State vs Amra Ram
2025 Latest Caselaw 10071 Raj

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

State vs Amra Ram on 22 May, 2025

Author: Pushpendra Singh Bhati

Bench: Pushpendra Singh Bhati

[2025:RJ-JD:23102-DB]

      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
                  D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 721/2002

State of Rajasthan

                                                                      ----Appellant

                                       Versus

Amra Ram son of Suja Ram, by caste Meghwal, resident of

Umarlai, P.S. Kalyanpur, District Barmer.

                                                                    ----Respondent



For Appellant(s)               :   Mr. C.S. Ojha, PP
For Respondent(s)              :   Mr. Harshwardhan Singh
                                   Mr. Mahipal Bishnoi, Amicus Curiae



     HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI

HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SUNIL BENIWAL

Judgment

(per Hon'ble Beniwal,J.) Reserved on : 13/05/2025 Pronounced on : 22/05/2025

1. The appellant-State has assailed the judgment and order

dated 28.02.2002 passed by the learned Additional Sessions

Judge (Fast Track), Balotra in Sessions Case No.40/2001, by which

the accused-respondent has been acquitted of the offences under

Sections 302, 304-B and 498-A of IPC.

2. The facts relevant to the case are that Chaina Ram (PW-14)

lodged a complaint on 03.09.2001 (Ex.P/2) at Police Station

Kalyanpura, alleging, inter alia, that his daughter Somti, who had

been married to the accused-respondent for about 4-5 months,

was being harassed. He stated that he had given dowry according

[2025:RJ-JD:23102-DB] (2 of 11) [CRLA-721/2002]

to his financial capacity, but the accused-respondent and her in-

laws began torturing her for bringing more dowry, eventually

sending her back to her paternal home. He assured them that

additional dowry would be provided after the harvest and sent his

daughter back to her matrimonial home on 29.08.2001. However,

on 31.08.2001, when he visited her matrimonial home, he learned

that she had died.

2.1 On receiving this complaint, the police registered an FIR

(Ex.P/11) under Sections 304-B and 498-A of IPC and

investigation commenced. After thorough investigation, the police

filed charge-sheet and the learned trial Court framed charges

under Sections 302, 304-B and 498-A of IPC against the accused-

respondent. The prosecution examined as many as 17 witnesses

and exhibited as many as 20 documents. The respondent-accused

was examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C. and in defence as many

as 5 witnesses were examined and exhibited certain documents.

2.2 After appreciating the evidence available on record, the

learned trial Court acquitted the accused-respondent vide

impugned judgment and order dated 28.02.2002. Hence, this

appeal by the State.

3. Learned counsel appearing for the State submitted as

under:-

3.1 From the evidence of PW's-10 to 16, it is unequivocally clear

that the deceased Somti was put to death and there is clear

evidence to the effect that the accused-respondent strangulated

her.

3.2 The learned trial Court has also committed grave error in not

properly appreciating the evidence of Dr. Rasa Ram (PW-8), who

[2025:RJ-JD:23102-DB] (3 of 11) [CRLA-721/2002]

has clearly deposed that the cause of death was asphyxia due to

throttling and there were marks of throttling on her neck and the

same was, thus, sufficient to prove that the deceased was put to

death by the accused-respondent but the learned trial Court has

wrongly disbelieved the testimony of this witness.

3.3 The learned trial Court has also observed that there are

contradictions in the statements of the prosecution witnesses but

a scrutiny of the same does not reveal any contradiction. However,

if there is any, the same is very minor and are not fatal to the

prosecution, rather they may be because of way of expression by

different persons. The learned trial Court has not considered these

aspects of the matter and has wrongly acquitted the accused-

respondent.

4. Per contra, the learned Amicus Curiae, appearing for the

accused-respondent, supported the impugned judgment and order

and submitted that the learned trial Court has rightly made

recorded the finding and has rightly acquitted the accused-

respondent.

5. We have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused

the material available on record.

6. The entire prosecution case hinges on the statements of

Chainaram (PW-14), the father of the deceased; Smt. Suklli (PW-

15), her sister; and Bhanwari Devi (PW-13), her mother. A close

scrutiny of the deposition made by Chainaram (PW-14) reveals

that, during cross-examination, he stated that substantial dowry

was given at the time of Somti's marriage. In both his

examination-in-chief and cross-examination, it was never stated

[2025:RJ-JD:23102-DB] (4 of 11) [CRLA-721/2002]

or deposed that any dowry demand was made prior to or at the

time of marriage.

