Rajasthan High Court - Jodhpur
State vs Madan Lal And Ors on 11 June, 2025
Author: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
Bench: Pushpendra Singh Bhati
[2025:RJ-JD:20354-DB]
HIGH COURT OF JUDICATURE FOR RAJASTHAN AT
JODHPUR
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 635/2009
State of Rajasthan
----Appellant
Versus
1. Madan Lal s/o Kishan Lal.
2. Prakash Chand s/o Udai Lal.
3. Udai Lal s/o Magni Ram
4. Kishan Lal s/o Magni Ram
All residents of Dungla, District Chittorgarh (Raj.).
----Respondent
Connected With
D.B. Criminal Appeal No. 359/2009
1. Madan Lal s/o Kishan Lal, aged 27 years.
2. Prakash Chandra s/o Udai Lal aged 24 years,
3. Udai Lal s/o Magni Ram aged 70 years,
4. Kishan Lal s/o Magni Ram, aged 68 years.
All residents of Karsana, P.S. Dungla, District Chittorgarh (Raj.).
----Appellant
Versus
The State of Rajasthan.
----Respondent
For Appellant(s) : Mr. C.S. Ojha, PP
For Respondent(s) : Mr. Abhimanyu Singh, Amicus Curiae
HON'BLE DR. JUSTICE PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI
HON'BLE MR. JUSTICE SANDEEP SHAH
Judgment
Reserved on 24/04/2025
Pronounced on 11/06/2025
Per Dr. Pushpendra Singh Bhati, J:
1. The instant criminal appeals arise out of a common judgment
and order dated 19.05.2009 passed by the learned Additional
District & Sessions Judge, Nimbahera ('Trial Court') in Sessions
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Case No.12/2008 (State of Rajasthan Vs. Madan Lal & Ors.),
whereby the learned Trial Court, acquitted the accused (Madan lal,
Prakash Chandra, Udai lal and Kishan lal) of the charges against
them under Sections 302/34 & 447 IPC, but convicted and
sentenced them as hereunder:
Offence Sentence In Default of
payment of fine
further undergo
325/34 of I.P.C. Two years' R.I. with One month's
fine of Rs.1,000/- additional S.I.
(each of the
accused)
323/34 of I.P.C. Six months' R.I. -
1.1. For the purpose of clarity, in the present adjudication, the
parties herein shall be referred to as 'State' and 'accused'
respectively.
1.2. The State has preferred the above-numbered Criminal
Appeal No. 635/2009, against the impugned judgment to the
extent of acquittal of the accused, whereas the accused persons
have challenged the said judgment, to the extent of their
conviction, by preferring the instant Criminal Appeal No.
359/2009.
2. The matter pertains to an incident which had occurred in the
year 2007 and the present appeals have been pending since the
year 2009.
3. Brief facts of this case, as placed before this Court by the
learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State, are
that on 14.12.2007 at around 12:00 p.m., one Satyanarayan
(complainant), while he was under treatment at CHC, Dungla,
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submitted a written report (Ex.P.10) before the S.H.O., Police
Station, Dungla, stating therein that on the said date at around
8:00 a.m. when the complainant went to his well, the accused,
came there, armed with an axe & lathi. It was stated in the
written report that the accused Prakash and Madan attacked the
complainant with axe, and the accused Udai Lal and Kishan Lal
forcibly took off the clothes of the complainant and subjected him
to grave beatings, as a result whereof, the complainant sustained
injuries on the head (by axe), fracture in hand as well as injuries
on both the legs. As per the complainant, the said act of the
accused persons was intervened by Sohan Lal, Durga Shanker and
Udi Bai, who at the relevant time were present at the place of the
incident.
3.1. On the basis of the aforementioned information, a case was
registered under Sections 447 & 323/34 IPC and the investigation
began accordingly. While the investigation was going on,
Satyanarayan (complainant) died under the treatment. Thus, upon
completion of the investigation, the charge-sheet was filed against
the accused persons under Sections 447, 323/34 & 302 IPC before
the concerned Court.
