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Kuljeet Singh vs The State Of Rajasthan ...
2025 Latest Caselaw 9241 Raj

Citation : 2025 Latest Caselaw 9241 Raj
Judgement Date : 21 March, 2025

Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur

Kuljeet Singh vs The State Of Rajasthan ... on 21 March, 2025

[2025:RJ-JD:15403]



      HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
                       JODHPUR
                 S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 11588/2023

Kuljeet Singh S/o Late Shri Rajendra Singh, Aged About 29
Years, R/o Village 2Ffa, Via Gajsinghpur, Tehsil Srikaranpur,
District Sriganganagar (Raj.).
                                                                         ----Petitioner
                                        Versus
1.         The State Of Rajasthan, Through Secretary, Rural
           Development            And      Panchayati              Raj   Department,
           Government Of Rajasthan, Secretariat, Jaipur.
2.         The       Chief        Executive         Officer,         Zila    Parishad
           Sriganganagar.
3.         The Vikas Adhikari, Panchayat Samiti Srikaranpur,
           District Sriganganagar.
                                                                     ----Respondents


 For Petitioner(s)            :     Mr. Vivek Firoda
 For Respondent(s)            :     Mr. Kuldeep Vaishnav


               HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE ARUN MONGA

Order (Oral)

21/03/2025

1. While serving as Gram Sewak-Village Development Officer

('VDO'), petitioner's father died in harness on 08.05.2022. Being

dependent son of the deceased Gram Sewak, he seeks benefit of

the compassionate appointment policy. However, vide the

impugned letter dated 19.09.2022 (Annexure-9), it was informed

that since there is a pending criminal case against him in the court

of the Judicial Magistrate, Sri Karanpur, arising out of an FIR

No.92/2016 dated 29.06.2016 for offences under Sections 341,

323, and 143 of the IPC, he is ineligible for government

[2025:RJ-JD:15403] (2of 19) [CW-11588/2023]

employment and that his claim will be considered after conclusion

of the Court case. Hence the instant petition.

2. The facts leading to this writ petition are; being one of the

dependents of the deceased government employee, petitioner

submitted an application dated 15.06.2022 for appointment on

compassionate grounds, along with the required documents.

2.1. During the pendency of his aforesaid application, one

Jasvinder Singh complained vide his letter dated 31.05.2022 that

petitioner cannot be granted appointment due to the pending FIR

(criminal case arising there from) against him, as noted above.

Jasvinder Singh is the complainant in the FIR.

2.3. Resultantly, vide office letter dated 19.09.2022, assailed

herein, the Vikas Adhikari, Panchayat Samiti, informed the

petitioner that in terms of circular letter dated 04.12.2019 issued

by the Personnel Department, State of Rajasthan, he was found

ineligible.

3. The stand taken by the respondents, inter alia, is that, in the

application seeking compassionate appointment, the petitioner

himself did not disclose the fact of the criminal case registered

against him. Instead, Jaswinder Singh, the complainant who

lodged the FIR, raised the objection by informing the department

about the pendency of the criminal case against him.

3.1. It is stated that charges were framed against the petitioner

under Sections 341/34, 323/34, 324/34, and 325/34 of the IPC on

18.04.2019. Trial is currently pending before the Additional Chief

Judicial Magistrate, Sri Karanpur. Thus, in accordance with the

Circular dated 04.12.2019 issued by the Department of Personnel,

[2025:RJ-JD:15403] (3of 19) [CW-11588/2023]

appointment to the petitioner has been rightly declined. Writ

petition be, therefore, dismissed.

4. In the aforesaid backdrop, I have heard learned counsel for

the petitioner as well as learned counsel for the respondents and

have gone through the case file.

5. At the outset, learned counsel for the petitioner submits that

in the prescribed proforma, to be filled up as the job application,

submitted by the petitioner, there was no column in the proforma

which required the petitioner to disclose the information about his

involvement in any criminal case. Thus, there is/was no

concealment on the part of the petitioner. In any case, mere

pendency of a criminal case does not per-se render the petitioner

ineligible for appointment. More so, when it does not affect the

nature and dignity of the post for which he sought appointment.

6. Learned counsel for the respondents argues on the lines of

the stand in their written reply in support of their action. He seeks

dismissal of the petition.

7 Having heard both sides and perused the record, I am of the

opinion that the petition merits being allowed. Let us see how, by

recording reasons thereof, after analysis and discussion of the

applicable law and interpretation of circular dated 04.12.2019,

ibid.

8. First and foremost, I am unable to accept the respondents'

contention that, owing to misrepresentation or concealment, the

petitioner is not entitled to any relief, because at the time of

submitting the application for compassionate appointment he did

not disclose the fact of the criminal case registered against him.