7. During cross-examination, he further stated that he did not

see Somti's body when he went to her matrimonial home,

however, his thumb impression on Ex.P/4 and Ex.P/6 show that he

was handed over the dead body of deceased Somti, so also the

statements of PW-3, PW-7, PW09 and PW-10. It is also noted from

his statement that the accused-respondent was not present when

Somti's body was recovered and brought to her matrimonial

home. Even during the funeral, his presence was not

acknowledged by any of the witnesses, including PW-13 to PW-15.

8. The absence of the accused-respondent, Amra Ram, at the

time of the recovery of the body and during the funeral procession

supports his defense statement, wherein he claimed that he was

not at home on the date the incident occurred and that he did not

attend the funeral of the deceased, Somti. Despite this, the entire

investigation and prosecution narrative concluded that Amra Ram

(the accused-respondent) was the main culprit and that his

continuous and persistent dowry demands allegedly instigated

Somti to take the drastic step of committing suicide. However, his

absence at the time of the incident clearly indicates that he was

not present when this unfortunate event took place.

9. The statements of PW-13 and PW-15, when read conjointly,

suggest that both witnesses stated there is no tradition of giving

dowry in their community. Neither of them mentioned that there

was any demand for dowry by the accused-respondent prior to or

at the time of marriage. Although both witnesses stated that after

Somti's marriage she was harassed by the accused-respondent for

[2025:RJ-JD:23102-DB] (5 of 11) [CRLA-721/2002]

dowry, they did not specify what was the alleged demand. Only

assertion is that there was demand of Rs.5,000/-In fact, Chaina

Ram (PW-14) categorically stated that there was a demand of

₹5,000 by the accused-respondent, but clarified that it was for

agricultural purposes. If the demand of ₹5,000 was indeed for

agricultural needs, it cannot be construed as a demand for dowry.

10. A close scrutiny of the statements of the doctor who

examined the body of the deceased Somti, along with the

postmortem report, reveals that the cause of death was asphyxia

due to throttling. The learned trial court has recorded a detailed

discussion regarding the statement given by the doctor who

conducted the postmortem. Upon considering the same, it was

found that the exact cause of death could not be ascertained due

to the decomposition of the body, which had remained in water,

and the swelling in the body with the skin being ruptured. This

made it impossible to conclusively determine the actual cause of

death. During cross-examination, the doctor was unable to

definitively state whether the death was due to drowning or

throttling.

11. It is further noted that the Investigating Officer (PW-17), in

his cross-examination, stated that no apparent injuries were

observed on the body of the deceased. He also mentioned that

Chaina Ram (PW-14), the father of the deceased, was present at

the time when the body was examined. He further asserted that,

upon investigation, no case under Section 302 of the IPC was

found to be made out. Additionally, he stated in his cross-

examination that witnesses such as Bhuraram, Jefaram,

Khimaram, Rikbaram, Hari Singh, Hadmanram, Tejaram, Lalaram,

[2025:RJ-JD:23102-DB] (6 of 11) [CRLA-721/2002]

etc., did not mention any harassment, dowry demand, or dispute

between the family of the accused-respondent and the

complainant.

12. The learned trial Court, after considering the entire evidence

on record, made the following observations:-

"(i) Somti's marriage took place on 24.06.2001, and

there was no demand for dowry at the time of marriage.

This fact is neither mentioned in the FIR nor has it been

proven that any dowry demand was made at the time of

the marriage.

(ii) PW-13, Somti's sister, and PW-15, Somti's mother,

categorically stated that there is no tradition of giving

dowry in their community.

(iii) The FIR contains a vague assertion regarding the

dowry demand; however, the first informant, Chaina

Ram (PW-14), during his cross-examination, admitted

that ₹5,000 was demanded for agricultural purposes.

(iv) PW-13 to PW-15 admitted that the accused-

respondent, Amra Ram, visited their house, brought

sweets, and had dinner in accordance with the family

rituals, and at that time, Somti appeared happy.

(v) The statement of the complainant, as well as the

statement of PW-15, does not indicate that the accused-

respondent was present at the scene when the

unfortunate incident occurred.

(vi) PW-12, PW-15, and PW-17 did not mention in their

examination-in-chief that they had seen Somti's body,

[2025:RJ-JD:23102-DB] (7 of 11) [CRLA-721/2002]

nor was there any evidence indicating that Somti had

been killed.