3.2. Owing to the nature of the crime, the matter was committed
to the Court of Session for the trial.
3.3. During the course of trial, the statements of 27 witnesses
(P.W. 1 to P.W. 27) were recorded, and documents (Ex.P.1 to 43)
got exhibited on behalf of the prosecution; whereafter, the
accused were examined under Section 313 Cr.P.C., in which they
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pleaded innocence and false implication in the criminal case in
question due to previous animosity.
3.4. After conclusion of the trial, the learned Trial Court passed
the impugned judgment dated 19.05.2009, as above, whereby
though the accused were acquitted under Sections 302/34 & 447
IPC, but convicted under Sections 325/34 & 323/34 IPC. Hence,
the State is in appeal against the acquittal part of the impugned
judgment, whereas the accused are in appeal against the
conviction part of the impugned judgment.
4. Learned Public Prosecutor appearing on behalf of the State
submitted that the evidence on record and the statements of the
prosecution witness as well as documents clearly point out
towards the guilt of the accused. Harlal (P.W. 6), eyewitness, has
clearly stated that on the day of incident while he was working on
his field, he heard a few voices, thus, he stopped and witnessed
that the accused, Prakash, Madan lal, Udailal and Kishan lal were
attacking the deceased. It was further submitted that Sohan lal
(P.W. 18), eyewitness, has also stated that when he reached the
place of incident he saw that all the accused were beating the
deceased.
4.1. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that Udobai (P.W.
8) the wife of the deceased also saw the deceased being attacked
by the accused, and Durgashankar (P.W. 9), the nephew of the
deceased heard voices, and thus he ran towards the place of
incident and saw that the deceased was being attacked by all the
accused herein.
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4.2. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted Mahendra Singh
(P.W. 17), was the auto driver who took the deceased from the
well to the hospital, has stated in his testimony that there was no
part of body left where the deceased was not injured.
4.3. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted one Kailash
Chandra (P.W. 7), has stated that he saw the deceased lying on a
bed in Dugla hospital, and at that time his dressing was going on.
It was submitted that from the Dungla hospital the deceased was
referred to the General Hospital, Chittorgarh were Dr. Chotu Lal
Meena (P.W. 15) was posted as radiologist who conducted the X-
ray examination of the deceased. P.W.15 has stated that there
were multiple fractures on the body of the deceased along with
fracture right side of jaw, right leg, left forearm. Ex.P 16, the X-
ray report also reveals the multiple fractures on the body of the
deceased.
4.4. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that it is evident
from the statement of Dr. Jai Kumar (P.W. 16), who prepared the
Injury report (Ex.P. 24), that there were multiple injuries present
on the body of deceased. It was concluded by the said Doctor that
when he received X-ray report on 18.12.2007 he found that the
injury no. 5 to 8, were grievous in nature. It was also concluded
by the said doctor that as per the X-ray report there was a
fracture on the head and jaw of the deceased which along with the
other multiple injuries were dangerous to the life of the deceased.
It was also submitted that due to the critical condition of the
deceased he was admitted to the Trauma Centre, MB hospital,
Udaipur on 15.12.2007, where Dr. Tarun Kumar Gupta (P.W. 27),
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neuro-surgeon, was posted. It was highlighted that the testimony
of P.W. 27 was that the deceased was in critical condition when he
was admitted to the hospital, and subsequently, he passed way on
21.12.2007 due to the injuries he suffered.
4.5. Learned Public Prosecutor also submitted that Dr. Anupam
Johri (P.W. 19) conducted the postmortem of the deceased, and
gave the description of the injuries wherein he has stated that the
deceased was hit on the head due to which he suffered coma and
died. P.W. 19 has stated that such kind of injury in ordinary course
of nature is sufficient to cause death.
