief and rehabilitation

for victims. The Act embodies a legislative commitment to uphold

the dignity, equality, and security of historically marginalized

communities. Section 3(1) of the Act enumerates specific forms of

atrocities, categorised under sub-clauses (i) to (xv), which, when

committed against members of SCs or STs, constitute criminal

offences. These sub-clauses outline a wide range of reprehensible

acts, reflecting both physical and psychological forms of abuse.

Sub-clause (x) of Section 3(1) addresses acts that intentionally

insult or intimidate a member of a Scheduled Caste or Scheduled

Tribe with the purpose of humiliating them in any public place.

Including this provision is essential because it recognizes that

psychological violence, such as insults and intimidation, can be as

damaging as physical violence, especially when aimed at

marginalized communities. Such acts serve to demean and

degrade individuals, reinforcing social hierarchies rooted in caste

discrimination. Public acts of insult and intimidation can also incite

communal tensions, leading to broader social unrest. Moreover,

criminalizing these acts acts as a deterrent, discouraging

individuals from engaging in behavior that undermines the dignity

and self-respect of SC and ST members. It underscores the state's

commitment to uphold human dignity and equality, ensuring that

marginalized communities are protected from the psychological

harm caused by targeted humiliation and intimidation in public

spaces. Ultimately, this provision aims to foster a society where

[2025:RJ-JD:24994] (6 of 11) [CRLA-97/1996]

respect and dignity are upheld for all citizens, regardless of their

caste background.

The Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Hitesh Verma Vs.

State Uttarakhand reported in (2021) 81 OCR (SC) 241 has

observed as under :-

"11. It may be stated that the charge-sheet filed is for an offence under Section 3(1)(x) of the Act. The said section stands substituted by Act No. 1 of 2016 w.e.f. 26.1.2016. The substituted corresponding provision is Section 3(1)(r) which reads as under:

"3(1)(r) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view;"

12. The basic ingredients of the offence under Section 3(1)

(r) of the Act can be classified as "1) intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe and 2) in any place within public view".

In Swarn Singh & Ors. v. State, reported in 2008 (4)

RCR (Crl.) 74 (SC) it was held that for a public view some

members of the public should be there and they should not be the

relatives and friends of the complainant. In view of the same, the

expression "public view" has to be interpreted to mean that public

person present should be independent and impartial and not

interested in any of the parties.

In the case of Rabindra Kumar Chhatoi (Supra) the

Hon'ble Apex Court observed as under:-

"On a reading of the same, it is evident that the intention to insult or intimidate with an intent to humiliate a member of

[2025:RJ-JD:24994] (7 of 11) [CRLA-97/1996]

the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribe must be "in any place within public view". There is no doubt that the second respondent herein, is a member of the Scheduled Caste. The question is, whether, the alleged utterances by the appellant herein, was in any place within public view. It is noted that when the second respondent sought to repair her house which is adjacent to the appellant's house along with her employees (Labourers) and went into the appellant's house without seeking his prior permission, it was objected to by the appellant herein. The place of occurrence of the alleged offence was at the backyard of the appellant's house. Backyard of a private house cannot be within the public view. The persons who accompanied the second respondent were also the employees or the labour force she had engaged for the purpose of carrying out repairs to her house which is adjacent to the appellant's house. They cannot also be termed as public in general."

The core issue in the case of Karuppudayar (Supra) was

whether the alleged caste-based insult occurred "within public

view," a requirement under Sections 3(1)(r) and 3(1)(s) of the Act

[corresponding to Section Sections 3(1)(r) before amendment in

the SC/ST Act is Section 3 (1)(x)]. The Court found that the

incident took place within the complainant's office, not in public

view, thus not constituting an offence under the Act. Relevant

paragraphs are extracted herein-below:-

"9. A perusal of Section 3(1)(r) of the SC-ST Act would reveal that for constituting an offence thereunder, it has to be established that the Accused intentionally insults or intimidates with intent to humiliate a member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe in any place within public view. Similarly, for constituting an offence Under Section 3(1)(s) of the SC-ST Act, it will be necessary that the Accused abuses

[2025:RJ-JD:24994] (8 of 11) [CRLA-97/1996]

any member of a Scheduled Caste or a Scheduled Tribe by caste name in any place within public view.

