Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 9274 Raj
Judgement Date : 25 March, 2025
[2025:RJ-JD:13157]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 19849/2024
1. Rakesh S/o Sh. Kapoor Singh, Aged About 33 Years, R/o
House No. 57, Sandol, Dist. Hisar, Haryana, At Present
Sdd Colony, Nh 62, Suratgarh, Tehsil Suratgarh, Dist. Sri
Ganganagar.
2. Divyanka Choudhary D/o Rakesh, Aged About 1 Years,
Minor, R/o House No. 57, Sandol, Dist. Hisar, Haryana, At
Present Sdd Colony, Nh 62, Suratgarh, Tehsil Suratgarh,
Dist. Sri Ganganagar Dist. Sri Ganganagar Her Biological
Father Sh. Rakesh S/o Sh. Kapoor Singh.
----Petitioners
Versus
1. The Public, At General.
2. Life Insurance Corporation Of India, Through Its Branch
Manager, Suratgarh, Dist. Sri Ganganagar, Rajasthan.
3. Life Insurance Corporation Of India, Sub Divisional Office
Situated At Jaipur Road, Bikaner, Rajasthan.
4. Rahul S/o Rajendra, R/o House No 11/5945, Street No.
1/3 Bharat Nagar, Kangpur Road, Sirsa, Dist. Sirsa,
Haryana.
5. Jaybala W/o Rajendra, R/o House No 11/5945, Street No.
1/3 Bharat Nagar, Kangpur Road, Sirsa, Dist. Sirsa,
Haryana.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Monal Chugh
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Rajeev Purohit for LIC
Mr. Himanshu Shrimali for R-4 & R-5
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE NUPUR BHATI
Order
Reserved on 06/03/2025 Pronounced on 25/03/2025
1. The instant petition has been filed by the petitioners under
Article 227 of the Constitution of India challenging the order dated
22.11.2024 (Annex.8) passed by Additional District and Session
Judge, Suratgarh (hereinafter as 'trial Court') in Civil Misc. Petition
No.37/2024 whereby application filed by the petitioners under
[2025:RJ-JD:13157] (2 of 11) [CW-19849/2024]
Section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter as
'CPC') for grant of temporary injunction has been dismissed. The
petitioners seek following relief:
"It is, therefore, most humbly and respectfully prayed that the instant writ petition may kindly be allowed and by issuing an appropriate writ, order or direction and the impugned order dated 22.11.24 (Annex-8) may kindly be ordered to be quashed and set aside to the extent of deciding the application preferred by the petitioners u/s 151 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908.
It is furthermore prayed that the application preferred by the petitioners under section 151, CPC may kindly be allowed in toto.
Any other appropriate relief which this Hon'ble High Court deems just and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case may kindly be passed in favour of the petitioner"
2. Briefly stated the facts of the case are that Petitioner Nos.1
and 2 are the husband and daughter, respectively, of Late Mrs.
Priyanka (hereinafter as 'deseased'). The deceased was a
permanent employee of respondent Nos.2 and 3 (Life Insurance
Corporation) at Suratgarh office. Subsequent to the death of the
deceased the petitioners requested respondent Nos.2 and 3 to pay
the service benefits of the deceased payable to them, being her
class-I legal heirs, however, the respondent Nos.2 and 3 refused
this request on the ground that the respondent Nos.4 and 5 are
the nominees of the deceased in the service records and unless
the petitioners produce succession certificate in this respect, the
service benefits of the deceased cannot be granted to them.
Thereafter, the petitioners filed an application (Annex.3) under
Section 372 of Indian Succession Act, 1925 (hereinafter as 'the
Succession Act') seeking, inter alia, for grant of succession
certificate declaring them as class-I legal heirs of the deceased.
[2025:RJ-JD:13157] (3 of 11) [CW-19849/2024]
The respondent Nos.2 and 3 filed reply (Annex.4) to the
application (Annex.3) denying averments made therein. The
petitioners also submitted a representation (Annex.5) to the
Branch Manager of the respondent No.2 to not to disburse the
service benefits of the deceased to respondent Nos.4 and 5
without the permission of the learned trial court. The petitioners
also filed an application (Annex.6) under Section 151 of the Code
of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter as 'CPC') before the learned
trial court praying inter alia that during the pendency of the
proceedings under Section 372 of the Act, the service benefits and
amount of insurance policy of the deceased may not be disbursed
to the respondent Nos.4 and 5 or anyone else. The respondent
Nos.2 and 3 filed reply (Annex.7) to the application (Annex.6)
denying the averments made therein. Subsequently, the
application (Annex.6) filed under Section 151 of the CPC came to
be dismissed by the learned trial court vide order dated
22.11.2024 (Annex.8). Aggrieved of the same, the instant petition
has been filed by the petitioners.
3. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the
learned trial court has erred in rejecting his application (Annex.6)
solely on the ground that petitioners can avail alternative remedy
of filing a seperate civil suit for the relief claimed in application
(Annex.6). He submitted that filing a seperate civil suit would
create multiplicity of proceedings. He also submitted that the
learned trial court has not considered the relevant legal principle
that the nominee is merely a collecting agent and cannot be held
to be a successor and mere nomination does not confer any
beneficial interest upon the nominee. He also submitted that the
[2025:RJ-JD:13157] (4 of 11) [CW-19849/2024]
nomination made under Section 39 of the Insurance Act, 1938
(hereinafter as 'the Insurance Act') is subject to the claims of legal
heirs of the assured under the law of succession. He placed
reliance upon the following judgments for this submission: Smt.
Sarabati Devi and Anr. vs. Smt. Usha Devi [Civil Appeeal No.96 of
1972, decided on 06.12.1983]; Smt. Sunita vs. Union of India
[W.P. (c) 1031/2024, decided on 06.02.2024]; Shakti Yezdani and
Anr. vs. Jayanand Jayant Salagaonkar and ors., (2024) 4 SCC
642.
4. Learned counsel for the petitioners submitted that the Part-X
of the Succession Act, which governs the grant of succession
certificate, does not provide for any remedy of interim order,
therefore, the petitioners preferred application (Annex.6) under
Section 151 of the CPC and the learned trial court ought to have
exercised its inherent poweres under Section 151 of the CPC to
restrain the respondent from disbursing the service benefits and
sum payable under insurance policy of the deceased during the
pendency of the application (Annex.3) for grant of succession
certificate. He also submitted that balance of convenience lies in
the favour of the petitioners and in case the amount of service
benefits and sum payable under the insurance policy are disbursed
to the nominees (Respondent Nos.4 and 5), the petitioners would
have to initiate separate recovery proceedings, and the petitioners
would suffer irreparable loss. For these submissions, he placed
reliance upon the following judgments: Shambhu Sharan Tiwary
and Ors. vs. Re-Estate of Late Radha Raman [Civil Writ
Jurisdiction Case No.16559/2011 (Patna High Court), decided on
22.03.2011]; Suman Kumari @ Suman vs. Nand Kishor and ors.
[2025:RJ-JD:13157] (5 of 11) [CW-19849/2024]
[W.P. (C) 6701/2018 and C.M. Nos.25451/2018, 41307/2019 and
11129/2020 (Delhi High Court), Decided on 06.11.2020]; K.R.
Sakthi Murugeshwari vs. The Divisional Manager Divisional Office,
Life Insurance Corporation of India and Anr., (2023) 2 WLR 725
(Madras High Court).
5. Per Contra, learned counsel for the respondent Nos.2 and 3
submitted that the respondent Nos.2 and 3 are bound to release
the amount of insurance policy to the nominees as per Section 39
(7) of the Insurance Act as the deceased herself has specifically
named respondent Nos.4 and 5 as nominee. He also submitted
that the scope of Section 372 of the Succession Act is limited to
grant of succession certificate as the proceedings are summary in
nature and the relief that the petitioners have sought by way of
application (Annex.6) under Section 151 of the CPC can be
granted in a civil suit only.
6. Learned counsel for the respondent Nos.4 and 5 submitted
that the respondent Nos.4 and 5 are the nominees of the
deceased and therefore, entitled to receive the service benefits
and sum payable under the insurance policy of the deceased. He
also submits that proceedings under Section 372 of the
Succession Act are summary in nature and therefore, dispute
relating to the right to receive the service benefits and sum
payable under insurance policy cannot be decided in such
proceedings. He also submitted that in the event of succession
certificate being granted in favour of the petitioners, they shall
have to file a separate civil suit to claim the service benefits and
the sum payable under the insurance policy of the deceased.
[2025:RJ-JD:13157] (6 of 11) [CW-19849/2024]
7. Heard the counsel for the parties and perused the material
available on record.