(vii) A cumulative analysis of the evidence presented by

the prosecution does not suggest any clear motive for

the alleged murder or suicide.

(viii) Serious contradictions and improvements are noted

in the statements made by the witnesses in the FIR, in

their Section 161 Cr.P.C. statements, and in their

testimony in Court."

13. The above-mentioned observations made by the learned trial

court as well as the scrutiny of the original record leave no doubt

that the prosecution has failed to establish the guilt of the

accused-respondent beyond a reasonable doubt, as neither the

presence of the accused-respondent on the date of the incident

nor the dowry demand, particularly soon before the death, was

established by the witnesses to bring the offence within the

purview of Section 304-B of the IPC.

14. In view of the discussion above and considering the law laid

down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in the case of Karan Singh Vs.

State of Haryana [Criminal Appeal No.1076/2014], decided

on 31.01.2025, which outlines the ingredients required to

establish a case under Section 304-B of the IPC, it is clear that, in

the present case, there was neither any evidence of cruelty or

harassment at the behest of the accused-respondent nor any

dowry demand shortly before the death, which would bring the

accused within the purview of Section 304-B and Section 498-A of

the IPC. The learned trial court was, therefore, justified in

[2025:RJ-JD:23102-DB] (8 of 11) [CRLA-721/2002]

extending the benefit of the doubt to the accused-respondent and,

consequently, acquitting him of the alleged offence.

15. At this juncture, this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce

the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble

Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa and Ors. Vs. State of

Karnataka : (2024) 3 SCC 544 and Babu Sahebagouda

Rudragoudar and Ors. Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal

Appeal No.985/2010, decided on 19.04.2024), as under:-

Mallappa & Ors (supra):

"36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be summarized as:

(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of all evidence, oral or documentary;

(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;

(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall ordinarily be followed;

(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal;

(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal and must cover all the facts;

(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court."

Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoundar and Ors(supra):

"38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of Cr.P.C. as follows:

'8.1 The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the presumption of innocence;

[2025:RJ-JD:23102-DB] (9 of 11) [CRLA-721/2002]

8.2 The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary evidence;

8.3 The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against acquittal, after re-appreciating the evidence, is required to consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence on record;

8.4 If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that another view was also possible; and 8.5 The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and no other conclusion was possible.

39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused has to be exercised within the four corners of the following principles :

(a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent perversity;

(b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to consider material evidence on record; (c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from the evidence available on record."

16. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court

passed the impugned judgment of acquittal of the accused-

respondents under Sections 302, 304-B and 498-A of IPC, which

in the given circumstances, is justified in law, because as per the

settled principles of law as laid down by the Hon'ble Apex Court in

the aforementioned judgments, to the effect that the judgment of

the Trial Court can be reversed by the Appellate Court only when it

demonstrates an illegality, perversity or error of law or fact in

arriving at such decision; but in the present case, the learned Trial

Court, before passing the impugned judgment had examined each

and every witnesses at a considerable length and duly analysed

the documents produced before it, coupled with examination of

the oral as well as documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned

[2025:RJ-JD:23102-DB] (10 of 11) [CRLA-721/2002]

judgment suffers from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as

to warrant any interference by this Court in the instant appeal.

17. This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the

acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited,

and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court

demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a

contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by

the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and

thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment deserves no

interference by this Court in the instant appeal.

18. Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into

the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the

aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit

case warranting any interference by this Court.

19. Consequently, the present appeal is dismissed.

20. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C., the

accused-respondents are directed to furnish a personal bond in a

sum of Rs.25,000/- each and a surety bond in the like amount,

before the learned Trial Court, which shall be made effective for a

period of six months, to the effect that in the event of filing of

Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for grant of leave,

the accused-appellant, on receipt of notice thereof, shall appear

before the Hon'ble Supreme Court as soon as they would be called

upon to do so.

21. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the

learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.

22. This Court is thankful to Mr. Harshwardhan Singh and Mr.

Mahipal Bishnoi, who have rendered their assistance as Amicus

[2025:RJ-JD:23102-DB] (11 of 11) [CRLA-721/2002]

Curiae on behalf of the accused-respondents, in the present

adjudication.

(SUNIL BENIWAL),J (DR.PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI),J

skm/-

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