5. Per Contra, Mr. Abhimanyu Singh, Amicus Curiae, learned
counsel for the accused while opposing the submissions made on
behalf of the State, submitted that the impugned judgment to the
extent of conviction of the accused is contrary to the settled
principles of law, and very crucial aspects of the factual matrix
present on the record have not been considered properly.
5.1. Learned counsel submitted that Udai Singh (P.W.26), SHO
Dugla at the relevant time, stated in his witness testimony that
deceased himself gave Titamba Bayan which were taken into
consideration while preparing the charge-sheet, however it was
not present in the record. It was submitted that the said
statements were in favor of the accused.
5.2. Learned counsel further submitted that the presence of the
tractor at the place of the incident is false and fabricated, because
had the tractor been present at the place of incident then in that
case there would have been tyre marks, which would have been
mentioned in the Naksha Mauka (Ex.P. 1). Furthermore, it was
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submitted that the tractor in question was recovered only on
29.12.2007, i.e., after 15 days, and the presence of blood on the
tractor despite such a long duration is not possible.
5.3. Learned counsel further submitted that the whole story of
the incident has been created due to previous animosity and
political pressure. It was further submitted that Mohanlal (P.W.
02), Babulal (P.W. 20), Rajesh Bharadwaaj (P.W.22), Mahendra
Singh (P.W.17) in their statements have stated that in response to
the incident under consideration, the witnesses sat on a strike due
to which political pressure was created and thus, the accused were
implicated in the case.
5.4. Learned counsel further submitted that registration of the
FIR in the instant case was delayed without any explanation as to
sufficient cause for the delay, thus, it shows the FIR was
registered in pursuance of a larger plan. It was submitted that
Kailash Chandra (P.W.7) in his stated that on 14.12.2007 at
around 9 a.m. he wrote the written complaint on behalf of the
deceased, however the FIR was not registered until 12 p.m., and
therefore it was submitted that the possibility of fabrication and
concoction cannot be ruled out.
5.5. Learned counsel also submitted that P.W.8, P.W.9, P.W.18 all
claim to be eyewitnesses to the alleged incident, however, none of
the witnesses tried to save the deceased from the alleged attack
by the accused. It was submitted that at the time of attack the
deceased was undressed the accused, however, no such clothes
were recovered.
[2025:RJ-JD:20354-DB] (8 of 17) [CRLA-635/2009]
5.6. Learned Counsel submitted that in light of the discrepancies
and contradictions within the testimonies of the witnesses the case
against accused is not proved beyond reasonable doubt. It was
submitted that Mohan lal (P.W.2) has only stated the name of the
accused Madanlal, Prakash and Udailal, however subsequently, the
name of Kishanlal was also added. It was further submitted that
P.W.8, P.W.9 are related witnesses and therefore, their testimonies
cannot be believed.
5.7. Learned Counsel further submitted that at the first instance
the injury report (Ex.P.24) was prepared by Dr. Jai Kumar, wherein
only 4 injuries have been mentioned, out of which injury no. 1, 3
and 4 are stated to be of simple nature, and the injury no. 2, for
which an X-ray report was requested, was injury related to right
forearm. It was contended that subsequently the number of
injuries increased to 8 by the medical jurist, Chittorgarh, and
finally postmortem report reflected 24 injuries. In such
circumstances Ex.P. 24 cannot be relied upon as done by the
learned Trail Court in order to pass the impugned judgment to the
extent of their conviction.
6. Heard learned counsel for the parties as well as perused the
record of the case.
7. This Court observes that the instant case pertains to incident
dated 14.12.2007, wherein one Satyanarayan was severely beaten
up, and consequently a written report was submitted, alleging that
the accused attacked and injured him gravely. Upon the said
report, an FIR was registered against the accused and, that during
the treatment Satyanarayan passed away. Accordingly, the trial
[2025:RJ-JD:20354-DB] (9 of 17) [CRLA-635/2009]
commenced and impugned order was passed, whereby the
accused were acquitted under Sections 302/34 & 447 IPC, but
convicted under Sections 325/34 & 323/34 IPC. Hence, the
present appeals.