8. This court finds that learned trial court has rejected the
application (Annex.6) on the grounds that firstly, the petitioners
have alternative remedy to file civil suit for the relief claimed in
application (Annex.6); secondly, the petitioners have failed to
demonstrate before the learned trial court that whether injunction
can be granted in the proceedings under Section 372 of the
Succession Act by restraining the respondent Nos.4 and 5
(Nominees) from exercising the rights vested as nominees.
9. This court finds it appropriate to refer Sections 373 and 387
of the Succession Act. And the same are reproduced hereunder:
"373. Procedure on application.--(1) If the District Judge is satisfied that there is ground for entertaining the application, he shall fix a day for the hearing thereof and cause notice of the application and of the day fixed for the hearing--
(a) to be served on any person to whom, in the opinion of the Judge, special notice of the application should be given, and
(b) to be posted on some conspicuous part of the court-
house and published in such other manner, if any, as the Judge, subject to any rules made by the High Court in this behalf, thinks fit, and upon the day fixed, or as soon thereafter as may be practicable, shall proceed to decide in a summary manner the right to the certificate.
(2) When the Judge decides the right thereto to belong to the applicant, the Judge shall make an order for the grant of the certificate to him.
(3) If the Judge cannot decide the right to the certificate without determining questions of law or fact which seem to be too intricate and difficult for determination in a summary proceeding, he may nevertheless grant a certificate to the applicant if he appears to be the person having prima facie the best title thereto.
(4) When there are more applicants than one for a certificate, and it appears to the Judge that more than one of such applicants are interested in the estate of the
[2025:RJ-JD:13157] (7 of 11) [CW-19849/2024]
deceased, the Judge may, in deciding to whom the certificate is to be granted, have regard to the extent of interest and the fitness in other respects of the applicants."
Thus, it is evident from the bare perusal of Section 373 (1)(b) that
the proceedings under Section 372 are summary in nature and
only the right to grant of succession certificate is to be decided by
the civil court.
9.1. Section 387 of the Succession Act reads as under:
"387. Effect of decisions under this Act, and liability of holder of certificate thereunder.-- No decision under this Part upon any question of right between any parties shall be held to bar the trial of the same question in any suit or in any other proceeding between the same parties, and nothing in this Part shall be construed to affect the liability of any person who may receive the whole or any part of any debt or security, or any interest or dividend on any security, to account therefore to the person lawfully entitled thereto."
Thus, Section 387 in unequivocal terms stipulates that no decision
made under Part X, which includes grant of succession certificate
under Section 372, shall bar the same question being raised
between the same parties in any subsequent suit or proceedings.
And nothing in Part X shall be construed to affect the liability of
any person who may receive the whole or any part of any debt or
security, or any interest or dividend on any security, to account to
the person lawfully entitled thereto.
10. This court also deems it appropriate to refer to the judgment
of the Hon'ble Supreme Court passed in Banarsi Dass vs. Teeku
Dutta and Ors. : MANU/SC/0333/2005, wherein the Hon'ble
Supreme Court has made following pertinent observation
regarding the object of the succession certificate:
"16. The main object of a Succession Certificate is to facilitate collection of debts on succession and afford protection to parties paying debts to representatives of deceased persons. All that the Succession Certificate
[2025:RJ-JD:13157] (8 of 11) [CW-19849/2024]
purports to do is to facilitate the collection of debts, to regulate the administration of succession and to protect persons who deal with the alleged representatives of the deceased persons. Such a certificate does not give any general power of administration on the estate of the deceased. The grant of a certificate does not establish title of the grantee as the heir of the deceased. A Succession Certificate is intended as noted above to protect the debtors, which means that where a debtor of a deceased person either voluntarily pays his debt to a person holding a Certificate under the Act, or is compelled by the decree of a Court to pay it to the person, he is lawfully discharged. The grant of a certificate does not establish a title of the grantee as the heir of the deceased, but only furnishes him with authority to collect his debts and allows the debtors to make payments to him without incurring any risk. In order to succeed in the succession application the applicant has to adduce cogent and credible evidence in support of the application. The respondents, if they so chooses, can also adduce evidence to oppose grant of succession certificate. The trial court erroneously held that the documents produced by the respondents were not sufficient or relevant for the purpose of adjudication and DNA test was conclusive. This is not a correct view. It is for the parties to place evidence in support of their respective claims and establish their stands. DNA test is not to be directed as a matter of routine and only in deserving cases such a direction can be given, as was noted in Goutam Kundu's case (supra). Present case does not fall to that category. High Court's judgment does not suffer from any infirmity. We, therefore, uphold it. It is made clear that we have not expressed any opinion on the merits of the case relating to succession application.