[2025:RJ-JD:15403] (4of 19) [CW-11588/2023]

9. Indisputably, the application for compassionate appointment

was required to be submitted in the proforma prescribed by the

respondents. The proforma for application had no column or

question to elicit information about the candidate's involvement in

any criminal case. The petitioner simply filled up the information

as per the prescribed columns and submitted his application

Annexure-A-5. As there was no column or question in the

application proforma to evoke information about the candidate's

involvement in any criminal case, the petitioner cannot be blamed

for concealment or non-disclosure, let alone, intentional non-

disclosure of the fact of involvement in the criminal case.

10. Even, qua the alleged misrepresentation, as canvassed by

learned counsel for the respondents, the petitioner cannot be held

guilty for the same very reason i.e. when the prescribed

application proforma itself did not mandate disclosure of pending

criminal proceedings. In the absence of any such requirement, the

petitioner duly complied with all other formalities. No inference of

misrepresentation can, therefore, be drawn. Further, the

pendency of criminal case does appear to be involving allegations

that either impinge upon integrity, moral turpitude, or suitability

for public service. Such a pendency, ought not, by itself, disentitle

a candidate from being considered for appointment, if otherwise

fit, suited and eligible. Moreover, compassionate appointment is a

welfare measure intended to alleviate the penury/financial

hardship faced by the dependents due to sudden death of their

sole bread winner deceased employee, by providing immediate

[2025:RJ-JD:15403] (5of 19) [CW-11588/2023]

succor to the family, and its denial on hyper-technical grounds

would defeat its very object.

11. Moving further, in Bheemsen Vs. State of Rajasthan &

Ors.1 (decided recently vide judgment dated 17.03.2025 by this

very Bench), while submitting an on-line application for the post of

Constable Driver, the petitioner in response to the column

"whether any FIR has ever been lodged against you?" had

answered "No". However, during verification, it was discovered

that an FIR under sections 323/324/147/148/149 IPC had been

lodged against him. The respondents' stance was that owing to

concealment of material act, the petitioner was not entitled to any

relief. This contention was rejected by relying upon the Apex Court

judgment in Ravindra Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh &

Ors.2, decided on 22ndFebruary 2024. Relevant thereof

(Bheemsen's judgment) is extracted hereinbelow:-

"5. No doubt at the time of filling up the online application for the post in question the petitioner did not disclose the factum of registration of an FIR against him. Reasons are not far to seek. He must have been in a dilemma that in case he discloses the same, there was high prospect of being disqualified at that very stage. He will not be allowed to participate in the selection process. Moreover, his dilemma seems to have arisen from his bona fide belief that he was falsely implicated in the FIR, as no role of any kind was attributed to him. He was not even a principal accused, though, of course, was arrayed as accused being part of assembly of people who were present at the scene of occurrence, which led to registration of FIR

6. In somewhat similar circumstances, in the case of Ravindra Kumar v. State of Uttar Pradesh & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 5902/2012), decided on 22ndFebruary 2024, Supreme Court addressed an issue akin to what is herein, where a candidate who had explicitly stated in an affidavit that no criminal proceedings were pending against him. While dealing with this situation, the Supreme Court observed as under:-

2 Civil Appeal No.5902/2012, decided on 22.02.2024

[2025:RJ-JD:15403] (6of 19) [CW-11588/2023]

"29. xxx xxx xxx While examining whether the procedure adopted for enquiry by the authority was fair and reasonable, we find that the order of cancellation of

12.04.2005 does not even follow the mandate prescribed in Clause 4 of the Form of verification of character set out in the earlier part of this judgment. Like it was found in Ram Kumar (supra) instead of considering whether the appellant was suitable for appointment, the Appointing Authority has mechanically held his selection was irregular and illegal because the appellant had furnished an affidavit with incorrect facts. Hence, even applying the board principles set out in para 93.7 of Satish Chandra Yadav (supra), we find that the order of cancellation dated 12.04.2005 is neither fair nor reasonable. Clause 9 of the recruitment notification has to be read in the context of the law laid down in the cases set out hereinabove.

30. On the facts of the case and in the backdrop of the special circumstances set out hereinabove, where does the non-disclosure of the unfortunate criminal case, (which too ended in acquittal), stand in the scheme of things? In our opinion on the peculiar facts of the case, we do not think it can be deemed fatal for the appellant. Board-brushing every non-disclosure as a disqualification, will be unjust and the same will tantamount to being completely oblivious to the ground realities obtaining in this great, vast and diverse country. Each case will depend on the facts and circumstances that prevail thereon, and the court will have to take a holistic view, based on objective criteria, with the available precedents serving as a guide. It can never be a one size fits all scenario.