10. The term "any place within public view" initially came up for consideration before this Court in the case of Swaran Singh and Ors. v. State through Standing Counsel and Anr. MANU/SC/7954/2008 : 2008:INSC:941 : (2008) 8 SCC 435. This Court in the case of Hitesh Verma v. State of Uttarakhand and Anr. MANU/SC/0843/2020 :

2020:INSC:636 : (2020) 10 SCC 710 referred to Swaran Singh (supra) and reiterated the legal position as under:

14. Another key ingredient of the provision is insult or intimidation in "any place within public view". What is to be regarded as "place in public view" had come up for consideration before this Court in the judgment reported as Swaran Singh v. State [Swaran Singh v. State, MANU/SC/7954/2008 : 2008:INSC:941 : (2008) 8 SCC 435:

(2008) 3 SCC (Cri) 527]. The Court had drawn distinction between the expression "public place" and "in any place within public view". It was held that if an offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, then the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. On the contrary, if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then it would not be an offence since it is not in the public view (sic) [Ed.: This sentence appears to be contrary to what is stated below in the extract from Swaran Singh, MANU/SC/7954/2008 : 2008:INSC:941 : (2008) 8 SCC 435, at p. 736d-e, and in the application of this principle in para 15, below:"Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence

[2025:RJ-JD:24994] (9 of 11) [CRLA-97/1996]

since it is in the public view."]. The Court held as under:

(SCC pp. 443-44, para 28)

28. It has been alleged in the FIR that Vinod Nagar, the first informant, was insulted by Appellants 2 and 3 (by calling him a "chamar") when he stood near the car which was parked at the gate of the premises. In our opinion, this was certainly a place within public view, since the gate of a house is certainly a place within public view. It could have been a different matter had the alleged offence been committed inside a building, and also was not in the public view.

However, if the offence is committed outside the building e.g. in a lawn outside a house, and the lawn can be seen by someone from the road or lane outside the boundary wall, the lawn would certainly be a place within the public view. Also, even if the remark is made inside a building, but some members of the public are there (not merely relatives or friends) then also it would be an offence since it is in the public view. We must, therefore, not confuse the expression "place within public view" with the expression "public place". A place can be a private place but yet within the public view. On the other hand, a public place would ordinarily mean a place which is owned or leased by the Government or the municipality (or other local body) or gaon sabha or an instrumentality of the State, and not by private persons or private bodies.

(emphasis in original)

11. It could thus be seen that, to be a place 'within public view', the place should be open where the members of the public can witness or hear the utterance made by the Accused to the victim. If the alleged offence takes place within the four corners of the wall where members of the public are not present, then it cannot be said that it has taken place at a place within public view."

Considering the judicial pronouncements of the Supreme

Court, it is observed that for an act to constitute an offence under

[2025:RJ-JD:24994] (10 of 11) [CRLA-97/1996]

section 3(1)(x) of the SC/ST Act, the alleged act must occur in

public view, ensuring transparency and preventing clandestine

acts. The Court has emphasized that the presence of impartial

witnesses who are not related to the complainant or victim is

crucial to establish the occurrence of the act openly and

transparently.

In the present case, the FIR as well as statement of the

witnesses they explicitly stated in their statement that accused-

appellants entered in the house of the complainant and used

abusive languages and the house is not cover under the definition

of 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act. A critical requirement for a conviction

under this section is that the alleged act must have occurred "in

public view." In the present case, the prosecution has not

presented sufficient evidence to establish that the alleged act of

using abusive language or any other relevant conduct took place

in a location visible to the public or in a manner that would

constitute "public view" as interpreted by legal precedents. The

absence of this crucial element renders the charge unsustainable.

So far offences under Sections 147, 447 and 504 IPC is

concerned. Undisputedly, the occurrence relates back to year 1992

and, the appellants have so far undergone for certain period

including remission, out of total sentence of six months' R.I., and

have also suffered the mental agony and trauma of protracted

trial. The appellants has served the sentence for offence under

Sections 147, 447 and 504 IPC. Thus, looking to the over-all

circumstances and the facts that the appellants No.2 to 5 have

remained behind the bars for a considerable time, it will be just

and proper if the sentence awarded by the trial court for offence

[2025:RJ-JD:24994] (11 of 11) [CRLA-97/1996]

under Sections 147, 447 and 504 IPC is reduced to the period

already undergone by the appellants No.2 to 5.

In view of above discussion, the appeal is partly allowed. The

impugned order of conviction dated 23.01.1996 passed by learned

Special Judge, SC/ST (Prevention of Atrocities Act Cases),

Pratapgarh, in Special Session Case No.254/1992 is hereby

quashed and set aside to the extent of conviction for the offence

under Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST Act and the appellants No.2 to 5

are acquitted from the offences under Section 3(1)(x) of SC/ST

Act while extended the benefit of doubt. While maintaining the

conviction for offence under Sections 147, 447 & 504 IPC, the

sentence awarded to appellants No.2 to 5 for the said offences is

hereby reduced to the period already undergone. Appellants No.2

to 5 are on bail. They need not surrender. Their bail bond stands

discharged. Record, if received, be sent back forthwith.

(MANOJ KUMAR GARG),J 125-Ishan/-

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