8. This Court observes that there are two principal points for
determination in the present appeals:-
1. Whether the acquittal of the accused under Sections
302/34 and 447 IPC by the learned Trial Court is legally
sustainable, or requires interference in appeal?
2. Whether the conviction under Sections 323/34 and
325/34 IPC deserves to be set aside?
9. This Court shall now proceed to decide the first point of
determination, and this Court deems it appropriate to reproduce
the relevant portions of the judgments rendered by the Hon'ble
Apex Court in the cases of Mallappa & Ors. Vs. State of
Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 1162/2011, decided on
12.02.2024) and Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors.
Vs. State of Karnataka (Criminal Appeal No. 985/2010,
decided on 19.04.2024), as hereunder-:
Mallappa & Ors. (Supra):
"36. Our criminal jurisprudence is essentially based on the
promise that no innocent shall be condemned as guilty. All the
safeguards and the jurisprudential values of criminal law, are
intended to prevent any failure of justice. The principles which
come into play while deciding an appeal from acquittal could be
summarized as:
[2025:RJ-JD:20354-DB] (10 of 17) [CRLA-635/2009]
(i) Appreciation of evidence is the core element of a criminal
trial and such appreciation must be comprehensive inclusive of
all evidence, oral or documentary;
(ii) Partial or selective appreciation of evidence may result in a
miscarriage of justice and is in itself a ground of challenge;
(iii) If the Court, after appreciation of evidence, finds that two
views are possible, the one in favour of the accused shall
ordinarily be followed;
(iv) If the view of the Trial Court is a legally plausible view,
mere possibility of a contrary view shall not justify the reversal
of acquittal;
(v) If the appellate Court is inclined to reverse the acquittal in
appeal on a re-appreciation of evidence, it must specifically
address all the reasons given by the Trial Court for acquittal
and must cover all the facts;
(vi) In a case of reversal from acquittal to conviction, the
appellate Court must demonstrate an illegality, perversity or
error of law or fact in the decision of the Trial Court."
Babu Sahebagouda Rudragoudar and Ors. (Supra):
"38. Further, in the case of H.D. Sundara & Ors. v. State of
Karnataka (2023) 9 SCC 581 this Court summarized the
principles governing the exercise of appellate jurisdiction while
dealing with an appeal against acquittal under Section 378 of
CrPC as follows:
"8.1. The acquittal of the accused further strengthens the
presumption of innocence;
8.2. The appellate court, while hearing an appeal against
acquittal, is entitled to reappreciate the oral and documentary
evidence;
8.3. The appellate court, while deciding an appeal against
acquittal, after reappreciating the evidence, is required to
consider whether the view taken by the trial court is a possible
view which could have been taken on the basis of the evidence
on record;
8.4. If the view taken is a possible view, the appellate court
cannot overturn the order of acquittal on the ground that
another view was also possible; and
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8.5. The appellate court can interfere with the order of acquittal
only if it comes to a finding that the only conclusion which can
be recorded on the basis of the evidence on record was that the
guilt of the accused was proved beyond a reasonable doubt and
no other conclusion was possible."
39. Thus, it is beyond the pale of doubt that the scope of
interference by an appellate Court for reversing the judgment
of acquittal recorded by the trial Court in favour of the accused
has to be exercised within the four corners of the following
principles:
(a) That the judgment of acquittal suffers from patent
perversity;
(b) That the same is based on a misreading/omission to
consider material evidence on record;
(c) That no two reasonable views are possible and only the
view consistent with the guilt of the accused is possible from
the evidence available on record."
9.1. In light of the above authoritative principles, this Court has
re-appreciated the evidence led before the learned Trial Court.
Upon doing so, this Court observes the following significant
aspects which cast serious doubt on the prosecution's case:
9.1.1. When the deceased was taken to the Dungla Hospital on
14.12.2007, he was examined by Dr. Jai Kumar (P.W.18), who
recorded only four injuries on the body of the deceased. These
were: (i) a crushed wound on the head measuring 2x2 cm, (ii)
swelling on the right forearm and left elbow measuring 5x5 cm,
(iii) scratches on the left leg, and (iv) scratches on the right leg.