7. Per contra the above, learned counsel for the respondents relies on an another judgment of Supreme Court rendered in Rajasthan Rajya Vidyug Prasaran Nigam Ltd. Vs. Anil Kanwariya, reported in (2021) 10 SCC 136, wherein it was held as under :-

"12. The issue/question may be considered from another angle, from the employer's point of view. The question is not about whether an employee was involved in a dispute of trivial nature and whether he has been subsequently acquitted or not. The question is about the credibility and/or trustworthiness of such an employee who at the initial stage of the employment, i.e., while submitting the declaration/verification and/or applying for a post made false declaration and/or not disclosing and/or suppressing material fact of having involved in a criminal case. If the correct facts would have been disclosed, the employer might not have appointed him. Then the question is of TRUST. Therefore, in such a situation, where the employer feels that an employee who at the initial stage itself has made a false statement and/or not disclosed the material facts and/or suppressed the material facts and therefore he cannot be continued in service because such an employee cannot be relied upon even in

[2025:RJ-JD:15403] (7of 19) [CW-11588/2023]

future, the employer cannot be forced to continue such an employee. The choice/option whether to continue or not to continue such an employee always must be given to the employer. At the cost of repetition, it is observed and as observed hereinabove in catena of decision such an employee cannot claim the appointment and/or continue to be in service as a matter of right."

8. While the observations contained hereinabove, no doubt gives the discretion to an employer to disqualify candidate in case of non-disclosure / suppression of the material facts but the pressing question would be that whether it is a case of the employer having a trust deficit arising out of the non-disclosure by a candidate?

9. In the present case, rejection of the petitioner's candidature does not seem to be based on trust deficit but merely a mechanical exercise of mind by stating that since (i) he suppressed the registration of the FIR; and (ii) registration of the FIR disqualifies him, therefore, he was not eligible to be appointed.

10. The impugned order does not reflect that there was an objective view taken by independent application of mind. Decision was merely regarding petitioner's ineligibility, and it is owing to that he was held to be non-suitable."

It is pertinent to note here that in Ravindra Kumar (supra),

reliance in turn is placed on a larger bench judgment of the Apex

Court in Avtar Singh Vs. Union of India & Ors.3.

12. The petitioner's case herein is much stronger and stands on

a higher pedestal. Irrefragably, the application for compassionate

appointment was required to be submitted in the proforma

prescribed by the respondents. In his case, the proforma for

application had no column or question to bring forth information

about the candidate's involvement in any criminal case. The

petitioner simply filled up the required information as per the

prescribed columns and submitted his application Annexure A-5.

As there was no column or question in the application proforma

seeking information qua the candidate's involvement in any

criminal case, the petitioner cannot be blamed for non-disclosure

thereof, be it intentional or unintentional, as the case may be. This 3 (2016) 8 SCC 471

[2025:RJ-JD:15403] (8of 19) [CW-11588/2023]

being the situation, I see no reason why the benefit of judgment

ibid be not given to the petitioner.

13. Adverting now the main plank of defense taken by the

respondents i.e. circular dated 04.12.2019 (it is part in Hindi part

English), relevant part thereof is as under :-

"vr% 'kklu esa lHkh Lrjksa ij ,d:irk cuk, j[kus ds fgr esa] bl fo"k; esa iwoZ esa tkjh rRlac/kh lHkh ifji=ksa@funsZ"kksa ds vf/kØe.k esa fuEukuqlkj fn'kkfunsZ"k tkjh fd;s tkrs gSa %&

pfj= lR;kiu ds laca/k esa fofHkUu lsok fu;eksa esa izko/kku bl izdkj gSa %&

Character. The character of a candidate for direct recruitment to the service must be such as to qualify him for employment in the service. He must produce a certificate of good character from the principal/Academic Officer of the University or College in which he was last educated and two such certificates written not more than six months prior to the date of application from two responsible persons not connected with the College or University and not related to him.

(1) A conviction by a court of law need not of itself involve the refusal of a certificate of good character. The circumstances of the conviction should be taken into account and if they involve no moral turpitude or association with crimes of violance or with a movement which has a its object the overthrow by violent means of the government as established by law, the mere conviction need not be regarded as a dis-qualification.

(2) Ex-prisoners, who by their disciplined life while in prison and by their subsequent good conduct have prove to be completely reformed, should not be discriminated against on grounds of their previous conviction for the purpose of employment in the service. Those, who are convicted of offences not involving moral turpitude or violance, shall be deemed to have been completely reformed on the production of a report to that effect from the Superintendent, After Care Home or if there are no such Homes in a particular district, from the superintendent of police of that district.

(3) Those convicted of offences involving moral turpitude or violence shall be required to produce a certificate from the superintendent, After Care Home, or if there is no such home in particular district, from the superintendent of police of that district, endorsed by the Inspector General of prisons to the effect that they are suitable for employment as they have proved to be completely reformed by their disciplined life while in prison and by their subsequent good conduct in an After Care Home.

