Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
Mangal Chand vs Judge,Labour Court Bikaner And Ors. ... on 12 March, 2025
Author: Dinesh Mehta
Bench: Dinesh Mehta
[2025:RJ-JD:13909]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
S.B. Civil Writ Petition No. 3381/2004
Mangal Chand S/o Shri Pancha Ram Meghwal, Aged 23 Years, R/
o Ward No.36, Ratangarh, District Churu.
----Petitioner
Versus
1. Judge,labour Court Bikaner.
2. State of Rajasthan, Through Chairman, Municipal Board,
Ratangarh, District Churu.
3. Chief Executive Officer Municipal Board, Ratangarh, District
Churu.
----Respondents
For Petitioner(s) : Mr. Acharaj Singh Saluja
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Madhav Soni for Mr. Paramveer
Singh Champawat
JUSTICE DINESH MEHTA
Order
12/03/2025
1. By way of present writ petition, the petitioner has impugned
the judgment and award dated 26.02.2003 passed by the learned
Labour Court, Bikaner (hereinafter referred to as the 'Labour
Court'), whereby reference made by the State vide notification
dated 22.03.2002 was negated.
2. The pertinent facts of the case at hands are that the
petitioner was appointed as daily wages employee by the
respondent-Board on 15.02.1998 for operating Electric Pumpset.
According to the petitioner's pleading, he had served the
respondents up to 31.05.1999 when his services were retrenched
without following the mandatory requirement of Chapter VA of the
[2025:RJ-JD:13909] (2 of 6) [CW-3381/2004]
Industrial Dispute Act, 1947 (hereinafter referred to as the 'Act of
1947').
3. Feeling aggrieved of such retrenchment, the petitioner raised
an industrial dispute and a reference came to be made by the
State Government vide notification dated 22.03.2002, requiring
the Labour Court to answer as to whether the petitioner was an
employee in the Municipal Board, Ratangarh, District Churu and if
yes, then whether his retrenchment on 31.05.1999 was valid or
not? If not then, the claimant was entitled to what relief.
4. Though the petitioner asserted that he had served the
respondent-Board from 15.02.1998 to 31.05.1999, however, he
could produce the evidence of his serving the respondent-Board
from 17.12.1998 to 25.03.1999 only.
5. The Labour Court on the basis of pleadings and evidence on
record came to a conclusion that since the petitioner could prove
the factum of serving the respondent-Board for the period
between 17.12.1998 to 25.03.1999, he cannot be said to be an
employee rendering continuous service, as the total period he
served was less than 240 days.
6. Mr. Saluja, learned counsel for the petitioner argued that the
Labour Court has erred in answering the reference made by the
State against the petitioner.
7. While contending that the muster roll and other
evidence/documents were with the respondent-Board, learned
counsel for the petitioner argued that the petitioner's oral
assertion that he had served the respondent-Board from
15.02.1998 to 31.05.1999 ought to have been accepted by the
[2025:RJ-JD:13909] (3 of 6) [CW-3381/2004]
Labour Court, as the burden to produce relevant evidence lay
upon the respondent-Board, as entire record was in its possession.
8. Regardless of the aforesaid argument, Mr. Saluja, learned
counsel for the petitioner argued that there is no requirement of
completing 240 days' of service for the purpose of invoking
provision of sections 25F and 25G of the Act of 1947.
9. In support of his argument aforesaid, learned counsel relied
upon the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court rendered in the
case of Samishta Dube vs. City Board, Etawah & Anr., reported in
(1999) 3 SCC 14. Inviting Court's attention towards Para No.7 of
the judgment ibid, learned counsel argued that Hon'ble the
Supreme Court has categorically held that a workman is not
required to work for 240 days; and if a workman has been
retrenched without following due procedure provided under
section 25F of the Act of 1947, his retrenchment is liable to be
held illegal.