Out of these, the first, third, and fourth injuries were opined to be
simple in nature. With respect to the second injury on the
forearm, the doctor reserved his opinion. He noted that all injuries
appeared to have been caused by a blunt weapon.
[2025:RJ-JD:20354-DB] (12 of 17) [CRLA-635/2009]
9.1.2. Subsequently, on the next day, i.e., 15.12.2007, the same
doctor gave an account of eight injuries; however, none of these
included a fracture of the skull, which, according to the Post-
Mortem Report, was the primary cause of death.
9.1.3. Furthermore, Dr. Chotulal Meena (P.W.16), who prepared
the X-ray report, did not record any fracture on the skull either.
Yet, in the Post-Mortem Report prepared later on 21.12.2007, a
total of 24 injuries were recorded, including a skull fracture. The
record is silent as to why and how the number of injuries
increased over time, and more critically, how a fatal skull fracture
was not detected earlier.
9.1.4. Such a glaring discrepancy, both in the number of injuries
and in the nature of the critical head injury, significantly weakens
the prosecution's version. In absence of any plausible explanation
for these contradictions, the Court is not inclined to hold that the
injury causing death can be attributed to the accused beyond
reasonable doubt.
10. This Court further observes that insofar as the allegation of
criminal trespass is concerned, this Court has carefully examined
the ocular and documentary evidence led by the prosecution and
this Court finds that Mohan Lal (P.W.2) deposed that the accused
persons were assaulting the deceased on the boundary of his field.
Harlal (P.W.6) also stated that the incident occurred on a boundary
near the field. Udibai (P.W.8), on the other hand, stated that the
deceased was attacked in the field itself, while Durgashankar
(P.W.9) also stated that the incident took place on the field.
[2025:RJ-JD:20354-DB] (13 of 17) [CRLA-635/2009]
Sohanlal Menariya (P.W.18), however, did not specifically mention
the location of the incident in his examination-in-chief, and in
cross-examination, he stated that the incident occurred on the
boundary of the field. Patwari Devi Nandan (P.W.21) testified that
the said boundary, where the alleged incident took place, is a
private path and not a public way, though he was unable to
specify to whom the path belonged.
10.1.This Court finds that from the above conflicting depositions,
it is clear that there is no consistent or conclusive evidence to
establish that the place of occurrence was within the exclusive
possession of the deceased. The prosecution witnesses themselves
differ, where some stating the incident occurred in the field, others
stated on the boundary, and yet others on a private path, the
ownership or possession of which remains undetermined.
10.2. This Court further observes that in the absence of clear
proof that the accused persons entered into the land in the
exclusive possession of the deceased, with the requisite intent to
intimidate, insult, or annoy, the essential ingredients of criminal
trespass as defined under Section 441 IPC are not satisfied. It is
also relevant that the alleged path appears to have been used by
public, and there is no evidence to prove that the accused had no
right to be present there.
10.3.Accordingly, this Court finds that the prosecution has failed
to prove the offence under Section 447 IPC beyond reasonable
doubt. The acquittal of the accused persons on this count, as
recorded by the learned Trial Court, warrants no interference.
[2025:RJ-JD:20354-DB] (14 of 17) [CRLA-635/2009]
11. This Court further observes that the learned Trial Court passed
the impugned judgment of acquittal of the accused under Section
302/34 and 447 IPC, which in the given circumstances, is justified
in law, because as per the settled principles of law as laid down by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgments, to the
effect that the judgment of the Trial Court can be reversed by the
Appellate Court only when it demonstrates an illegality, perversity
or error of law or fact in arriving at such decision; but in the
present case, the learned Trial Court, before passing the impugned
judgment had examined each and every witnesses at a
considerable length and duly analysed the documents produced
before it, coupled with examination of the oral as well as
documentary evidence, and thus, the impugned judgment to the
extent of acquittal of the accused on the said charges, suffers
from no perversity or error of law or fact, so as to warrant any
interference by this Court in the instant appeal.