[2025:RJ-JD:15403] (9of 19) [CW-11588/2023]

bl laca/k esa izdj.k eku- loksZPp U;k;ky; esa igqapus ij ekuuh; U;k;ky; }kjk fnYyh iz"kklu cuke lq"khy dqekj ¼1996 ¼11½ CC 605½ esa ;g fl)kUr izfrikfnr fd;k gqvk gS fd Þlsok esa fu;qfDr iznku djrs le; vH;FkhZ dk pfj= ,oa iwoZ vkpj.k egRoiw.kZ gSA vijkf/kd izdj.k esa nks"kflf) vFkok nks"keqfDr vFkkZr okLrfod ifj.kke bruk lqlaxr ugha gS ftruk dh vH;FkhZ dk vkpj.k o pfj=Aß

lsok fu;eksa dh vis{kk ;g gS fd ^fdlh vH;FkhZ dks fu;qfDr fn, tkus ;k u fn, tkus ds laca/k esa fu;qfDr izkf/kdkjh dks izR;sd izdj.k ds rF;ksa] ifjfLFkfr;ksa ,oa ftl in ij fu;qfDr nh tkuh gS ml in ds dk;Z dh izd`fr ,oa xfjek ds vuqlkj xq.kkoxq.k ij fu.kZ; ysuk pkfg,A iwoZ vkpj.k ds vk/kkj ij fdlh Hkh vH;FkhZ dks fu;qfDr ds ;ksX; ;k v;ksX; ikus dk fu.kZ; djrs le; fu;qfDr izkf/kdkjh dks izR;sd izdj.k esa vijk/k dh ifjfLFkfr;ksa dks Hkh /;ku esa j[k dj vH;FkhZ ds vkpj.k dk vkadyu djuk pkfg,A*

mDrkuqlkj ;g fufoZokn gS fd fdlh vH;FkhZ dks fu;qfDr fn, tkus@ugha fn, tkus dk fu.kZ; vafre :i ls fu;qfDr izkf/kdkjh dks gh] lqlaxr lsok fu;eksa dks /;ku esa j[krs gq,] xq.kkoxq.k ds vk/kkj ij ysuk gksxkA rFkkfi dqN izdj.k ,slh izd`fr ds gksaxs ftuesa Li"Vr% ;g ekuk tk ldrk gS fd vH;FkhZ fu;qfDr gsrq ik= ugha gS tcfd vU; dqN ,sls izdj.k Hkh gksaxs ftuesa fu;qfDr ls oafpr fd;k tkuk fdlh Hkh n`f"V ls mfpr@U;k;iw.kZ ugha ekuk tk ldrkA vr% fu;qfDr vf/kdkfj;ksa ds lkekU; ekxZn"kZukFkZ fun"kZu ds :i esa ,slh izd`fr ds izdj.kksa dks ;gka ys[kc) fd;k tk jgk gS %&

1- ,sls izdj.k@fLFkfr;ka ftuesa fu;qfDr gsrq vik=rk ekuh tkuh pkfg,%&

;fn fdlh Hkh vH;FkhZ ds fo:) fuEu esa ls fdlh Hkh izdkj ds vijk/k ds rgr izdj.k vUos{k.kk/khu@U;k;ky; esa fopkjk/khu ¼under trial½ gS vFkok nks"kflf) mijkar ltk gks pqdh gS] rks mls jkT; ds v/khu lsokvksa@inksa ij fu;qfDr gsrq ik= ugha ekuk tkuk pkfg, %&

¼i½ uSfrd v/kerk ;Fkk Ny] dwVjpuk] eRrrk] cykRlax] fdlh efgyk dh yTtk Hkax djus ds vijk/k esa vUroZfyrrk ¼ involvement½ gksA

¼ii½ Lokid vkS"kf/k vkSj eu% izHkkoh inkFkZ voS/k O;kikj fuokj.k vf/kfu;e] 1988 ¼1988 dk vf/kfu;e la- 26½ esa ;FkkifjHkkf"kr voS/k O;kikj esa vUroZfyrrk gksA

¼iii½ vuSfrd O;kikj ¼fuokj.k½ vf/kfu;e] 1956 ¼1956 dk dsUnzh; vf/kfu;e la- 104½ esa ;FkkifjHkkf"kr vuSfrd nqO;kZikj esa vUroZfyrrk gksA

¼iv½ fu;ksftr fgalk ;k jkT; ds fo#) ,sls fdlh vijk/k esa vUroZfyrrk gks] tks Hkkjrh; n.M lafgrk] 1860 ¼1860 dk dsUnzh; vf/kfu;e la- 45½ ds v/;k; 6 esa of.kZr gSA

[2025:RJ-JD:15403] (10of 19) [CW-11588/2023]

¼v½ Hkkjrh; n.M lafgrk ds v/;k; 16 ,oa 17 esa ;Fkkof.kZr vijk/kksa esa vUroZfyrrk gksA

¼vi½ Hkkjrh; n.M lafgrk dh /kkjk 147] 148 ¼cyok djuk½ ds vijk/k esa vUroZfyrrk gksA

¼vii½ Hkkjrh; n.M lafgrk dh /kkjk 498 A ¼fL=;ksa ds izfr vkijkf/kd nqO;Zogkj&ngst½ ds vijk/k esa vUroZfyrrk gksA

¼viii½ vtk@vttk vf/kfu;e 1989 ds rgr vijk/k esa vUroZfyrrk gksA

¼ix½ ySafxx vijk/kksa ls ckydksa dk laj{k.k vf/kfu;e ¼iksDlks½] 2012 ds rgr vijk/k esa vUroZfyrrk gksA