11. Further, the Hon'ble Supreme Court in Madhvi Amma
Bhawani Amma and Ors. vs. Kunjikutty Pillai Meenakshi
Pillai and Ors.: MANU/SC/0393/2000, has observed that:
"15. This can be examined from another angle. The grant of Succession Certificate falls under Part X of the aforesaid Act. Its range is between Sections 370 to 390. It is significant to refer here Section 387. This declares the effect of decisions made under this Act and the liability of holder of such certificate. It lays down that any decision made under this Part, (Part X) upon any question of right between the parties shall not bar the trial of the same
[2025:RJ-JD:13157] (9 of 11) [CW-19849/2024]
question in any suit or other proceedings between the same parties. It further records that nothing in this Part shall be construed to affect the liability of any person who may receive the whole or any part of any debts or security to account therefore to the person lawfully entitled thereto. Section 387 is quoted hereunder:
Section 387: Effect of decisions under this Act, and liability of holder of certificate thereunder:
No decision under this Part upon any question of right between any parties shall be held to bar the trial of the same question in any suit or in any other proceeding between the same parties, and nothing in this Part shall be construed to affect the liability of any person who may receive the whole or any part of any debts or security or any interest or dividend on any security, to account therefore to the person lawfully entitled thereto.
16. This leaves no room for doubt. Thus any adjudication made under Part X of this Act which includes Section 373 does not bar the same question being raised between the same parties in any subsequent suit or proceedings. This provision takes the decisions under Part X of the Act outside the preview of Explanation VIII to Section 11. This gives protective umbrella to ward off from the rays of res judicata to the same issue being raised in a subsequent suit or proceedings."
12. Thus, taking into consideration the judgment passed by the
Hon'ble Supreme Court in Madhvi Amma Bhawani Amma
(Supra) and Banarasi Dass (Supra) as well as Sections 373 (3)
and 387 of the Succession Act, there is no cavil to the proposition
of law that proceedings under Section 372 of the Succession Act
are summary in nature and the grant of succession certificate does
not give any general power of administration on the estate of the
deceased. Also, mere grant of succession certificate does not
conclusively determine the right of such holder of succession
certificate over the debts or securities in respect of which the
certificate is granted. The petitioners have an alternative remedy
available as there is no bar to file a civil suit for determination of
rights in case the succession certificate is granted to them.
[2025:RJ-JD:13157] (10 of 11) [CW-19849/2024]
13. Therefore, it is clear that mere grant of succession certificate
under Section 372 of the Succession Act does not conclusively
determines the rights of the concerned person (s) so as to entitle
them absolutely to the service benefits and the sum payable under
the insurance policy of the deceased to the exclusion of other
person.
14. Having considered the above position of law, this court finds
that the present case entails competing interest of the parties i.e.,
claim of the petitioners being class-I legal heirs vis-a-vis claim of
the respondent Nos.4 and 5 being nominees, which cannot be
determined conclusively in the proceedings under Section 372 of
the Succession Act considering the limited scope of such
proceedings and for which appropriate remedy lies in a civil suit
before the competent court. Thus, even if the service benefits and
amount payable under the insurance policy to the respondent
Nos.4 and 5 is stayed during the pendency of the proceedings
under Section 372 of the Succession Act, as prayed for by the
petitioners in their application (Annex.6), ultimately, the parties
would have to approach the competent court in order to determine
the share they are entitled to, if any, in the service benefits and
the sum payable under the life insurance policy of the deceased.
Thus, in view of the aforesaid, the contention put forth by the
counsel for the petitioners that filing a separate civil suit would
create multiplicity of proceedings and would cause hardship to the
petitioners is not sustainable. And for the above reasons the
judgments relied upon by the learned counsel for the petitioners
do not render any assistance to him.
[2025:RJ-JD:13157] (11 of 11) [CW-19849/2024]
15. Therefore, in view of the above, the instant petition deserves
to be dismissed and is accordingly dismissed.
16. Pending application (s), if any, shall also stand disposed of.
(DR. NUPUR BHATI),J 9-/devesh/-
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