10. Mr. Madhav Soni, associate to Mr. Paramveer Singh
Champawat, learned counsel for the respondents argued that the
petitioner had led evidence documentary and oral and according
to such evidence, he had worked from 17.12.1998 to 25.03.1999
and total number of days he worked, if added comes to 99 days,
which are admittedly lesser than the requisite period of 240 days.
11. Learned counsel argued that the petitioner's reliance upon
the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of
Samishta Dube (supra) is misplaced inasmuch as the provisions
involved in the said case were that of UP Industrial Disputes Act,
1947 in which, provision may be analogous but not exactly the
same.
[2025:RJ-JD:13909] (4 of 6) [CW-3381/2004]
12. Learned counsel further invited Court's attention towards the
additional affidavit which the petitioner had filed and submitted
that even according to the documents filed with the additional
affidavit dated 11.02.2025, the total period during which the
petitioner had worked was 17.12.1998 to 25.03.1999. He
therefore, submitted that the judgment and award dated
26.02.2003 passed by the Labour Court is perfectly just and valid
and no interference is warranted.
13. Heard learned counsel for the parties.
14. The principle that onus lies upon the employer to produce
the relevant record is not an abstract principle. It has to be seen
in the backdrop of the facts involved in each case. In the instant
case though the petitioner had orally asserted to have worked
from 15.02.1998 to 31.05.1999 but his oral evidence was belied
by the documentary evidence according to which the petitioner
had worked from 17.12.1998 to 25.03.1999.
15. The petitioner has failed to make any assertion or move an
application before the Labour Court to call for any particular
document by which he could prove his claim of having worked up
to 31.05.1999.
16. The petitioner's plea that he could produce copies of the
muster roll only which he had is untenable. Such assertion or plea
cannot be accepted.
17. One cannot accept the proposition that the petitioner had
worked for the period claimed. One would keep on wondering that
how he would not have the muster roll of the remaining period, if
he had copies of the muster roll evincing his attendance from
17.12.1998 to 25.03.1999.
[2025:RJ-JD:13909] (5 of 6) [CW-3381/2004]
18. In absence of any specific pleading, neither any direction
could be issued to the respondent to produce the muster roll nor
could any inference be drawn in favour of the petitioner.
19. Resultantly, the finding arrived by the Labour Court that the
petitioner had worked for 240 days is ex-facie erroneous, because
his total period of service (from 17.12.1998 to 25.03.1999), if
counted, comes to be 99 days.
20. So far as reliance upon the judgment of Samishta Dube
(supra) is concerned, according to this Court, the facts and
statutory provisions are clearly distinguishable inasmuch as the
provisions involved therein were the provisions of UP Industrial
Disputes Act, 1947 and not of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
21. Learned Labour Court has observed that provisions contained
in section 6N of the UP Industrial Disputes Act, 1947 is
corresponding to section 25F of the Act of 1947.
22. Hon'ble the Supreme Court has held that section 6P does not
require any particular period of continuation of service as required
by section 6N of the UP Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. Since, the
case of the petitioner therein related to section 6N of the Act of
1947, whereas applicable provision in the present case is section
25 of the Act of 1947, which is pari materia to section 6N of the
UP Industrial Disputes Act, 1947.
23. This Court is of the considered view that the judgment of
Samishta Dubey (supra) is not applicable in the present case. That
apart, provision contained under section 25F clearly prescribes
that the requirement mentioned in the proviso is applicable if the
workman has been in continuous service for not less than one
year.
[2025:RJ-JD:13909] (6 of 6) [CW-3381/2004]
24. The expression continuous service of one year has been
defined in section 25B of the Act of 1947 and accordingly person
shall be deemed to have continuously worked for one year, if he
has completed 240 days of his service in one calender year.
25. In view of the what has been discussed hereinabove and in
light of the judgment of Hon'ble the Supreme Court in the case of
Surendra Nagar District Panchayat vs. Dahyabhai Amarsingh,
reported in 2005 (8) SCC 750, this Court does not find any merit
or substance in the present writ petition. The petition is thus,
dismissed.
(DINESH MEHTA),J
6-raksha/-
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