;gka ;g Hkh Li"V fd;k tkrk gS fd mDr izdkj ds vijk/kksa ls lacaf/kr dksbZ Hkh lwpuk tkucw>dj fNikus okys vH;fFkZ;ksa dks Hkh fu;qfDr gsrq vik= ekuk tk,xkA

2- ,sls izdj.k@fLFkfr;ka ftuesa vH;FkhZ dks fu;qfDr gsrq ik= ekuk tkuk pkfg,%& ¼i½ ftu vH;fFkZ;ksa dks vkijkf/kd izdj.k esa vUos'k.k esa nks'kh ugha ik;k x;k gks rFkk lacaf/kr HkrhZ esa ijh{kk ifj.kke tkjh gksus ds ,d o'kZ ds Hkhrj vUos'k.kksijkar ,Q-vkj- U;k;ky; esa izLrqr dh tk pqdh gksA ¼ii½nks'keqfDr ds ekeyksa esa] foHkkx esa bl laca/k esa xfBr lfefr ftlesa ,d iqfyl vf/kdkjh Hkh lnL; gksxk] vH;FkhZ ds iwoZo`r (antecedents), vkjksikas dh xgurk ,oa nks'keqfDr dk vk/kkj] vFkkZr D;k nks'keqfDr lEekutud :i ls iznku dh xbZ gS vFkok lansg ds ykHk@le>kSrs ds vk/kkj ij iznku dh xbZ gS] vkfn dk leqfpr ijh{k.k dj] vH;FkhZ dks fu;qfDr nsus ds laca/k esa fu.kZ; ysxhA ¼iii½ vH;fFkZ;ksa ds ,sls izdj.k ftuesa U;k;ky; }kjk ifjoh{kk vf/kfu;e dh /kkjk 12 dk ykHk fn;k tkdj ifjoh{kk ij NksMk x;k gksA ¼nks'kflf) fdlh fujgZrk ls xzLr ugha@jktdh; lsok@Hkkoh thou ij fdlh izdkj dk foijhr izHkko ugha½A ¼iv½ vH;fFkZ;ksa ds ,sls izdj.k ftuesa nks'kh djkj fn;k tkdj fd"kksj U;k; ¼ckydksa dh ns[kjs[k vkSj laj{k.k½ vf/kfu;e] 2005 dh /kkjk 24¼ i½ dk ykHk iznku fd;k x;k gksA leLr fu;ksDrk vf/kdkjhx.k ls vis{kk dh tkrh gS fd os vH;fFkZ;ksa ds pfj=@iqfyl lR;kiu ds laca/k esa fu;qfDr ds le; lacaf/kr lsok fu;eksa ds izko/kkuksa ,oa bu fn'kk&funsZ"kksa ds izko/kkuksa dks n`f"Vxr j[krs gq, leqfpr fu.kZ; ysaxsA rFkk mDr izd`fr ds izdj.kksa dks u rks vuko";d :i&ls yfEcr j[ksaxs vkSj u gh dkfeZd foHkkx dks lanfHkZr djsaxsA"

14. It would be seen from the text of circular dated 04.12.2019

that the same is in the nature of general guidelines to be observed

[2025:RJ-JD:15403] (11of 19) [CW-11588/2023]

by the concerned authorities and that the ultimate decision to

adjudge the suitability or unsuitability of a candidate has to be

taken by the appointing authority by taking into consideration the

facts and circumstances of each case. Further, it has been laid

down in the circular ibid that while appointing a candidate, his

character; and previous conduct are important. The result of

criminal case - whether conviction or acquittal - are not as much

relevant as are his conduct and character. These guidelines also

show that as per the Service Rules, there is no absolute or

automatic disqualification for employment of a candidate even

after his conviction and sentencing for criminal offences (obviously

any offence, including those falling in Chapter XVI and XVII of the

Indian Penal Code now Bharatiya Nyaya Sanhita or an offence

involving moral turpitude) and that on satisfying certain

conditions, such candidate can also be considered for

appointment.

14.1. Circular's emphasis on individual assessment conveys, and

rightly so, that it is not meant to serve as an inflexible rulebook

but, rather general guidelines envisaged therein are to be borne in

mind. The context Matters. Thus, the ultimate decision about a

candidate's suitability must be made on a case-by-case basis. This

allows the appointing authority to look at the totality of a

candidate's character and past conduct, rather than relying solely

on the outcome of a criminal proceeding.

14.2. It becomes far more relevant in cases where a candidate

might have a minor or isolated offence, and may even be a case

of strong reformation and good conduct over time, but yet he is

rejected by sheer routine mechanics. The guidelines contained in

[2025:RJ-JD:15403] (12of 19) [CW-11588/2023]

the circular are not to be treated so rigidly as to not even allow for

the possibility that a candidate's past, even if marred by being a

suspect or under trial, may be outweighed by subsequent

reformation and exemplary behavior. In the present case there is

no other recorded criminal history other than the FIR in question,

which too, seems to have arisen due to some personal dispute.