11.1.This Court also observes that the scope of interference in the
acquittal order passed by the learned Trial Court is very limited,
and if the impugned judgment of the learned Trial Court
demonstrates a legally plausible view, mere possibility of a
contrary view shall not justify the reversal of acquittal as held by
the Hon'ble Apex Court in the aforementioned judgment, and
thus, on that count also, the impugned judgment to the extent of
acquittal of the accused deserves no interference by this Court in
the instant appeal.
11.2.Thus, in light of the aforesaid observations and looking into
the factual matrix of the present case as well as in light of the
[2025:RJ-JD:20354-DB] (15 of 17) [CRLA-635/2009]
aforementioned precedent laws, this Court does not find it a fit
case warranting any interference by this Court to the extent of
acquittal of the accused.
12. This Court shall now proceed to decide the second point of
determination, which arises from the appeal preferred by the
accused persons challenging their conviction under Sections
323/34 and 325/34 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860, as recorded
by the learned Trial Court.
12.1. Upon perusal of the evidence, this Court notes that multiple
prosecution witnesses, including Mohan Lal (P.W.2), Harlal (P.W.6),
Udibai (P.W.8), and Durgashankar (P.W.9), have consistently
deposed regarding the injuries sustained by the complainant
party. These depositions are corroborated by medical evidence.
Even if the medical report prepared at the first instance is
considered by this Court--namely, the examination conducted
immediately after the incident--the same clearly records injuries
on the person of the complainant party, including swelling and
contusions. These injuries have been medically certified as being
caused by a blunt weapon and have been categorized as simple
and grievous in nature. The injury on the forearm, in particular,
was later confirmed to be a fracture, thereby fulfilling the
ingredients of grievous hurt under Section 320 IPC, attracting the
penal provisions of Section 325 IPC.
12.2. The prosecution has successfully established the presence of
the accused in the incident and the nature of injuries caused to
the complainant party. While the accused denied their
involvement, no substantive defence evidence was led to rebut the
[2025:RJ-JD:20354-DB] (16 of 17) [CRLA-635/2009]
prosecution's version in this regard. Further, the nature of the
injuries and the manner in which they were inflicted suggests
common intention, making the application of Section 34 IPC
appropriate.
12.3.Therefore, this Court finds no perversity or illegality in the
findings of the Trial Court convicting the accused persons under
Sections 323/34 and 325/34 IPC. The conviction recorded is based
on cogent oral and medical evidence and does not warrant
interference in appellate jurisdiction.
13. Consequently, the present appeals, numbered Criminal
Appeal No. 635/2009 preferred by State against the impugned
judgment to the extent of acquittal of the accused is dismissed,
and Criminal Appeal No. 359/2009 preferred by the accused in
order to challenge the said judgment, to the extent of their
conviction, is also dismissed.
14. Keeping in view the provision of Section 437-A Cr.P.C./481
B.N.S.S., each of the accused are directed to furnish a personal
bond in a sum of Rs. 25,000/- and a surety bond each in the like
amount, before the learned Trial Court, which shall be made
effective for a period of six months, to the effect that in the event
of filing of Special Leave Petition against this judgment or for
grant of leave, the accused, on receipt of notice thereof, shall
appear before the Hon'ble Supreme Court as soon as they would
be called upon to do so.
15. All pending applications stand disposed of. Record of the
learned Trial Court be sent back forthwith.
[2025:RJ-JD:20354-DB] (17 of 17) [CRLA-635/2009]
13. This Court is thankful to Mr. Abhimanyu Singh, who has
rendered his assistance as Amicus Curiae, on behalf of the
accused, in the present adjudication.
(SANDEEP SHAH),J (DR.PUSHPENDRA SINGH BHATI),J
SKant/-
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