More of it later.

15. Reference may at this stage be also had to 3-Judge

judgment of Apex Court rendered in Avtar Singh Vs. Union of

India & Ors. (2016) 8 SCC 471 decided on 21.07.2016 wherein

it was held, inter alia, that though it is open to the employer to

adjudge antecedents of the candidate, but ultimate action should

be based on objective criteria on due consideration of all relevant

aspects.

16. Being apposite, relevant part of Avatar Singh judgment is

extracted below for ready reference :-

"30. The employer is given "discretion" to terminate or otherwise to condone the omission. Even otherwise, once employer has the power to take a decision when at the time of filling verification form declarant has already been convicted/acquitted, in such a case, it becomes obvious that all the facts and attending circumstances, including impact of suppression or false information are taken into consideration while adjudging suitability of an incumbent for services in question. In case the employer comes to the conclusion that suppression is immaterial and even if facts would have been disclosed it would not have adversely affected fitness of an incumbent, for reasons to be recorded, it has power to condone the lapse. However, while doing so employer has to act prudently on due consideration of nature of post and duties to be rendered. For higher officials/higher posts, standard has to be very high and even slightest false information or suppression may by itself render a person unsuitable for the post. However, same standard cannot be applied to each and every post. In concluded criminal cases, it has to be seen what has been suppressed is material fact and would have rendered an incumbent unfit for appointment. An employer would be justified in not appointing or if appointed, to terminate services of such incumbent on due consideration of various aspects. Even if disclosure has been made truthfully, the employer has the right to consider fitness and while doing so effect of conviction and

[2025:RJ-JD:15403] (13of 19) [CW-11588/2023]

background facts of case, nature of offence, etc. have to be considered. Even if acquittal has been made, employer may consider nature of offence, whether acquittal is honourable or giving benefit of doubt on technical reasons and decline to appoint a person who is unfit or of dubious character. In case employer comes to conclusion that conviction or ground of acquittal in criminal case would not affect the fitness for employment, incumbent may be appointed or continued in service.

xxx xxx xx

34. No doubt about it that verification of character and antecedents is one of the important criteria to assess suitability and it is open to employer to adjudge antecedents of the incumbent, but ultimate action should be based upon objective criteria on due consideration of all relevant aspects.

35. Suppression of "material" information presupposes that what is suppressed that "matters" not every technical or trivial matter. The employer has to act on due consideration of rules/instructions, if any, in exercise of powers in order to cancel candidature or for terminating the services of employee. Though a person who has suppressed the material information cannot claim unfettered right for appointment or continuity in service but he has a right not to be dealt with arbitrarily and exercise of power has to be in reasonable manner with objectivity having due regard to facts of cases.

36. What yardstick is to be applied has to depend upon the nature of post, higher post would involve more rigorous criteria for all services, not only to uniformed service. For lower posts which are not sensitive, nature of duties, impact of suppression on suitability has to be considered by authorities concerned considering post/nature of duties/services and power has to be exercised on due consideration of various aspects.

37. The "McCarthyism" is antithesis to constitutional goal, chance of reformation has to be afforded to young offenders in suitable cases, interplay of reformative theory cannot be ruled out in toto nor can be generally applied but is one of the factors to be taken into consideration while exercising the power for cancelling candidature or discharging an employee from service.

38. We have noticed various decisions and tried to explain and reconcile them as far as possible. In view of the aforesaid discussion, we summarise our conclusion thus:

38.1. Information given to the employer by a candidate as to conviction, acquittal or arrest, or pendency of a criminal case, whether before or after entering into service must be true and there should be no suppression or false mention of required information.

38.2. While passing order of termination of services or cancellation of candidature for giving false information, the employer may take notice of special circumstances of the case, if any, while giving such information.

[2025:RJ-JD:15403] (14of 19) [CW-11588/2023]

38.3. The employer shall take into consideration the government orders/instructions/rules, applicable to the employee, at the time of taking the decision.

38.4. In case there is suppression or false information of involvement in a criminal case where conviction or acquittal had already been recorded before filling of the application/verification form and such fact later comes to knowledge of employer, any of the following recourses appropriate to the case may be adopted:

38.4.1.In a case trivial in nature in which conviction had been recorded, such as shouting slogans at young age or for a petty offence which if disclosed would not have rendered an incumbent unfit for post in question, the employer may, in its discretion, ignore such suppression of fact or false information by condoning the lapse.

38.4.2.Where conviction has been recorded in case which is not trivial in nature, employer may cancel candidature or terminate services of the employee.

38.4.3.If acquittal had already been recorded in a case involving moral turpitude or offence of heinous/serious nature, on technical ground and it is not a case of clean acquittal, or benefit of reasonable doubt has been given, the employer may consider all relevant facts available as to antecedents, and may take appropriate decision as to the continuance of the employee.

38.5. In a case where the employee has made declaration truthfully of a concluded criminal case, the employer still has the right to consider antecedents, and cannot be compelled to appoint the candidate.

38.6. In case when fact has been truthfully declared in character verification form regarding pendency of a criminal case of trivial nature, employer, in facts and circumstances of the case, in its discretion, may appoint the candidate subject to decision of such case.

38.7. In a case of deliberate suppression of fact with respect to multiple pending cases such false information by itself will assume significance and an employer may pass appropriate order cancelling candidature or terminating services as appointment of a person against whom multiple criminal cases were pending may not be proper.

38.8. If criminal case was pending but not known to the candidate at the time of filling the form, still it may have adverse impact and the appointing authority would take decision after considering the seriousness of the crime.

38.9. In case the employee is confirmed in service, holding departmental enquiry would be necessary before passing order of termination/removal or dismissal on the ground of suppression or submitting false information in verification form.

[2025:RJ-JD:15403] (15of 19) [CW-11588/2023]

38.10. For determining suppression or false information attestation/ verification form has to be specific, not vague. Only such information which was required to be specifically mentioned has to be disclosed. If information not asked for but is relevant comes to knowledge of the employer the same can be considered in an objective manner while addressing the question of fitness. However, in such cases action cannot be taken on basis of suppression or submitting false information as to a fact which was not even asked for.

38.11. Before a person is held guilty of suppressio veri or suggestio falsi, knowledge of the fact must be attributable to him."

17. In the light of aforesaid, at the cost of repetition, it may be

noted that circular dated 04.12.2019 (Annexure R-1) itself states

that the same is in the nature of general guidelines and that the

ultimate decision-whether or not to appoint a candidate - is to be

taken by the appointing authority in each case on its own merits,

taking into consideration the peculiar facts and circumstances, the

nature of work and status of the post and; that in each case, while

deciding on the suitability or unsuitability of a candidate, the

appointing authority should assess candidate's character by taking

into consideration the facts and circumstances of the offence.

18. As already observed, in present case, there is absolutely no

plea or material placed on record to show that the appointing

authority after due and objective consideration and application of

mind to the facts and circumstances of the case had taken any

conscious decision on it's merits for refusal to appoint the

petitioner. Vide impugned letter dated 19.09.2022, the Vikas

Adhikari, Panchayat Samiti, Sri Karanpur, District Sri Ganganagar,

simply informed the petitioner that in terms of circular letter dated

04.12.2019 issued by the Personnel Department, he was found

ineligible for appointment to the post of Village Development

Officer ('VDO') on compassionate grounds due to a pending

[2025:RJ-JD:15403] (16of 19) [CW-11588/2023]

criminal case against him and; that his claim will be considered

after conclusion of the court case. This action of respondent No. 3,

in my opinion, cannot be said to be more than just a mechanical

approach by the respondents, totally bereft of application of mind

to the facts and circumstances of the case by the concerned

appointing authority.

19. Reverting to the alleged offences attributed to the petitioner

originating from dispute with complainant Jasvinder Singh, some

facts may now be noted about the criminal case i.e. the FIR

No.92/2016 (Annexure-A-7) under Sections 341/323//143/382

IPC which was lodged at Police Station, Gajsinghpur by one

Jasvinder Singh aged 20 years against the petitioner, 22 years old

then. It's relevant part reads thus:-

"Fkkuk tlfoUnzflag fnukad 29-6-16 LFkku lh,plh th,pihvkj le; 8,,e Jh tlfoUnzflag iq= lq[kfoUnzflag mez 20 o"kZ tkfr xfB;k fuoklh 2 ,Q,Q, jgus okyk gwa vkt lqcg 5-30 ,,e ij esjs ?kj dqythrflag iq= jktsUnzflag tkfr tVfl[k fuoklh 2,Q,Q, ftlus eq>s vkokt yxkdj cqykdj dgk fd jsl yxkus pyrs gSa nksuksa ds lkFk ?kj ls lkFk ?kj ls py dj 2 ,Q,Q, ls 3 ,Q,Q, rjQ dh jksM ij nkSM+ yxkus vk x;s tc ge vkRekflag ds ckx ds ikl igqaps rks ckx esa ls pkj yksx vkSj vk;s ftuesa ls ,d yM+dk dqythrflag eklh dk yM+dk Fkk vkSj vU; rhu dks eSa ugha tkurk ftUgksaus ikapksa us ,d jk; gksdj esjs lkFk dqN fcuk crk;s ykBh o ljh;k ls vpkud esjs lkFk ekjihV dh ftlls eq>s dqythrflag us esjs flj ij lkeus pksV ekjh og mldh eklh ds yM+ds us ykBh ls da/ks ij ihNs ihV ij pksV ekjh ftlls esjs flj esa nks txg [kwu vk jgk gS vU; rhuksa us esjs iSj M.Mksa ls pksV o ihB ij ihNs dkQh ekjh pksVas ekjh ftlls eq>s ihM+k o nnZ tkfgj gks jgk gS mlds ckn ikapksa ogha ij iM+k NksM+dj pys x, mlds ckn iou tksrflag vk;k ftlus eq>s mBkdj esjs ?kj rd NksM+k rFkk et:c dk ekSds ls eksckby Nhudj ys vk;s ,lMh tlfoUnz flag] ,lMh lqHkk"k pUn dsEi lh,plh xtflagiqj ih,l xtflagiqj vkt fnukad 29-6-16 ds oDr 8 ,,e ij mijksDr et:c tlfoUnz flag iq= lq[kftUnzflag tkfr jkexfB;k mez 20 lky fuoklh 2,Q,Q, Fkkuk xtflagiqj ds cksys vuqlkj ipkZ c;ku rgjhj fd;s x;s etewu ipkZ c;ku ls tqeZ /kkjk 341] 323] 143] 382 vkbZihlh dk ?kfVr gksuk ik;k x;k gS et:c dks ipkZ c;ku iqu% i<+dj lquk;s lqu le> lgh eku vius gLrk{kj djrk gS vkbZUnk Fkkuk igqap vfHk;ksx iathc) fd;k tkosxkA ,lMh tlfoUnzflag] ,lMh lqHkk"k pUnz ,plh ih,l xtflagiqj dsEi lh,plh xtflagiqj ih,l xtflagiqj vkt fnukad 29-6-16 ds

[2025:RJ-JD:15403] (17of 19) [CW-11588/2023]

oDr 10 ,,e ij Jh lqHkk"k pUnz ,plh 133 cgokys jokuxh jiV la[;k 1104rk gktk dk x;k gqvk okil vk;k ipkZ c;ku et:c tlfoUnz flag ij vfHk;ksx la[;k 92@16 /kkjk 341] 323] 143] 382 vkbZihlh ih,l xtflagiqj esa ntZ dj vuqla/kku dj Jh lqHkk"k pUnz ,plh 133 dks lqiqnZ fd;k x;kA ,QvkbZvkj izfr;ka fuEukuqlkj tkjh dh xbA"

20. It would be seen that there is nothing in the FIR to show that

when at about 05:30 AM, Kuljeet Singh i.e. the petitioner herein

came to the complainant's house and called him out to join him

for a race, the petitioner was armed with any weapon like baton,

lathi or saria. Further, though the FIR says that the petitioner

gave him blow on his head, but it is silent with what specific

weapon Kuljeet Singh gave that blow. To be noted also, that the

FIR does not speak of any previous grudge, ill will or enmity of the

petitioner against the complainant or any circumstances to show

that the petitioner shared the common intention of the other

assailants for the commission of the offences.

21. Be that as it may, considering these facts and points, I am

of the opinion that it cannot be said that the nature of the

offences ascribed to the petitioner and the attending

circumstances are such as would impinge upon the

duties/functions and dignity of the post for which he is aspiring.

22. The respondents have no doubt also informed the petitioner

through the impugned letter that his claim will be considered

after conclusion of the Court case. In my opinion, this does not

justify refusal of the relief due to the petitioner in the lis at this

stage itself. The object of the scheme for Compassionate

appointment is that following death of an employee in harness,

immediate succor be provided to his family to tide over the

sudden financial crisis. Conclusion of the criminal case, which

[2025:RJ-JD:15403] (18of 19) [CW-11588/2023]

may be even go up to the Supreme Court, would take quite long

time. It would be unjust and unfair to keep the petitioner waiting

in uncertainty till then. Besides, with passage of time,

circumstances may change and entail more hurdles against the

petitioner including age bar and ability of the distressed family to

sustain till then, thus diluting, diminishing and even defeating the

petitioner's claim for compassionate appointment. The relief may

also become meaningless for the petitioner owing to sheer delay.

23. As an upshot of the above discussion, I am of the opinion

that action of the respondents is not only in violation of the

aforesaid law laid down in Avtar Singh (supra) by a 3-Judge Bench

of the Supreme Court but also shows utter non-adherence to their

own administrative policy instructions and the failure to show

application of mind to the facts and circumstances of case by the

appointing authority. To my mind, it also infringes upon the

petitioner's fundamental rights under the Constitution to be

considered for public employment. The respondents' action

cannot, therefore, be sustained in law.

24. Resultantly, the petition is allowed; the impugned letter

dated 19.09.2022 (Annexure-9) issued by respondent No. 3 is

quashed; the respondents are directed to consider the petitioner's

claim and if he is found otherwise eligible for the post applied for,

they shall issue the order for his compassionate appointment on

the post of Village Development Officer subject to it's review in

the light of outcome of the pending trial against him and upon the

petitioner's furnishing an undertaking that in case he is convicted

in the pending criminal trial, he shall not claim any equity on the

basis of the instant order. The needful shall be done within a

[2025:RJ-JD:15403] (19of 19) [CW-11588/2023]

period of two months from the date the petitioner approaches the

appointing authority with a web print of the instant order

alongwith an undertaking as above.

25. Pending applications, if any, stand disposed of.

(ARUN MONGA),J 113-AK Chouhan/-

Whether fit for reporting : Yes / No

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